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Preface and acknowledgements
This volume brings together two major trends in research and teaching in the 
fields­of­Security­Studies­and­International­Relations­(IR):­a­growing­substantive­
interest in non- state actors and an increased emphasis on methods. Countless 
publications and university course modules of the past 20 years go beyond an 
exclusively state- centred understanding of international security. Non- state 
actors such as rebel groups, warlords, militias, terrorists, criminal groups, private 
military­and­security­companies,­local­self-­defence­forces,­business­firms­or­non-
 governmental organizations (NGOs) regularly preoccupy practitioners, scholars 
and students of political science. These are not only increasingly popular but 
also particularly challenging objects (and subjects) of knowledge production for 
conceptual, practical and normative reasons (see our introduction to this volume 
in Chapter 1).
 Precisely because non- state actors in international security pose a number of 
serious methodological problems, they constitute an exceptionally instructive 
field­of­research­to­probe­a­broad­range­of­methodological­approaches,­including­
less traditional methods in IR such as narrative, ethnographic or geospatial ana-
lyses. This is why we asked an international group of researchers of non- state 
actors­ in­ international­ security­ to­ reflect­ on­ the­ practical­ application­ of­ a­ par-
ticular method (or combination of methods) in their own research. Moreover, we 
approached experts on these methods to provide a comparative discussion of the 
methods­ and­ their­ application,­ reflecting­ on­ the­ implications­ of­ choosing­ one­
method­over­another­and­discussing­the­relative­merits­and­difficulties­of­the­dif-
ferent approaches in use. The result is this book, which presents and discusses a 
broad and diverse selection of interpretive and explanatory methods ‘in use’, i.e. 
in studies of non- state security actors.
 As it includes not only a presentation of selected methods and methodologies, 
but also engages in a discussion of their practical application as well as their 
merits­ and­ limitations,­ this­ volume­fills­ a­ gap­ in­ the­burgeoning­ literature­ and­
teaching on methods in IR and Security Studies. While students are generally 
taught different qualitative and quantitative methods and may also learn about 
how to choose a method for their own research, their textbooks and studies 
hardly ever prepare them for the challenges they confront when actually using 
them. Notwithstanding the boom of method books, classes and teaching materials 
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that has shaped IR and Security Studies, the leap from knowing methods to 
applying them is still a great one. Our ambition is to encourage, facilitate and 
help in training for this jump.
 The idea for this volume grew out of several workshops of the research network 
on ‘Privatisation of Security through Private Military and Security Companies’, led 
by Andrea Schneiker and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). We 
gratefully­acknowledge­the­financial­support­of­the­German­Research­Foundation.­
We particularly thank the members of the research network and the participants of 
workshops in Bonn, Munich and Siegen for their valuable comments on several 
chapters in this volume. We owe special thanks to Christiane Frantz, Anna Leander 
and Elke Krahmann who have supported this project with their intellectual ideas 
and practical advice. Our greatest thanks go to the authors of this volume, who 
have agreed to write pretty unconventional types of chapters and share their hands-
 on experiences when using methods in their own research. We hope a lot of stu-
dents­and­scholars­will­find­their­open,­transparent,­and­self-­reflexive­discussions­
of methods and their practical application useful.




Researching non- state actors in 
international security – a multitude of 
challenges, a plurality of approaches
Andreas Kruck and Andrea Schneiker
From methodological textbook knowledge to practical 
research
Social science methods are tools that help us find new or better answers to 
important questions of our time. As is the case with most tools, knowing what a 
given method is good for and how it works in theory is one thing; being able to 
make the most productive use of it in research practice is quite another. To 
produce relevant and valid findings, researchers who conduct, for example, case 
studies must have a sound knowledge of case study methodology (see for 
example, George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007; Collier, Brady and Seawright 
2010). The same holds true for post- positivist methods such as discourse and 
narrative analysis (Milliken 1999). But abstract methodological knowledge1 is 
hardly sufficient; it must be put into practice to render the chosen method a 
powerful tool for generating theoretical or empirical insights.
 All scholars of political science face the same challenge: not only must they 
identify a suitable method for analysing a research question; they must also apply 
it to a particular case or a number of selected cases. More often than not, it is at 
this point that things get interesting – but also tricky because there is a gap between 
knowing the methods and actually using them. In this edited volume, we hope to 
bridge this crucial gap by introducing methods of International Relations (IR) and 
political science ‘in use’. Fortunately, there are now plenty of excellent textbooks 
on methods – in IR in particular2 and in the political and social sciences in general3 
– that introduce, describe and explain various qualitative and/or quantitative 
methods, covering a broad range of explanatory and/or interpretivist approaches. 
However, most of these texts cannot sufficiently prepare us for the challenges that 
confront us when we actually apply these methods, because the authors usually 
focus on comprehensive descriptions and discussions of the different methods, 
rather than on their concrete application within specific research designs.
 The chapters in this volume, by contrast, retrace and reflect on how research-
ers in IR and political science have used a broad range of methods to study non- 
state actors in international security in an effort to establish causal claims, 
analyse texts or do fieldwork. More specifically, the chapters address and offer 
guidance on three major questions.
2  A. Kruck and A. Schneiker
• On the basis of which selection criteria can we choose a suitable method (or 
a combination of methods) to address a specific research question?
• How can we translate a method (or a combination of methods) into a 
research design?
• When we apply the chosen method(s) to a specific case, how can we deal 
with problems that arise during the research process?
Moreover, just as the man with a hammer tends to see a world full of nails, our 
knowledge and choice of a method – and, conversely, our ignorance and non- use 
of others – will condition what sort of knowledge we gain and what kind of 
insights we systematically neglect. Accordingly, the chapters in this volume 
highlight the implications of using a particular method for the results of the 
research, i.e. for the observations that are made and the interpretations or the 
explanations that are offered. The volume thereby introduces a broad range of 
methods and their applications within specific research contexts and projects, 
including both more traditional methods and newer ones (in IR, at least, and spe-
cifically with reference to non- state actors):





• Causal case studies: covariational analysis, congruence analysis, process 
tracing
• Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)
• Quantitative geospatial analysis
• Assessment of policy effectiveness
• Surveys
• (Lab- in-the- field) experiments.
Research on non- state actors in international security: 
proliferation of issues, multiple challenges and 
methodological ways forward
Not so long ago, the focus on non- state actors might have seemed odd to all but 
a few scholars of international security. After all, security studies were tradition-
ally concerned with the causes of war and peace between states (Waltz 1979; 
Mearsheimer 2001; Russett and O’Neal 2001). While there had been earlier 
studies of non- state security actors (e.g. Eckstein 1964; Gurr 1970; Wardlaw 
1982; Crenshaw 1983) and of the significance of transnational relations (Nye 
and Keohane 1971), it is especially since the end of the Cold War that a broad 
range of non- state actors have become highly relevant research objects. These 
actors include rebel groups, warlords, militias, terrorists, criminal groups, private 
military and security companies (PMSCs), local self- defence forces, business 
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firms and non- governmental organizations (NGOs), and they increasingly preoc-
cupy both practitioners and scholars of political science and IR.4
 Perhaps even more important than this proliferation of actors beyond the 
realm of states, their institutions and representatives, research issues and ques-
tions – as well as theoretical approaches to studying them – have also become 
more diverse (Buzan and Hansen 2009; Collins 2013; Williams 2013; Peoples 
and Vaughan- Williams 2015). Questions about what explains the behaviour of 
certain types of actors, e.g. terrorist attacks, or the interaction between non- state 
and state actors, e.g. (intra- as well as interstate) war and the peaceful resolution 
of conflicts, continue to be important concerns and are likely to keep researchers 
busy in the foreseeable future. But recent and contemporary research on non- 
state actors is not limited to questions about the causes and effects of particular 
actions and interactions. In current scholarship, a much broader set of novel 
research foci are being studied, and from a variety of theoretical perspectives, 
including explanatory and interpretive, positive and critical theories:
• How is it possible that certain security actors or policies are regarded as 
legitimate while others are considered illegitimate? (See Chapter 3 by Alex-
ander Spencer, as well as Cutler 2010 and Krahmann 2012.)
• How are security threats and risks discursively constructed (see Buzan et al. 
1998; Spencer 2010; Krahmann 2011), and what are the implications of dif-
ferent constructions?
• How do everyday micro- practices of non- state actors play out in conflict 
zones, and how do they shape the dynamics and outcomes of violent con-
flict? (See Chapter 12 by Tessa Diphoorn, as well as Abrahamsen and Willi-
ams 2011 and Hönke 2013.)
• When and how are non- state actors able to influence security policies, and 
what makes them powerful? (See Price 1998; Leander 2005a; de Jonge 
Oudraat and Haufler 2008; Dembinski 2009.)
• How effective is security governance by non- state actors? (See Chapter 14 
by Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus Dieter Wolf, as well as Leander 2005b, 
Bryden and Caparini 2006, Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010 and Petersohn 2013.)
This list of still somewhat general research foci could be both extended and 
specified, but already reveals the proliferation of research objects and interests in 
the field of security studies, yielding new questions and novel insights. This is 
also reflected in the (more or less recent) establishment of academic journals 
such as Civil Wars, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Critical Studies on Security, 
European Journal of International Security and the Journal of Global Security 
Studies, which also cover non- traditional security actors and issues.
 In important ways, non- state actors in international security are not only 
increasingly common but also particularly challenging objects and subjects of 
knowledge production, owing to both their non- state status and the peculiarities 
of the fields of security and security policy. With regard to the former, reliable 
and comparable data on non- state actors are often unavailable. Existing research 
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approaches and data sets are often still state- centric (see Chapter 9 by Patrick 
Mello on qualitative comparative analysis), for various reasons, one being the 
history of the discipline. In addition, non- state actors in armed conflicts often 
operate in inaccessible environments, so scholars can only rely to a limited 
extent on official documents, surveys or ready- made statistics. In Chapter 10, for 
example, Alexander De Juan shows how geospatial analyses that link geograph-
ical features with patterns of violence often work best for subnational units of 
analysis that are not congruent with state or administrative boundaries. The 
chapters by Joakim Berndtsson (Chapter 6) and Andreas Kruck (Chapter 8) show 
how researchers studying PMSCs face considerable challenges when trying to 
collect reliable data on non- state security actors with commercial interests; even 
if researchers are able to get official information about, say, the contracting of 
PMSCs by state agencies, the data might not be complete or comparable across 
different countries or both, thus posing methodological challenges.
 In fact, the very distinction between non- state actors and state actors may be 
problematic. In international security, it is sometimes difficult to identify non- state 
actors and to distinguish them from state actors, because the former, such as NGOs, 
businesses (see Chapter 14 by Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus Dieter Wolf ) or 
even warlords, may provide ‘public’ functions and are therefore perceived as 
somehow ‘public’ actors (see Chapter 6 by Joakim Berndtsson), whereas state 
actors may follow ‘private’ (market) logics (see Chapter 8 by Andreas Kruck).
In addition, compared with state officials, non- state actors may be somewhat 
inexperienced objects of research. Whereas, at least, Western state bureaucracies 
generally have established rules for how to deal with requests from researchers, 
non- state actors, especially security actors, may not necessarily have appropriate 
protocols in place and hence may not know what information they can or should 
share with researchers. This raises questions about access to the field.5 Such 
inexperience and its implications are described in Anja Mihr’s chapter on semi- 
structured interviews with representatives of NGOs (Chapter 5). Non- state actors 
in international security may also be particularly keen on increasing their (some-
times shaky) legitimacy and recognition, which shapes (and may distort) the way 
they present themselves and their actions in interviews (see Chapter 5 by Anja 
Mihr) or in public statements (see Chapter 4 by Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin 
and Chapter 6 by Joakim Berndtsson). In this sense, they may be prone to what 
one might call hidden agendas.
 This issue also highlights the fact that scholars who study non- state actors 
should reflect on the politics of their methodological choices; that is, the perfor-
mative effects of their research. To what extent do their selection of methods and 
their analysis contribute to the reification, normalization or questioning of certain 
assumptions about the nature and legitimacy of particular modes and actors in 
international security (see Chapter 3 by Alexander Spencer)? This is of specific 
relevance because non- state actors are often involved as both objects and active 
players in legitimation and delegitimation discourses about their appropriate role 
in international security (see especially Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 12).
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 These challenges of studying non- state actors are compounded and reinforced 
by the particular challenges of studying the field of security. The high stakes, as 
well as the resulting political sensitivity and the non- transparency or secrecy of 
security issues, further complicate access to reliable data and raise serious ethical 
questions (see for example Chapters 12 to 14 by Tessa Diphoorn, Sabrina Karim 
and Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus Dieter Wolf respectively). In contrast to, 
for example, humanitarian NGOs that are frequently (whether correctly or not) 
perceived as being guided by altruistic motivations of alleviating the suffering of 
vulnerable populations, non- state actors in security, particularly armed ones, are 
not necessarily seen as the ‘good guys’. This is not least due to the fact that their 
actions might include violence; as a result, their legitimate actorhood may be 
challenged. Again, these perceptions highlight the need to be aware that our 
research ‘objects’ often have political agendas, as well as the potentially prob-
lematic performative effects of our own research in normative or political terms.
 Although some or all of these methodological challenges may be particularly 
pertinent and difficult to overcome for non- state actors in security, we should not 
overestimate the latters’ specialness, let alone their uniqueness in methodo-
logical terms, not least because state and non- state actors are sometimes difficult 
to distinguish and we sometimes study both types within one research project. 
Most of the above- mentioned challenges also apply to studies of state actors and 
to at least some policy fields beyond security. Hence, they are not unique to non- 
state actors in international security; rather, it is precisely because non- state 
actors in international security pose a number of serious methodological chal-
lenges that ‘cracking this tough nut’ may help us learn a lot that is applicable to 
a broad range of research designs in IR and political science. Thus, research on 
non- state actors in international security offers plenty of challenges and oppor-
tunities to probe different methods and to reflect upon their best possible prac-
tical use. Such research is particularly instructive for students seeking insights 
and advice on how to best use specific methods in their research projects.
 Given the above- named difficulties, this field of research also lends itself to the 
application of less traditional methods in International Relations, such as sociologi-
cal and ethnographic approaches, in order to gain insights into, say, the experiences 
and self- understanding of private security actors, or to geospatial analyses in order 
to learn more about the formation and strategies of violent non- state actors. In this 
sense, the study of non- state actors in international security may be an innovative 
laboratory for developing new research techniques that may ultimately be fruitful 
for a broader range of research interests in IR (see, for example, the narrative ana-
lysis presented by Alexander Spencer in Chapter 3 and the sentiment analysis 
introduced by Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin in Chapter 4). Methods such as 
qualitative comparative analysis (presented by Patrick Mello in Chapter 9), which 
are commonly used in state- focused studies of IR and comparative politics, can 
offer new insights when applied to non- state actors.
 Given these expanded research opportunities and challenges, it becomes even 
more imperative to select a suitable method for pursuing a particular research 
goal and to apply it in the most productive way possible. This approach points to 
6  A. Kruck and A. Schneiker
one of the major lessons – if not the major lesson – to be learned from the chap-
ters compiled in this volume: the research interest or question , i.e. the analytical 
problem, should determine the choice of method or methods – not the other way 
around. This may sound trivial, but time and again we seem tempted to conduct 
primarily methods- driven research rather than starting out with an important 
research question and then selecting the most productive method(s) to answer it.
 From this plea for a problem- driven choice of methods follows a second key 
tenet reflected in this volume: as the study of non- state actors in international 
security involves a multitude of legitimate and productive research objectives, 
and as different research objectives require different methods, a plurality of 
methods – quantitative and qualitative, explanatory and interpretivist, positivist 
‘problem- solving’ and ‘critical’ (see Cox 1981) – can, should and does inform 
research on non- state actors in international security. Even though a single 
volume can hardly do justice to the existing range of practised and promising 
methods for examining non- state actors in international security, we have chosen 
as broad and diverse a selection as possible.
 The volume as a whole is not confined to any normative outlook or epistemo-
logical predisposition, nor does it favour a particular theoretical or methodo-
logical approach – it provides theory- based but also very practical guidance on 
the selection and application of a method embedded in a certain research design 
suited to answer a specific research question. In doing so, the volume goes 
beyond traditional dichotomies such as quantitative versus qualitative or positiv-
ist versus post- positivist methods. This does not mean that it is blind to important 
epistemological and sometimes also political differences implied by the selection 
and use of different methods. Quite the contrary, it is all about making conscious 
and informed choices: what kind of method will help me gain the particular kind 
of knowledge I seek, and which types of knowledge are necessarily and system-
atically overlooked or ignored by my choice of a specific method?
 Such selectivity in the knowledge- producing capacity of a specific method 
can, at least to a certain extent, be mitigated by mixed- methods designs, which 
combine several methods of data generation and data analysis. Thus, a call for 
methods triangulation is a third major lesson provided by this volume, which 
features several chapters that combine two or more methods, acknowledging 
that the daily needs of researchers are often more complex than single- method 
approaches would suggest and that, in times of widely cherished methods tri-
angulation, many types of analyses involve more than one method. For 
example, Chapter 4 by Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin on PMSCs and their 
(self-)presentation on Twitter combines sentiment analysis with a more qual-
itative framing analysis, whereas Chapter 6 by Joakim Berndtsson shows how 
interviews and qualitative content analysis can complement each other as data-
 generating tools in a study of state contracting with PMSCs. In Melanie Coni- 
Zimmer and Klaus Dieter Wolf ’s research (Chapter 14), evidence on the 
effectiveness of corporate engagement in zones of conflict was gathered 
through a combination of semi- structured interviews with representatives of 
businesses and a diverse set of stakeholders, content analysis of the publicly 
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available reports of corporations and stakeholders and observations during 
field research in conflict zones.
 Methods can be combined sequentially, as in the chapter on different case- 
study approaches by Andreas Kruck (Chapter 8); alternatively, they may be 
nested, as revealed through Tessa Diphoorn’s research design, in which inter-
views were integrated into the broader practices of participant observation (see 
Chapter 12). Methods may be combined either on more or less equal footing (see 
Chapter 13 on surveys and experiments by Sabrina Karim and Chapter 8 by 
Andreas Kruck on case study approaches) or with one method being supplemen-
tary to the other, main approach (see Chapter 12 by Tessa Diphoorn on parti-
cipant observation complemented with interviews). At any rate, as will be shown 
in the chapters, combining methods requires careful attention to (potentially) dif-
ferent data requirements and epistemological outlooks and, almost certainly, 
additional work. But, as the research examples presented in this volume show, 
these efforts may often pay off in terms of generating broader and/or deeper 
insights than a single- method design would allow.
Choosing and using methods: some questions as guidelines
Based on our discussion so far, and as will be emphasized in the chapters that 
follow, it should be apparent that there is no optimal and generally applicable 
formula for choosing and using the ‘right’ method. Nonetheless, the research 
experiences described in this volume do suggest a number of thematically clus-
tered questions that may be regarded as a set of guidelines for making conscious 
and informed methodological choices both at the beginning of a research project 
and ‘along the way’.
Research interest and theoretical approach
• Does a specific method or combination of methods allow for the analysis of 
the actors, structures or processes in which we are interested?
• Does it fit with the theoretical approach of our analysis?
• Is the chosen method appropriate for the type of empirical data we have at 
our disposal for analysing our research question?
• Is the method suitable for generating the epistemological type of knowledge 
in which we are interested?
Skills and resources
• Which skills on the part of the researcher are required by a specific method 
or set of methods?
• What technical equipment (e.g. hardware or software) is necessary? Do we 
have the technical skills to use it?
• How much time do we have for completing the research? How long will it 
take to apply a specific method of data generation and analysis?
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Implications of chosen method(s)
• How will the outcome of the analysis in our cases be influenced by the 
chosen method(s)?
• What information will we get by using a certain method, and what informa-
tion will we not get?
• What are the political and/or ethical implications of our analysis? Does our 
research have problematic performative effects?
Single- method vs. multi- methods designs
• What is the added value of combining several methods? Will it be enough to 
justify the extra work involved by the use of most multi- methods designs?
• Are the methods compatible and/or complementary in terms of data require-
ments, analytical insights and basic epistemological outlooks?
Coping strategies
• Have we clarified and justified all major choices and changes made to our 
research design that proved to be necessary during the course of the research 
process?
• Do we have a methodological second- best or fall- back option in case a 
certain method and research strategy do not generate data that will allow 
meaningful inferences (for analytical or practical reasons)?
• Have we made sure that competent and sympathetic supervisors and/or 
peers will provide feedback and advice regarding the progress of the 
research project?
This is not a definitive and comprehensive checklist. Other, additional issues 
may be relevant to individual research projects. However, most research projects 
will benefit if researchers consciously ask themselves and address these ques-
tions. Nevertheless, no book on methods can make up for one crucial aspect: 
training. None of us who seeks to apply a particular method or combination of 
methods for the first time should expect to be an expert on these methods from 
the beginning; rather, the more often one applies a method, the better one is 
likely to get at doing so. Hence, training ourselves in the practical use of 
methods is both a necessary and a rewarding endeavour.
Scope and structure of this book
In order to provide some ‘empirical overlap’ (Klotz 2008: 2) and to permit a 
meaningful comparison of the various methods ‘in use’, this book focuses on 
one common field of research, namely non- state actors in international security. 
Instead of treating different methodological approaches as individual and inde-
pendent of one another, this volume discusses different methods by offering 
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examples of research that involve a wide range of non- state actors in inter-
national security.
 Authors who themselves have conducted research on non- state actors each 
present a particular method or set of methods; that is, its selection and applica-
tion. These contributions cover methods that focus on the interpretation of text 
(Chapters 3 through 6); seek to establish a causal claim (Chapters 8 through 10); 
and involve some fieldwork (Chapters 12 through 14). They include small- n, 
medium- n, and large- n approaches, as well as numerous instances where several 
kinds of methods have been combined in a multi- methods research design.
 Before different methods and their applications are discussed, in Chapter 2, 
Andreas Armborst focuses on terrorists and terrorist acts to illustrate the concep-
tualization of non- state actors in international security and to discuss the dif-
ficulties in defining ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ and the profound and lasting 
consequences for the overall research project of conceptual decisions made at 
the outset.
 The chapters in Part I, ‘Interpreting texts’, feature narrative analysis (Chapter 
3), sentiment and frame analysis (Chapter 4), interviews (Chapters 5 and 6) and 
qualitative content analysis (Chapter 6). In Chapter 3, Alexander Spencer con-
ducts a narrative analysis of the discourse in the British media on the rebellion 
and revolution in Libya in 2011 and shows that this type of analysis helps us 
understand how certain definitions of non- state security actors become dominant 
whereas others are marginalized. While in this case the text corpus that was ana-
lysed could be reduced to a reasonable size, allowing for a qualitative analysis, 
Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin (see Chapter 4), in contrast, had to cope with 
big data: 264,852 tweets on the operations of the PMSC Academi Elite. In order 
to interpret this vast amount of data, they first carried out a sentiment analysis 
that allowed them to identify the most relevant tweets, which were then further 
analysed by means of a qualitative content analysis. Another method often used 
to generate textual data are qualitative interviews. In Chapter 5, Anja Mihr draws 
on her research on non- state actors in the context of transitional justice across 
different countries such as Sierra Leone, Brazil, Hungary, Japan, Spain and 
Germany to discuss how to make the most of semi- structured interviews. In 
Chapter 6, Joakim Berndtsson introduces a study involving a contract between 
the Swedish Foreign Ministry and a PMSC to demonstrate how semi- structured 
interviews with state officials and representatives of the private security industry 
can complement thematic (content) analysis in order to obtain information that 
cannot be found in the official documents published by these actors.
 Part II, ‘Establishing causal claims’, presents case study techniques (Chapter 
8), qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Chapter 9) and geospatial analysis 
as an innovative form of quantitative analysis (Chapter 10). In Chapter 8, 
Andreas Kruck discusses how to combine the case study techniques of covaria-
tional analysis, congruence analysis and causal process tracing to explain 
security privatization in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. In Chapter 9, Patrick Mello demonstrates how a medium- sized sample 
of cases can fruitfully be analysed based on qualitative comparative analysis. 
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Although this method has been used most often to explain state actions and 
interactions, he discusses how it can also contribute to the study of non- state 
actors in international security. In Chapter 10, Alexander De Juan presents 
geospatial analysis as a promising quantitative tool to establish correlations 
among spatial variables, socioeconomic factors and violence even in highly chal-
lenging research settings, in this case in his analysis of militias in Darfur.
 Part III, ‘Doing fieldwork’, introduces research approaches that involve 
varying amounts of fieldwork. In Chapter 12, Tessa Diphoorn discusses guide-
lines for using participant observation based on her studies of private security 
officers in South Africa, Kenya, Jamaica and Israel. In Chapter 13, Sabrina 
Karim elaborates on how to combine different kinds of experiments and surveys 
to analyse the effects of public security policies on the Liberian population. 
Chapter 14 by Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus Dieter Wolf presents empirical 
assessments of the effectiveness of business company policies in conflict zones 
such as Nigeria, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo based not 
only on observation during field research but also on semi- structured interviews 
and content analysis of publicly available reports.
 This book not only includes a presentation of selected methods but also 
engages in a discussion of their practical application and their merits and lim-
itations as compared with other approaches. In addition to the methods chap-
ters, each section ends with a discussion chapter in which expert authors 
provide a comparative reflection on the methods presented in the relevant 
section and their application: Jutta Joachim discusses the methods applied in 
the section on ‘Interpreting texts’ (Chapter 7), Bertjan Verbeek reflects on the 
different approaches presented in the section on ‘Establishing causal claims’ 
(Chapter 11) and Jacqui True discusses the different ways of ‘Doing fieldwork’ 
(Chapter 15). The authors of these discussion chapters reflect on the implica-
tions of choosing one method over another and discuss the relative merits and 
difficulties of the different approaches in use. The volume concludes with a 
chapter by Anna Leander (Chapter 16) on methodological perspectives for 
research on non- state actors, calling for ‘an approach to method that is well 
informed, but also open, imaginative and ready to make unconventional meth-
odological moves and combinations’.
Notes
1 Whereas ‘methods’ denotes the tools or means chosen to collect and/or analyse data, 
‘methodology’ refers to the theory and systematic analysis of the body of methods used 
in a particular (sub-)discipline.
2 See Sprinz and Wolinsky- Nahmias (2005), Ackerley, Stern and True (2006), Klotz and 
Prakash (2008), Salter and Mutlu (2013), Shepherd (2013), Stump and Dixit (2013), 
Aradau et al. (2015) and Lamont (2015), among others.
3 See King, Keohane and Verba (1994), Van Evera (1997), George and Bennett (2005), 
Yanow and Schwartz- Shea (2006), Gerring (2007, 2012), Box- Steffensmeier, Brady 
and Collier (2008), Hancké (2009), Kellstedt and Whitten (2009), Rihoux and Ragin 
(2009), Schatz (2009), Brady and Collier (2010), Blatter and Haverland (2012), Sch-
neider and Wagemann (2012) and Bennett and Checkel (2015), among others.
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4 Relevant recent articles and books on these and other non- state security actors abound. 
For an overview with additional references, see, among others, the contributions in 
Dunn Cavelty and Mauer (2009), Burgess (2010), Schmid (2013), Newman and 
DeRouen (2014) and Abrahamsen and Leander (2016).
5 Nevertheless, non- state actors may offer insights (e.g. into their motivations and justifi-
cations for action) that bureaucratic actors may be unwilling to disclose because the 
latter are bound to conceptions of ‘national interest’ and ‘raison d’état’ (see Chapter 5 
by Anja Mihr).
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2 Conceptualizing political violence 




Studying non- state actors in international security research can be a daunting 
challenge. So much so that it takes a whole book, such as this one, to discuss all 
the potential research strategies. This area of research is difficult for many 
reasons, and these reasons can be related to methodology (e.g. sampling, collec-
tion and analysis of data), theory (e.g. competing paradigms – see Walt 1998: 
38), and conception and definition.
 This chapter illustrates issues of conceptualization based on the question of 
how to conceptualize terrorists – who represent a particular type of non- state 
actors – and, more specifically, how to conceptualize their violent actions. In 
social research, one has different options for operationalizing terrorism and polit-
ical violence, each of which has its own methodological, theoretical and concep-
tual advantages and flaws. The goal of this chapter is to enable the researcher to 
make a conscious decision about which approach is most suitable and to explain 
how one can operationalize particular research objectives when studying non- 
state actors in the realm of international security.
 As the most prevalent form of violent conflict today, clashes between non- 
state actors, as well as between non- state and state actors, have replaced the 
classic inter- state wars of the 20th century (Kearns and Young 2014: 256). 
Almost every contemporary armed conflict involves a wide range of participants, 
including private military and security companies (PMSCs) (see Chapter 4 by 
Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin, Chapter 6 by Joakim Berndtsson and Chapter 8 
by Andreas Kruck), private militias, rebels (see Chapter 3 by Alexander 
Spencer), defected battalions, pirates, warlords, organized criminal gangs, 
cartels, insurgents, self- proclaimed states and pro- this or anti- that groups. 
‘Classic’ geopolitical disputes, such as the South China Sea, and inter- state wars, 
such as the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008, seem to be the last of 
their kind.
 In order to understand contemporary armed conflicts and international 
security, it is useful to have a thorough grasp of the nature of violence. Violence 
is always employed as a means to an end. Different actors use political violence, 
including terrorism, for different purposes. Because a non- state actor can be 
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anyone who does not represent a sovereign state, the motives of these individuals 
are highly diverse. Non- state actors are driven by a wide variety of interests, 
including commercial, ideological, political, religious, ethnic, racist, sexual, nar-
cissistic, egotistic, megalomaniac, nepotistic or tribal – and often by a combina-
tion of them. Consequently, it is not surprising that the theoretical explanations 
for political violence committed by non- state actors differ from those for viol-
ence committed by states, which usually act (or claim to act) in the interest of 
national collectives, such as to maintain sovereignty and security or to secure 
access or rights to natural resources and energy.
 State actors may establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; 
however, even totalitarian states find it virtually impossible to monopolize the 
use of force. Often, terrorists apparently want to demonstrate just this. For some 
groups, killing indiscriminately is the preferred choice to demonstrate how 
powerless the regime actually is.
 Because political violence is such a fundamental element of international 
security, it is worthwhile taking a closer look. Here, I present different concep-
tual avenues for the study of terrorism and political violence as utilized by non- 
state actors. The sections that follow may be seen as a beginner’s guide to 
terrorism research. They demonstrate how to utilize five conceptual approaches 
to the study of terrorism and political violence: the constructivist approach, in 
which terrorism is just a political claim without an empirical manifestation in the 
real world; the criminological approach, which holds that terrorism is a type of 
deviant behaviour and therefore can be explained through criminological theory; 
the legal approach, which is based on the assumption that terrorism is any action 
that is legally defined as such; the academic consensus approach, which enu-
merates as many definitional characteristics of terrorism as necessary to reach a 
certain consensus about its definition regardless of how broad such a definition 
is; and the gradual modelling approach, which applies the concepts of choice, 
preference and utility from economic theory to differentiate the types of targets 
selected in political violence.
 When one begins to study the political violence committed by non- state 
actors in international security, it is important to be aware of how complex this 
topic is. Many newcomers to the field who initially wanted to study terrorism as 
a type of behaviour and political action end up studying something else. This 
chapter provides an overview of the different directions terrorism research can 
take so that the decision to undertake such studies is a deliberate one. Studying 
terrorism poses a difficult challenge, not because of what the terrorists do, but 
because of the complex discourses surrounding this topic.
Utilizing different conceptual frameworks of terrorism 
for research
There is by no means a shortage of concepts and definitions of terrorism, and 
they each have advantages and weaknesses when they are applied in empirical 
research. For example, a researcher who adopts a constructivist approach within 
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international relations (Buzan et al. 1998) may investigate how and with what 
consequences political players use the label ‘terrorists’ to frame certain groups 
as a threat to domestic, national or international security. The data and methods 
used in this approach differ from those used in a research project on, say, the 
ethnography of Salafi insurgent groups in Chechnya. The choice of concept, data 
and methodology all depend on the researcher’s objective. The following sec-
tions describe five conceptually different starting points for the study of 
terrorism.
The constructivist approach
According to the radical constructivist approach, terrorism is just a ‘political 
claim’ (Hayes 2015: 3) that has no other empirical manifestation. Hayes’ asser-
tion is based on the fact that terrorism is indeed an ‘essentially contested 
concept’ (Weinberg et al. 2004; Gallie 1956). The problem with the current con-
ceptual model of terrorism is that there is no universally shared model to begin 
with. Politicians, international organizations, academics and the media all appear 
to have slightly different – sometimes even contradictory – views when answer-
ing the seemingly simple question ‘What is terrorism?’.
 In light of this conceptual anarchism it seems logical to adopt the radical con-
structivist view and say that terrorism is just a political claim with no additional 
empirical meaning. Constructivist research in international security studies 
investigates ‘the impact of ideas’ (Walt 1998: 40), such as the ‘idea of ter-
rorism’, or Olof Palme’s revolutionary ‘idea of common security’ (Wiseman 
2005). Given that ideas can be powerful drivers of social and political change, it 
is worthwhile researching them in depth. Constructivist research on terrorism 
can also offer a historical perspective on the emergence of this – essentially con-
tested – concept and the historical consequences of its introduction into the 
realm of international security (e.g. the War on Terror). Often, interesting yet 
barely analysed primary research material is available to address constructivist 
questions, such as protocols and reports of international commissions (Thakur et 
al. 2005), governmental statements and court papers.
 However, the constructivist approach to research on terrorism distracts from the 
behavioural aspect, namely that terrorism is a particular act of political violence. 
Given the arbitrary usage of the term ‘terrorism’ in common parlance to describe 
actions and actors that have nothing in common except that they are associated 
with political violence of some sort, it is indeed worth asking whether the concept 
of terrorism has any analytical usefulness at all or whether it may even obstruct 
empirical research into political violence: as Hayes suggests, ‘the term terrorism 
creates the false impression that the action it describes represents a special or 
unique phenomenon’ (Hayes 2015: 1, emphasis added). However, later in this 
chapter, I will answer the question of whether the concept of terrorism is still a 
useful one by arguing: yes it still is, but not in its current form. In order to concep-
tualize terrorism as a distinctive type of political violence, we can tackle the 
problem from the opposite direction, that is, not from the terminological side but 
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from the empirical side – by asking whether there is a special or unique phenom-
enon within the behavioural range of political violence that we can conceptualize 
as such, thus leaving aside the forever- contested question of whether ‘terrorism’ is 
actually the right word.
Conceptualizing terrorism as a crime?
Another intuitive idea is to conceptualize terrorism as a crime. Terrorism appar-
ently is a crime, and criminological theory provides a whole variety of explana-
tions for criminal behaviour. It therefore seems reasonable to capitalize on 
criminology, which is the discipline of ‘law- making, law- breaking, and reactions 
to law- breaking’ (Sutherland 1934: 3). Criminology has an affinity with ter-
rorism studies, so it is not surprising to see criminological theory applied to the 
study of political violence (see the 2015 special issue of Terrorism and Political 
Violence entitled ‘Criminological Theory and Terrorism’, edited by Freilich and 
LaFree 2015). However, criminology also struggles with the topic of terrorism 
and political violence, because when one conceptualizes terrorism as a type of 
criminal behaviour, three anomalies arise. It is worth reflecting on these anoma-
lies because they tell us a great deal about the nature of terrorism.
1 Ordinary criminals break the law; terrorists abolish the law. Unlike perpet-
rators of stereotypical crimes such as theft, vandalism, drug offences or tax 
fraud, terrorists are convinced that rather than breaking the law, they are 
restoring justice. From the terrorist’s point of view, terrorism is not a crime 
but the reaction to a crime (Black 2004). This is of course true for all forms 
of retaliation, retribution, criminal self- help, street justice and vigilantism 
(Black 1983). People may take the law into their own hands when they think 
penal measures are not sufficient or not effective in addressing their griev-
ances. Essentially, vigilantism and street justice are substitutes for penal 
measures. Yet, criminal justice, street justice, vigilantism and terrorism are 
all different things. Criminal punishment is a lawful response to an unlawful 
act; vigilantism and street justice are unlawful responses to an unlawful act; 
but terrorism is an unlawful response to a lawful status quo. The grievance 
of the terrorist is not a legally protected good – terrorists do not look for 
substitutes to enforce the law, they are trying to change or abolish the law.
2 Ordinary violent offenders prefer particular victims; terrorist offenders are 
indifferent in the choice of victims. Roughly speaking, ordinary criminal 
violence is either a means of coercion or a means of retaliation. Usually 
people resort to violence either for moralistic ends, such as to retaliate 
against an actual or perceived injustice, or as a form of coercion to satisfy 
monetary, sexual or other desires. In all these cases, perpetrators are never 
completely indifferent or indiscriminate when choosing their victims. Of 
course, when targeting a victim, a robber has more options than does 
someone who wants to take revenge on a thief for stealing his smartphone. 
Terrorist offenders, however, are almost completely indifferent in the choice 
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of victims because they seek attention. And to attract attention, it does not 
matter who is killed, as long as the perpetrators claim that their victims are 
somehow responsible for the grievances that motivated the killing. Whereas 
the individual victims are random, the location of the attack is usually not. 
Terrorists prefer soft, symbolic targets so they can inflict a maximum 
number of casualties with minimal effort and weaponry. Because terrorists 
kill indiscriminately, they can credibly threaten entire populations, albeit to 
a limited extent. However, just as the victim is exchangeable, so is the per-
petrator. It does not matter who actually carries out the terrorist attack, as 
long as a group can credibly claim responsibility for it. The constellation 
between the perpetrator of terrorist violence and the victim(s) is characteri-
zed by replaceability on both sides: the sending end and the receiving end of 
violence. This unlikely offender–victim constellation is best illustrated by 
the lone- wolf terrorist who kills a person he does not know on behalf of a 
person or group he does not know either. Classic criminological theory 
cannot explain such behaviour.
3 In response to ordinary criminal behaviour, the state applies criminal law; 
in response to terrorism, the state changes criminal law. The state’s reac-
tion to terrorist crime is the third anomaly. States throughout the world have 
violated their own rule of law when fighting against terrorism. These viola-
tions include preventive and pre- trial detention, extraordinary rendition and 
the torture of terrorist suspects (Sonderegger 2012), to name the most 
obvious examples. Ordinary crimes, regardless of how despicable or how 
enormous, do not have as great an impact on the criminal justice system. 
Terrorism has altered the legal doctrines of states by shifting them towards 
more preventive approaches (Müller 2011), and some states respond to non- 
state terrorism with state terrorism.
These three anomalies show that criminology has a conceptual problem when it 
comes to terrorism. Terrorism is a crime, but it is fundamentally different from 
other types of deviant behaviour. Yet it is precisely these differences that can tell 
us a great deal about the peculiarities of terrorism.
Utilizing legal definitions of non- state actors and terrorism
Another way to conduct terrorism research is to use legal definitions. It can be 
convenient and pragmatic to operationalize terrorism according to one of the many 
legal definitions that have been proposed in the past (Young 2006). For example, 
there are 13 United Nations Conventions on Terrorism that define certain terrorist 
acts, such as the taking of hostages, bombings, terrorist financing and nuclear ter-
rorism. The criminal codes of different nations differ greatly from one another. 
The United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000, for instance, defines terrorism as:
The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or an inter-
national governmental organization or to intimidate the public, or a section 
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of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious, 
racial or ideological cause; and it involves or causes: serious violence 
against a person; serious damage to a property; a threat to a person’s life; a 
serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or serious interference 
with or disruption to an electronic system.
Legal definitions provide a certain degree of consensus and are legal facts within 
the domestic and international political context. There is nothing wrong with uti-
lizing legal definitions for research as long as such use aligns with the general 
research objective. In particular, constructivist studies can make use of legal def-
initions because such definitions are a concrete example of how powerful polit-
ical actors construct terrorism. But it is also important to keep the broader 
perspective in mind: if terrorism research is predominantly based on legal 
instead of scientific operationalizations, its results will be systematically biased 
because the research community then studies terrorism as a legal category and 
not as a particular act of political violence.
 In addition, legal and academic definitions of terrorism can differ because 
they serve different purposes within their respective domains. Scientists opera-
tionalize terrorism to identify its causes and consequences. Legislators opera-
tionalize terrorism to prosecute and ultimately prevent it. Scientific and legal 
definitions operate in different professional areas. Criminology textbooks teach 
that crime is a tremendously contingent and artificial category of human 
behaviour: ‘The society allocates significant financial, human and institutional 
resources just to determine which concrete behaviour ought to be considered 
delinquent or criminal’ (Sack 1968: 442, author’s translation). The same applies 
to terrorism. Legal definitions of terrorism are artificial constructs, resulting from 
complex social negotiations. A legal definition of political violence is often of 
limited value to the social sciences (in the same way as academic definitions are 
often of limited values for legislators), because both domains have different pur-
poses – that is, criminal prosecution and knowledge production, respectively. Of 
course, the constructivist view is that scientific knowledge is just as socially 
negotiated as legal categories are. Be that as it may, judges and prosecutors, like 
scientists, must collect evidence to decide whether a given act was indeed an act 
of terrorism, or whether or not a given group is to be designated a terrorist group. 
But this evidence is evidence according to the social construction of law, and not 
evidence according to (the social construction of ) science. In many cases, both 
types of evidence correspond (e.g. forensic evidence), because both judges and 
scientists seek ‘the truth’. But it would be flawed to assume that these fact- 
finding regimes always come to the same conclusion in classifying violence as 
terrorism. For example, in the United Kingdom, serious violence against prop-
erty can be an act of terrorism, whereas political sciences usually consider ter-
rorism to be violence against people. No one single interpretation is right or 
wrong in itself, but both professions would be misguided if they relied exclu-
sively on the other’s evidence and definitions. A legislator would fail to desig-
nate groups that are indeed terrorists as terrorist groups (according to the 
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government); a judge would fail to convict a terrorist who is indeed a terrorist 
(according to the law); and a researcher would operationalize groups that are not 
actually terrorists as terrorist groups (according to social science).
Utilizing enumerative definitions of terrorism
Another popular approach in academic research is to utilize an enumerative defi-
nition of terrorism, as formulated by Schmid (2011), or to adopt certain parts of 
this definition. Like legal definitions, this definition includes objective and sub-
jective characteristics of violent behaviour that qualify as terrorism. The purpose 
of an enumerative definition is to reach a certain degree of consensus. It has the 
advantage that it has undergone rigorous scrutiny by the academic community 
and that it is less likely to change than legal or political definitions, e.g. after a 
legal reform. As such it describes terrorism in a more neutral manner as a certain 
modus operandi of political violence rather than as a punishable act or as a 
derogative political claim.
 Because terrorism is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Weinberg et al. 
2004; Gallie 1956), it took the academic community 40 years to formulate some 
sort of consensus definition, and this does not seem to be the end of the story. 
But why is it so difficult to define a certain type of political violence as ter-
rorism? Equally surprising is why people are still trying to do so. The standard 
answer to the former question is because ‘one man’s freedom fighter is another 
man’s terrorist’. No matter how often this slogan is repeated, it remains mis-
leading insofar as it neglects the core of the issue, namely which variations of 
political violence constitute terrorism and which do not (Richardson 2006: 26). 
The slogan illustrates only one point: that in political conflicts there will always 
be different opinions about what constitutes legitimate cause. The question of 
whether or not terrorists have legitimate cause is necessarily a subjective assess-
ment and therefore not suitable as a definitional criterion. For this reason, the 
enumerative definition avoids any explicit moral assessment of whether a given 
cause is legitimate or illegitimate. This is a major analytical advantage; 
however, it introduces an implicit moral assessment through the backdoor by 
stating that terrorism deliberately targets (innocent) civilians, which again 
makes terrorism illegitimate by definition. This is not to deny that a deliberate 
attack against civilians is illegitimate according to almost all ethical standards 
and common sense. But, at the same time, the term ‘civilian’ admits the concept 
of innocence and guilt into the definition of terrorism and thereby reopens the 
door to controversial debate.
 Another weakness of the definition is that it requires quite an extensive enu-
meration of characteristics to reach a sort of consensus. The ‘revised academic 
consensus definition of terrorism’ (Schmid 2011) includes 12 definitional fea-
tures. If an action or behaviour is of such particularity that it requires the enu-
meration of 12 checklist- like features, we must ask whether we are in fact 
dealing with an empirically observable phenomenon or with an academic arte-
fact. Moreover, such a bulky definition is cumbersome to operationalize in a 
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given research design. Just imagine the troubles of formulating and testing a 
theory that explains the following: 
Physical violence, or the threat thereof, carried out in single-, dual- or 
multi- phased sequences of action, intended to terrorize, intimidate, antago-
nize, disorient, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or provoke a conflict 
party by targeting civilians, non- combatants or other innocent and defence-
less persons, perpetrated by small groups, diffuse transnational networks, as 
well as by state actors or state- sponsored clandestine agents. 
The ‘consensus definition’ is – necessarily – so vague as to level all potential 
points of disagreement.
 On reviewing different academic definitions of terrorism, Andrew Silke con-
cluded: ‘The various definitions reach from the absurdly over- specified to the 
unacceptably over- general’ (Silke 2004: 3). Given that the ‘consensus definition’ 
by Schmid appears to be of little analytical use owing to its bulkiness and vague-
ness, it is reasonable to identify those definitional parameters that are crucial for 
conceptual clarification. A pragmatic approach to this problem would be to 
utilize only certain elements from the enumerative definition (which of course 
may come at the expense of consensus). The developers of the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD), for example, allow users to filter the 140,000 attacks it has on 
record with respect to ‘only’ three definitional criteria.1
 Another reason why the definitions of ‘terrorism’ continue to be challenged is 
that they regard terrorism as a mutually exclusive category within the spectrum 
of political violence. But such exclusiveness is questionable. Distinguishing ter-
rorist violence from other types of political violence is difficult because the 
boundaries between them are blurred. The next section describes a gradual 
model of terrorism and political violence as a fifth option of how to conceptual-
ize political violence of non- state actors. Its purpose is to avoid some of the chal-
lenges presented by the legal and enumerative definitions.
Utilizing a gradual model of political violence
In view of the previous discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of conven-
tional definitions, it is clear that research on terrorism is trapped in a conceptual 
deadlock. Analysis of legal definitions according to a constructivist approach is 
a viable option for avoiding the definitional challenges, but it does not tell us 
much about the violence itself. In addition, enumerative definitions of terrorist 
violence imply that terrorism is an illegitimate form of political violence because 
it indiscriminately and deliberately targets (innocent) civilians. It is for this 
reason that terrorism still remains an essentially contested concept.
 But how can we exclude implicit moral assessments when defining a 
behaviour that is de facto and de jure illegitimate? First, we can take for granted 
that terrorism is illegitimate. Second, we have to replace the contested defini-
tional element ‘deliberately and indiscriminately targeting (innocent) civilians’. 
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If we accept the ‘consensus definition’, it becomes clear that the essential char-
acteristics of terrorist violence are somehow determined through the configura-
tion of three variables: target, expectation and goal of the perpetrator. When 
conceptualizing terrorist violence, the question of whether the target is a civilian 
or a combatant, innocent or guilty, neutral or partisan, does not matter. What 
does matter is the degree to which the perpetrator is indifferent in his or her 
choice between civilian and combatant, innocent and guilty, neutral and partisan 
targets.
 A gradual model of terrorism states that political violence is terrorist to the 
degree to which the perpetrator is indifferent in the choice of targets. This under-
standing is based on the rather casual observation that ‘It appears as though ter-
rorists rarely have a very coherent idea of what kind of reaction they will get 
[…]. They can countenance opposite reactions, from capitulation to widespread 
repression, and be almost equally pleased’ (Richardson 2006: 128, 131).
 This observation also answers the question posed at the outset: is there ‘a 
special or unique phenomenon’ within the behavioural range of political viol-
ence that we can conceptualize as such? Violent actors that are indifferent in 
their choice of targets are a special and unique phenomenon indeed.
 The gradual model of terrorism utilizes Max Weber’s concept of ‘an ideal 
type’ (Weber 1968: 191). An ideal type, also known as a pure type, is an exag-
gerated description of an empirical phenomenon (the ‘real’ type); it is exagger-
ated to illustrate the defining characteristics of a given social phenomenon. The 
ideal type functions as a conceptual fixing point to which empirical observations 
of political violence can relate. Applied to the model of political violence, this 
means that there are probably no actors who are completely indifferent in the 
choice of targets and in their expectations about what will be achieved through 
an attack. The crucial point is that some actors are more indifferent than others 
and that these differences allow us to distinguish different forms of political viol-
ence (Armborst 2010). Whether or not ‘terrorism’ is the correct term to describe 
political violence at the left end of the continuum is another question; for lack of 
a better term, I shall stick with ‘terrorism’ here.
 Figure 2.1 illustrates the gradual model. At the far left end of the continuum 
(terrorist violence), actors equally prefer all potential targets because they 
assume they will benefit from whatever the consequences of an indiscriminate 
attack. At the right end of the continuum (assassination), the preferred target is 
limited to one, because there are strictly limited expectations as to what will be 
achieved by attacking this specific target. No other target would be useful to the 
perpetrator. Other types of political violence oscillate between these two poles of 
target preference. The utility curve shows how the expected benefits of the attack 
vary between different targets. In the case of terrorism, the perpetrators are 
equally satisfied with all potential targets because the perpetrators have no spe-
cific expectation about what will be accomplished – their only expectation is that 
they will benefit from the consequences of the attack in some way. To put it fig-
uratively, terrorists think that they have been dealt a bad hand in political poker. 
By causing havoc, they are hoping for a new deal and a better hand. If this does 
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Figure 2.1 Gradual model of political violence.
Source: figure and text revised, based on Armborst 2010: 425.
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not happen, they can strike again. The assassination strategy, by contrast, has a 
specific target and a specific purpose. Some militant groups employ both tactics 
or any militant manoeuvre that is between these two poles.
From conceptual models to research scenarios
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide detailed research scenarios for 
each of the five conceptual approaches just described, but I want to offer some 
general ideas about how to integrate the gradual model of political violence into 
a research design. This exercise also serves to illustrate how research designs, 
and ultimately research outcomes, are shaped by the conceptualization of ter-
rorist violence. According to the gradual model, political violence is designated 
terrorism depending on the degree to which the perpetrators are indifferent in 
the choice of their targets. Perpetrators show no preference when deciding 
between two or more targets if the targets have the same utility – that is, if the 
expected benefits of the attack are equally preferred by the perpetrator. The ter-
minology of this definition is borrowed from economic theory, and although it 
may seem cynical to compare the choices of terrorists with consumers’ buying 
decisions, the crucial point is that militant actors can be more or less indifferent 
in their choice of targets. Potential research questions that originate from this 
conceptualization include the following: What makes militant actors more or less 
indifferent in their choice of targets? What sociological, psychological, strategic 
and political circumstances increase or decrease the perceived utility of different 
categories of targets for militant actors? Violence itself has no utilitarian value; 
it always appears in combination with something else, such as strategic or tacti-
cal expectations, retaliation, ransom demands or hate. These expectations should 
be considered along with the modus operandi.
 In a classic research design, the continuum of political violence can take the 
place of the dependent variable (the variable to be explained by other variables) 
with an ordinal scale (rank order). This variable can be included in qualitative, 
quantitative and analytically mixed research designs. To construct it, some 
information is required about the actor’s subjective expectations about engaging 
in political violence. Several types of documents and data can provide this 
information, such as claims of responsibility in which the perpetrators describe 
their reasons for the attack; ideological statements that describe the rationale 
behind the use of force; psychological assessments; face- to-face interviews with 
convicted terrorists; and statistical and documentary databases such as the GTD, 
the WikiLeaks Iraq War Logs with its nearly 400,000 SIGACT reports (Signi-
ficant Action of War) and the Afghan War Logs with its 91,000 incident reports.
 Whatever the database for the operationalization, it is crucial to develop trans-
parent and reasonable criteria for ranking the cases according to their degree of 
indifference. For example, if the data include a sample of 250 incidents of polit-
ical violence, it must be clear why the researcher classifies one incident as an 
indication of ‘high target preference’ and another as an indication of ‘low target 
preference’. (The same applies when individuals or groups are ranked.) Another 
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practical question is what scale or units should be chosen to construct the vari-
able. This choice also depends on the data being used. If the content of the data 
is nuanced and rich – that is, if it contains sufficient details about the preference 
level and (expected) utility of the attack – it may justify a scoring system from 1 
to 100. In other cases, the data might not include sufficient indications to differ-
entiate political violence to such a degree. Thus, the dependent variable would 
have fewer categories, such as high, medium and low. In any case, the researcher 
must make a justifiable and transparent decision on how to operationalize the 
variable.
 In the next step, the researcher can look for correlates of political violence to 
determine variables that are associated with a high or low degree of target pref-
erence. For example, what particular political or psychological circumstances 
systematically co- occur with high levels of indifference of militant actors? This 
question can be addressed both by qualitative and by quantitative analysis. In 
content analysis, for example, the researcher can investigate whether a high (or 
low) degree of target preference is associated with particular narratives or dis-
courses, and if so, what they are. Statistical analysis can be used to investigate 
what variables explain differences in target preference and how they interact. 
The applied statistical model – for example, whether linear regression, general-
ized linear models or log- linear models must be used – depends on the level of 
measurement. It is also crucial to consider whether the data being used are on 
the aggregate level (as with country indicators such as poverty, unemployment 
and crime rates) or on the individual level (with single measurement points – e.g. 
the income of every single individual in a given country – instead of the average 
income). The aggregate level of the data has far- reaching consequences for sub-
sequent statistical analyses, which cannot be addressed here.
 From the discussion in this chapter, one can conclude that there are dif-
ferent ways and means of conceptualizing political violence committed by 
non- state actors. The bad news is that the study of terrorism and political viol-
ence is a messy and disparate field of research. The good news is that you as a 
researcher do not have to know every single approach in detail to be able to 
carry out a good study on this topic. It suffices to know what the different 
approaches are, what their strengths and shortcomings are and which of them 
will provide the most useful starting point for a particular research interest or 
a particular type of data to which you have access or that you want to collect. 
Of course, this chapter cannot cover modes of data collection and data ana-
lysis in all due detail. It rather serves as a point of departure for further empir-
ical research of political violence.
Note
1 These definitional criteria are as follows:
The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal 
[…]. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some 
other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims […]. 
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The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the 
act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law 




Armborst, Andreas. 2010. ‘Modelling Terrorism and Political Violence’. International 
Relations 24(4): 414–432.
Black, Donald. 1983. ‘Crime as Social Control’. American Sociological Review 48(1): 
34–45.
Black, Donald. 2004. ‘Terrorism as Social Control’, pp. 9–18 in Terrorism and Counter- 
Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives, M. Deflem, ed. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Freilich, Joshua D., and Gary LaFree. 2015. ‘Criminology Theory and Terrorism: Intro-
duction to the Special Issue’. Terrorism and Political Violence 27(1): 1–8.
Gallie, Walter B. 1956. ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 56(1): 167–198.
GTD. n.d. ‘Criterion’. Available from: www.start.umd.edu/gtd/more/Criterion.aspx 
(accessed 1 March 2015).
Hayes, Jarrod. 2015. Is the Concept of Terrorism Still Useful? Zurich: ETH Zurich, Inter-
national Relations and Security Network, Center for Security Studies.
Kearns, Erin M., and Joseph K. Young. 2014. ‘Military Tactics in Civil War’, 
pp. 257–266 in Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars, E. Newman and K. DeRouen, Jr., 
eds. Abingdon: Routledge.
Müller, Tim N. 2011. Präventive Freiheitsentziehungen als Instrument der Terrorismus-
bekämpfung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Richardson, Louise. 2006. What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat. 
London: John Murray.
Sack, Fritz. 1968. Kriminalsoziologie. Frankfurt am Main: Akademische Verlagsgesells-
chaft.
Schmid, Alex P. 2011. ‘The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism (Rev. 
ACDT 2011)’, pp. 86–87 in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, A.P. 
Schmid, ed. Abingdon: Routledge.
Silke, Andrew. 2004. ‘An Introduction to Terrorism Research’, pp. 1–29 in Research on 
Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, A. Silke, ed. London: Frank Cass.
Silke, Andrew, and Jennifer Schmidt- Petersen. 2015. ‘The Golden Age? What the 100 
Most Cited Articles in Terrorism Studies Tell Us’. Terrorism and Political Violence. 
doi:10.1080/09546553.2015.1064397.
Sonderegger, Linus. 2012. Die Rückkehr der Folter? Anwendung von Zwang bei der Ver-
nehmung im deutschen und US- amerikanischen Recht. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Sutherland, Edwin. H. 1934. Principles of Criminology. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
Thakur, Ramesh, Andrew F. Cooper, and John English, eds. 2005. International Commis-
sions and the Power of Ideas. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Walt, Stephen M. 1998. ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’. Foreign 
Policy 110: 29–46.
Weber, Max. 1968. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre. 3rd edn. Tübingen: Mohr.
Conceptualizing non-state violence  27
Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch- Hoefler. 2004. ‘The Challenges of 
Conceptualizing Terrorism’. Terrorism and Political Violence 16(4): 777–794.
Wiseman, Geoffrey. 2005. ‘The Palme Commission: New Thinking about Security’, 
pp. 46–75 in International Commissions and the Power of Ideas, R. Thakur, A.F. 
Cooper, and J. English, eds. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Young, Reuven. 2006. ‘Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal 
Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation’. 





3 Rebels without a cause
Narrative analysis as a method for 
research on rebel movements
Alexander Spencer
Introduction
This chapter is interested in showing how certain understandings of the (inter-
national) political world become dominant while others remain marginalized. 
The method of narrative analysis helps illustrate the dominance of certain stories 
in public discourse while at the same time indicating the void left by the stories 
that remain untold or marginal. Narratives and their analysis are important for 
the social sciences for two interrelated reasons: first, narratives are important for 
human cognitive processes; humans think about the world and themselves in a 
narrative form. Second, narratives are important for identity construction as they 
are present in any form of history- telling from the present to the past in which 
relationships between the own community and those of others are established.
 As the title of this chapter indicates, narrative analysis does, however, not 
give insights into questions of causation. Rather it offers answers to ‘how pos-
sible’ questions and indicates how certain understandings about non- state actors 
in international security become dominant while others are marginalized. Hence, 
narrative analysis is especially useful to study how particular (non- state) actors 
and courses of action (e.g. military intervention or cooperation with non- state 
armed groups) in international security are legitimized or de- legitimized in dis-
course. Dominant (de-)legitimating narratives and their understandings of actors 
and contexts shape what is considered possible, logical or natural to do – at the 
expense of alternative discourses and courses of action. In order to show how 
narrative analysis can be practically used in research on non- state actors in inter-
national security, this chapter will outline the method of narrative analysis and 
apply this to the rebellion and revolution in Libya in 2011. It examines how to 
reconstruct by means of narratological tools the stories that are told about the 
conflict in the British media and the realm of the political elite. It will show how 
the rebels were romanticized (and thus legitimized) in discourse and how these 
romantic notions of the rebel marginalize other narratives that do not fit this 
understanding, such as stories about human rights violations by rebels. Narrative 
analysis was ideally suited to pursue my original research goals, i.e. to recon-
struct dominant as well as marginalized understandings of the Libyan rebels in 
Britain with a view to understanding which British courses of action were made 
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(im-)possible by these narrative understandings. However, beyond the specific 
case of Libyan rebels, it could be applied to study a broad range of (contested) 
security actors (see Kruck and Spencer 2013; Spencer 2014, 2016). It is impor-
tant to note that the chapter (and the interpretive method of narrative analysis) 
does not give insights into the material or ideational causes of rebellion but 
rather focuses on the interpretative level of description by showing the domi-
nance of certain stories told by Western (in this case the British) news media and 
political elite and the marginalization of others.
 In pursuit of this, the chapter will be structured as follows: the first part will 
illustrate the concept of a narrative and how narratives are important for Interna-
tional Relations (IR). Here, a method of narrative analysis is outlined which 
focuses on the essential narrative elements of setting, characterization and 
emplotment. The second part will apply this interpretative method to the narrati-
ves on rebellion in Libya found in the newspaper media and in parliamentary 
debates and speeches of leading politicians in Britain. It will thereby show the 
dominance of a romanticized story of rebellion. The third part will very briefly 
indicate the marginalization of alternative narratives, which emphasize human 
rights violations by rebels.
Narratives and their analysis
Concept and relevance of narratives
Narratives can be found in almost every realm of human life where someone tells 
us about something. Narratives involve a number of very different text types 
(written, oral and visual) ranging from literary texts such as novels and poems to 
films, TV reports, newspaper reports and commentary, school and university text-
books, websites and conversations in our daily life (Fludernik 2009: 1). While 
some simply understand a narrative as ‘telling someone else that something hap-
pened’ (Herrnstein Smith 1981: 228), others stress the issue of time, setting and 
purpose of this telling: ‘Somebody telling somebody else on some occasion and 
for some purpose(s) that something happened’ (Phelan 2005: 18). Thus, a narrative 
can be conceived as the (re-)production of an event or of a sequence of non- 
randomly connected events (see Genette 1982: 127). Moreover, a narrative cen-
trally involves some sort of disruption or specialty, something that makes it 
meaningful and interesting for a certain audience and thus worth telling. Finally 
and most importantly for our analysis, narratives contain some sort of actor, i.e. 
human or human- like agents such as rebels who are characterized in multiple ways 
(Herman 2002). Combining these elements Michael Toolan considers narratives as 
“a perceived sequence of non- randomly connected events, typically involving, as 
the experiencing agonist, humans or quasi humans, or other sentient beings, from 
whose experience we humans can “learn” ’ (Toolan 2001: 8).
 But how can narrative analysis, commonly the realm of literary studies, help 
in the understanding of political and social issues in general and rebel move-
ments in particular? Essentially, there are two interrelated lines of argumentation 
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that one may pursue here: a cognitive perspective and a cultural perspective (Pat-
terson and Renwick Monroe 1998: 315). The first emphasizes that narratives are 
a ‘fundamental instrument of thought […] indispensable to human cognition 
generally’ (Turner 1996: 4–5). Narratives are considered to be part of human 
mental activity (Kreiswirth 2000: 305) in the sense that the human brain 
‘captures many complex relationships in the form of narrative structures’ (Flud-
ernik 2009: 1). Similar to metaphors or analogies (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 
Spencer 2012), narratives illustrate a cognitive process of making sense of the 
world through narration. Therefore, analysis of narratives on, for example, rebel 
movements and their success or failure among a particular audience gives us an 
insight into common perceptions and thoughts on these actors. The second per-
spective considers narratives as culturally embedded phenomena that are part of 
every society. Myths and stories of the past, including stories about political 
actors such as rebels, are an essential part of all forms of community- building 
where the constitution of a common identity is sought. Cultural memory is, 
above all, made up of different narratives that provide ‘us with a fundamental 
epistemological structure that helps us to make sense of the confusing diversity 
and multiplicity of events and to produce explanatory patterns for them’ (Flud-
ernik 2009: 2).
 Taking these two perspectives together, one can argue that individuals as well 
as communities make sense of themselves and of the social world around them 
through narratives that constitute their identities as well as their understandings 
of other actors. In that view, rebels may be (co-)authors and ‘subjects’ of 
identity- constructing self- narratives as well as objects of media narratives that 
constitute a particular understanding of rebel movements. By placing oneself, a 
community or actors such as rebel movements (not necessarily consciously) in a 
particular narrative and thereby constituting identity, narratives guide action 
(Somers 1994: 606–607). Although social narratives are very rarely single 
authored, the analysis of narratives can nevertheless be considered as an investi-
gation into social action and agency. Thus, the analysis of narratives is of relev-
ance particularly for political science as it contributes to our understanding of 
common conceptions of ‘political reality’ and widely held attitudes towards 
political actors such as rebel movements. The analysis of how and why some 
narratives succeed and others fail to have an impact ultimately helps to under-
stand the distribution and influence of discursive power (Patterson and Renwick 
1998: 315–316).
 These thoughts are not fundamentally new for political science or IR and are 
very much in line with the cultural, discursive or post- positivist turn and a con-
structivist understanding of politics in which reality is constituted through dis-
course (Brockmeier and Carbaugh 2001: 9). In contrast to a positivist 
understanding of social science in which there is an effort to establish an objec-
tive, if not universal truth similar to the natural sciences, discourse- oriented con-
structivists highlight the subjectivity of knowledge and deny the existence of an 
absolute truth. Unsurprisingly, one comes across the concept of narrative most 
commonly in constructivist and post- structuralist work on, for example, identity 
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constructions of self and other, and the drawing of borders (Ringmar 1996; 
Campbell 1998; Hansen 2006; Browning 2008), the influence of (pop-)cultural 
narratives (Nexon and Neumann 2006; Lacassagne et al. 2011) or the use of 
Hayden White’s insights into historical narratives and explanations (Suganami 
2008; Roberts 2006). Yet, despite the widespread use of the concept, very little 
attention has been paid to the roots or rather home turf of narratives, namely 
the field of Narratology. Overall in IR, the concept of narrative has frequently 
been used as a synonym for discourse or frame and has not focused on the spe-
cific characteristics of what constitutes a narrative. Narratology offers concrete 
categories for the empirical analysis of narratives through the established con-
sensus of what elements are necessary for making something a narrative 
(Spencer 2016: 13–44).
Analysing constitutive elements of a narrative: setting, 
characterization, emplotment
How could one go about conducting analysis of a vast cultural phenomenon such 
as narratives? The analysis of narratives in literature studies offers a number of 
categories which help in the investigation. As visible from the above conceptual-
izations of the term, a narrative is made up of a number of features such as a 
scene or setting of a story, an agent that is characterized as well as an event and 
emplotment of the happening in a causal chain (Toolan 2001; Fludernik 2009: 
40). All of these elements are elaborated on in the narrative discourse in order to 
give them a more specific character and a certain evaluative implication. The 
dimensions of setting, characterization and emplotment can be empirically ana-
lysed and are representative of an overall narrative. While not all of these dimen-
sions are always of the same importance, they may all serve as focal points for 
more detailed analysis.
 With regard to the setting, the idea is that similar to a stage play or a film the 
background or location in front of which the story unfolds is of importance for 
the narrative as a whole. As Toolan (2001: 41) argues: ‘The locations [or set-
tings] where events occur are […] given distinct characteristics and are thus 
transformed into specific places’. We all want to know where a story takes place 
and we consciously or unconsciously look for indicators of the surroundings as 
they give us a clue of the kind of story we are about to indulge in.
 A second important narrative element is characterization of the agent (see 
Fludernik 2009: 6). We are all highly interested in what an agent in a story is 
like. ‘The actors are provided with distinct traits. In this manner they are indi-
vidualized and transformed into characters’ (Toolan 2001: 41). Yet it is not so 
much a one- off description of an agent such as a rebel that is of most importance 
for the characterization of it, him or her, but the small continuous predications 
that build an agent into a character (Fludernik 2009: 46). There are a number of 
ways in which the characterization of an actor in the story can be influenced. The 
first and the most simple is giving the agent a name or label rather than simply 
referring to him, her or it by their occupation or role they play in the story. The 
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giving of a name or a label personalizes the relationship between the reader and 
the agent in the story. For example calling a rebel a freedom fighter can bring 
with it a number of associations including the legitimacy of his/her cause. 
Second, an agent is characterized by being placed in relation to others. For 
example this can involve hierarchical relationships such as in the family (mother 
and child) or in society (protector and protected) or more equal relations such as 
business partners (Fludernik 2009: 44–45).
 A third means of characterization involves the description of the agent’s 
physical attributes, such as clothes or the kind of weaponry rebels carry or outer 
appearance, including facial expression. As most of these features are considered 
to be a deliberate choice of the agents and under their control they are thought to 
provide an insight into the character. A fourth possibility of characterizing an 
agent is through his/her/its thought process or direct speech. What the character 
thinks or says greatly influences our perception of what that agent is like and 
how he/she/it becomes a character. While the narrator of a story is fully respons-
ible for suggesting the thought of characters, the direct speech in newspaper 
commentary or other media channels is not under the control of the narrator 
(Herman and Vervaeck 2007: 227). Apart from the name giving, the relationship 
to others, the description of appearance and direct speech, a final very important 
implicit aspect of characterization is the way in which the agent acts. Ultimately, 
the behaviour has an important effect on what we perceive the characters such as 
rebels to be like (e.g. unorganized, brave, freedom loving, determined, etc.).
 The third narrative element, including the event and the emplotment, are 
essential for a narrative: in a narrative something has to happen (see Fludernik 
2009: 5).What is more, the happening or rather the event understood as an action 
has to lead to more action. So the events in a narrative do not stand on their own, 
they have to be placed in relation to each other (Baker 2010: 353). Here we have 
to distinguish a temporal and a causal dimension in the ordering of events and 
action. While the temporal elements of a narrative are important as they 
emphasize or foreground certain events and limit or silence other happenings, 
the causal dimension, commonly termed ‘causal emplotment’, elaborates the 
causal relationship between the elements of a narrative. Emplotment allows us to 
weigh and explain events rather than just list them, i.e. to turn a set of proposi-
tions into an intelligible sequence about which we can form an opinion. The 
notion of causal emplotment illustrates how events are connected to each other.
Designing and conducting a narrative analysis
How does one practically go about conducting a narrative analysis? A first step 
would be to identify the subject of interest (here: the rebels in Libya during the 
uprising against Gaddafi). Second, one has to decide on the realm of analysis, for 
example, school books, the news media or speeches by the political elite, as well 
as the time period one is to analyse. This depends very much on the claims the 
researcher wishes to make. If one hopes to paint a broad picture of an overall 
perception, one will have to aim to include a wide range of sources representative 
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of the realm one wishes to represent. For example, when analysing media 
content, it is important to include the most representative media outlets in terms 
of size, popularity and range of ideological stances. While these can never be 
fully representative, one can aim to be as inclusive as possible.
 Third, narrative analysis offers the researcher three fundamental categories – 
setting, characterization and emplotment – which are then used to structure the 
analysis of the selected material. In the analysis the text material is then dis-
sected into individual words or phrases that fit into the three categories. Follow-
ing several rounds of dissection, the researcher will start to gain an insight into 
the dominance of certain representations within each category. This analysis is 
greatly aided by the use of qualitative data analysis software programs such as 
MAXQDA or NVivo which allow the analyst to mark segments of the text and 
assign categories for each quote. Alternatively, one is able to conduct this ana-
lysis using simple marker pens and an Excel spreadsheet to gather the mass of 
quotes one will encounter for each category.
 Fourth, having filled the categories, the analyst identifies the main and 
dominant elements found in the texts and engages to retell the story by using the 
quotes as a collage. Of course, in doing so, one can also count the (relative) fre-
quency of certain categories or words in the analysed texts. However, I should 
stress that narrative analysis is mainly interested in qualitative insights and in 
reconstructing stories of political actors, settings and behaviour. There are other 
tools (e.g. quantitative content analysis) which are better suited if one’s primary 
interest is in quantitative evidence that can be found in texts.
 As the reader will notice in the example below, rather than simply para-
phrasing the content of the different texts, the form of narrative analysis pro-
posed in this chapter relies on the citation of numerous words (adjectives, verbs 
and nouns) and phrases in order to create a collage from the newspaper reports. 
This, although at times obstructing the readability due to excessive footnotes, 
makes the presentation of the narrative elements transparent and verifiable. 
However, it is important to note that, by creating a collage of a vast number of 
quotes this chapter is itself a narrative. This narrative is inherently subjective. 
Yet, through transparency, verifiability and showing the extensiveness of the 
narrative elements, the subjective story can be made intersubjective.
Narratives of rebellion in Libya
The following section will apply the method of narrative analysis outlined above 
to the discourse on the rebellion in Libya against Colonel Gaddafi in 2011 found 
both in the British newspaper media and in British parliamentary debates and 
speeches of the political elite at the time. I first reflect on the analysis of media 
narratives before turning to the analysis of narratives of the political elite. 
Finally, I highlight how narrative analysis understood as a critical method may 
serve to highlight alternative and marginalized understandings.
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Analysis of media narratives
In order to gain an insight into the narratives being told about rebels during the 
conflict I used the Nexis (formerly Lexis Nexis) news database to search for the 
concepts of ‘Libya’ and ‘rebel’ in the Guardian, The Times and the Sun news-
papers from the beginning of the conflict (17 February 2011) until its official 
conclusion (31 October 2011). Out of these, the analysis focused on 90 of the – 
according to the Nexis database – most relevant articles. The newspapers were 
selected as they cover both the left and the right of the political spectrum, as well 
as a more popular tabloid story about rebellion in Libya. Analysis beyond the 90 
articles did not yield any new or alternative narrative elements. In my analysis of 
the 90 articles, I inductively drew out dominant narrative elements with regard 
to the setting of the rebellion, the characterization of rebels and the emplotment 
of the rebellion. In particular, my narrative analysis revealed that romantic ele-
ments were (more or less) widespread in the setting, characterization and emplot-
ment of narratives about Libyan rebels.
 Focusing on the setting depicted in the media narratives, it becomes clear that 
the narrative of rebellion is set in the wider context of the Arab Spring. However, 
there are only a few material or scenic indications of a romantic setting that con-
stitute the narrative as one set in an exotic, far away and foreign desert, which is 
very different to the setting of the everyday in the West. Occasionally one does 
encounter references and scenes that play in a desert, with ‘sand dunes’,1 ‘blue 
sky’,2 ‘palm trees’3 and an ‘oasis’4 where the ‘sun sets’5 on rebel positions. 
However, the exciting and emotional side to the romantic setting appears far 
more prominently. While the emotion at first includes fear of Gaddafi, this tran-
scends into joy as ‘[p]eople are not afraid’6 anymore. While the civilian popula-
tion was at first ‘deeply fearful of Gaddafi’,7 the ‘fear barrier is broken’:8
As word spread, Tripoli’s streets filled with honking vehicles and soon thou-
sands upon thousands of people were converging on a compound that had 
previously filled them with dread. Their fear gone, they poured through the 
broken walls even as bullets and shells whistled overhead.9
This emotion of fear is replaced after victories with an ‘explosion of joy’,10 
‘joyous scenes’11 and ‘ecstatic celebrations’12 as the rebels are enthusiastically 
embraced and ‘greeted by civilians lining streets, cheering and waving rebel 
flags’.13 The rebels are ‘cheered’,14 civilians ‘flashed the V for victory sign’15 and 
residents ‘celebrate wildly’.16,17 As the narrative element of characterization will 
show in more detail, the rebel is said to be on the side of the people of the street 
against an oppressive regime.
 With regard to characterization, the rebel side of the conflict is commonly 
labelled as ‘revolutionaries’18 or ‘revolutionary forces’.19 Furthermore, one 
encounters a number of labels such as ‘liberation force’;20 ‘pro- democracy 
fighters’,21 ‘freedom crusader’,22 ‘freedom campaigners’23 or most commonly 
‘freedom fighters’,24 which link aspects of emplotment with characterization by 
38  A. Spencer
including causal motivations and goals underlying the struggle. The individual 
rebels are characterized not as professional fighters but as ‘young’25 
‘teenager[s]’26 or ‘25-year- old’27 ‘civilians’28 who have taken up arms against 
Gaddafi. ‘The rebel army is mostly ordinary young people, often well educated, 
who have had enough of their lives being destroyed by a dictator’.29 Emphasiz-
ing their civilian character, many of the depictions of the rebels includes refer-
ences to their former occupation such as ‘engineer’,30 ‘pharmacist’,31 ‘dentist and 
lab technician’,32 ‘cashier’,33 ‘house decorator’,34 ‘teacher’,35 ‘student’36 and even 
an ‘owner of a Liverpool takeaway’.37 Similar to many of the audience reading 
the story, the rebel is a normal human being one is able to identify with through 
similarity. The ‘teacher- turned-fighter’38 rebel has ‘no qualifications to be a 
soldier’39 and is by no means an elite fighter but rather characterized as an under-
dog in the conflict. The rebels are said to be ‘amateur fighters’40 who have a 
‘lack of military experience’.41 Furthermore, the rebels are said to be ‘ill armed’42 
and ‘ill equipped’43 as they ‘lack the firepower and military discipline’.44 Despite 
this characterization, the rebels remain impressive: ‘There has been a consistent 
tendency to underestimate the rebel leadership, a tendency to dismiss them as a 
rabble or a bunch of Islamists. At almost every turn thus far, they have surpassed 
expectations’.45 So they are also considered ‘brave men’46 in a ‘heroic uprising 
against Libya’s murderous tyrant Colonel Gaddafi’.47 ‘Most of the revolutionar-
ies are not trained soldiers but the spirit and bravery to fight is there’.48 They are 
fighting for admirable and honourable causes such as their people and homes49 
or in ‘pursuit of freedom’.50 The revolution involves ‘truly inspiring individuals: 
doctors, teachers, lawyers and engineers willing to die for their freedom’.51
 With regard to emplotment, the event of war in Libya is constituted as an 
asymmetrical conflict in which the righteous weaker rebels are struggling against 
a stronger and unjust enemy in the form of the Gaddafi Regime. As already indi-
cated in their characterization, the emplotment of the conflict in Libya emphas-
izes that the ‘rebels were heavily outnumbers and outgunned’:52 ‘As the sun set, 
the rebels were perched behind the few anti- aircraft guns they hold, their thin 
turrets pointing towards an empty black sky’.53 The conflict is emplotted as a 
struggle against the odds in which the rebels only have ‘sparse forces’54 and 
‘Colonel Gaddafi’s forces have better weapons’.55 Nevertheless, the underdog 
rebel forces remarkably win against all odds as ‘we witnessed this volunteer 
force – armed with a hotch- potch of AK- 47s and rocket- propelled grenades – 
stand firm against a much better equipped army’.56
 Apart from the asymmetry, the conflict is emplotted as a resistance to an 
unjust order that ‘terrorised its inhabitants’,57 ‘systematically maltreated the 
civilian population’58 and where ‘people suffered from the repression and brutal-
ity of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’.59 The unjust order, run by an ‘crazed tyrant’60 
is constituted as a ‘murderous’,61 ‘cruel and destructive regime’62 responsible for 
‘indiscriminate shelling’63 and ‘atrocities’64 and ‘the most brutal response to the 
Arab Spring’.65 Therefore, the narrative involves a struggle for an ideal, a fight 
for liberation and an illustration of love for a country and its people, as rebels are 
quoted: ‘We love our country. We love each other’.66 The narrative constituted 
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the cause of the conflict to be a ‘burning desire for freedom’67 and democracy.68 
The conflict is a ‘fight for democracy’69 and the rebels ‘are fighting for 
freedom’.70 The reader in the UK can identify with the rebels as they ‘want 
freedom and democracy, just like we have in Britain’.71 ‘They are students, engi-
neers, teachers and doctors who came together through Twitter and Facebook. 
They want freedoms people in Britain and the West take for granted’.72
 Overall the British media narrative of rebellion in Libya that I reconstructed 
from the newspaper articles is a romantic story in an emotional setting in which 
the rebel is characterized as a young and brave underdog fighting against a brutal 
and oppressive regime for an ideal such as democracy and freedom.
Analysis of narratives of the political elite
While media discourses are now widely accepted in the social sciences as rel-
evant sites for analysis where political struggles of meaning and power take 
place, one may still doubt whether these media narratives are also reflected in 
the political elite narratives of decision makers. Therefore, as a next step after 
the media analysis, I conducted a narrative analysis of British decision- makers’ 
discourse on the rebellion in Libya. I analysed all the 23 parliamentary debates 
in the House of Commons on the situation in Libya and on UN Security Council 
Resolution 1971 on the intervention in the country, between the beginning of the 
conflict (17 February 2011) until its official conclusion (31 October 2011). This 
was further supplemented by five public speeches given by Prime Minister 
David Cameron at the time. Interestingly, my narrative analysis of British parlia-
mentary debates and political speeches revealed that many of the elements with 
regard to the setting, characterization and the emplotment of the rebel that were 
found in the media were also clearly visible in the discourse of the political elite. 
The analysis of political elite narratives thus underlined that certain (romantic) 
understandings of the Libyan rebel(lion) have become dominant in both British 
society and policy- making circles.
 With regard to the setting, one comes across some references that indicate an 
exotic location that is different to the everyday Briton, by stressing the conflict 
setting of the Libyan ‘desert’73: ‘At the meeting Nicholas Sarkozy hosted in 
Paris, we made the right choice: to draw a line in the desert sand, and to halt his 
murderous advance by force’.74 The conflict is placed in the overall context of 
the Arab Spring and there are references to the exciting and emotional side of the 
story, such as celebration, fear, hope and drama,75 for example ‘This has been 
the most dramatic episode of what has been called the Arab Spring’76 and 
‘Where there was fear, now there is hope and an optimism and belief that is truly 
inspiring’.77
 Many of the narrative elements of characterization found in the media dis-
course are also present in the discourse of the political elite. While one does 
encounter a number of fairly unromantic labels for the actors involved, such as 
‘opposition groups’,78 other labels such as ‘the Libyan people’79 or ‘anti- Gaddafi 
forces’80 indicate sympathy towards them from a British perspective. At the 
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same time, the narrative includes clearly more romantic labels such as ‘pro- 
freedom rebels’81 or ‘free Libyan fighters’.82 Yet these fighters are not considered 
to be professional soldiers but ‘ordinary Libyans from all walks of life’83 who 
are no match for Gaddafi’s troops: 
Ordinary Libyans from all walks of life came together and rose up against 
Gaddafi. From the villages of the Nafusa mountains to the tower blocks of 
Misrata, the alleyways of Zawiyah and the streets of Benghazi, the Libyan 
people fought with incredible courage.84
In this struggle, the rebel is characterized as being ‘brave’85 and having 
‘courage’86 as they are ‘fighting the dictator with their bare hands’.87 They have 
successfully ‘liberated themselves’88 and are ‘taking their destiny into their own 
hands’.89 Therefore, ‘we should also pay a tribute to the bravery and resilience of 
the Libyan people themselves. This has been their revolution and none of it 
could have happened without them’.90 Similarly, one is able to identify with the 
rebels as they are said to be fighting for an understandable cause, such as 
freedom and democracy. They ‘want the sort of freedoms that we take for 
granted in this country’.91
 Many of the elements indicated in the characterization of the rebels also 
reappear in the emplotment of the event as a ‘popular uprising’92 or a ‘revolu-
tion’.93 Again, the conflict is constituted as an asymmetrical struggle against an 
unjust order where the regime is ‘attacking peaceful protestors’94 ‘using the full 
might of his armed forces, backed up by mercenaries’.95 Gaddafi is emplotted as 
a ‘despot’96 and ‘tyrant’97 who is ‘cruelly’98 committing ‘barbaric acts against the 
Libyan people’,99 ‘murdering’100 ‘his people indiscriminately’101 with ‘no mercy 
and no pity shown’.102 Part of the narrative is emplotted as a struggle for a 
utopian future in which everything will be much better. The people of Libya are 
fighting for a ‘better future’,103 ‘democratic future’,104 a ‘peaceful and prosperous 
future’105 or a ‘peaceful, successful and democratic future’.106 Importantly, as 
already indicated as part of the characterization, the rebels’ struggle against an 
unjust order is pursued for noble ideals as Libyans are said to be ‘struggling for 
democracy and freedom’.107 The desire for ‘openness’,108 ‘freedom’109 and 
‘democracy’110 are said to be the understandable cause of the conflict with the 
Gaddafi regime. These values are explicitly linked to British values and are, 
similar to elements in the characterization of the rebels, a means of understand-
ing and identifying with the righteousness of the struggle for ‘freedoms that 
people in Britain take for granted’.111
 Very similar to the narrative elements found in the British media, the story of 
rebellion in Libya is found to involve an emotional setting in which the young 
underdog rebel is bravely fighting a far stronger brutal and oppressive Gaddafi 
regime in an asymmetric conflict for a better, almost utopian, future and the 
noble ideals of freedom and democracy.
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Narrative analysis as a critical method: retracing alternative 
and marginalized stories (of rebellion)
The critical potential of narrative analysis is its ability to highlight the domi-
nance of certain narratives but also to unmask the silenced discourses of the mar-
ginal. Therefore, my narrative analysis also focused on retracing such 
marginalized narratives. While stories of the rebel who is struggling for noble 
ideals against an unjust and more powerful order are very much present in both 
the media and political coverage of the conflict in Libya, other, less amicable 
narratives only exist at the margins despite their potential truthfulness. The fol-
lowing section will briefly illustrate such a narrative, which tells a story in which 
rebels are responsible for war crimes and human rights violations during and 
after the conflict. Of course, it will depend on the goals of the researcher (and 
the available space in an article, chapter or book) to what extent his or her nar-
rative analysis will put an emphasis on marginalized (rather than or besides 
dominant) narratives. But from a critical perspective on international security, it 
is important to focus not only on hegemonic but also alternative stories in one’s 
analysis.
 In my analysis of narratives about the rebellion in Libya I found that it is 
widely accepted that Gaddafi’s regime is responsible for a large number of 
crimes, attacks on civilians and human rights violations; by contrast, stories 
accusing the rebels of perpetrating such crimes are rare. This does not mean that 
the rebel side of the conflict simply did not commit such acts, as there are a 
number of actors who try to emphasize that members of the rebels were in 
indeed responsible for human rights violations.
 For example, Amnesty International stated in its report on the conflict in 
Libya that, although not on the same scale as the Gaddafi regime, members of 
the opposition ‘have also committed human rights abuses, in some cases amount-
ing to war crimes’.112 Overall, nine pages of the report on the conflict are dedic-
ated to crimes and human rights violations by rebels. Rebels and their supporters 
are said to ‘have abducted, arbitrarily detained, tortured and killed former 
members of the security forces, suspected al- Gaddafi loyalists, captured soldiers 
and foreign nationals wrongly suspected of being mercenaries fighting on behalf 
of al- Gaddafi forces’.113 Similarly, Human Rights Watch tells a story in which 
‘[r]ebel forces also committed human rights and humanitarian law violations 
during the armed conflict’.114 Rebels are here accused of ‘revenge attacks’115 
against suspected Gaddafi loyalists as well as ‘arbitrary arrests’,116 ‘serious 
abuses’,117 ‘mistreatment’118 and ‘torture in detention, in some cases leading to 
death’.119 The most prominent case of human rights violations includes accusa-
tions of ‘revenge killings’120 and, in particular, the suspected revenge execution 
of 53 Gaddafi supporters: ‘Some of the victims had their hands bound behind 
their backs; they all seemed to have been shot at that location.’121
 Few of these stories are taken up in the media122 or the political debates in 
parliament and, at times, the existence of violations by rebels is denied: ‘All I 
can say about the opposition forces and the danger of civilian deaths from their 
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activities is that, so far, we have no record of their being engaged in attacks on 
civilians.’123 Interestingly, when such stories of situations in which crimes by 
rebels could be committed, they are emplotted as understandable in the given 
setting: 
Foreign mercenaries, particularly black Africans, have been blamed by 
rebels for committing the most heinous crimes, including gang rape. It 
seems astonishing then, in the heat of battle, with a friend just killed, that 
the rebels did not murder the youth from Chad. Instead, they took him to a 
hospital and he was treated alongside their friends.124
Similarly, with regard to the looting committed by rebels, their acts become 
understandable as the loot is not really stolen; ‘in truth it did not seem much like 
looting as most of the treasures they carted away were acquired with wealth 
stolen from the Libyan people.’125
 In the case of the Gaddafi’s killing by rebels, there are a number of voices in 
the media that emphasize the brutal and criminal nature of the act,126 its implica-
tions for the human rights situation in Libya127 and stress that Gaddafi should 
have been put on trial:128 ‘His executioners are as bad as he was, demonstrating 
complete ignorance of human values’.129 Similarly, a number of other actors, 
such as Amnesty International130 and the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights,131 criticized the death of Gaddafi and called for an investigation.132 Hugo 
Chávez claimed: ‘They assassinated him. It is another outrage. We shall 
remember Gaddafi our whole lives as a great fighter, a revolutionary and a 
martyr’.133 In contrast, however, the majority of media narratives do not tell the 
story of Gaddafi’s death as a crime or a human rights violation. The killing of 
Gaddafi is said to be justified as ‘[t]he murderous tyrant got the fate he 
deserved’:134 ‘His death was grotesque and violent. Much as he had lived his 
life’.135 Alternatively, Gaddafi is said to have got off too lightly as ‘[k]illing him 
on the spot was an easy way out for him’ and that victims ‘felt cheated that the 
dictator had escaped justice’.136 Other media reports stress that the killing of 
Gaddafi was a necessary step to ‘help stabilise the position of Libya’s new 
leaders, particularly if his followers now gave up the fight’.137 ‘Viewed from a 
“realpolitik” perspective, this was the best possible outcome for the country, its 
present rulers and those optimistic enough to believe that Libya can eventually 
be transformed into a vibrant democracy’.138 In the story, the person responsible 
for the death of Gaddafi is not only a killer but a ‘Libyan hero’:139 ‘Why all the 
fuss about who killed Gaddafi? The man who shot him should be given a 
medal.’140 At the same time some of the more critical voices on the killing of 
Gaddafi are attacked and delegitimized: 
Gaddafi has finally got what was coming to him and the first thing out of the 
UN is, ‘We must have an inquiry into exactly how he died’. What did they 
do to help the good people of Libya overcome this tyrant during the past 40 
years? Nothing!141
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 In contrast to the stories told in the media, some amongst the political elite in 
Britain, such as defence secretary Philip Hammond, are a ‘little’ more sceptical 
about Gaddafi’s death: The Libyan revolutionaries’ image had been ‘a little bit 
stained’ by Gaddafi’s death, Hammond told the BBC. ‘It’s certainly not the way 
we do things. We would have liked to see Colonel Gaddafi going on trial to 
answer for his misdeeds.’142 Similarly, William Hague noted that he would have 
preferred for Gaddafi to be captured alive: ‘We would have preferred him to be 
able to face justice at the International Criminal Court or in a Libyan court for 
his crimes. We don’t approve of extrajudicial killings’.143 However, he goes on 
to stress that 
[a]t the same time we are not going to mourn him. This and the fall of Sirte 
and Bani Walid is a major opportunity for Libya to be able to move on to 
what they’ve fought for all this year, into a free and democratic future.144
David Cameron was less hesitant as he ‘hailed Gaddafi’s death as a step towards 
a ‘strong and democratic future’ for the north African country’.145
 Despite the existence of crimes and human rights violation by rebels, these 
stories remained largely on the margins of the narratives being told about rebel-
lion in Libya. Narrative analysis is able to show how some of these alternative 
narratives on human rights violations by rebels were silenced, ridiculed and 
explicitly refuted and how other narratives even tried to justify and present these 
violations as understandable. The analysis of narratives is thus able to uncover 
dominance and marginalization of political understandings.
Conclusion
This chapter has given an insight into the use of narrative analysis for research into 
non- state actors in international security. Narrative analysis does not give research-
ers insights into the causes of rebellion but into the portrayal of how rebellion is 
told as a story. As the analysis of parts of the British news as well as British parlia-
mentary debates and speeches by the politicians showed, the narratives of rebellion 
in the Libyan conflict in 2011 were predominantly told in a romantic fashion. This 
contributed to legitimizing Libyan rebels and British political and military support 
of these rebels. Many of the narrative elements outlined in pre- existing cultural 
stories, such as Lawrence of Arabia, including an emotional exotic setting of the 
dessert, heroic and brave young rebels and an asymmetric and almost utopian 
struggle for an ideal such as freedom, were also present in the narratives on rebel-
lion in Libya. Beyond the mere existence of such romantic story elements the 
chapter argued that these dominant understandings marginalized and silenced other 
more negative narratives on crimes and human rights violations despite their poten-
tial ‘truthfulness’. Narrative analysis can contribute to the understanding and criti-
cism of dominant political perceptions in world politics. It can be applied to study 
a broad range of contested state and non- state actors and courses of action in inter-
national security (Spencer 2016).
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4 PMSCs and Twitter
Sentiment analysis as a tool for 
evaluating social media data
Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin
Introduction
Private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become a key factor in 
international security, increasingly performing tasks that were formerly executed 
by military forces of the state (Singer 2008; Dunigan 2011). The prominence of 
PMSCs has led scholars to examine the ramifications of their rise (e.g. Avant and 
Sigelman 2010; Krahmann 2010; Pattison 2014) and the consequences of their 
work (e.g. Leander 2010; Petersohn 2014). In addition, researchers have studied 
the self- narratives that PMSCs construct and disseminate on their websites 
(Joachim and Schneiker 2012, 2014) and the prevailing narratives on PMSCs in 
traditional news media (Kruck and Spencer 2013). What has been lacking so far is 
an analysis that compares the dominant frames regarding PMSCs in public dis-
course outside the traditional media with the frames that PMSCs themselves dis-
seminate to the public. Frames can be understood as a representation of a 
perspective in which certain aspects are strengthened to influence the generally 
accepted understanding of a specific image or situation (Joachim 2007). From a 
liberal perspective, public discourses and the frames they contain help to explain 
the varying degrees of outsourcing of security services, because public consent to 
participation in military missions is considered to be influencing the extent of 
PMSCs’ employment (Cusumano 2014: 230–231; Kruck 2014).
 In this chapter, we link to this research by studying how PMSCs seek to influ-
ence the public via social media and how they are perceived by other actors in 
these media. Social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube 
can be considered arenas for public deliberation and the formation of public 
opinions (Tsaliki 2002; O’Connor et al. 2010). The study of the use of social 
media by business companies is just beginning (e.g. Mangold and Faulds 2009; 
Hanna et al. 2011; Kaplan and Haenlein 2011; Zeitzoff et al. 2015). Moreover, 
scholars of International Relations have relied on social media to analyse a 
variety of actors, such as terrorist organizations and their self- representations 
(Farwell 2014); the foreign policies of states (Zeitzoff et al. 2015); and collective 
action, as in the case of the Arab Spring (Lotan et al. 2011; Hamdy and Gomaa 
2012; Wolfsfeld et al. 2013). However, the use of social media by PMSCs and 
social media discourses regarding PMSCs remain to be studied.
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 Just as PMSCs use their websites (Joachim and Schneiker 2012, 2014), so 
they presumably also use social media to convey a certain image of themselves. 
In keeping with the research on PMSCs’ self- and media narratives (Kruck and 
Spencer 2013), we would expect the public discourse on PMSCs in the social 
media to be more negative than their self- representations. Our aim was to 
analyse the communication both from PMSCs and about PMSCs in social media. 
We sought to determine whether there is a difference between these two (sets of ) 
discourses and, if so, to measure the scope of this difference. Another aim was to 
identify the major frames used by the different sets of actors. Therefore, we 
focused on the social media platform Twitter and the tweets from the company 
Academi Elite (formerly known as Blackwater or Xe Services), as well as the 
tweets about that company. Twitter as a data source is particularly suitable 
because its users respond promptly to current issues and the limited content of 
these messages is easy to survey and collect (Zimmer and Proferes 2014: 254ff.).
 We chose Blackwater as our subject, because it is one of the best known and 
most contested PMSCs. Contracted by the US government on a regular basis, the 
company attracted huge media attention after an incident that occurred during 
the Iraq War in 2007 (Roberts 2014; Apuzzo 2015), when some Blackwater 
employees shot 17 innocent Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square in Baghdad.1 Due to 
technical limitations imposed by Twitter, we were unable to access tweets that 
had been published around the time of the Nisour Square incident in 2007. 
However, we collected other tweets that were issued by Academi Elite about two 
other events in which the company was involved or that were issued by other 
Twitter users about these two other events. We began collecting data when 
rumours emerged that Academi Elite personnel were involved in the crisis in 
Ukraine and stopped data collection once the trial concerning the Nisour Square 
massacre had entered its non- public phase. We collected 264,852 tweets that 
were posted during our data collection period from March through August 2014.
 Very large data sets such as ours often pose a challenge when one attempts to 
analyse social media (Lewis et al. 2013). Ultimately, we were interested in a 
qualitative aspect; that is, the frames used by Academi and by others concerning 
Academi. However, analysing this enormous amount of data by immediately 
using qualitative methods (e.g. qualitative content analysis) was not feasible 
because of the inherently time- consuming nature of such methods and the huge 
dataset. Instead, we decided to begin with a quantitative method that would 
allow us to obtain an overview of the data and to categorize it and thereby to 
reduce the dataset that we then could analyse with qualitative means; we opted 
for a sentiment analysis.
 Sentiment analysis, which is also referred to as opinion mining, is a computa-
tional technique to automatically categorize text segments according to their evalu-
ative expressions (Pang and Lee 2008; Liu 2012, 2015; Lucas et al. 2015; 
Serrano- Guerrero et al. 2015). Bing Liu has described sentiment analysis as the 
‘field of study that analyzes people’s opinions, sentiments, evaluations, appraisals, 
attitudes, and emotions towards entities such as products, services, organizations, 
individuals, issues, events, topics, and their attributes’ (Liu 2012: 7). ‘Sentiment 
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analysis’ is commonly used as an umbrella term to denote various techniques and 
research interests in the field of natural language processing (NLP) that seek to 
assess textual representations of human communication quantitatively. All these 
techniques have in common the evaluation of source material to identify its general 
sentiment in terms of its positive or negative polarity on a predefined scale.
 For our sentiment analysis of social media discourses on PMSCs, we used a 
software program based on the Stanford Sentiment framework that classifies 
tweets into five categories of evaluative statements: very positive, positive, 
neutral, negative and very negative. Such categorization alone does not allow us 
to determine which frames are disseminated in the social media, but it does 
enable us to identify different sets of tweets that can then be analysed by qual-
itative means. In our case, the sentiment analysis allowed us to identify the very 
positive and the very negative tweets, which we then subjected to qualitative 
content analysis. More generally, applying sentiment analysis to identify rel-
evant sets of data drawn from a very large database can be useful, for example, 
in evaluating how political actors are perceived in social media (Tumasjan et al. 
2010; Murthy 2015); in measuring opinions regarding a particular policy (Ceron 
et al. 2013; González-Bailón and Paltoglou 2015), company or institution (Van 
de Kauter et al. 2015); or for studying how social media are used by terrorists 
(Cheong and Lee 2011; Klausen 2015).
 According to Bryman’s (2006) typology of mixed- methods designs, our 
methodological approach represents an ‘offset’ design rationale, because both 
quantitative sentiment analysis and qualitative content analysis are employed to 
mitigate the weaknesses of each of these instruments and to combine their 
strengths. The strength of the sentiment analysis is its power to categorize large 
amounts of data. This type of computer- assisted content analysis is ‘well- suited 
to identifying and confirming “blank spots” in discourse, or revealing what is not 
talked about or what is no longer talked about’ (Bennett 2015: 997). By applying 
qualitative content analysis to specific categories of tweets identified in the senti-
ment analysis, we were able to reconstruct and interpret the dominant positive 
and negative frames with respect to Academi that appeared in the discourse on 
Twitter (see also Bryman 2012).
 The following sections explain the steps necessary in collecting and preparing 
the data and subsequently conducting a sentiment analysis. The chapter con-
cludes with an overview of our findings, with a special focus on the sets of state-
ments we identified as being the most negative and the most positive.
Data retrieval and preparation
Retrieving social media content on a large scale cannot be done manually. 
Opening the Twitter website and manually extracting tweets, for example, is a 
slow and error- prone process. Commercial businesses offer tailored data sets 
with prices ranging from several hundred to thousands of US dollars, usually 
depending on the volume. Another way of obtaining a complete data set is to use 
special software tools that can retrieve data to meet researchers’ specific needs 
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by filtering the data according to keywords, geographic areas or languages. In 
addition to a wide range of fully or partially commercial tools, there are also free 
and open- source solutions such as NodeXL and the package twitteR for the R 
statistical computing project.
 Our data sets were collected by means of a program we wrote to access the 
Twitter API.2 This program allowed us to collect all tweets originating from and 
directed to Academi, as well as all tweets that contained the keywords ‘Academi 
Elite’, ‘Blackwater’ or ‘Xe Services’ that originated from other users. This 
enabled us to collect 264,852 tweets, which were stored in ordinary text docu-
ments of medium size.3 We then divided the data into two data sets to identify 
frames that were dominant in the public and the company spheres. The first data 
set contained the tweets published by Academi Elite and those directly addressed 
at it using, for example, an ‘@’ reference; this will now be referred to as the 
‘Academi data set’. The second data set of tweets, which will be referred to as 
the ‘public data set’, consisted of all tweets that did not originate from the 
company itself but that contained the current name of Academi Elite or one of its 
former names (e.g. ‘Blackwater’). The two data sets were not equal in size: the 
Academi data set contained 1356 tweets, whereas the public data set consisted of 
263,496 tweets.
 The next step was to consolidate the data sets by removing all tweets that 
were not relevant to our research question. Owing to the large size of the result-
ing data set, we extracted a random sample of 1000 tweets, which we then pro-
cessed manually to identify and remove all non- fitting tweets along with their 
respective retweets from the overall data set. A significant portion of the public 
data set contained tweets that were not related to our case study of the PMSC 
Academi Elite but referred to the popular TV series Game of Thrones, the pro-
motion of songs, or a women’s football match, among many other things.4 In 
addition, all non- English tweets were removed from the data sets, because the 
aforementioned software program works best when the English language is used. 
After the removal of these tweets, the public data set contained a total of 162,350 
entries and the Academi data set remained the same. We decided not to filter out 
tweets with identical text, because they occurred in the form of retweets and 
expressed the implicit support and sharing of the original message.
 To ensure smooth processing by the sentiment analysis program, the collected 
data first had to be revised. Text contained in tweets differs significantly from 
most other types of written language, such as that seen in newspaper articles, 
books or blog entries. In addition to text messages, tweets may contain links to 
other websites or may address another Twitter user directly by their user name in 
the format ‘@username’. Such particularities typically cause problems, because 
most natural language processing techniques, such as sentiment analysis, work 
best with or even require correct formal language. In contrast, tweets often have 
a complex structure, are idiosyncratic and usually contain colloquial language. 
These properties make them a tough challenge for linguists and computer scien-
tists alike who are trying to improve the automated evaluation of natural lan-
guage. One example of such difficulties is the seemingly easy task of identifying 
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the end of a sentence. Although in most cases sentences are separated by a 
period, question mark or exclamation mark, a multitude of exceptions to this rule 
exist with respect to tweets. Not only are some entities often referred to by their 
abbreviations (e.g. ‘U.S.’); certain titles indicating a level of professional 
advancement such as ‘Dr.’ or quantities such as ‘4 million umbrellas’ require a 
sophisticated approach to sentence detection.
 In addition, computer programs still struggle with certain characteristics of 
human language, such as sarcasm, irony, allusions, innuendo, dialects and meta-
phors. For instance, the colloquial sentence ‘This was a funny movie – not!’ 
might be interpreted by the program as a very positive statement because of its 
grammatical structure. For the reader, however, the unconventional form in 
which the negation appears at the end of the sentence changes the meaning 
entirely and is reliably and correctly interpreted as a negative statement.
 Other popular characteristics of Twitter, such as hashtags, further complicated 
processing for us. Hashtags must be preceded by a hash sign (#), and spaces 
between its components are not allowed, which leads to the ‘gluing together’ of 
words or phrases (e.g. in the hashtag #ukrainiancrisis). The multitude of slightly 
different hashtags referring to the same event further aggravates the problem, 
and to optimally use the maximum of 140 characters allowed in a tweet, users 
often rely on abbreviations or invent new, creative expressions such as ‘w/o’ 
(‘without’) and ‘w/e’ (‘whatever’). As the technical development of the under-
lying technologies progresses, entirely new forms of textual representations are 
emerging on Twitter, including smileys (‘:-)’) and the more diverse emojis. The 
latter are graphical representations frequently used in social media; for example, 
the ‘thumb- up’ icon is derived from Twitter.
 To bridge the gap between the expected formal language and the language 
that is actually found on Twitter, we removed all links and the expression ‘RT’ 
that are automatically added to a tweet when it is retweeted. We also replaced 
user references with invented surnames, such as ‘Daniel’, and expanded the most 
commonly used abbreviations (e.g. replacing ‘ive’ with ‘I have’). A common 
phenomenon that was more difficult to address was the expansion of hashtags, 
such as ‘#unitedstatesdefenseandmilitaryforces’; still, a significant proportion of 
the hashtags could be processed by simply removing the #. In the case of ‘#Iraq’, 
for example, we decided to remove only the preceding # from the tweets. After 
preparing the tweets of both data sets in this way, we applied the sentiment 
analysis.
Sentiment analysis
The most widespread approaches to sentiment analysis rely on machine- learning 
techniques in which algorithms are trained on small samples of data until they 
have reached a satisfactory level of accuracy. Machine- learning techniques have 
become widely used because they usually offer high levels of accuracy and can 
be applied in a wide range of scenarios, even if the source material poorly 
adheres to syntactic or semantic conventions, as is the case with tweet content. A 
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key feature of such machine- learning frameworks and algorithms is their ability 
to construct patterns from a limited amount of data and to then apply these pat-
terns to new data. In most cases, machine- learning techniques yield very good 
results, but creating them can be time- consuming.5 To conduct the sentiment 
analysis in our research project, we used the well- documented open- source 
framework Stanford NLP from the Stanford Natural Language Processing 
Group.6
 Being a machine- learning framework, the Stanford program requires a model 
to analyse the data. The model provides a benchmark for the computer program 
to sort the sentiments into the proper categories, and the process of building a 
model is called training. The standard Stanford Sentiment framework was origin-
ally trained on 11,855 sentences derived from online film reviews, each sentence 
of which was annotated with a score according to a five- level scale ranging from 
0 to 4: very negative (0), negative or fairly negative (1), neutral (2) positive or 
fairly positive (3) and very positive (4). For example,
Original text: ‘Good film, but very glum.’
Annotated version: (3 (4 (3 Good) (2 film)) (2 (2,) (1 (2 (2 but) (2 very)) 
(1 (1 glum) (2.)))))7
The numbers preceding the words in parentheses indicate the sentiment scores 
for the individual word or phrase, and the words are then grouped together with 
additional parentheses to indicate their relation. Next, the grouped words are 
assigned a new sentiment score to account for changes that might result from the 
regrouping. In the example shown above, for instance, the word ‘good’ was 
assigned a positive score (3) and the word ‘film’ a neutral score (2), but together 
the words express a very positive sentiment, so as a group they were assigned 
the highest score for positivity (4).
 Sentiment scores are also assigned on the level of phrases. Each phrase is 
extracted from the tweet’s text and in most cases represents a complete sentence. 
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of recognized phrases per tweet, indicating that 
most tweets consist of no more than two phrases (or sentences).
Table 4.1 Distribution of sentences per tweet in the data sets
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Source: own table.
Note
Rounding errors may lead to sums other than 100%. Rows representing less than 1% were omitted.
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 If a tweet consists of more than one phrase, how should the final score for the 
whole tweet be calculated? One way to do this would be to determine the 
average of all the values. Another would be to take only the score of the longest 
phrase in a pars pro toto manner, based on the argument that the longest phrase 
carries more meaning because it is more elaborate and therefore more indicative 
of the sentiment than are the other phrases. However, this need not be the case, 
as can be seen in the following example:
‘No one could do anything about it as we were in Iraq.’ [phrase 1] (2)
‘– ISIS on gains?’ [phrase 2] (2)
‘Nope, Blackwater on killing US govt workers.’ [phrase 3] (1)
‘http://t.co/3VL94SezKy’ [phrase 4] (2)8
The sentiment analysis generates a neutral score (2) for the first, second and 
fourth phrases, whereas a fairly negative score (1) was assigned to the third 
phrase.9 Although the first phrase is the longest part of the tweet, only the third 
phrase clearly indicates the negative sentiment of the tweet, so the overall senti-
ment would be neutral. The arithmetic mean of 1.75 (7 divided by 4) still indi-
cates a largely neutral tweet, with a weighted average of 1.63. The example 
shows how the addition of a hyperlink in the tweet may blur the result in that it 
distorts the calculated results of the sentiment analysis. By removing the link, we 
can reduce the number of phrases to three and the arithmetic mean score to 1.67 
(5 divided by 3) and the weighted average to 1.57. For this reason and in order to 
increase the precision of our results, all links in the tweets were removed.
 In our research project, the question of what strategy should be used to 
compute the final score for each text was actually more of a thought experiment. 
Owing to the 140-character length limitation, the tweets in our study consisted 
mostly of one sentence, rarely of two and very rarely of three or more. A pretest 
had revealed that the different calculating schemes produced similar outputs for 
our data, so we could have used them interchangeably in our example; we 
decided to base our results on the scores assigned to the longest text phrase 
detected in a given tweet.
 Because the researchers at Stanford University had trained their program on 
11,855 sentences obtained from online film reviews, it had to be retrained for the 
coding of tweets. We manually coded 1000 tweets out of the Academi data set 
and the public data set by assigning sentiment scores in a syntactically and 
semantically plausible manner (see Socher et al. 2013). The (re-)training of the 
model required three data sets: the training data set, the development data set 
and the test data set, each of which represented a different fraction of the data 
under scrutiny. First, we determined the sentiment scores for 1000 tweets based 
on manual coding, after which we divided the 1000 manually coded tweets into 
the three data sets to train the program on how to classify tweets.
 The first data set (the training data set) was used to train a model of the 
program, which was then tested on the second data set (the development data 
set). In an iterative procedure, in which the model was trained and tested on the 
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development model several times, the model’s accuracy was gradually improved. 
After the training, the model’s accuracy was assessed by applying it to a third 
data set, which by convention is called the test data set. When the accuracy of 
the model reached 70.12 per cent, we considered it to be sufficiently trained.10
Results of the sentiment analysis
Our expectations regarding the results of the sentiment analysis were based on 
two hypotheses: (1) that the sentiment scores for the tweets in the Academi data 
set would differ from those in the public data set and (2) that the company’s cor-
porate image as disseminated on Twitter was likely to be presented in neutral or 
even positive tones, whereas the tweets representing public discussion involving 
the company were more likely to be negative owing to the scandals in which 
Blackwater was involved. Figure 4.1 presents the results of the sentiment ana-
lysis for both data sets. The neutral and moderate categories contained the vast 
majority of tweets, whereas tweets with very positive or outright negative scores 
were fairly rare. Thus, our sentiment analysis confirmed both our first hypothesis 
(i.e. that the sentiment scores would differ across the two data sets) and our 
second hypothesis (i.e. that the Academi data set would generally yield more 
positive sentiment scores than the public data set would).
 In accordance with our mixed- methods approach, the next step after the senti-
ment analysis was to select the very positive and very negative tweets in each 
data set for further qualitative content analysis. For the Academi data set, the 
scoring revealed 15 very negative tweets and 34 very positive tweets; in the 
public data set, there were 9032 very negative tweets and 813 very positive 
tweets. As expected, the tweets from the public data set contained generally 











































Figure 4.1 Comparison of sentiment scores as percentages of all tweets in the data sets.
Source: own figure.
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the share of negative tweets in the Academi data set was significant and worth 
looking into.
Qualitative content analysis of outlier values
A closer qualitative examination of the tweets was necessary to understand 
which elements of the tweets were decisive for the categorization ‘very negative’ 
or ‘very positive’. We saved all the negative tweets in a text file and qualitatively 
examined a random sample of 1000 entries in a pars pro toto manner. We found 
that the prevalence of negative tweets can at least partially be attributed to the 
specific topics surrounding PMSCs and the related vocabulary. As a PMSC, 
Academi publishes security- related news that is evaluated as negative by the 
program used to classify the tweets for the sentiment analysis. To give an 
example, the following tweet, posted by Academi, was scored as fairly negative 
because it contains the words ‘killed’ and ‘attack’:
Policeman killed in al- Shabaab attack in Kenya. Read more from India 
Times: http://t.co/knE5YPMefK #news #kenya #al- shebaab.
Although the content of the information is evidently negative, it is unlikely that 
it would have a negative tone considering that it is Academi’s own news tweet. 
In particular, tweets related to the company’s work, such as workshops on gun 
safety (e.g. ‘We have a variety of training options for civilians and individuals: 
pistols, shotguns, rifles – we have it all!’) result in negative sentiment scores, 
probably because the tweet refers to specific weapons. However, this does not, 
or not necessarily, lead to a negative evaluation of the PMSC; rather, in the case 
of a PMSC, words that would otherwise connote negativity might not carry the 
same meaning. This characteristic represents a challenge to research on PMSCs 
or on armed security actors more generally.11 Thus, our qualitative analysis 
revealed problems with the sentiment analysis that would otherwise have 
remained unnoticed.
 Moreover, our qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2008) yielded insights 
into the prevalent topics and arguments that underlie the positive or negative 
evaluations of Academi on Twitter. We conducted separate qualitative content 
analyses of the Academi data set and the public data set, focusing on the mani-
fest content of tweets categorized as very negative or very positive. The mes-
sages were then summarized based on the most common topics.
 Two topics dominated the public discussions about Academi: the threatening 
of a state department official by an employee of the company (then operating 
under the name Blackwater) and the trial following the shooting in Nisour 
Square in Baghdad. Both incidents occurred in 2007, at which time the company 
was a major contractor working for the US government in Iraq.
 The first event, though it dated back to 2007, gained momentum in the Twitter 
community only later, in 2014, when an article published by the New York Times 
revealed that a state department official had been threatened by a Blackwater 
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employee (see Risen 2014). The incident as a whole, especially the role of the 
company and its employees, was received very negatively, as indicated by the 
sentiment scores. This finding was substantiated by a qualitative evaluation of 
tweets condemning the incident, such as ‘[t]his is insane report: blackwater 
threatened to kill a state department official investigating them’.
 Even more prominent than the first event, and received almost as negatively, 
was the trial that led to the conviction of former Blackwater employees for the 
shooting in Baghdad’s Nisour Square in 2007 in which several Iraqi civilians 
were killed. The trial took place in a federal court in Washington, DC. The US 
Department of Justice charged the former Blackwater operatives with counts of 
first- degree murder. Right from the beginning the trial was discussed so inten-
sively that the judge, Royce Lamberth, explicitly ordered the jurors not to 
consult any social media at all – specifically mentioning Twitter – but to stick to 
the evidence presented during the trial, reportedly remarking, ‘Just don’t do it; 
just stick to the evidence’ (Al Jazeera America 2014).
 Several tweets indicate that Twitter users approved of the Blackwater guards 
having to face charges: ‘Blackwater operatives finally being tried for murders? 
Am I dreaming? http://t.co/znNripwOuv’ and ‘[…]. This is awesome. Next 
Blackwater Academi should be sued to Hell and back: #Mercenaries should be 
#hostishumanigener …’. Some tweets suggested incomprehension and indigna-
tion about the continuous contracting of the company even after the 2007 inci-
dent. For economic reasons, some even questioned the need to hire PMSCs in 
general. Users felt that Blackwater was paid too much for duties that the US 
military could and should have performed itself, as indicated by the tweet ‘Too 
much spent on military? Probably. Too much spent on outsourced privateers of 
the Blackwater ilk? FFS yes!’. Moreover, users expressed the fear that the gov-
ernment did not have enough control over the contractors or that those com-
panies themselves had too much power. This is evident in tweets such as ‘Holy 
shit, lost control over your mercenaries, US? Blackwater manager threatened to 
kill govt inspector ~ http://t.co/eQXM6YBWYk’ or ‘Are contractors too 
powerful?@nytimes article on Blackwater running the show in Iraq makes me 
think of Iron Man: http://t.co/4CT8oUMcpL’. The issue of privatizing security 
was rarely mentioned, although the debate clarifies that some users considered 
PMSCs per se as being problematic: ‘There are a lot of government functions 
that should never be privatized. Defense is one of those. #Blackwater.’
 In addition to the tweets condemning the incident in Nisour Square and the 
subsequent trial of those involved, as well as the tweets criticizing Blackwater, 
statements also appeared that seemingly came from former operatives of Black-
water and that criticized the whole trial with comments such as ‘Its disgusting 
and wrong and i didnt serve 3 tours as a blackwater/xe mercenary to come home 
to this bullshit.’
 The aforementioned two topics (the event and the trial) were both derived 
from the strongly negative tweets of the public data set. But, perhaps more sur-
prisingly, criticism of the company could also be found in the tweets that con-
tained very positive sentiments. Despite their positive expression, these tweets 
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shared the criticism of the negative tweets but did so in a syntactically and 
semantically positive tone. For example, one tweet strongly lauded investigative 
journalist Jeremy Scahill’s book in which he strongly criticizes Blackwater: 
‘[h]ighly recommend jeremy scahill’s blackwater: the rise of the worlds most 
powerful mercenary army. it’s a great read.’ Thus, the qualitative content ana-
lysis revealed that both the negative and the positive tweets in the public data set 
were largely dominated by the same strong criticism of Blackwater and differed 
only in their articulation. This shows that the qualitative content analysis was 
crucial to complement (and at times correct) the preceding sentiment analysis.
 The topics that dominated the public data set were virtually absent from the 
Academi data set, which consisted primarily of company PR messages to 
promote training courses and job openings. The most frequently occurring topic 
in the positive tweets were references to the 100,000 job initiatives designed to 
provide jobs to veterans and Academi’s contribution to this initiative, such as 
‘Academi congratulates the 100k jobs mission and is proud to contribute to its 
goal!’
 Again, the limits of the sentiment analysis are shown in the case of tweets 
from the Academi data set that received negative scores. Tweets such as ‘Record 
number of U.N. peacekeepers fails to stop african wars from […]’, which was 
linked to an article in the Washington Post, were classified as very negative by 
the program, even though the message as relayed by Academi was little more 
than a fairly neutral newspaper article and did not indicate a negative assessment 
of Academi. The negative score was a result of the combination of the idea of 
failing to stop wars and the word ‘war’ itself. Nonetheless, the sentence as a 
whole does not indicate a negative tone but rather addresses a topic that can 
easily be interpreted as carrying a negative meaning. The negatively classified 
tweets of the Academi data set consisted almost exclusively of such false posit-
ives. Correcting these wrong classifications required manual recoding of the cor-
responding tweets and adding them to the material on which the sentiment model 
was trained.
Conclusion
The goal of our analysis was (1) to test whether differences in the tonal polarity 
were evident between the discourses of the PMSC Academi Elite and those of 
the general public on Twitter about Academi Elite, and (2) to identify the crucial 
frames responsible for different tonalities. The amount and linguistic character-
istics of the data posed serious methodological challenges that were overcome 
by means of a mixed- methods design that combined quantitative sentiment ana-
lysis and qualitative content analysis. Using this design, we relied both on the 
sentiment analysis to provide evidence of differences between the two data sets 
with regard to the expressed sentiments and on the content analysis to determine 
that the dominant frames were significantly more negative in the public dis-
courses about the PMSC than they were in the company’s immediate Twitter 
sphere.
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 Classifying the tweets by means of the sentiment analysis enabled the sub-
sequent content analysis. The qualitative content analysis showed that there were 
no topical intersections between the two sets of discourses and identified the key 
frames responsible for the different sentiment scores for each data set. It also 
largely confirmed the differences in the distribution of sentiment scores indicated 
by the sentiment analysis and permitted erroneous or misleading assessments of 
the sentiment analysis to be corrected.
 Our study provides several insights into the use of sentiment analysis. Its 
greatest advantage is its strength in processing large amounts of data in an era 
when massive data sets are becoming the norm for researchers in the social sci-
ences. As a heuristic tool, it gauges the distribution of sentiments within data 
sets, enabling us not only to compare them with one another but also to perform 
further analysis by selecting the most promising data for subsequent, in- depth 
(qualitative) analysis. Our content analysis not only corroborated our initial 
hypotheses – which had already been confirmed by the results of the sentiment 
analysis – but also allowed us to identify the major arguments and thematic 
aspects present in each data set, which led to either a negative or a positive 
representation of the company.
Notes
 1 However, we are aware of the singularity of Blackwater and would like to emphasize 
that it is not representative of the PMSC industry – most PMSCs do not engage in 
armed activities, whether in combat or otherwise.
 2 API is an abbreviation for application programming interface.
 3 The individual document size did not exceed 30 MB.
 4 The identified tweets and their retweets were removed from the sample.
 5 For an alternative approach, such as dictionary- based techniques, see Grimmer and 
Stewart (2013); Lucas et al. (2015); Serrano- Guerrero et al. (2015).
 6 The framework is available online at http://nlp.stanford.edu. Alternatives include the 
Apache Software Foundation Mahout (http://mahout.apache.org) and its Spark frame-
work (http://spark.apache.org/mllib).
 7 A training, development and testing data set is available from http://nlp.stanford.edu/
sentiment.
 8 We anonymized all the tweets cited in this chapter to protect the privacy of the 
Twitter users.
 9 As indicated by the scores for the links, the software framework assigns scores to 
phrases even if they are not part of a strictly syntactically and semantically correct 
sentence. Even if these scores were always neutral – which they are not – they would 
distort the result of the calculation of the score for the whole sentence. Therefore, we 
removed all links in the tweets prior to processing.
10 There is no universally accepted threshold for the level of accuracy; accuracy is 
understood here as the portion of correct classifications of the overall sentiment of a 
phrase. The model trained here reached a level of accuracy of 70.12 per cent. In com-
parison, machine- learning programs have achieved rates ranging from 63.5 per cent 
(Diakopoulos et al. 2011: 196ff.) to 80 per cent or better (Annett and Kondrak 2008), 
whereas trained human coders usually exhibit an intercoder reliability of 70 to 80 per 
cent (Mikhaylov et al. 2012: 83). Therefore, we considered an accuracy level of about 
70 per cent to be sufficient for our purposes.
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11 To mitigate the impact of this phenomenon, the sentiment model could be retrained 
using tweets that exhibit this pattern. We realized this only after our first round of 
analyses; it shows that sentiment analysis based on machine- learning is an iterative 
process. For optimal results, the model would have to be retrained as suggested. 
Given the low number of tweets exhibiting this pattern and its consequently negligible 
impact, we did not pursue this option.
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5 Semi- structured interviews with 
non- state and security actors
Anja Mihr
Introduction
In this chapter, I will discuss how to use semi- structured interviews with non- 
state security actors, based on my experience and expertise gathered during dif-
ferent empirical research projects. An interview is a method to collect data in 
which one person, the interviewer, asks questions to another person, the respond-
ent. This can be done either face to face, by telephone or Skype or by email. In 
the social sciences, interviews are among the most common methods used to 
collect data (DiCicco- Bloom and Crabtree 2006; Polit and Beck 2006). On the 
one hand, interviews are based on in- depth preparation prior to the interview. On 
the other hand, they rely on careful analytical assessment of the interview after-
wards as well as on contextual analysis.
 An interview may be either structured or semi- structured (Fontana and Frey 
2005). Structured interviews use a questionnaire format that includes specific 
(closed) questions and ‘boxes to be ticked’. In most cases, they are used when 
language translation is needed, the respondent has a language impairment or the 
interview is being conducted by email. Structured interviews are used to generate 
quantitative rather than qualitative data. Semi- structured interviews involve an 
‘interview guide’ rather than a questionnaire; that is, a set of questions that lead 
the interviewer through the session with the respondent. There are no boxes to 
tick, and the data generated are of a qualitative nature. Semi- structured inter-
views allow for a reflexive approach towards the respondent; that is, interview-
ers may ask respondents more tailored questions and engage them in a 
conversation about the subject matter at hand. If time allows, both sides have the 
flexibility to delve deeper into a particular topic.
 Semi- structured interviews are most useful when researchers have only one 
chance to interview someone and when several interviewers and researchers of the 
same project will be sent out to do the fieldwork at different stages and in different 
countries and with different interviewees. According to Bernard (2006), the semi- 
structured interview guide provides a clear set of instructions for interviewers and 
helps produce comparable qualitative data. The gathered data allow for interpreta-
tion to answer the specific research questions of the project, program or fieldwork. 
Semi- structured interviews are often preceded or accompanied by participatory 
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observations (see Chapter 12 by Tessa Diphoorn) or informal and unstructured 
talks, such as in conjunction with a political event, caucus or conference. This may 
help the researcher gain a keen understanding of the topic and develop further 
semi- structured questions for subsequent interviews with specific key stakeholders 
that are relevant to the project.
 Semi- structured interview guides allow researchers to ask open- ended ques-
tions and to interpret the ‘why’ question of a study in many research contexts, 
whereas structured interviews tend to answer ‘how many’ questions and are 
more suitable for data collection, surveys (see Chapter 13 by Sabrina Karim) and 
statistics. The difference is of particular importance in inter- and transdiscipli-
nary research, which involves researchers from different backgrounds who 
conduct interviews at different stages or phases of a project. Before a research 
project is begun, those involved in its design should make clear to the project 
team which type or types of interview(s) will be used, even if they decide to 
combine structured and semi- structured approaches. In addition, there is the 
question of whom to interview, which in the case of non- state security actors can 
present particular challenges.
 An interview guide is a useful tool for interviewing non- state security actors, 
whether they be members of the local paramilitary or of a private, commercial 
security sector training company, such as Academi (formerly Blackwater). These 
actors often emerge when governments and local authorities are unable to 
provide effective and reliable security and protection. In many countries in trans-
ition, after times of conflict or war, these non- state actors are usually one of the 
primary targets for security sector reform (SSR). But, more generally speaking, 
non- state actors in the field of security are diverse and broad- ranging; they 
include non- governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations 
(CSOs), multinational or national corporations, religious groups, and diaspora, 
migrant, minority or refugee groups, but also violent non- state actors such as 
armed groups, rebels and terrorists (Mihr 2012). Among non- state actors we also 
find academics, experts and former policymakers and legislators who speak only 
in their private capacity and do not do so on behalf of or to represent any institu-
tion, whether it be a state or a non- state institution.
 In our three- year, interdisciplinary research project, ‘The Impact of Trans-
itional Justice in Democratic Institution Building’, which covered eight countries 
throughout the world, the challenges were to coordinate field trips, interviewers, 
language interpreters and both state and non- state interviewees at different stages 
and phases of the project. Some interviews required interpreters while others did 
not. Some were conducted partly with interpreters during the first months of our 
research in Sierra Leone and Brazil. Other interviews were conducted only after 
20 months into the research project in countries such as Germany, Japan and 
Hungary. In our project, a structured questionnaire would have made collecting 
the data we needed very difficult because, over time, new questions emerged, 
earlier ones were dropped and new ones were included in the interview guide. A 
number of researchers made several visits to the countries in question and con-
ducted semi- structured interviews. Strict questionnaires would have generated 
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only ‘safe’ facts and figures that had already appeared elsewhere in the literature. 
Semi- structured interviews with an interview guide and clear ‘why’ questions 
proved to be the best approach to collecting a rich set of qualitative data to be 
assessed and to provide answers to our main research question. A guide, such as 
the one we used, adapts to the dynamic and changing nature of a project and its 
focus over a period of time.
 Thus, this chapter focuses on examining the use of semi- structured interviews 
as viewed through different empirical research projects that involved non- state 
security actors, including CSOs, NGOs and experts from business, law and 
academia or human and civil rights activists or separatist- group sympathizers 
who have responded in their private capacity but have been part of a regime 
transformation or of decision- making processes concerning a political event (e.g. 
the making or implementation of laws).
The purpose of semi- structured interviews with non- state 
security actors
In a research project, semi- structured interviews are suitable for addressing 
‘why’ questions and generating qualitative data that allow for further interpreta-
tion. In the social sciences and the humanities, they are the core of empirical 
research designs of this type (Bernard 2006). Interviewing key stakeholders adds 
to the qualitative component of the design by unravelling and uncovering 
information, data and nuances of policymaking of both the recent past and the 
present. By juxtaposing quantitative data with the views and positions of stake-
holders, as seen from the perspective of the interviewees and respondents, this 
approach contributes to a triangular research design. Non- state actors and experts 
are of particular interest because they often talk about their personal experiences 
and motivations, as well as about the failures in their work – that is to say, unlike 
state officials or authorities, who represent institutions and are less likely to share 
their own experiences, non- state actors often respond in their personal capacity 
as independent individuals (Whiting 2008; Mihr 2011).
 In human rights, post- conflict and transformation research, non- state actors 
are essential respondents, because they add value to the institutional knowledge 
and data that are already available. In post- conflict societies and countries in 
transition, non- state security actors in the field are often key to establishing or 
re- establishing security. For research projects conducted during this period (i.e. 
the period of transitional justice or institution building), security actors, such as 
former combatants or members of armed groups, child soldiers, and paramili-
taries, or agencies that provide security training and capacity building (i.e. in the 
context of demilitarization) are of central interest to the researchers. They tell 
the stories behind the ‘big’ political agreements and decisions that are often ana-
lysed through quantitative research.
 In contrast to the non- state armed security actors, active members of grass- 
roots organizations or human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International, will 
relate personal experiences such as their successful (or unsuccessful) lobbying 
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efforts or will describe how they finally managed to make themselves heard and 
actually change the political agenda by participating in parliamentary hearings 
on torture or on refugees. In political science research, NGOs, CSOs, private 
enterprises and businesses, as well as individual activists and foundations, have 
often turned entire political agendas around, which is why they deserve our 
attention when we are conducting empirical and qualitative field research.
 The best way to approach these groups is through semi- structured interviews, 
which leave room for personal reflections, storytelling and digressions, because 
they are guided by a major ‘why’ or ‘how did it happen’ question. The inter-
viewer’s role is to guide the respondents through the talk in order to help them 
remember and share information that will supplement quantitative data. For 
example, we can quantitatively assess how many women are members of parlia-
ment in a particular country, and we may also know that this number was once 
regulated based on a political decision allowing a specific quota. But in order to 
know who pushed and lobbied for this quota, we need to conduct semi- structured 
interviews, particularly with non- state actors (such as female members of NGOs) 
who might have been the driving force behind such efforts.
 Quantitative data can thus be supplemented by qualitative data based on 
observations, participation and face- to-face or online interviews. The purpose of 
these types of interviews is to provide further insights into motivation or 
behaviour (e.g. asking NGO representatives why they made or did not make spe-
cific decisions), into the political dynamics, systems and decision- making pro-
cesses in non- state armed or security groups, NGOs, CSOs, and into the 
relationships among actors and among institutions. One might ask, for example, 
whether citizens do or do not participate in elections and whether they trust par-
liaments and governments or courts (Horton et al. 2004). The main criterion 
used in choosing this interview method is to understand ‘how’ and ‘why’ organi-
zations and institutions do what they do and their underlying motivations; in 
other words, it generates pieces of information that would not necessarily be 
available through observations or written statements from these groups. Thus, 
the data and results generated by these interviews must be considered com-
plementary to other available data.
 In social science research, semi- structured interviews are most valuable when 
the subject matter has a strong attitudinal and behavioural focus. This is the case, 
for example, if one wants to determine why some institutions receive more trust 
from citizens than others, why some democracies function better than others and 
why people participate in grass- roots organizations more actively in some soci-
eties than in others (Trinczek 2009). Because these institutions are legitimized 
through citizen participation, it is important to interview those groups – namely, 
citizens and non- state actors – who ‘decide’ whether to trust an institution or not, 
whether to participate in elections or civil rights movements or not, and so forth.
 In International Relations or comparative politics, the aim of semi- structured 
interviews is often ‘to look behind the scenes’ in order to gain insights into the 
motivations and factors that led to the adoption of certain international human 
rights treaties, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
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of 2000 and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 
2006. In this case, such interviews could be used to obtain information about the 
procedures and dynamics that led to a certain outcome (e.g. a human rights 
treaty) as a way of filling gaps in previously documented data, such as one would 
find in academic articles, books or databases (Horton et al. 2004: 339).
 During transition periods, non- state security forces, such as paramilitaries and 
private security companies, often fill the security gap left by the government’s 
inability to provide protection. However, these forces often share different 
reasons for laying down their arms, demobilizing and becoming civil security 
services for the time of transition to a functional governmental security sector. 
For researchers in the area of post- conflict or transitional justice, the reasons 
security actors relinquish their arms and become civil servants are of primary 
interest, not least because knowledge of these reasons allows researchers to draw 
direct links to how institutions are built during such periods.
 Another purpose of semi- structured interviews is to verify or falsify critical 
assumptions and hypotheses concerning larger groups, peers or target groups, 
some examples being children, women, minorities or persons aged 60 years or 
older. Surveys are one way of finding out how the population at large or specific 
target groups think and act (see Chapter 13 by Sabrina Karim). Semi- structured 
interviews can also help find out about people’s motivations; they allow us to 
explore the extent to which our theoretical priors are reflected in the actual 
behaviour and perception of significant actors and enable us to formulate new 
grounded theories (Horton et al. 2004: 348).
 When the first survey by Sommer and Stellmacher (2009) on human rights 
awareness in Germany was published in 2001, the results were surprising 
because the percentage of citizens who had a relatively broad understanding of 
human rights was unexpectedly low, and the few who did know about human 
rights said they had learned about them through their interaction with Amnesty 
International. But to determine why and how this was so, and why an NGO and 
not the state education system was the source of this human rights knowledge in 
Germany, it was necessary to interact with these people by means of semi- 
structured interviews. The answers were revealing in that it became clear that the 
formal education system in Germany had failed to provide systematic education 
about human rights because those in charge were under the misapprehension that 
political education about state institutions is the same as human rights education 
(Mahler et al. 2009). Semi- structured interviews are also valuable in creating a 
network of contact persons for the researchers on individual levels that can later 
be a source of (follow- up) information, unlike structured interviews, which do 
not allow for such personal networks and ties to emerge from the interviews.
 Another category of non- state interviewees are those we often refer to as 
‘experts’. In such cases, it is important for the interviewer to adapt to the back-
ground of the expert, whether that person has a managerial, humanitarian or 
military background. For example, private security officers, managers, aca-
demics, human rights consultants or former military officials, even when they 
are outside their office settings, tend to conform to the habits of their working 
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practices and rhetoric. For example, when respondents are asked about their 
experiences in their (former or current) capacity as CEO of a company or as a 
former police officer or civil rights activist during, say, the political transition in 
Hungary or Brazil in the 1990s, they will automatically revert to behaviour 
typical of their working situation at that time.
 The success and added value of semi- structured interviews with experts there-
fore depend largely on the social competence of the interviewer, not on that of 
the respondent. Many of these experts are oriented to predominantly question- 
and-answer interactions. Interviewers run the risk of dooming the whole inter-
view to failure if they begin by inviting a respondent to engage in a lengthy 
narration, because the semi- structured interview setting is often diametrically 
opposed to the everyday communication structures that characterize the expert’s 
workplace (Trinczek 2009: 205–206). Thus, changing the nature of an interview 
environment to one that would be more appropriate for a dialogue format can 
require considerable time and social competence on the part of the interviewer.
 In relative terms, talking to non- state or state experts during the exploratory 
phase of a research project is a more efficient and focused method of gathering 
data than is relying on participatory observation or systematic quantitative 
surveys. Conducting expert interviews can shorten time- consuming data- 
gathering processes, particularly if the experts are seen as ‘crystallization points’ 
for practical insider knowledge and are interviewed as surrogates for a wider 
circle of players. Expert interviews are also called for when one’s access to data 
might otherwise prove difficult or impossible (Bogner et al. 2009: 2), which is 
particularly true of non- state experts who are not bound by a particular state doc-
trine or by an official narrative of past events.
 Generally speaking, due to the growth of multi- stakeholder participation in 
major events, both private and public and on the international level as well as on 
national levels, the role of non- state actors becomes increasingly important for 
political action and thus for political science research. In this context, the variety 
of actors and the question of whom to consider either a state or a non- state actor 
become increasingly blurry. This question and the choice of one interviewee 
over another should be carefully investigated and assessed before an interview is 
conducted.
Methodological challenges
There is always the risk that qualitative research and interview data may be over-
 interpreted. Although semi- structured interviews allow us to interpret people’s 
behaviour, opinions and motivations, they can also turn into storytelling ses-
sions, which provide little in the way of analysable data. Often, interviewees/
respondents will invite the interviewer to accompany them to a private meeting, 
an event or a political caucus or manifestation to witness (and thereby verify) 
their estimations of a situation first hand. This option must be cautiously assessed 
by the interviewer, because too close a relationship between the two parties can 
result in bias when the collected data are being interpreted. Although such 
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 participatory observations may be useful in interpreting the respondent’s spoken 
word and other data, accompanying and spending additional time with the inter-
viewee and other members of that particular peer group in a more social environ-
ment might in some ways influence or manipulate the interviewer in terms of the 
interviewee’s/group’s motions, moods, personal affinities or aversions. Depend-
ing on the circumstances and the non- state actor, it may be the interviewee who, 
consciously or not, selects the location of the interview. S/he can dominate the 
interview and manipulate, for example, which question might come next or 
whether to let the flow of the narrative continue as it is (which would not happen 
in a structured interview). On the other hand, by (and when) guiding the respond-
ent through the interview, the interviewer influences the process and outcome of 
the interview in a significant manner.
Selection of actors and sampling of groups
Another challenge is choosing interviewees on the basis of specific criteria, such 
as level of education (Barriball and While 1994: 328–329). Non- state and 
security actors are by no means a homogeneous group, ranging from the illiter-
ate to the highly academic. When it comes to state actors, however, it is highly 
unlikely that someone at the ministry of defence or a police academy would not 
be fairly well educated, whereas in the realm of non- state actors, the chances are 
much greater that one will be asked to interview people with lower levels of 
education. Of course, a person’s level of education does not necessarily reflect 
their intellectual capacity, but it does have an influence on their ability to be 
articulate during an interview. This factor can, in turn, influence the way we ask 
questions and guide or manipulate respondents throughout an interview. When I 
conducted interviews with members of the Roma and Gitano communities in 
Slovakia and Spain, respectively, about whether they felt their human rights 
were respected or not, I met many people who had a low level of education but 
were eager to be interviewed (Mahler et al. 2009). They certainly had opinions, 
but their language and their ability to express themselves had to be taken into 
account and put into context. In such cases, the interviewer must keep in mind a 
certain responsibility to the interviewee. The same is true when conducting face- 
to-face interviews with children. It is often tempting for an interviewer to abuse 
the situation and twist interviewees’ words in a way that will make their 
responses consistent with the interviewer’s view but not necessarily with the 
interviewee’s real views.
 Non- state actors vary widely, ranging from eyewitnesses to peer groups, from 
representatives of NGOs to grass- roots activists to armed security actors, such as 
rebels. They can be academics, experts or former police or military officers. This 
broad category also includes actors who are difficult to contact, such as former 
guerrillas, warlord combatants, terrorists, neo- Nazis and members of other 
radical and violent groups and organizations. But, in any of these cases, the 
success of attempts to persuade these actors to agree to be interviewed will 
depend on the interviewer’s social competence and his or her ability to seek 
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these actors out. Even though the interviews are conducted for scientific pur-
poses, actors of these backgrounds often will agree to interviews only under the 
condition that they will have the opportunity to send out their political message. 
Researchers must be aware of the political and even radical messages that an 
interviewed actor might want to send out by using the interview for his or her 
own benefit and to justify his or her violent actions. At the latest when we need 
written approval and authorization of the interview for scientific ethical purposes 
(usually by a written consent form), we will see that many actors withdraw their 
consent for us to cite passages from the interview in our publications.
 Some years ago, for my research on transitional justice in Spain, I interviewed 
supporters of terrorists affiliated with Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA). 
These supporters agreed to be interviewed only on the condition that their names 
and personal affiliations would be anonymized. For this reason, the material in 
these interviews (or, in this case, talks) could not be used for interpretation, but 
it did serve as valid background information that could be assessed and it pro-
vided some context for the other interviews and data in this research project (see 
Mihr et al. 2011). It goes without saying that it is in the respondents’ own 
interest to provide their version of events to the interviewer in the hope that it 
will be cited in an academic publication. However, interviewing radical actors is 
a sensitive issue; by agreeing to be interviewed, they often use the platform 
offered by the academic research unit – namely, the interviewers – to justify 
their violent actions and quest for legitimacy (Clapham 2006).
 A similar example can be found in security or transition research when one is 
conducting interviews with victims and survivors of imprisonment or mass atro-
cities such as genocide. During my research on human rights in Germany and 
later in Ruanda, I met not only many political prisoners, victims of torture and 
survivors of genocide but also some of the perpetrators (Mihr 2013). Asking 
intrusive questions in such cases can be traumatizing to the respondents and lead 
to unpredictable responses, such as weeping or complete silence. At the very 
least, researchers in these difficult positions should prepare for such eventualities 
by talking to psychologists who know how to approach traumatized survivors. I 
have met interviewers who could not forgive themselves for subjecting an inter-
viewee to such a stressful situation. Apologies afterwards are often not enough. 
Even though many victims and survivors are now organized in support groups 
and can be contacted through NGOs that offer internet access or visibility (which 
is why we find them), they are not necessarily strong enough psychologically to 
face an academic researcher who asks straightforward questions concerning 
details of past atrocities, which the interviewees may have forgotten or mentally 
blocked until they are reminded as we seek answers to the why and how of their 
violent past.
 Interviewers must carefully select the activists and members of NGOs or 
CSOs to be interviewed, especially those on the local or grass- roots levels. For 
example, in researching the impact of transitional justice in Uganda, a country 
whose administrative language is English, I interviewed victims and survivors 
who had endured a decade- long war and atrocities committed by the Lord’s 
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Resistance Army in the northern part of the country. These interviews were chal-
lenging in a number of ways. One first had to overcome the language barrier. In 
addition, the women refused to be interviewed alone, and they were not allowed 
to speak without a man being present; tribal or village leaders (usually men) 
would speak on their behalf or try to find someone in the village who could 
speak English, sometimes a young man with some high- school education, even 
though he himself had not experienced the war. These leaders or spokesmen 
often spoke on behalf of the entire village. The fact that the level of education, 
traditions, gender and other ethical or religious issues impeded face- to-face inter-
views was not the most troubling aspect – in general, the problem is rather the 
fact that, as researchers, we might not be self- critical enough about such inter-
views. We are easily tempted to improperly consider responses to be legitimate 
sources of data as a way of verifying hypotheses that otherwise could not be cor-
roborated. In short, the problem does not lie with the interviewee because of lin-
guistic, educational, religious or gender differences or because of the peer group 
as such; rather, the problem lies in how we generate and reflect on the informa-
tion and data they share with us.
 Regardless of these difficult circumstances, there is one advantage to conduct-
ing face- to-face interviews; that is, the opportunity to validate the respondent’s 
answers by observing non- verbal cues, particularly when sensitive issues are 
being broached. We often refer to this type of attention to non- verbal indicators 
as ‘participatory observation’. When interviewing pairs or groups of people, we 
must ensure that all questions are answered by all interviewees, but we should 
also take note of the respondents’ behaviour and the surroundings while trying to 
prevent the effects of group pressure on their answers (Nasiritousi et al. 2016). 
Interviewing members of these groups in sequence, if possible, is usually better, 
because it makes it possible to compare the answers later.
 However, most of the positive responses to our requests for an interview 
come from persons with academic degrees or from academics and researchers 
themselves. Not only do they sympathize with us as researchers, but they also 
feel less threatened, have fewer language issues and, last but not least, are happy 
to ‘advertise’ their latest publications, articles or policy briefs throughout the 
interview as a way of promoting their own academic or activist work in the area 
at hand.
 The second group that often agrees to be interviewed includes leading repre-
sentatives of NGOs or CSOs that depend on international or public donations 
and funds – the ‘donor- driven’ NGOs. They usually speak a common world lan-
guage (mostly English) because they must regularly report to their external 
donors, most of which are located in the Global North – namely, in Europe or 
North America. That is why many of these representatives are fairly proficient in 
English and agree to participate. Because they are under constant pressure to 
report and be accountable to their (international) stakeholders for the work they 
do (and the money they spend), they are more available for interviews. Being 
quoted and cited in researchers’ publications or on their websites is a form of 
reference and accountability that may attract future donors. I mention this here 
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because, although we all acknowledge that many representatives of NGOs work 
hard and earn little, we should all be realistic enough to know that they do not 
consider it a priority to spend time with researchers from universities based 
mainly in the Global North unless they can expect some sort of benefit for 
themselves.
 A third group of non- state actors that tends to respond quickly and positively 
to interview requests includes former officials, leaders or representatives of 
NGOs, political parties or state authorities who are now willing to participate in 
their capacity as private citizens and to whom we often refer as experts or eye-
witnesses. In this context, language and memory difficulties are some of the 
challenges, which occurred, for example, when interviewing civil rights activists 
or former members of the Solidarnosc movement that was active in Poland in 
the 1980s. These activists sometimes speak only in their mother tongue (in this 
case, Polish), and they may combine their own memories and experiences with 
narratives heard from participants or the media after the fact and which do not 
necessarily reflect their own personal experience.
 Before I proceed to discuss some other methodological challenges one may 
face during semi- structured interviews with non- state interviewees, I would like to 
share one more observation. When doing research in our home countries, we rarely 
confront language problems unless we are interviewing linguistic minorities or 
refugees, and, when going abroad, we often choose countries in which we are able 
to communicate in at least one of the common administrative languages, such as 
Spanish in Latin America, French in West and North Africa or English in East and 
South Africa and India, and so on. Thus, we may unintentionally exclude emerg-
ing countries such as Belarus, China, Iran and Kazakhstan in anticipation of poten-
tial language difficulties. At the same time, a lot of the grass- roots organizations 
and non- state actors in such countries depend on international financial support (as 
explained above). As a result, they need to translate the native- language websites 
into English, French, Spanish or Arabic, depending on their major donor country/
countries, thus facilitating contact prior to our field visit. By contrast, NGOs that 
do not translate their websites into at least one of the more common global lan-
guages will rarely be ‘detected’ by our research team (unless we have grant money 
to pay a native speaker or colleague who knows the language of a specific 
country). We should be aware of these drawbacks and recognize that language bar-
riers can be an obstacle and a source of bias in our research, as can be non- state 
actors supported and driven by external donors (Fontana and Frey 2005).
 Similar problems may arise when we conduct interviews with non- state actors 
in wealthier countries, such as South Korea, Germany and Japan in which none 
of the world’s languages is a common one. Because such actors do not depend 
on international donors, instead receiving all their support from within their own 
countries, it can be almost impossible to find civil rights activists, victims or eye-
witnesses who speak English, even though they are well organized and do not 
suffer from a shortage of money. I know this from personal experience, having 
tried to arrange for interviews about transitional justice with non- state actors or 
victims of a dictatorial regime in South Korea and elsewhere. The NGO or CSO 
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websites appear only in the language spoken by the particular nation because 
they are accountable only to their own national donors or agencies; they have no 
need to promote their cause in English because it would offer no political and 
monetary benefit. In such cases, we had to hire native speakers to help us 
examine Japanese, German or Korean websites to identify potential interview-
ees. Among those interviewees were civil rights activists who had been leaders 
in the student movement during the June Democratic Uprising in South Korea in 
1987, victims of Stasi repression under the former Communist regime in East 
Germany, and NGO activists in Japan who initiated reconciliation programmes 
with former slave labourers and inaugurated private memorials for victims of the 
Second World War throughout the country. Had we not invested in translation 
services, we would have missed the opportunity to meet with these interviewees 
and obtain a considerable amount of valuable data.
 The same is true when conducting research in European or Asian countries 
where English is not a common language, such as Poland, South Korea, Japan 
and Hungary. In countries such as these, most non- state actors publish websites 
in their respective language. This limitation impedes our preparatory research 
and biases the research design if we are unable to select equal pairs and sets of 
non- state actors.
The essential link of the ‘why’ question
The semi- structured interview is an asset that allows us to make a link between 
what people say they did and what they actually did. The data collected capture 
the nuances and sensitivities of people’s actions and the meaning of such actions 
in different contexts – something that purely quantitative data does not permit. 
Data generated through interviews help to capture how people perceive their 
actions or their relationship to institutions, regime change, neighbourhood pol-
icies, and so forth. Such personal knowledge is indispensable to a thorough 
assessment when one, for example, investigates regime change or creation, con-
flicts or peace. To understand why, in 1992, the European Economic Community 
decided to establish a political union and its member states formed the European 
Union, we have to interview contemporary stakeholders (now experts) and eye-
witnesses of that time. Publicly available ‘facts’ and quantitative data are not 
necessarily profound or accurate enough to explain the momentum, the motivat-
ing factors, and why, after the end of the Cold War in 1990, these countries were 
ripe for a political union. Without qualitative knowledge and data through inter-
views, it is difficult to answer the big ‘why’ questions: for example, why did the 
institutions, governments and citizens of the European Union act or react in 
certain ways? Thus, through semi- structured interviews, we can better under-
stand major political and societal changes by examining their micro- foundations 
and the reasons they take place, with the added value of being able to focus on 
their attitudinal and behavioural aspects.
 The method of semi- structured interviews helps explain multi- causal or 
cumulative causal relationships. This holds regardless of whether the research 
76  A. Mihr
design is multi- or monodisciplinary. Interviews oriented toward qualitative 
research may seek to obtain both factual information and the meaning of such 
information. However, conducting an interview to extract meaning or purpose is 
usually more difficult owing to the subjectivity of the interviewer (and the inter-
viewee), as explained above (Kvale 1996). The interviewers’ main responsibility 
(and the main challenge they face) is therefore to control their own subjectivity 
and be as neutral and reflective as possible in trying to understand the meaning 
behind the interviewees’ words in the most unbiased and objective way possible 
(Horton et al. 2004: 340).
 Edwin van Teijlingen (2014) divides semi- structured interviews into four 
phases: (1) the planning phase; (2) the doing phase; (3) the analysis phase; and 
(4) the reflecting phase. These four phases will now be described in more detail.
 The first phase, planning, is when the questions and the ‘interview guide’ 
containing the ‘why’ question are formulated. It should also make clear what 
motivated the researcher to ask these questions and thus refer to the general 
design and goals of the research. During this phase, one should already be pre-
paring the interview and establishing a communicative atmosphere.
 The second phase, doing, consists of the actual interviewing in the field with 
the interviewee. An interview can last from 30 minutes to several hours. The 
researcher/interviewer has to listen carefully to the respondent and observe any 
non- verbal behaviour as well. An interview can be very different depending on 
where it takes place (e.g. in an office space, a public cafeteria or restaurant or a 
private home). Non- state actors often prefer either a public space or a private 
home for the simple reason that their office is too small. My best interviews are 
usually conducted in private homes, where there is no external interference and 
the interviewees soon tend to warm up, respond more freely and engage in nar-
ratives that would otherwise never have come to light. Even though the respond-
ent may not be willing to authorize certain stories later, additional data may 
prove useful in putting these stories and emotions into context; conversely, these 
stories may help us interpret the data in a new light. In addition to the interview-
ees’ actual, authorized answers, their verbal and non- verbal behaviour can be 
captured during this phase and be useful in evaluating their responses.
 The third phase, analysis, involves creating, transcribing and/or summarizing 
the interview records. It is also the phase during which the interviewers should 
analyse their own behaviour to determine whether answers that otherwise would 
not have been given were somehow triggered or to review whether they had 
risked retraumatizing interviewees who had been victims or were survivors of 
horrific acts, as explained above. Researchers often only realize afterwards how 
strongly they may have manipulated or influenced the outcome of the interview 
as a result of uncontrolled reactions, suggestive or polemic questions, mimicking 
or persuasive body language.
 Therefore, during the fourth phase, reflection, the researcher should identify 
information gaps in the interview and also prepare for the next interview. This 
phase allows us to add new questions generated by the previous interview(s) or 
subsequent discussions that can be addressed in the forthcoming interview(s) 
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with the same or a different person. Researchers who work in an interdiscipli-
nary environment for a long period of time and meet a variety of interviewees 
and interviewers may have more opportunities to learn from previous interviews. 
Individual researchers, such as PhD candidates and postdoctoral fellows, may 
wish to return to interview the same candidate to obtain information they over-
looked during the first interview; however, non- state actors often have limited 
resources and time and may not necessarily agree to be interviewed by the same 
researcher more than once.
 In general, interviewers who plan to conduct a semi- structured interview are 
advised to listen more than to speak, because most interviewers tend to talk too 
much. It is important to ask questions in a straightforward, clear and non- 
threatening way in order to avoid distracting the interviewee, and it is crucial to 
avoid using phrases such as ‘I think that …’ or expressing personal opinions 
through cues and hints, because interviewees may then try to please the inter-
viewer by giving what they believe are correct or desired responses. Finally, the 
interviewer must show genuine interest in what the interviewee is saying and 
appear to be enjoying the exchange; we should conceal any feelings of fear or 
boredom by maintaining a consistent tone of voice, posture and facial expression 
(van Teijlingen 2014).
 Thus, prior to an interview, interviewers should have acquired in- depth know-
ledge of the data, facts and figures about the subject to be addressed. The inter-
viewer must guide the respondent through the interview and be as neutral as 
possible, drawing on extensive knowledge of the case under investigation. For 
example, in my interviews with eyewitnesses and civil rights activists involved 
in the political transitions in East Germany and Hungary in the 1990s, I dis-
covered that the interviewees were often unaware of facts about the period in 
question and confused their own experience with stories they had heard or read. 
For this reason, researchers must always carefully confirm and filter interview 
content by checking it against existing external data and established information. 
In particular, we should examine how interview data are shaped by general 
historical narratives and popular belief, the social environment and the research 
process itself.
 Probing too much, too early or too late is another mistake one can make when 
conducting semi- structured interviews, particularly with non- state actors and 
their representatives who are not used to giving high- level academic interviews 
or have language impairments. Although well meaning, we may interrupt an 
interviewee who is getting carried away with a story, memories and narratives or 
who cannot find the right words to express emotions and memories. In trying to 
‘help’ in this way, we interrupt the interviewee’s train of thought, possibly 
missing out on important information. To listen and to be patient are probably 
the most important skills in this type of interview (Fontana and Frey 2005). 
Probing can be verbal or non- verbal and, to be sure, can help direct an interview 
and ease the respondent back on track. To accomplish this, one can pose ques-
tions such as ‘Can you give examples …?’ and ‘How do you feel about this …?’, 
or one can simply ask for justification of what has been said with a question such 
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as ‘Could you please tell me in your own view the pros and cons of this par-
ticular situation and why you think that is the case …?’ Trained interviewers 
listen attentively and only prompt an interviewee when it is absolutely 
necessary.
 Because most of the non- state security actors we interview are eyewitnesses, 
activists, representatives or experts, they are agents of different rationality 
models and have been effective in that they actually succeeded in influencing 
public awareness through the media or politics. Political scientists seek to inter-
view these individuals because they are an integral part of the subject matter we 
wish to explore, whether it be in International Relations, comparative politics, 
regime assessments or contemporary history. Bogner et al. (2009) argue that the 
ability to put specific knowledge to use for political gain is a constitutive charac-
teristic of this type of ‘post- traditional’ expert (Bogner et al. 2009: 4). For an 
expert or a counter- expert, therefore, the goal is to interpret the world in a high- 
profile and influential but not necessarily new manner and thus become a 
powerful voice in the struggle for the establishment of certain conditions of defi-
nitions. From a methodological perspective, expert knowledge is crucial, so 
interviewers must be aware that experts are on a constant ‘mission’ to promote 
and articulate their views to a larger audience and not necessarily to reveal a 
truth or to help the research project to be a success.
 Thus, key methodological challenges for semi- structured interviews with non- 
state actors are the selection and identification of actors and their role in the 
research project (Mihr 2011). Gender, language or cultural differences play a 
greater role when one interviews non- state actors as opposed to state actors, 
because state actors give interviews based on their position or have received clear-
ance from their superiors to participate in their official but not private capacities. 
Moreover, they tend to have interpreters who can facilitate the interview. We inter-
view those actors because of their position within the institutional framework they 
represent, not so much because of their personal motivations, experiences and 
future visions, which can be very personal and private. Non- state actors are more 
sensitive to these questions, because they do not represent a formal or state agency 
and often act outside the formal or legal governmental framework.
 Preparing well for the interview and obtaining as much information and 
factual data about the situation, era, incident or event of interest as possible are 
of the utmost importance in being able to separate the respondent’s story from 
external data. Interviewers should avoid being too well acquainted with the inter-
viewee but at the same time should create an atmosphere that is comfortable for 
both parties. The interview guide containing the ‘why’ question should con-
stantly be adapted as the research progresses. The different phases – preparation, 
interviewing, analysis and reflection – distinguish the semi- structured interview 
from the structured interview, which involves only a question- and-answer 
method. The success of a semi- structured interview will be evident when the 
researcher feels that she or he has been able to obtain information and data that 
explain and answer the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions that are otherwise not avail-
able in the existing literature or databases.
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Conclusion
The take- home message for those who conduct field research that involves semi- 
structured interviews with non- state actors is that it is a learning process and a 
skill that anyone with open research questions can acquire. Regardless of 
whether the research project is comparative, multicausal or monocausal, what 
makes interviewing non- state actors an asset is the fact that we generate data that 
help explain the circumstances and the reasons for the subject matter under 
study. Generally speaking, non- state security actors are not bound by narratives 
based on official state doctrine when answering our questions. During the inter-
view, they are more flexible, and they are willing to be guided and to accept in- 
depth questions and discussions.
 Contemporary empirical field research and interviews are focusing more and 
more on non- state actors and less on state actors for two reasons. First, when 
interviewing state actors, such as representatives of governments or diplomats, 
the outcome has often been disappointing because the interviewee later failed to 
authorize the responses if they did not follow strict state orders or because the 
answers were ones that could have been found on the website of the respective 
institution, such as parliament or the ministry of justice. Non- state and private 
corporate actors, particularly in the emerging realm of multi- stakeholder 
decision- making (e.g. in cyber security and governance), are being asked to 
assume state duties and responsibilities to safeguard the security of citizens or 
internet users. This is an area that is gaining significance for political science 
researchers (Nasiritousi et al. 2016). However, the methodological challenges 
remain the same regardless of which actor is interviewed, because the success of 
an interview depends mainly on how well the interviewer is prepared and 
whether the interview is conducted in the most neutral and professional way 
possible.
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interviews and document analysis 




This chapter introduces the reader to a study of security contracting by the 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). The study was conducted as part 
of a larger research project entitled ‘Security for Sale’ which I worked on 
together with my colleague Professor Maria Stern between 2009 and 2013. The 
overarching aim of the project was to map out and analyse different understand-
ings of security work and expertise among public and private security profes-
sionals. Originally, the idea was to research security privatization in several 
different countries. As the project progressed, however, we grew increasingly 
interested in the Swedish case, having noticed significant changes in terms of the 
official view of – and indeed use of – private security among state agencies. In 
the end, the project resulted in several case studies within Sweden, covering a 
variety of aspects of security privatization, such as the use of private security 
companies (PSCs) at Stockholm Arlanda Airport, the implications of security 
privatization for Swedish security and development work in Afghanistan, the 
view of PSCs among Swedish military officers, and, as will be explored below, 
the contracting of PSCs by the Swedish MFA for diplomatic protection (Bern-
dtsson and Stern 2011, 2013; Berndtsson 2012, 2013). With the exception of the 
study on Swedish ‘PSC- military relations’ (Berndtsson 2013), the studies relied 
chiefly on interpretative or qualitative analyses of textual sources collected 
through interviews and official state documents.
 The study discussed in this chapter was initiated in 2010 and subsequently 
published in Millennium: Journal of International Studies as ‘Security Profes-
sionals for Hire: Exploring the Many Faces of Private Security Expertise’ (Bern-
dtsson 2012). The study was prompted by the decision by the Swedish MFA in 
2008 to contract with private security contractors to provide armed protection 
and security management services at the Swedish embassies in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Sudan. Before this time, the official Swedish position on the use of PSCs in 
high risk or conflict areas had been characterized by reluctance and suspicion, 
but this changed into a much more active engagement with, and a growing reli-
ance on, commercial security services. From our perspective in the research 
project, this change raised a number of pertinent questions: Why had the 
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Swedish position on private security changed? How did PSCs become seen (and 
rationalized) as accepted and trusted security providers? What were the con-
sequences of this development for Swedish engagement in peace operations and 
in development assistance and reconstruction efforts? While all of the questions 
were deemed interesting and relevant for the project, this particular study needed 
a more narrowly defined focus. With the overarching aim of the research project 
in mind, it was decided that this study should focus primarily on one particular 
question, namely: How were images of private security contractors as ‘security 
experts’ articulated and received by the key actors in the MFA contracting 
process?
 At this point in time, fairly little was known about the Swedish use of PSCs 
beyond the basic fact that both the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs had started contracting with private security companies 
as early as 2005/2006.1 However, there was a general lack of knowledge about 
the nature and scope of contracts, the use of public procurement procedures or 
the views of contracts and companies among state security officials. This meant 
that the study needed to map out the basic facts of the case as well as to collect 
data that would make it possible to address the main research question. In the 
end, a qualitative, exploratory study was designed, focusing empirically on the 
MFA contract and relying on a combination of data collected from official state 
documents as well as semi- structured (elite) interviews with both PSC and MFA 
representatives. The method for analysis was ‘thematic’ in the sense that data 
were systematically coded and scanned for key themes and concepts and to 
examine how they were used in the construction of private security expertise.
 In this chapter, the aim is to describe and reflect on the ways in which this 
study was designed, how and why the different methods were chosen and used, 
as well as the methodological implications of these choices. Importantly, it will 
also discuss a number of practical problems that arose in relation to the organ-
ization and carrying out of the study, and the steps taken to overcome them. The 
chapter proceeds as follows: the following section will describe some of the key 
theoretical points of departure for the study and how these, together with the 
research question, provided a basis for the design of the study and the choice of 
methods for data collection and analysis. In the following section, the applica-
tion of methods will be discussed in more detail, focusing chiefly on strategies 
for, and problems with, data collection. Finally, the concluding section will 
reflect on the experiences of applying these methods for studying private security 
actors more broadly.
Designing a study of private security professionals
As explained above, the aim of the study of the Swedish MFA contract was to 
find out how PSCs are constructed and accepted as experts on security. This 
issue is important because it links up with larger questions about the ways in 
which state and non- state security actors and activities are legitimized in dif-
ferent contexts. Theoretically, the study draws on the (largely constructivist and 
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critical) work on security expertise, risk management and security knowledge by 
scholars such as Anna Leander and Elke Krahmann, as well as work on ‘security 
assemblages’ by Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams and on private 
security identities or corporate cultures by Kateri Carmola (Leander 2006, 2007; 
Krahmann 2011; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Carmola 2010). A key argu-
ment is that PSCs are ‘hybrid’ actors who draw on multiple ‘identities’ or ‘cul-
tures’ to construct images of security expertise and professionalism. This 
construction or messaging is of course done in relation to (and communication 
with) several different audiences, such as prospective clients, or other security 
actors and professionals. In this context, Carmola has helpfully pointed out that 
PSCs frequently draw on, and shift among, different organizational cultures or 
characteristics depending on the context and the audience, including the ‘worlds 
of the military, the business world and the humanitarian NGO’ (Carmola 
2010: 28).
 From this perspective, it becomes clear that in order to get at the formation 
of private security expertise, and to capture the hybrid and shifting nature of 
PSC ‘identities’, it is necessary to study not only the companies’ articulation of 
self- images in different settings and the ways in which they draw on various 
forms of specialized and legitimate knowledge, but also to study the ways in 
which these are received by different audiences. Doing so might generate inter-
esting new knowledge about the complex and variable nature of PSCs, thus 
moving away from oversimplified, static and potentially misleading descrip-
tions of what PSCs are, and how they become legitimate non- state security 
actors. In line with this argument, the study of the Swedish MFA contract 
focused both on how Swedish state authorities describe and specify the kind of 
security knowledge and skills they want from a private security contractor, as 
well as the ways in which the PSCs involved in the contracting process present 
themselves as security professionals or with expert knowledge in different con-
texts, for instance as they strived to meet the demands of (and thus become 
accepted by) the prospective client.
 The study was thus designed as a single (or in- depth) case study. As we 
know, there are potential benefits, as well as pitfalls, with single (or small- n) 
case studies (for some examples of such discussions, see Yin 2009; Bennett and 
Elman 2007; Gerring 2004; and Chapter 8 by Andreas Kruck in this volume). 
The single case study clearly has limitations, for instance in terms of making 
generalizations to a larger population of cases. However, viewing a case study as 
‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger 
class of (similar) units’, it also becomes clear that small- n or single case studies 
may contribute to the way in which we understand and study other, similar cases 
(Gerring 2004: 342). The study of the Swedish MFA contract can thus be seen 
as an opportunity to make an empirical contribution and to generate new know-
ledge about a particular case which, at the time, was poorly understood and 
clearly under- researched. This in itself is an important undertaking – not least in 
research on private security where so much of the literature (and thus our know-
ledge and understanding) has been based on studies of two cases: the US and the 
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UK. The case also offered a chance to apply theoretical ideas and concepts that 
have been used in other cases, and thus contribute to the development of a useful 
framework for analysing some of the key aspects of private security expertise.
 In essence, the MFA study sought to make sense of the ways in which the key 
actors involved in the contracting process communicate, articulate and make 
sense of private security expertise. As noted above, the idea was to see how 
PSCs draw upon and emphasize different identity traits, but also to study how 
these images were received and interpreted by state representatives. Empirically, 
this meant that the study needed to focus on different ‘settings’ in which special-
ized security skills and knowledge were discussed and articulated, and thus be 
able to capture nuances and differences in how PSCs construct (and are con-
structed as) security experts and in the process to identify how and when aspects 
of military, business and humanitarian cultures or identities come into play.
 Of course, there are many settings or contexts in which PSCs articulate and 
explain their services, skills and specialized knowledge, and these may be fairly 
distinct or overlapping. For analytical reasons, however, thinking in terms of dif-
ferent settings makes sense because, as we know, a private security company 
may well draw on very different traits when presenting itself on its website com-
pared with, say, to other commercial actors, to academics, or to international 
humanitarian organizations. The point in this study was not to cover all of these 
different sites, but rather to select a small number of manageable and relevant 
settings that could be used to flesh out differences and similarities. Eventually, 
two broad settings were outlined: the first was the ‘public’ image, i.e. the official 
representation of a security company, aimed at prospective clients, the press and 
the general public. This image is typically found in information produced by the 
company and published in written form on websites, in booklets or other market-
ing material. The second setting was the ‘professional’ image, i.e. the image that 
companies seek to convey when bidding for a contract or communicating with 
other security professionals. Empirically, the focus in the first setting was on the 
company (Vesper Group) that was eventually awarded the contract (and had thus 
been able to convince a previously sceptical MFA of its ability to deliver profes-
sional security services). In the second setting, the focus was on the contracting 
process itself, where two companies (Vesper Group and Scandinavian Risk Solu-
tions, SRS) submitted bids and where MFA security officials reviewed and 
evaluated the ability of each company to meet the requirements of the contract.
 Having come thus far, one of the main challenges for this study was the ques-
tion of access to data. As students and researchers in this field know, access to 
reliable data on the activities of private security contractors has often been in 
short supply – not least when it comes to the specific contents of contracts (see 
for example Kinsey 2006: 6–7). The security industry is secretive by nature, and 
the lack of information is particularly pronounced in relation to private security 
activities in and around violent conflicts or in ‘high- risk’ areas. This situation is 
very different from studying domestic security privatization in countries such as 
Sweden, the US or the UK, where it is often much easier to get access to official 
documents and people to interview, as well as to employ other data collection 
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methods such as participant observation or surveys. In the context of overseas 
security contracting, much of the information on private security contracts is 
classified and thus not easily available for researchers. Finally, in many quarters, 
the issue of public use of private security in conflict settings remains highly con-
troversial and politically sensitive, making the task of collecting reliable data 
even more daunting. Trying to overcome these problems, the researcher needs to 
be aware of (and reflect on) these challenges and the limitations they impose on 
research, and to be careful not to read selectively, as well as to design studies 
that avoid (unnecessary and unwanted) bias as far as possible.
 At this point, it is useful to consider the nature of documents in general, and 
the usefulness of combining or mixing document analysis with other sources of 
data. As Bryman (2008: 526–527) reminds us, there are obvious risks with treat-
ing documents (e.g. from the state) as comprehensive or transparent representa-
tions of the ‘reality’ of a particular organization. Documents such as reports, 
minutes of meetings, or indeed invitations to tender for contracts, are created in 
a specific context, for a specific purpose and with a particular audience in mind 
and do not necessarily lend themselves to accurate and useful analyses of what 
goes on in an organization. Thus, ‘if the researcher wishes to employ documents 
as a means of understanding aspects of an organization and its operations, it is 
likely that he or she will need to buttress analysis of documents with other 
sources of data’ (ibid.: 527). Certainly, documents or websites may very well be 
used as the sole source of data if, for example, the aim of the research is to 
understand how a larger sample of security companies discursively construct 
professional and gendered identities and how they frame these images to com-
municate with prospective clients (for a good example of how PSC websites can 
be used in this way, see Joachim and Schneiker 2012). The point here is that for 
an exploratory study aimed at an in- depth understanding of a single case or con-
tract, the research design has much to gain in terms of quality, empirical depth 
and credibility by mixing different methods for data collection.
 In the case of the MFA contract study, the idea was to collect data from the two 
main settings outlined above. This meant on the one hand to collect data on the 
‘public’ image of Vesper Group. As the focus was on the articulation of security 
expertise and knowledge, texts produced by the company for publication on its 
website served as a good point of departure. However, there is only so much you 
can glean from these texts, as they are often phrased in fairly general terms and 
aimed at a very broad audience. For instance, PSC websites rarely comment on 
specific contracts or their relationship with other public or private security profes-
sionals. To complement these data, the company was also approached via email 
and asked for an interview with a management representative. Using data collec-
tion through qualitative interviewing allowed me to move beyond the general and 
sometimes superficial statements on the website, and to probe a range of issues and 
questions that were not covered in the online material (such as their view of the 
general debate on the private security industry, or their take on the Swedish market 
for PSCs). This provided a fuller picture of the self- image of the company and 
improved the prospect of addressing the research question.
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 In the second setting, a similar line of thinking led to a mixed data collection 
approach. The idea was that official documents from the Swedish state relating 
to the contracting process, i.e. the invitation to tender, the bids or proposals and 
the subsequent MFA evaluations and decisions, would make it possible to see 
what services the MFA specified in the call, what criteria they set up to evaluate 
the security expertise of private security providers, as well as the ways in which 
the companies strived to meet these criteria and in the process describe and 
explain their competence in different areas. In addition, the MFA evaluations 
and decisions would most likely say something about how companies’ skills and 
expertise were deemed relevant, useful, legitimate and persuasive by state 
security officials. However, and as discussed below, the Swedish official state 
documents turned out to be of questionable quality, and complementing these 
sources of data became all the more important. In this case, making a credible 
and meaningful analysis of private security expertise and the ‘professional 
image’ of private security actors in this contracting process would not have been 
possible without the data from an interview with MFA security officials. Before 
elaborating on the application of different methods for data collection and the 
problems faced during this phase, a few words on data analysis are in order.
 Departing from the question about the construction of private security exper-
tise and the theoretical framework derived from previous studies on PSC identity 
and self- images, the analysis drew primarily on a set of methods for analysis that 
are sometimes referred to simply as “thematic analysis.” There are many ways in 
which such an analysis can be made, and there is no “standard” formula or pro-
cedure. Broadly speaking, it is a flexible qualitative approach focusing on elicit-
ing key themes and meanings from mainly (but not necessarily only) textual 
sources, either in order to inductively explore a phenomenon or to test hypo-
theses (Guest et al. 2012). Or, as Braun and Clarke write, thematic analysis 
‘examines the ways in which events, realities, meanings, experiences and so on 
are the effects of a range of discourses operating within society’ (Braun and 
Clarke 2006: 81). Thus, the approach is less quantitatively oriented than classic 
content analysis; it goes ‘beyond counting explicit words or phrases and focus 
on identifying and describing both implicit and explicit ideas within the data’ 
(Guest et al. 2012: 10). Thematic analysis essentially focuses on identifying pat-
terns or meanings in and across qualitative data sets. The analysis of the MFA 
contract was partly deductive in that it was guided by pre- defined ‘main themes’, 
i.e. theoretical categories and concepts collated from previous research on 
private security expertise that help give direction to the analysis. These were 
mainly drawn from Leander’s work on security knowledge/expertise and Car-
mola’s three organizational types or cultures. This meant that the ‘military’, 
‘humanitarian’ and ‘business’ dimensions of PSC identity were treated as main 
themes that we can expect to find in different settings where their expertise is 
described or explained. In the analysis, the main task was to find out in what way 
and to what extent the main themes appeared in the case of the Swedish MFA 
contract, what weight they were given, as well as to identify new supporting or 
sub- themes (such as the theme of ‘Swedishness’ discussed below).
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 To sum up, the study was designed as an in- depth single case study of the 
2008 MFA contract, relying on a design using mixed methods for data collection 
to provide a basis for a ‘thematic’ analysis of private security expertise in two 
different settings. As with all research designs, this also comes with its particular 
benefits and challenges. One of the strengths of the design is arguably in the 
combination of different sources of qualitative data. Combining data from offi-
cial state and private sources with semi- structured interviews clearly yielded a 
much richer image of private security expertise than could have been gained 
from either of the two types of sources. The interviews also allowed me to probe 
some of the themes and topics found in the documents further, and to cover 
issues not found in the documents. The combination increased both the quality 
and credibility of the analysis, and made it possible to overcome some of the 
problems associated with relying on a narrow selection of potentially biased 
sources. However, the design of the study also has clear limitations, especially in 
terms of empirical scope and representativeness of results but also, as we shall 
see, in terms of quality of data.
Data collection: documents and interviews
As noted above, one key challenge for this study was the lack of previous 
research on the Swedish use of private security in high risk or conflict areas. 
Thus, one of the first tasks was to try to find out more about the contract and its 
contents. Apart from a few questions in the Swedish Parliament and some short 
articles in newspapers, the discussion of the Swedish use of PSCs in high- risk 
settings was virtually non- existent. The idea was the official documents from the 
MFA could provide some basic information, as well as insight into the ‘profes-
sional image’ of the companies bidding for the contract. Thus, on 25 May 2010, 
a Freedom of Information request was sent via email to the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, asking them to release, for research purposes, all documents pertaining 
to the 2008 contract. When the official reply arrived on 18 June, it became 
evident that this source had some serious limitations. The documents (around 
100 pages in all) did provide a fairly clear image of the contracting process, 
excerpts from the bids from the two PSCs along with the MFA evaluations, as 
well as some details about the nature, extent and cost of the contract. However, 
many sections or parts of sections were partly or wholly blanked out, formally 
with reference to national security interests and the Public Access to Information 
and Secrecy Act. The blanked out parts were typically in sections on key assign-
ments and requirements, arrangements and organization of service provision at 
the embassies and use of equipment (including weapons). While the need for 
confidentiality in some areas can be readily understood, the perceived need for 
secrecy on so many issues nonetheless came as a surprise. At the same time, the 
blanked out sections (amounting to around 30–40 per cent of the total number of 
pages released) represented a result in themselves; they suggested that even in a 
fairly open democracy such as Sweden, many issues surrounding the contracting 
for security services abroad is seen as sensitive.
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 Methodologically, it would have been very difficult to rely on the documents 
alone, as they were clearly far from complete and conveyed at best a partial and 
distorted image of the contracting process. The formal decision to suppress 
certain details also included instructions on how to appeal. If an appeal was sent 
in, the Freedom of Information request would be reviewed by a government 
minister. Submitting an appeal might have resulted in more documents being 
released, but it could have diminished the chances of securing an interview with 
MFA security officials. In this case, no appeal was made; instead, the MFA Sec-
retariat for Security were contacted and asked to participate in an interview. 
With hindsight, an appeal would probably not have affected the chances of 
securing the interview, but at the time it appeared less risky to ask for an inter-
view without an appeal and thus try to rectify some of the shortcomings of the 
documents.2 As will be discussed below, despite the limitations of this source of 
data, the documents did provide basic information about the contracting process 
that proved fruitful both for the construction of interview questions, and for an 
initial analysis of key themes related to private security expertise.
 Regarding the other source of documents, this time collected from the PSC 
website, the experience was similar. The texts on these pages are obviously 
written for some particular purpose(s) and intended for a broad audience. Thus, 
while the texts describing the company’s services, expertise, ethical code of 
conduct or the professional background and experience of staff do reveal a lot 
about how it wishes to construct its public image, it does not provide us with the 
full picture. Although the omissions and gaps on PSC websites are not as visible 
as in the documents released by the MFA, they are clearly there, and we must 
again ask ourselves if these sources are enough for our scientific purposes or if 
they need to be complemented with other sources. In the case of the MFA con-
tract study, the very obvious limitations of the official state documents along 
with the feeling of not being able to get at the ‘public image’ of private security 
expertise by analysing only online material were clear indications that something 
more was needed. In this particular study, there were few options besides con-
ducting research interviews with both state and PSC officials.
 As many students of private security have experienced, interviewing PSC 
managers or state security officials requires a fair amount of planning, practice 
and, last but not least, luck. These are busy people, not always easy to get hold 
of, and occasionally suspicious of academics asking critical questions about 
(what are often perceived as) sensitive issues.3 The first challenge is to find the 
right persons to interview and to get them to participate. This normally requires 
a formal letter with a description of the research project and the purpose of the 
interview. In my experience, PSC managers and state security officials are gener-
ally willing to take part in research projects as long as they can be convinced of 
the usefulness of participating. For PSC managers, this usefulness might be 
found in the chance to explain and motivate their activities, or to get their 
message across. Of course, this presents researchers with something of a 
dilemma: we want to gain access to people on the ‘inside’ to learn about their 
organizations, activities, motivations or self- images but at the same time we do 
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not want to simply (and uncritically) reproduce their ideas and world- views. On 
the other hand, we do not want to be seen as overly critical or biased, in which 
case company managers would most likely refuse to take part.
 The key here is, as Kinsey has also pointed out, to retain ‘a certain degree of 
open mindedness about the [private security] industry’ (Kinsey 2006: 7). 
Emphatically, this does not mean accepting the world- views of the security 
industry or refraining from asking critical questions. It does mean, however, that 
when approaching PSCs (or, for that matter, state security officials), we need to 
build rapport, to come across as genuinely interested in learning from their 
experiences and as capable of (re-)presenting their stories in a professional 
manner. In the MFA contract study, as well as in previous and later work, these 
ideas have been translated into a formula for securing and conducting interviews 
that has generally worked well. In the first contact with prospective interviewees, 
I have presented the research project in general terms and the purpose and format 
of the interview in more detail. At this stage, and following the ethical guidelines 
of the Swedish Research Council, prospective interviewees are also provided 
with information about consent, the right to opt- out, anonymity and how inter-
view data will be treated once the interview has been conducted. This means that 
interviewees retain a fair amount of control over their stories. A verbatim tran-
script of the (usually recorded) interview is sent to them afterwards, and inter-
viewees are given a chance to comment on quotes or references that will be used 
in the published study. As several of my interviewees have told me, the feeling 
of being in control has been one important reason for them to accept participa-
tion.4 While one could argue that too much control is handed over to interview-
ees, I think that this is ethically sound practice that serves to protect the people 
we involve in our projects. In my experience, it has not affected my ability to 
ask critical questions, or to make independent interpretations of interview data.
 In the MFA contract study, two semi- structured interviews were conducted: 
one in August 2010 with the head and deputy head of what was then the Secre-
tariat for Security at the Swedish MFA; the other in October 2010 with a repre-
sentative of Vesper Group management. The rationale for approaching these 
(and not other) individuals was that they were the ones closest to the contracting 
and decision- making process, and could thus be expected to have unique insight 
and knowledge that could not be found elsewhere. Additional interviews with 
PSC employees and/or MFA staff could have generated more data. In this case, 
however, interviewing three of the most centrally placed persons in the case 
yielded enough insight into the contracting process and served as a sufficient 
complement to the data collated from the documents and the website. Both inter-
views were organized around a list of main questions and topics, but also with 
enough flexibility to follow up on interesting leads. The research question as 
well as my initial readings and analyses of the document and website data served 
as a basis for designing the interview guides and main topics. The opening 
 questions revolved around the debate on security privatization, and the purpose 
was to get interviewees to talk about this topic in general or neutral terms, but 
also to get them to position themselves vis- à-vis common views and statements 
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(e.g. ‘What is your take on the common understanding of PSCs as mercenaries?’ 
or ‘What were your reactions to the Nisour Square shootings in 2007?’). The fol-
lowing themes covered the background to and details of the MFA contract (e.g. 
‘What services do you think private security contractors can and should provide 
in this case?’ or ‘What is it that your company brings to the contract with the 
Swedish MFA?’). Apart from providing insight into the contracting procedure, 
these themes also opened up opportunities for questions about private security 
expertise and professionalism. The idea was to ask similar questions to both 
MFA officials and PSC representatives, and to get them to talk about what it is 
that makes private security providers useful, acceptable, and legitimate actors. 
This involved asking questions about how they (Swedish PSCs in general or 
Vesper Group in particular) are similar to, or different from, other actors such as 
state militaries or police forces, or indeed other private security actors. The third 
and final main theme covered questions of regulation, control and oversight. 
Here, the idea was to discuss issues of private security regulation and state 
control in general as well as in the specific case. Again, the aim was to learn 
more about the specifics of the particular contract, but also to get interviewees to 
reflect on issues such as the use of force by private security actors, the need for 
state control and oversight of these actors, the differences between private and 
state security actors in terms of regulation and control, and on the private 
security industry more generally.
 Each interview lasted about one hour, and the full transcripts yielded around 
40 pages of text for further analysis. The interviews provided both basic informa-
tion and, most importantly, ample reflection on issues related to the contract and 
the issue of private security expertise. Of course, some details were impossible 
to discuss during the interviews because they were classified or too sensitive. On 
these occasions, common interview techniques such as lifting the discussion to a 
more general and non- threatening level or playing devil’s advocate proved very 
useful, avoiding the ‘out of bounds’ or evidently uncomfortable areas of the 
MFA contract while at the same time getting interviewees to reflect more on rel-
evant topics. All in all, the interview data complemented the other sources well 
and provided a useful empirical basis for the subsequent analysis.
Data analysis: identifying themes and meanings related to 
private security expertise
As indicated above, the analysis of the empirical data was deductive in the sense 
that it was guided by a theoretical framework where main themes and concepts 
such as ‘private security expertise/knowledge’ and the ‘military’, ‘humanitarian’ 
and ‘business’ dimensions of PSC identity were drawn from previous research. 
The purpose of the analysis was to see if and how these themes appeared in the 
context of the MFA contract, how they were bestowed with meaning by key 
actors and in the two different settings, as well as to identify new and relevant 
sub- themes and concepts. At this point, the online material, along with the offi-
cial state documents received through the Freedom of Information request and 
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the data obtained through the two interviews made up the bulk of the empirical 
data for the study (all in all about 200 pages of text). With hindsight, these 
sources provided a sufficient empirical basis for the exploratory purpose of the 
study, but ideally a more comprehensive and sophisticated analysis could have 
been done with more data, for instance in terms of documents on internal MFA 
discussions leading up to the decision to contract for security, or interviews with 
a larger sample of PSC and MFA or government representatives and employees.
 Returning to the analysis of the data, it did not strictly follow any of the many 
existing formulas for ‘thematic analysis’, such as the six steps suggested by 
Braun and Clarke (2006). It did, however, proceed in three main steps or phases 
that served the purpose of systematically organizing the data and identifying 
recurring patterns and meanings. The first step was a close reading of the online 
material and the official state documents. This part of the analysis was both a 
kind of data familiarization, but also functioned as a way to find gaps and ques-
tions to be developed in the interviews. The second step was the actual coding of 
all the data once the interviews had been conducted. In practice, this meant man-
ually identifying and marking interesting pieces of the data (key words, phrases, 
expressions) with a particular focus on questions and patterns relating to the 
articulation and reception of PSC self- images. Since the datasets were relatively 
small, the coding was done manually, using different colours to mark different 
themes and sub- themes. The coding generated a large number of text extracts 
that could then be grouped together and analysed in relation to the main themes 
of security expertise and the military, humanitarian and business aspects of 
private security identity. The final step involved making visual (thematic) maps 
where the main themes were connected to relevant and supporting sub- themes 
and comparing the different datasets (i.e. the online material, the official docu-
ments and the interview transcripts) to see how pre- defined and new themes 
lined up in relation to the ‘public’ and ‘professional’ settings.
 In the published article, the main body of the text was structured around the 
two settings and the ways in which pre- defined and new themes were employed 
and given different meanings. In order to lend transparency and credibility to the 
analysis and to show how private security expertise was constructed in this case 
and how it was related to business, military and humanitarian qualities, a number 
of quotes from the different sources were used. In terms of results, it was clear 
that all of the main themes were present in the data, but to different degrees and 
with different meanings. For instance, references to a ‘military culture or iden-
tity’ were kept to a minimum in one setting while being a key theme in another. 
This clearly lends support to the idea of PSCs as ‘hybrid’ or ‘protean’ actors and 
as clearly being ‘more than one thing at once’ (Carmola 2010). It also revealed 
some very interesting sub- themes and concepts. For instance, it showed how the 
idea or theme of ‘Swedishness’ appeared in both the PSC and MFA interviews, 
and was used to motivate and explain security expertise, but also to construct a 
‘humanitarian’ self- image. It also showed how distinctions between ‘public and 
private security actors and expertise’ tended to become distorted and mixed up, 
especially when state security officials sought to rationalize the decision to use 
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private contractors. Taken together, the study showed how images and under-
standings of private security companies as ‘security experts’ are complex, and 
that questions of context and audience are key if we want to understand how 
these images are constructed, received and legitimised.
Discussion
The study discussed in this chapter employed an exploratory approach to address 
a research question about the formation of private security expertise in different 
settings. As discussed above, the combination of different sources of data and 
methods for data collection proved fruitful as it helped overcome some of the 
difficulties of gaining access to information on private security contracting. 
Complementing the partial and in this case highly distorted image provided by 
official documents was necessary in order to improve the quality of data and thus 
the credibility of the study, but also to facilitate comparisons. However, the data 
collection process was certainly not without challenges.
 In research on non- state actors in international security, conducting semi- 
structured interviews can be very useful, as they certainly were in this case, 
although finding interviewees who are willing to speak ‘on the record’ can be 
both challenging and time consuming. Interviewing also raises some fairly 
thorny questions about how to approach prospective interviewees, how to get 
them to move away from the ‘official’ or public relations rhetoric, as well as 
how to deal with ethical issues related to participation and use of interview 
material. In this context, we should be careful not to overestimate the possibility 
of gaining an ‘inside’ perspective through semi- structured interviews. To really 
move beyond official narratives, we need to consider alternative methods, such 
as participant observation and field work over an extended period of time (see 
Chapter 12 by Tessa Diphoorn in this volume). In addition, the themes and 
issues that you can reasonably expect to cover in interviews are limited – espe-
cially if the aim is to find out about details of contracts and PSC activities. 
Private security representatives and state security officials are often very cau-
tious and sometimes wary of researchers and will not necessarily be open to dis-
cussions of what they feel are sensitive issues.
 In this case, however, sufficient data were collected to allow for an analysis of 
the construction of PSC security expertise in the context of the Swedish MFA con-
tract. The analysis provided interesting and novel insight into the ways in which 
PSCs are constructed and legitimized as security experts, suggesting some ways 
forward for future studies, preferably with more cases and access to more data. 
Methodologically, this study could not have been conducted by focusing on offi-
cial documents alone. Even in a relatively open democratic society, the issue of 
private security contracting is highly sensitive, and access to reliable data can be 
very restricted. With hindsight, conducting more interviews would probably have 
been useful to overcome the deficiencies of the official documents. Yet it is also 
important to underscore that it is not necessarily the number of interviews that 
determines the quality of data; in this case, the central placement of the three 
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persons interviewed sufficed to lend considerable added value to the analysis. 
Ideally, however, the exploratory study of the MFA contract should be followed 
up, perhaps with a comparative case study design. This would allow for a more 
‘saturated’ or comprehensive analysis, making it possible to draw more far- 
reaching and general conclusions. Finally, the fairly rudimentary thematic analysis 
conducted in this study could be developed or – depending on data availability, the 
theoretical approach and formulation of research questions – exchanged for more 
technically advanced methods.
 On a more general note, the experiences from this study show that the combi-
nation of different sources of qualitative data collected from different ‘settings’ 
allowed the analysis to move at least some distance beyond official accounts, to 
probe central themes more deeply, and thus to better capture the complexities 
and ambiguities of private security expertise. In a wider perspective, conducting 
research on non- sate actors in international security where access to data is 
limited or where data can be suspected of being heavily biased, this kind of qual-
itative ‘data triangulation’ might serve as a useful methodological strategy.
Notes
1 One study published around this time was a report by Andreas Bergman for the so- 
called PRIV- WAR project, focusing on the legal status of PSCs in different countries, 
including Sweden (Bergman 2010). In the report, Bergman found that private security 
companies operating abroad are not specifically covered by Swedish law, and also that 
statements from Swedish state officials (including the Ministers of Justice and Foreign 
Affairs) from 2007 onwards appeared to suggest that no such regulation was needed.
2 In 2013, the MFA contracts were up for renegotiation and a new Freedom of Information 
request filed for another study. Again, many sections were blanked out. This time, an 
appeal was made and the original request was put before a government minister. In the 
decision (signed by the then Minister for International Development Cooperation, Gunilla 
Carlsson), the government decided to provide some additional information (a few para-
graphs in over 200 pages) but also decided to turn down the request once more. Motivat-
ing its decision, the government notes that even though the information is to be used for 
research (a condition under which restrictions can be lifted), and even though the govern-
ment can make information for such purposes available under conditions of confidential-
ity, the ‘risk of damage’ to Swedish national security interests and business relations 
could not be satisfactorily avoided. This experience underscored the sensitivity of the 
issue in the eyes of Swedish state officials, the silence that surrounds security contracting, 
as well as the difficulties of getting access to reliable (and comprehensive) data on state- 
PSC contracts – at least through official documents alone (for further discussion of these 
later experiences, see for example Berndtsson and Stern 2013: 70–71).
3 PSC managers and state security officials can be seen as representatives of different 
‘elites’ and studying them comes with specific methodological challenges (for some 
discussions of these issues, see for example Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987; Hertz and 
Imber 1995).
4 There are many ways in which to plan and conduct semi- structured interviews (for 
some general discussions, see Bernard 2000: 190–207, Bryman 2008: Chapter 18). For 
a more in- depth discussion of conducting semi- structured interviews in private security 
research, see Chapter 5 by Anja Mihr in this volume. In addition, there are many useful 
texts about specific techniques and discussions about the ethical issues of qualitative 
interviewing (Rubin and Rubin 2005; Bryman 2008: Chapter 5; Seidman 2006).
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7 Discussion chapter
Comments on ‘interpreting texts’
Jutta Joachim
Which method?
Which method to choose is not an easy question to answer. Unless there is an a 
priori preference on the part of the researcher for either qualitative or quant-
itative methods, what one seeks to accomplish is decisive in terms of a response. 
In the case of the chapters in this section, the goal is the interpretation of texts 
broadly defined. But even if the ‘what for question’ has been settled, the authors 
demonstrate that there is a plethora of methods to choose from. While the 
methods presented here can loosely be subsumed under the umbrella of content 
analysis, intended to capture how events or actors are perceived and are made 
sense of, they highlight very vividly that this type of method comprises various 
strands, each of which requires different tools or research steps and serves dif-
ferent purposes.
 Alexander Spencer (see Chapter 3) introduces narrative analysis, which in 
his eyes ‘helps illustrate the dominance of certain stories in public discourse 
while at the same time indicating the void left by stories that remain untold or 
marginal’ (Spencer, this book). In his case, narrative analysis makes apparent 
how rebels during the 2011 revolution in Libya were romanticized by both 
British media as well as political elites, while human rights violations perpet-
rated by them received close to no attention (Spencer, this book). Joakim Bern-
dtsson (see Chapter 6, this book) by comparison, employs thematic analysis to 
identify ‘key themes and concepts […,] examine how they were used in the con-
struction of private security [professionals]’ and ‘how they become legitimate 
non- state security actors’. Contrary to narrative analysis, which is based on 
certain preconceptions of how narratives are constructed and for what purpose, 
thematic analysis as presented by Joakim Berndtsson (this book) is rather explor-
ative in nature aimed at ‘generating new knowledge’. It is suited for mapping the 
range of possible manifestations of what one is looking for or, as Joakim Bern-
dtsson puts it, ‘identifying patterns or meanings in and across qualitative data 
sets’.
 Anja Mihr (see Chapter 5) discusses semi- structured interviews as an inter-
pretative method and a means to elicit ‘why’ or ‘how something happened’, and 
why ‘organizations and institutions do what they do’ as well as their motivation 
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behind it. Finally, Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin (see Chapter 4) present a 
mixed- methods-design combining quantitative computerized sentiment analysis 
with qualitative content analysis. While the former allows one to classify and 
group large amounts of text – in their case tweets – according to whether the 
message can be characterized as positive, negative or neutral, content analysis 
helps to dissect what the dominant positive and negative frames are.
 The methods introduced here have strengths and limitations that come to the 
fore in a comparative perspective which I will adopt, organizing my comments 
around the different research stages beginning with data collection and continu-
ing with the interpretative analysis.
What constitutes text and how to gain access to it
The chapters in this volume lend force to the assertion that ‘[a]nything that is 
intended to communicate a message is usable as material for content analysis’ 
(Hermann 2008: 152). What connotes ‘text’ varies widely ranging from official 
(state) documents (see Chapter 6 by Joakim Berndtsson and Chapter 3 by Alex-
ander Spencer), to newspaper articles (see Chapter 3 by Alexander Spencer), 
words uttered during interviews (see Chapter 5 by Anja Mihr and Chapter 6 by 
Joakim Berndtsson), but also homepages (see Chapter 6 by Joakim Berndtsson) 
or twitter messages (see Chapter 4 by Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin). While 
these various texts exhibit unique characteristics, their treatment in the different 
chapters also makes clear that none of them is ‘simply’ text, but already arrives 
quite often at the researcher’s desk with a layer of interpretation.
 All of the texts collected and used exhibit unique characteristics. They lend 
force to Joakim Berndtsson who, in reference to Alan Brymann (2008: 526–527), 
and in connection with government documents including ‘reports, minutes of 
meetings, or indeed invitations to tender for contracts’, asserts that all ‘are 
created in a specific context, for a specific purpose and with a particular audi-
ence in mind and do not necessarily lend themselves to accurate and useful ana-
lyses of what goes on in an organization’ (Berndtsson, this book). The websites 
of private security companies, for example, are often used for promotional, sale 
– as well as image enhancing purposes while tweets may have been written with 
different aims in mind, be it networking, building one’s reputation, or distrib-
uting information to name only a few. Given their particular characteristics, 
rarely do the authors analyse the different types of texts in isolation, but instead 
in a triangular fashion.
 This serves the purpose to, on the one hand, cross- check and solidify one’s 
findings. By pairing newspaper coverage with official statements of British elites 
during the course of parliamentary debates or Security Council meetings, Alex-
ander Spencer is able to show that the romanticized narrative of the Libyan 
rebels is not just an invention of the media, but also shared by political elites. 
Nevertheless, triangulation has a further meaning. According to Norman K. 
Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, it is not just a tool of validation. Instead and, on 
the other hand, it is a strategy that adds ‘rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and 
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depth to an inquiry’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 5). Seen this way, triangulation 
allows us to construct both a coherent as well as comprehensive story. It 
accounts for the imitability of different texts, the intention with which they have 
been produced and, as Iver Neumann observes, ‘… the medium through which 
they are published’ (Neumann 2008: 68).
 The uniqueness of texts becomes unmistakably clear when reading the chapter 
by Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin related to twitter messages. Their sheer volume 
contributes to the exceptionalism of the messages and makes it nearly inevitable to 
rely on quantitative methods. Furthermore, tweets are distinct from more conven-
tional types of documents because they are, as Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin 
(Chapter 4, this book) point out, ‘arenas for public deliberation and public opinion 
formation’. They make it possible for researchers not only to capture data in ‘real 
time’ and on ‘current themes’, but also ongoing ‘communications’ comprised of 
messages sent and the reactions to them. Hence, reactions to political events, devel-
opments, or statements do not have to be actively solicited by researchers by con-
ducting, for example, interviews, surveys or by relying on opinion polls. Instead, 
they are delivered ‘free house’ without delay and on the topic. Finally, tweets differ 
from other texts in yet another respect. Their authors often remain anonymous and 
provide little information about their true identity, an aspect to which I will return 
when turning to my reflections on interpretative analysis.
 Interviews too reveal interesting particularities. Contrary to the other sources 
mentioned in the different chapters, which are already given and demand of the 
researcher solely to choose between them, interviews only come into being 
through the encounter and communication between interviewee and researcher. 
In that sense, they have a certain ‘unpredictability’ as far as the result is con-
cerned. The emerging text is not merely dependent on the researchers’ ‘social 
competences’ and the quality of their more or less standardized questions, but 
also hinges on how much or how little the respondent is willing to reveal (Mihr, 
Chapter 5, this book). Interviews, according to Anja Mihr ‘leave room for per-
sonal reflections, story- telling and deviations’. While they allow, as Joakim 
Berndtsson, who also relies on them, points out (Chapter 6, this book), to ‘move 
beyond the general statement’ of publicly available material and ‘probe a range 
of issues’, conducting them involves a number of challenges that influence what 
the text will look like in the end. These challenges include, among others, the 
choice of the interviewees or experts, the relationship the researcher maintains 
with them, the language skills as well as identity- related factors of both 
researcher and respondent or the context in which or the means with which the 
interview is conducted. All of these factors contribute in their own way to what 
might be characterized as a ‘living document’.
 The challenges encountered when conducting interviews may suggest that the 
other types of texts are less cumbersome and rather straightforward when it 
comes to their retrieval and acquisition. Yet, as the chapters demonstrate, this is 
not necessarily the case. The official documents of the Swedish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that Joakim Berndtsson employs had neither been easy to get 
access to – the author and his research team had to apply for them to be released 
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– nor were they available in their entirety. Prior to their release, the ministry had 
run a check as to what is suitable for public consumption and what needs to 
remain secret for national security purposes (Berndtsson, Chapter 6, this book). 
Although the documents provided ‘a fairly clear image’ of different aspects of 
the contracting process with private security companies, they contained ‘blanked 
out parts [which] were typically … sections on key assignments and require-
ments, arrangements and organization of service provision at the embassies and 
use of equipment …’ (Berndtsson, Chapter 6, this book). Joakim Berndtsson’s 
account of the data collection phase illustrates once more how texts are unique 
artefacts, although it points to an additional source that contributes, along with 
their design, purpose or carrier, to their specific ‘contours’: the filtering pro-
cesses to which they have been subject.
 That the authors in this volume openly share how they went about collecting 
their texts and the difficulties they were faced with is laudable since these aspects 
of doing research are rarely covered to such an extent in method books. However, 
their observations also raise questions that deserve further reflection, especially in 
light of the fact that rarely is any text just text; it brings with it its own history and 
carries with it multiple interpretative layers. Can we, for example, combine 
unproblematically different data sources, such as documents and interviews? If so, 
what precisely do we learn from some, but not others and what does this variation 
tell us? Even if different texts tell us a similar story, such as for example in the 
case of Alexander Spencer or Joakim Berndtsson, what do the data sources as such 
in addition to the content of the texts reveal about how narratives or stories and 
dominant themes are (re-)produced, by whom and in what way? Does it make a 
difference whether it is a newspaper that (re-)produces the narrative or whether 
statements by governmental officials or documents of political parties or civil 
society organizations do, whether a tabloid carries the story or whether it is embed-
ded in a report of a human rights organization?
 Answering questions of this kind can contribute to a richer interpretation, yet 
also involves a shift in perspective. Rather than treating texts as a means to an 
end, i.e. to get at the story, and merely a data source, it requires for us to con-
ceive of the text as such as endogenous to our interpretative analysis and as an 
important piece to our puzzle. Depending on the source, we then may assign dif-
ferent weight to the narrative and perhaps conceive of it as more or less critical, 
as more or less status quo enhancing, or we may attribute more or less trans-
formative potential to it.
From text to text: interpretative analysis
Interpreting text is sometimes dismissed as a subjective and arbitrary enterprise 
that hinges on the researcher and what he or she deems important. Yet, as the 
chapters in this section demonstrate and as Donald Moon (1975: 173) observed: 
[t]he most obvious standards are coherence and scope: an interpretative 
account should provide maximal coherence or intelligibility to a set of social 
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practices, and an interpretative account of a particular set of practices should 
be consistent with other practices or traditions of the society. 
Each of the methods used here entails a particular strategy to accomplish this.
 Of the methods employed, narrative analysis seems to be the most straight-
forward in this respect. This might appear as somewhat counter- intuitive at first 
glance. Narratives are particularly ‘contextually thick’ (Patterson and Monroe 
1998: 316) and provide ‘a rich source of information about how people make 
sense of their lives, about how they construct disparate facts and weave them 
together cognitively to make sense of reality’ Patterson and Monroe 1998: 315). 
Yet, it is precisely this ‘thickness’ and richness, that affords a more rigorous 
‘road- map’ as to what to look for when analysing narratives, specified in Alex-
ander Spencer’s case by (1) the setting, (2) the characterization of the actor(s), 
and (3) the causal emplotment.
 Similar to narrative analysis, thematic analysis as employed by Joakim Bern-
dtsson in this book is far from random. Aimed at uncovering key themes in rela-
tion to private security companies, the author constructs a coding system 
deductively relying on ‘pre- defined “main themes”, i.e. theoretical categories 
and concepts collated from previous research on private security expertise’. 
While the themes and patterns prevalent in the literature provided orientation as 
far as content is concerned, drawing on the work of Virginia Braun and Victoria 
Clarke (2006) Joakim Berndtsson also had guide posts for how to proceed and 
for ‘… systematically organizing the data and identifying patterns and mean-
ings’. Subsequent to a close read of online and official state documents, he first 
manually coded the texts before grouping the marked fragments in relation to the 
dominant themes. He finished by constructing visual maps to determine 
dominant as well as sub- themes, the way in which the themes that evolved from 
the materials related and corresponded to each other as well as to different set-
tings. Finally, sentiment analysis – probably the most demanding in terms of 
preparation – also follows a protocol. It involves an iterative process between 
software and texts to teach the computer what constitute (very) positive, (very) 
negative, or neutral words so that it can assign the appropriate sentiment autono-
mously to thousands of twitter messages.
 While having a script of how to proceed might ensure a coherent interpreta-
tion, it also involves trade- offs. In particular, it may suggest a stringency or line-
arity that narratives or other textual materials rarely exhibit and it may draw 
attention away from the more intangible fabric, that is, the myths, the symbols or 
historical experiences on which stories rest and that lend power to them. Why 
does, for example, the exotic rebel play such an important role and how is that 
narrative informed or moulded by a post- colonial or geo- political script? Captur-
ing this fabric is perhaps what distinguishes narrative and thematic analysis from 
discourse analysis, which also is interested in ‘dominant representations of 
reality and one or more alternative representations’ but also their deeper meaning 
(Neumann 2008: 70). Compared with content analysis, which is interested in the 
story as such and the kind of story that is told, discourse analysis makes us dig 
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deeper and move beneath the surface. It makes us look back in time and ask 
what certain symbols or tropes represent or mean within a particular historical 
societal context or what contradictions and tensions they reveal.
  Contributing to the consistency and coherence of the analysis, the preoccupa-
tion with looking for certain things may prevent one from seeing (or hearing in 
the case of interviews) what is also there, but does not fit into the pre- given cat-
egories. Such aspects may include, for example, a gendered script that con-
tributes in the narrative about rebels, and the construction of white Western 
masculinity as hegemonic and that of Southern coloured men as different, other 
and subordinate or, in the case of private security companies, to the privileging 
of professional and military masculinity.
 Similar to road- maps, contextual knowledge, or what Iver B. Neumann in 
relation to discourse analysis refers to as ‘a basic level of cultural competence to 
recognize the shared understandings that create a common frame of reference, 
which makes it possible for people to act in relation to one another’ (Neumann 
2008: 64), can be argued as being essential for a coherent account. Contextual 
knowledge allows us to identify and capture what sticks out, what is dominant, 
or what is left out, and to uncover underlying power asymmetries, recurring pat-
terns or themes. As Molly Patterson and Kristen Monroe (1998: 320) note, ‘[t]he 
stories [and hence the narratives] we tell are profoundly influenced by what is 
possible and what is valued within our culture’. Ironically perhaps, it is the 
quantitative sentiment analysis that makes this utterly clear.
 What constitutes positive, negative, or neutral is far from obvious and differs 
across context(s) broadly. As Bo Pang and Lillian Lee with the exclamation ‘go 
read the book’ illustrate, ‘the exact same expression can indicate different senti-
ment in different domains’ (Pang and Lee 2008: 21). While it would be indic-
ative of a positive sentiment when used in a book review, it most certainly is 
negative when it is the r ésumé of a film review (ibid.). If we understand context 
in a yet narrower sense and apply it to the order in which words appear, it 
becomes even more apparent how difficult it can be to determine the overall sen-
timent of text segments (Dau and Martin, Chapter 4, this book). Take again an 
example by Bo Pang and Lillian Lee of a movie review: ‘This film should be 
brilliant. It sounds like a great plot, the actors are first grade, and the supporting 
cast is good as well, and Stallone is attempting to deliver a good performance. 
However, it can’t hold up’ (Pang and Lee 2008: 22, emphasis added). The 
number of positive words would lead to an overall positive sentiment, when in 
fact the movie is ultimately judged negative (see also Chapter 4 by Magnus Dau 
and Marlen Martin, 4). In addition, the nature of texts themselves may be sug-
gestive of a certain context. As Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin note, tweets, 
which, even if comprised of relatively few words, are ‘idiosyncratic and domi-
nated by colloquial language’, are different from the formal language the soft-
ware is based on and therefore require an active act of translation on the part of 
the researcher.
 While fundamental for interpretation, there are externally imposed limits of 
what we can know. Several of the chapters allude to such constraints, but do not 
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elaborate on their implications. As already noted above in connection with the 
sentiment analysis of tweets, information about the users is often difficult to 
acquire, such as their race, colour, gender or their geographical location. Many 
messages are posted anonymously and can even be computer- generated or users 
may use pseudonyms. Although this ‘veil of ignorance’ might be deemed as an 
advantage since it allows us to interpret text on its own merits, it is, however, the 
identity of the interlocutor that lends meaning and provides context to what is 
uttered. Consider the statement on the homepage of a private military and 
security company that claims to value diversity. The statement as such suggests 
a positive sentiment. However, when analysed in combination with an accom-
panying photo, which shows a white trainer in front of coloured people looking 
down, the statement takes on a different meaning. Rather than of inclusion, it 
speaks of existing power asymmetries and would lead us to think of the alleged 
diversity rather sceptically.
 Furthermore, and in contrast to narrative analysis, a computer is only sens-
itive and trained to evaluate a given text, but unable to capture the invisible 
(con-)text in the sense of what is not said. It cannot detect whether tweets are 
posted in an overwhelming fashion by individual users and might therefore be 
indicative of existing hierarchies, nor is it able, as Bo Pang and Lillian Lee point 
out, to expose seasoned writers who can cloak negative sentiments through 
positive words (Pang and Lee 2008: 21). While the limits to what we can know 
about context are perhaps more prevalent when analysing social media, the chap-
ters in this section make apparent that we may also encounter them when analys-
ing more conventional types of texts.
 The chapter by Joakim Berndtsson on private security companies draws atten-
tion to the fact that political actors may withhold information for ‘security 
reasons’. Moreover, the industry Joakim Berndtsson is studying is marked by 
non- transparency, with reliable information about contract volume, size or 
clients being hard to come by. Although these contextual gaps might be ameli-
orated by triangulation, this is not a guarantee. As the author suggests, when 
conducting interviews with representatives of individual companies, ‘security 
officials are often very cautious and sometimes wary of researchers and will not 
necessarily be open to discussions of what they feel are sensitive issues’ (Bern-
dtsson, Chapter 6, this book).
 Addressing the boundaries with respect to context, as Joakim Berndtsson but 
also Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin do, is useful in several respects. First, it 
helps to refute the myth that ‘method is and can do everything’ and that it only 
takes the right one or their right combination as well as adequate text sources to 
get at the ‘real’ story. Second, it draws attention to the relationship between 
methods and the research subject and how they condition each other. Most of the 
chapters in this section treat non- state actors as a means to an end to illustrate 
the method. The authors do not explicitly ask the questions that, however, seem 
equally relevant: what is special about non- state security actors and how may 
this influence or inflict upon the choice of methods? For example, is an interpre-
tative analysis particularly suited for studying non- state actors? Does it perhaps 
Discussion: comments on ‘interpreting texts’  103
allow us to give voice to actors that are often voiceless and invisible, as Anja 
Mihr suggests? In this case, our chosen method might not simply be a tool to 
generate knowledge and solicit their story, but could instead also be understood 
as a political move. Furthermore, how do attributes or characteristics of non- 
state actors impede qualitative interpretative research simply because conducting 
interviews or engaging in participant observation is difficult or impossible to do, 
as it might be life- threatening to either our research subjects when exposed (e.g. 
members of opposition groups) or to us (e.g. in the case of terrorist groups)? 
Reflecting upon the fit between research objects/subjects and methods in this 
sense reveals that methods and their choice also involve normative and/or moral 
considerations in terms of the responsibility we might have vis- à-vis our research 
subjects.
 This leads me to a last and final point related to one of the major boundaries 
of knowing, namely our own preconceptions. ‘The assumptions with which we 
begin, the theories, the modes of reasoning and even our political commitments 
color [our] narrative and simultaneously clarify and obscure features of the past’ 
(Froese 2013: 124). Of the authors in this section, several allude to this point. 
Joakim Berndtsson, for example, in reference to Christopher Kinsey (2006: 7), 
notes that interviewing representatives of the private security industry requires ‘a 
certain degree of open mindedness’ given the negative reputation of firms, on 
the one hand, and the sometimes existing scepticism on the part of researcher, on 
the other hand. In addition, Anja Mihr acknowledges the way in which our 
lenses and pre- conceived notions affect our research, which is why the ‘main 
challenge and the task of the interviewer’, according to her, ‘… is to control her 
own subjectivity and to be as neutral and reflective as possible’.
 While these authors are cognizant that our epistemological lenses and identi-
ties might play a role in the research we conduct, they seem optimistic that this 
factor can be controlled or be kept at a minimum. As Alexander Spencer 
(Chapter 3, this book) notes ‘through transparency, verifiability and showing the 
extensiveness of the narrative elements, the subjective story can be made inter-
subjective’. While this certainly should be the aim, in the end and despite our 
care ‘much, if not all, qualitative and ethnographic writing is a narrative produc-
tion’ (Denzin 1997: 4; see also Patterson and Monroe 1998: 324) with us telling 
a story of a story or as Alexander Spencer (Chapter 3, this book) acknowledges 
himself, ‘by creating a collage of a vast number of quotes this chapter is itself a 
narrative’. Because of the limits imposed by our own contextuality, doing inter-
pretation always has a double meaning. At the same time as the researcher 
attempts to gain insight into how political actors conceive of events or make 
sense of them, our epistemological lenses and identities function as filters allow-
ing us to see or hear certain things, but not others.
 Acknowledging these biases and making them explicit is what feminists have 
urged us to do not only because they let the reader know where we are coming 
from and why we may have interpreted the text in a certain way, but also these 
biases may be productive for interpretative analysis. As Iver Neumann points out 
in connection with cultural knowledge, a certain distance, however achieved, 
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contributes to what he refers to as a ‘marginal gaze where things look strange 
enough to present themselves as puzzles’ (Neumann 2008: 64). Our pre- 
conceived notions may precisely function in this manner, enabling us to see what 
is odd or different about something and needs explanation or interpretation, 
hence create the necessary distance.
 Overall, the chapters in this section are all real gems to read since they do not 
simply walk us through the methods in an abstract and depersonalized sense. 
Instead the authors put the scholar squarely back in. All of them convey that 
doing research does not always follow the carefully preconceived script or plan. 
It hinges instead as much on the human factor – the individuals we study and 
ourselves – and sometimes even outright luck. For ongoing PhDs the chapters 
therefore should be a must read. In addition to explaining what a narrative, them-
atic or sentiment analysis as well as interviewing entails, the chapters introduce 
a healthy dose of realism into our methodological discussions. Rather than 
assuming that the methods we use are bullet- proof and can do magic, we should 
expect and be prepared for hoops and bumps along the way.
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8 (Comparative) case studies
Combining case study techniques for 
the causal analysis of security 
privatization
Andreas Kruck
Introduction: the theory- guided study of security 
privatization and the usefulness of a plurality of case 
study techniques
Not all case studies rely on the same logic for establishing causal claims; rather, 
different case study methodologists (explicitly or implicitly) favour different 
understandings of the appropriate goals, techniques and standards for conducting 
case studies (see King et al. 1994; Van Evera 1997; George and Bennett 2005; 
Gerring 2007; Blatter and Blume 2008; Collier et al. 2010; Mahoney 2010, 
2012; Blatter and Haverland 2012; Bennett and Checkel 2015). This chapter 
illustrates, first, how the study of non- state actors in international security can 
benefit from combining the case study techniques of covariational analysis, con-
gruence analysis and causal process- tracing, and, second, how such a combina-
tion is possible in research practice. Such a combinatory approach is most useful 
for research that seeks to explain both broader macro trends (providing ‘the big 
picture’) and more specific, multicausal dynamics and policies (‘zooming in’ on 
the phenomenon under study). The broader purpose of this chapter is thus to 
demonstrate the value added in terms of reliability, breadth and depth of insights 
to be had from relying on all three of these case study techniques in one project. 
This multipronged approach is still uncommon, because covariational analysis, 
congruence analysis and process- tracing are usually treated as alternative 
approaches to case studies. In addition to proposing a triangulation of case study 
methods, this chapter also highlights the need to take the different modes of 
inference and data requirements of the three approaches seriously. Thus, such 
triangulation requires careful design and, most likely, additional work to gather, 
evaluate and weigh different types of evidence.
 I illustrate the use and usefulness of a plurality of case study techniques by 
drawing on my own research on security privatization and private military and 
security companies (PMSCs). The goal of my research was to explain the use 
of PMSCs by Western ‘strong’ and democratic states, namely the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany (Kruck 2014a, 2014b). That 
goal led me to the combined case study approach. Although previous research 
offered important insights into the causes and motivations for privatizing 
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security, theory- guided and comparative studies have been scarce. By relying 
on a triangulation of case study methods not previously pursued in this 
research field, this project sought to help close the gap in our understanding of 
what drives or inhibits states to resort to the use of PMSCs.
 The central question I posed, therefore, was: why have the US, the UK, 
France and Germany, to varying degrees, delegated security governance tasks to 
PMSCs? To answer this causal- analytical question, I drew on explanatory 
models reconstructed from extant explanations of Western security privatization 
(Singer 2003: 49–70; Avant 2005: 30–38; Deitelhoff 2010; Krahmann 2010: 
21–83; Petersohn 2010) and on more abstract, theoretical approaches from Inter-
national Relations and comparative politics, such as principal–agent theory, 
historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Each of the three 
models presented a distinct causal logic behind security privatization – func-
tional, political or ideational – from which testable hypotheses could be derived.
 From a functional standpoint, security privatization is the rational response of 
legislatures and governments to changing environmental demands that challenge 
the problem- solving capacities and economic cost- efficiency of public (state- 
based) modes of security governance. This response is driven by states’ resource 
needs and capacity gaps. Thus, functional reasoning predicts that the more 
complex the technological and operative contexts of warfare, the higher the 
dependence of public actors on PMSCs’ material and/or non- material resources, 
and the more states will make use of PMSCs. By implication, states will first and 
foremost outsource highly complex tasks. Moreover, a focus on cost- efficiency 
leads to the functional expectation that the greater the defence budget saving 
pressures and the higher the economic gains from security privatization, the 
more states will rely on the services of PMSCs. States will first and foremost 
outsource tasks for which there is a competitive private market.
 A political, power- based approach conceives of security privatization as a 
strategy adopted by executives to enhance their autonomy and policy influence 
in relation to (potential) veto players, such as national parliaments, (constitu-
tional) courts, domestic societal actors or other governments on the international 
level (see Moe 1990; Wolf 1999). From this perspective, the non- transparent use 
of PMSCs serves to avoid politically costly scrutiny, opposition and control in 
the area of security policy by parliamentary bodies, civil society and the media 
(Singer 2003: 209–215; Avant 2005: 43, 128–133; Avant and Sigelman 2010). 
Thus, the riskier and the less popular a military operation is among the domestic 
audience, the greater the incentives of governmental actors to circumvent 
domestic veto players and the higher their propensity to rely on the security ser-
vices provided by PMSCs. Above all, states will seek to outsource politically 
and societally controversial tasks to PMSCs. Moreover, the weaker the parlia-
mentary and judicial mechanisms of oversight and control concerning govern-
ments’ contracting with PMSCs, the more likely security privatization will occur 
and become extensive.
 In an ideational approach, patterns of security privatization follow from the 
transnational diffusion of neoliberal ideas and blueprints of market- based modes 
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of governance, even though their implementation remains conditioned by 
national laissez- faire liberal or state- interventionist conceptions of the state 
(Krahmann 2010; Petersohn 2010; Cusumano 2014). The more the prevalent 
conception of the state is shaped by laissez- faire (neo-)liberal ideas and norms 
rather than by state- interventionist ones, the more a privatized provision of 
security will be accepted as legitimate, proper and even ‘normal’ among political 
decision- makers and their electorates and the more extensively the state will use 
the security services of PMSCs. Outsourcing of activities that affect military 
core functions will occur later and more reluctantly than would be the case with 
non- core functions, because neoliberal ideas diffuse first to the margins of armed 
forces’ activities before they may move on into core areas of warfare.
 In this project, my primary goal in analysing states’ use of PMSCs was not to 
identify the relatively most powerful ‘winning’ theory (from among those three 
models) in a competitive theory test. First, the primary aim of my analysis was 
to provide a comprehensive explanation for the empirical phenomena of privati-
zation of security. Thus, one major objective was to explain broader intertempo-
ral and cross- country patterns, as well as more specific, country- level dynamics 
of the use of PMSCs. Second, the project was designed to reveal the explanatory 
merits and shortcomings – or the comparative advantages and weaknesses – of 
different theoretical models with an explicit view towards exploring rather than 
shutting down possibilities for theoretical synthesis.1 For these purposes, a com-
bination of different case study approaches proved most useful, as the remainder 
of this chapter will illustrate.
 In the following sections, I describe the research design, focusing on the 
choice and application of case study methods. First, I elaborate on the selection 
of cases, aspects of operationalization and issues of data selection. I then intro-
duce the different case study methods and reflect on their practical application in 
the project in question. I retrace how covariational analysis was employed to 
determine whether the functional, power- political and ideational independent 
variables highlighted by the alternative theories of security privatization cova-
ried over time and across countries with  the dependent variable, i.e. the use of 
PMSCs. This is followed by a reflection on how congruence analysis and causal- 
process-tracing were used for deeper and denser, theoretically saturated case 
studies of the US, the UK, France and Germany in order to reconstruct the more 
specific dynamics of security privatization. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the advantages and challenges of combining case study techniques.
Research design and methods in use: a combined case study 
approach
My empirical analysis relied on a structured, focused, multimethod comparison 
of a small number of purposefully selected cases. The analysis was structured in 
that I asked the same question – why has the state delegated security governance 
tasks to PMSCs? – of each case under study to guide and standardize data 
 collection, thus allowing comparisons of the cases and an accumulation of the 
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findings; it was a focused comparison in that it addressed certain aspects and 
data of the cases examined, namely the delegation of security functions to 
PMSCs (George and Bennett 2005: 67); and it was a multimethod (case- study) 
approach in that it drew on covariational analysis and on congruence analysis 
and process- tracing.
Case selection, operationalization and data
For my case studies, I selected countries for which the national dynamics of 
security privatization are empirically relevant in their own right because they 
concern major Western states (the US, the UK, France and Germany) and (more 
or less) important players in international security. Another more important 
reason I selected these cases was that I had a theoretical and analytical goal in 
mind; that is, to draw conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of dif-
ferent explanatory models. The selection of cases thus included data- rich cases 
for which not only the recent but also the historical development of privatization 
could be thoroughly retraced. This allowed for a longer- term perspective on pri-
vatization, thus enhancing intertemporal within- case variance. Moreover, the 
selection of ‘diverse cases’ that achieve maximum variance in terms of privati-
zation (see Gerring 2007: 97–99) took into account that a convincing explana-
tion should be able to explain both (very) strong security privatization tendencies 
(e.g. in the cases of the US and the UK) and much weaker ones (e.g. in the cases 
of Germany and France). Because a satisfying explanation should capture stark 
differences (e.g. between the US and Germany) and more subtle variations (e.g. 
between the US and the UK), the selection of cases also represented both large 
and small differences in privatization policies. Finally, the selection of extreme 
cases made it unlikely that relevant causes of privatization that might have been 
ignored in the three models would be overlooked, because in extreme cases such 
factors should be present in abundance and thus relatively easy to detect (Van 
Evera 1997: 80–81; Gerring 2007: 104). These selection criteria were critical to 
the development of a comprehensive synthetic perspective based on the recon-
structed theoretical models and empirical evidence on security privatization in 
the four countries analysed.
 For the operationalization and measurement of the key concept of ‘security 
privatization’, I focused on both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. This is 
because to understand the security privatization policies of a state and to assess 
how far privatization had gone, it was crucial to look at both how many and what 
kind of services the state bought from private contractors (e.g. waste disposal, 
field construction, logistics and transport, weapons maintenance, intelligence, 
armed protection) that were linked to military operations abroad (rather than to 
purely domestic security or police tasks).2 The consideration of both quantitative 
and qualitative aspects of the phenomenon under study should be useful for a 
host of research projects; it also draws attention to a broad(er) range of numeri-
cal and non- numerical data sources that may serve as evidence to support one’s 
arguments. In the study at hand, the scale of a state’s reliance on PMSCs, the 
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scope of outsourced tasks and the depth of the state’s use of PMSCs together 
determined the magnitude of privatization.
 Apart from these general concerns about achieving a comprehensive meas-
urement of such heterogeneous and complex phenomena as security privatiza-
tion and PMSCs, the choice of more specific indicators was also influenced by 
my ambition to ensure comparability across cases and, quite simply, accessibil-
ity of empirical data. Thus, the ratio of (the number of ) PMSC employees com-
pared with public armed forces in zones of conflict (e.g. 1 : 55, 1 : 1, 1.5 : 1) and 
the state’s budgetary expenses for private contractors (in relation to overall 
defence spending; e.g. 6.0 per cent, 3.0 per cent, 1.3 per cent) served as key 
quantitative indicators measuring the scale of security privatization. The scope 
and depth of privatization were designated by specifying the (more or less broad) 
range of outsourced tasks and the relative prevalence of certain types of services 
(e.g. logistics, weapons maintenance, armed protection). The crucial question for 
the qualitative depth of security privatization was whether the privatized tasks 
included ‘merely’ supporting, auxiliary and supplementary services or also 
essential ‘core’ functions for the provision of security (because the outsourcing 
of the latter indicates an even more fundamental and potentially more problem-
atic transformation). Thus, a distinction was made between military core and 
non- core functions, with the former including combat, command and control 
functions; global intelligence and reconnaissance; and strategic transport and 
force projection (Petersohn 2006: 12–15).
 Data for the case analyses were taken from policy documents and statements 
of decision- makers, such as governmental reports, parliamentary inquiries and 
reports, consultative reports by regulatory bodies, oral statements of decision- 
makers and the like, as well as from secondary sources (existing country studies 
on PMSCs) that provided a good deal of empirical information about the use of 
PMSCs in the US, the UK, Germany and, to a lesser extent, France. Wherever 
possible, I triangulated data from different primary and secondary sources to 
improve the reliability of my findings. Such a data double- check is particularly 
useful for study objects where the reliability of information from only one source 
(e.g. government or NGO reports) is doubtful (e.g. because the issuer of the 
information may have political incentives to withhold or distort relevant data).
Covariational analysis and its application: assessing the power and 
limits of monocausal explanations
I first used covariational analysis to observe whether functional, political and 
ideational explanatory variables and the dependent variable (i.e. the quantitative 
scale, scope and depth of security privatization through the use of PMSCs) cova-
ried over time and across countries in order to make causal inferences and assess 
the explanatory strengths and weaknesses of the above functional, political and 
ideational propositions. An alternative approach would have been to conduct a 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) rather than a covariational analysis as a 
first step (see Mello, Chapter 9, in this volume). I opted for the covariational 
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analysis rather than the QCA because I first wanted to find out to what extent 
individual (functionalist, political or ideational) hypotheses might be sufficient 
to provide an empirically comprehensive but theoretically parsimonious expla-
nation for the phenomenon under study. After the covariational analysis had 
shown that this was not the case, I subsequently engaged more thoroughly with 
the complexities of multicausal and dynamic explanations3 (see below). I thus 
sought parsimony first and then added complexity later on.
 Logically similar to quantitative methods (see De Juan, Chapter 10, in this 
volume), covariational analysis draws causal inferences by observing whether 
(hypothesized) causal factors and causal effects covary, for example, over time 
or across countries (King et al. 1994; Gerring 2007). ‘If there exists such a cov-
ariance over time or space between the independent variable (X) and dependent 
variable (Y), we can infer that X caused Y’ (Blatter and Blume 2008: 318). The 
main goal of covariational analysis is to make generalizing inferences from 
selected cases to a wider population of cases. In this conception, relevant obser-
vations for establishing causal claims are ‘data- set observations’ (i.e. the scores 
for dependent and independent variables) (Gerring 2007: 20, 23–25; Collier et 
al. 2010: 184–188). If causal inferences drawn solely from covariational analysis 
are to be convincing, the variable- centred correlation must be interpreted by 
linking it to theory, and all other potentially causally relevant factors must be 
controlled for by choosing comparable cases and most similar cases designs 
(Blatter and Blume 2008: 319–320). Even under somewhat less stringent con-
ditions, covariation of independent and dependent variables gives us some 
reason to believe it plausible that a theory has explanatory validity (Van Evera 
1997: 58–62). In the research project described here, this approach provided an 
initial assessment of the explanatory plausibility of functional, political and idea-
tional propositions. Moreover, covariational analysis is particularly useful for 
drawing macro pictures of broader trends and differences with regard to a certain 
phenomenon (e.g. security privatization), which is another reason why I applied 
it as a methodological ‘first cut’ in my analysis of states’ use of PMSCs.
 I first turned to the dependent variable describing trends and cross- country 
variation in the states’ contracting with PMSCs. The idea was to provide the 
reader with a larger, ‘panoramic’ picture of the approaches of the US, the UK, 
Germany and France to contracting with PMSCs. This picture also included a 
sketch of the evolution of the private security industry and the broader historical 
context of the move from mercenary armies via the state monopoly of armed 
force to PMSCs. Not only did this broad history and comparative account reflect 
a methodological choice to prepare the ground for an assessment of causal pro-
positions, but it was also driven by concerns about readability (avoiding the 
dryness of merely checking values of variables), capturing the reader’s interest 
in the phenomenon under study and providing a basic understanding of the phe-
nomenon before delving deeper into more specific causal analysis and inference. 
But, most importantly, from a methodological perspective, I designated the scale 
(referring to public–private force ratios and spending for private contractors), 
scope (the breadth of outsourced services) and depth (the existing/non- existing 
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outsourcing of core military functions) of security privatization in the US, the 
UK, France and Germany, as well as how these values changed over time. I out-
lined that there are larger differences between Anglo- Saxon and continental 
European countries but also more subtle differences among these countries (e.g. 
in the range of armed services outsourced by the US and the UK).
 To briefly sum up the descriptive findings, privatization is strongest among 
the Anglo- Saxon countries. The quantity and quality of the use of PMSCs by the 
US are unprecedented in modern times and are unrivalled. The UK also displays 
a strikingly high level of privatization in quantitative terms; at the same time, the 
qualitative scope of private security services is more limited in the UK. Activ-
ities outsourced by the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) focus on non- armed 
logistical support, which has become essential for British force projection and 
operability abroad. Although Germany and France have also increased their use 
of PMSCs, the levels of German and French security privatization are relatively 
low when compared with the levels in the US and UK, with Germany using a 
somewhat broader range of private security services than France does. The scope 
of privatized security services is more narrowly confined in both the continental 
European cases. Nonetheless, in Germany, and particularly in France, the sizable 
reliance on private strategic transport capacities touches on the core require-
ments of warfare.
 I then turned to the independent variables, probing whether the causal con-
ditions identified by the three models covary with these observable empirical 
trends and differences. I provided a qualitative, textual assessment of the degree 
of covariation between explanatory and dependent variables; that is, I explicitly 
reflected on which intertemporal trends and cross- national differences in the 
‘panoramic’ picture could or could not be captured by any one of the individual 
hypotheses. Of course, with a larger number of cases, a similar assessment could 
be made by relying on quantitative, software- based techniques (see De Juan, 
Chapter 10, in this volume). The functional complexity hypothesis finds support 
in some limited issue areas, such as the maintenance of high- technology weap-
onry and strategic transport capacities where varying levels of dependencies on 
PMSCs have emerged, which underlie variations in states’ use of private security 
services. Despite these insights, the complexity hypothesis also faces serious 
problems. Although the impression that recent asymmetric conflicts and new 
military technology have rendered warfare more complex is quite common 
among policymakers and academic observers (Ballard 2007), there is little 
factual evidence in intertemporal and cross- country data that the operational and 
technological complexity of warfare is the major driver of broader privatization 
trends. First of all, one may reasonably doubt that contemporary violent conflicts 
are indeed operationally and technologically more complex than previous 
security threats were (e.g. in the context of the confrontation of nuclear super-
powers during the Cold War) (Biddle 2004; Mello 2010). More specifically, the 
statistics on states’ defence budgets provided by NATO and the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that the relative share of 
expenses for armament technology in the defence budgets of the analysed 
114  A. Kruck
 countries has remained fairly constant for the past 30 years. At any rate, there is 
no robust evidence that the percentage of spending on complex high- technology 
goods and activities relative to other defence expenditures has increased in a way 
that is commensurate with the increased use of PMSCs. Finally, a large propor-
tion of PMSCs do not perform complex high- tech tasks such as the maintenance 
and operation of sophisticated means of warfare. Rather, they offer simple, low- 
skill services, such as cleaning, construction work, waste disposal and other day- 
to-day camp management tasks. In those large areas of low- skill services, 
resource dependencies do not play a major role.
 As for the functional cost-­efficiency­hypothesis, NATO and SIPRI data show 
that the defence budgets of the US, the UK, Germany and France were indeed all 
reduced after the Cold War. However, within the past ten years, defence spend-
ing has soared again (especially in the US) while the use of PMSCs has simul-
taneously grown. This finding is at odds with the expectation that defence budget 
pressures (i.e. cuts of defence budgets in relation to gross domestic products) 
drive privatization. Moreover, defence budget pressures have been stronger in 
Germany than in the US since the Cold War, but, in contrast to the US, Germany 
has not pursued a comprehensive, supposedly cost- saving strategy of security 
privatization. The economic cost- efficiency hypothesis also has a hard time 
accommodating findings that suggest that claims of reducing costs and increas-
ing cost- efficiency through outsourcing have frequently failed to materialize 
(Deitelhoff 2010: 194–195; Petersohn 2010: 545–546). As of 2005, about 40 per 
cent of US Department of Defense (DoD) contracts were awarded on a non- 
competitive basis, often with ‘cost plus’ arrangements, which guarantee com-
panies more profit if they spend more state money in the fulfilment of their 
contractual tasks. This hardly speaks for a (growing) preference of states to out-
source to competitive private markets.
 The political model appears to be supported by numerous studies that found 
indications that the use of PMSCs is indeed harmful to the transparency, 
accountability and parliamentary control of military operations and that govern-
ments are at the very least aware of this (Avant 2005; Avant and Sigelmann 
2010; Deitelhoff 2010). However, even a cursory glance at poll data on public 
support for major military operations (from the Korean to the Afghanistan War) 
in which the US, the UK, France and/or Germany were involved, reveals that the 
(un-)popularity of military operations and the use of private contractors do not 
covary systematically over time and across countries. In more general terms, it is 
not evident that incentives for Western states to reduce political costs should 
have substantially increased over the past two decades while the use of PMSCs 
has soared. The political model also leads to erroneous cross- national expecta-
tions. One would expect that states such as Germany, which have had less 
experience with fallen soldiers in the recent past and are thus more ‘casualty- 
sensitive’, rely more heavily on (armed) PMSCs than do states such as the US, 
which have regularly lost a substantial number of soldiers’ lives in combat. This 
assumption flatly contradicts empirical patterns of security privatization (Peter-
sohn 2010: 545). Moreover, if political costs as such were the main determinant 
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of security privatization, it should be puzzling that hardly controversial tasks 
such as logistics and maintenance work have been privatized extensively, 
whereas politically costly casualty- prone tasks such as combat- related activities 
have hardly been privatized at all. In other words, the model is of little help in 
explaining the delegation of uncontroversial logistical tasks to PMSCs, which is 
one of the most prevalent areas of privatization.
 The ideational model is supported in that conceptions of the state and the 
quantity and quality of states’ use of PMSCs correlate strongly. In the past two 
decades, neoliberal policy ideas and market- based modes of governance have 
been on the rise across numerous issue areas in the member states of the Organ-
isation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The transnational 
diffusion of a neoliberal model of lean armed forces is reflected in the common 
privatization strategies that have been included in the security and defence strat-
egies of nearly all Western OECD states. Nonetheless, the prevailing (national) 
laissez- faire liberal or state- interventionist conceptions of the state, and con-
sequently ideas- based predispositions to outsource core policy functions, such as 
the provision of security, still differ considerably: the US and the UK are charac-
terized by a more laissez- faire liberal and less state- interventionist conception of 
the state than France and Germany (Prasad 2006). This finding is corroborated 
by indices of economic freedom such as the ones provided by the Canadian Eco-
nomic Freedom Network and the Heritage Foundation in the US (Gwartney et 
al. 2011 and previous annual reports; Heritage Foundation 2012; see also Peter-
sohn 2010: 540–541 for a similar argument). In fact, overall government size 
indicators from these two indices for the US, the UK, Germany and France 
largely covary (over time and across countries) with the scale and scope of the 
respective states’ use of PMSCs.
 Under the privatization- friendly macro- ideational conditions in the UK, and 
especially in the US, the use of PMSCs is perceived as more acceptable and 
‘normal’, and closely tied public–private privatization coalitions have thrived. 
The large- scale use of PMSCs in the US and the UK can be perceived as the 
emanation and continuation of broader neoliberal thinking about defence and the 
changing trends in defence economics that increasingly took hold in both coun-
tries in the early and mid- 1990s. Reliance on PMSCs in the US and the UK is 
not an isolated phenomenon but has followed from the increasing influence of 
neoliberal ideas on defence economics and appropriate modes of security provi-
sion, which never took root in a comparable way in continental European states. 
This evolution is also underlined by existing studies tracing the differential 
impact of ideologies, norms and ideas on security privatization in the US, the 
UK and Germany (Krahmann 2010; Petersohn 2010). However, the ideational 
model also leaves some blind spots. It has little to say about the exact timing and 
speed of the diffusion of neoliberal privatization ideas into the realm of security. 
Although neoliberalism has shaped political culture in the UK and the US at 
least since the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in the early 1980s, it was 
only in the mid- 1990s, under the Major and Clinton administrations, that the two 
countries extensively and systematically outsourced security services to PMSCs 
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at home and abroad. Moreover, from a purely ideational perspective, the differ-
ences in the quantity and particularly the quality of privatization between the US 
and the UK should be even smaller than we observe today. The different policies 
of the US DoD and the British MoD concerning the use of armed PMSCs can 
hardly be explained by different laissez- faire liberal or state- interventionist con-
ceptions of the state. Moreover, Germany’s and especially France’s notable use 
of private capacities in specific issue areas (e.g. air transport) cannot be captured 
by ideational reasoning.
 So, after all, the covariational assessment suggested that none of the models 
had comprehensive and sufficient explanatory power on their own. But, despite 
their blind spots, all of these models provided conditions and mechanisms that 
appear, more or less, relevant for a comprehensive explanation. More specifi-
cally, the analysis revealed that all three of the models had particular explanatory 
strengths and weaknesses. Zooming in from this broader comparative picture to 
the more specific country- level dynamics of security privatization, I went on to 
draw on causal- process-tracing and congruence analysis in four country case 
studies of the outsourcing of security functions to PMSCs by the US, the UK, 
France and Germany. These techniques were chosen because, unlike covaria-
tional analysis or other medium- or large- n approaches, they provide deeper and 
denser insights into the dynamic unfolding and interaction of causal mechanisms 
over time.
Congruence analysis and process- tracing and their application: 
towards a more dynamic and synthetic explanation
Process- tracing focuses on retracing causal mechanisms; that is, the (inter-)link-
ages and the unfolding of causal factors over time that produce a certain case 
outcome. With its case- centred approach, process- tracing looks at ‘causal 
process observations’ (Collier et al. 2010; see also George and Bennett 2005; 
Mahoney 2010), ‘the observable within- case implications of causal mechanisms’ 
(George and Bennett 2005: 138) and, potentially, the complex interaction 
between different causal factors in the process (see also Mello, Chapter 9, in this 
volume). This involves not only checking independent and dependent variables 
but also searching for ‘traces for every step between the cause and the outcome’ 
(Blatter and Blume 2008: 320). We have to ‘trace […] backward the causal 
process that produces the case outcome, at each stage inferring from the context 
what caused each cause. If this backward process trace succeeds, it leads the 
investigator back to a prime cause’ (Van Evera 1997: 70). In other words, this is 
about uncovering the chain of events or the decision- making process by which 
initial conditions are translated into case outcomes (George and Bennett 2005: 
217). Thus, process- tracing analysts rely on the reconstruction of dense and 
detailed historical narratives (Büthe 2002).4
 Congruence analysis draws inferences from the congruence or non- 
congruence of concrete observations with specified predictions from abstract 
theories to the relevance of these theories for explaining the case or cases under 
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study (Blatter and Blume 2008: 325; see also Van Evera 1997: 56 and George 
and Bennett 2005 for elements of a congruence analysis approach). In contrast to 
covariational analysis, congruence analysis uses a much broader set of predic-
tions and observations beyond the values of independent and dependent vari-
ables. This includes not only causal process observations (e.g. sequences of 
actions and events) but also expectations about the most important actors, their 
perceptions and their motivations, structural factors and so on. Thus, congruence 
analysis requires rich, complex (rather than parsimonious) and clearly framed 
theories that contain a large number of observable implications; in this concep-
tion, a large number of causally relevant factors specified by the theory is an 
asset rather than a liability for making causal inferences. The more matches 
between theoretical prediction (model components) and empirical observation 
(empirical case study elements), the greater the explanatory power of the model 
(Blatter and Blume 2008: 326–328; Blatter and Haverland 2012: 144–204). 
However, the attribution of concrete observations to abstract concepts and to 
theoretical frameworks is not simply a technical manner (of checking fully oper-
ationalized variables) but requires explicit and extensive reflection, interpretation 
and justification. Interpretative techniques are necessary to make the ‘inferential 
leap’ from specific observations to abstract theories.
 Congruence analysis thus contributed to a denser and theoretically more 
saturated account of security privatization situated in a broader theoretical dis-
course about the privatization of governance. Causal- process-tracing in turn 
helped me to trace deeper causal mechanisms of security privatization over time, 
because it focused on the temporal unfolding and interaction of different func-
tional, political and ideational factors. The combination of congruence analysis 
and causal- process-tracing allowed me to assess the more specific explanatory 
strengths and weaknesses of the different models and to retrace the institutional 
dynamics of security privatization, as well as the causal workings of functional, 
political and ideational mechanisms in the US, the UK, France and Germany, 
thus drawing attention to important aspects that were hardly captured by mere 
covariational analysis. Based on these country case studies, I was able to make 
more fine- grained causal inferences about security privatization, point out 
insights and blind spots of the three explanations with regard to the process of 
security privatization, analyse the interaction of different explanatory variables 
and thus draw a number of lessons for theoretical debates about delegation in 
security governance.
 The basic procedure for each of the country case studies was to produce a 
dense and detailed historical narrative of several thousand words of the process 
of security privatization. For example, in the case of the US, I retraced how idea-
tional legacies from the eighteenth- century revolutionary wars shaped post- 
Second World War decisions in the 1950s and 1960s regarding public–private 
competition, which in turn paved the way for privatization policies under the 
Reagan administration. These decisions were then followed by post- Cold War 
congressional and executive initiatives to broaden the scope of security privati-
zation. The process culminated in the George W. Bush administration’s defence 
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strategy, which called for the privatization of all activities not directly linked to 
fighting wars and led to the unprecedented use of PMSCs in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars. This thick reconstruction, produced for each of the four 
country cases, was not merely descriptive, it also provided a causal interpretation 
of how different explanatory factors shaped political decision- making at critical 
stages of the historical process; that is, at all major junctures where the course 
for or against (further) security privatization was set.
 Thus, I retraced the move towards the use of PMSCs, including its drivers 
and brakes, for all four countries. I then undertook an explicit comparative inter-
pretation of the match between those case narratives and the propositions of the 
functional, political and ideational models. I should stress here that whereas the 
covariational analysis followed a more standardized logic of measuring values of 
variables (previously operationalized with the help of specific, a priori defined 
indicators), the process- tracing and congruence analyses complemented this cov-
ariational search for broad causal trends and patterns with a deeper and more 
interpretive approach that is better suited to uncovering complex and more spe-
cific dynamics of a given phenomenon. In essence, I came up with a causal inter-
pretation of the process and practices of security privatization, the plausibility of 
which the interested reader should be able to evaluate on the basis of empirically 
rich and extensive, if not ‘complete’, country case studies.
 What kind of theoretical inferences could be gained from the process- tracing 
and congruence analyses? Similar to the covariational analysis, these analyses 
revealed a mixed record of the three distinct models, which captured some 
aspects of security privatization but failed to grasp others. More importantly for 
comprehensively explaining the phenomenon under study and arguably also for 
theoretical progress in the analysis of the privatization of governance functions, 
the case studies strongly suggested that functional, political and ideational con-
ditions and mechanisms of security privatization did not operate independently 
of one another but rather reinforced or blocked one another’s operation. The 
country profiles lent considerable support to the key argument that functional 
triggers, in the form of states’ capability gaps and resulting dependencies on 
PMSCs, are important triggers of contractual institutional change, but their 
operation will be heavily conditioned by political and ideational variables. 
Large- scale and broad- ranging use of PMSCs is likely when (1) privatization- 
friendly ideas are already in place in the country under study; when (2) (strong) 
functional triggers create incentives for security privatization, with states looking 
for domestic historical precedents and/or contemporary exemplars in other coun-
tries in order to choose how to deal with these functional challenges; and when 
(3) political brakes on the use of PMSCs are absent or inactive.
 This combination of conditions and mechanisms – which, framed in abstract 
models, could be applied to and tested against other cases of privatization – 
captures the dynamics and differences in and between the country cases very 
well. In the US, functional triggers for increased contracting after the Cold War 
met with well- established neoliberal idea systems that favoured a strong role of 
the market in the provision of collective goods, whereas political brakes in the 
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form of constitutional limits or political contestation of security privatization 
were absent. Moreover, US history has been rich in precedents indicating a reli-
ance on private forces and private support to armed forces. As a result, the US 
went in for the extensive use of PMSCs from the mid- 1990s. In the UK, similar 
functional and ideational conditions for extensive security privatization have 
been in place, but political costs and contestation of politically delicate relation-
ships between the government and PMSCs have constrained the use of PMSCs, 
at least in some controversial issue areas such as armed security and foreign 
military training. The Cold War mercenary roots of many British firms, as well 
as scandals in the 1990s (most notably the Arms to Africa Affair) have put a 
brake on some privatization drives. France and Germany have also faced func-
tional incentives to rely on PMSCs to meet new security challenges and cut 
down the size of their armies. But France and Germany have only hesitantly and 
reluctantly followed the Anglo- Saxon model because of their ideational legacies 
of state- interventionist conceptions of the state and a strict state monopoly on the 
use of force. Activated political brakes in the form of constitutional limits and 
political resistance to a high- profile military role for the country (in the German 
case) and privatization of sovereign functions (in both cases) also play an 
important role. A model of extensive security privatization would thus be a bad 
fit with their ideational traditions and would be politically costly. The German 
government’s reluctance to publicly embrace the needs- based contracting that 
has occurred, as well as the wait- and-see approach to regulation, testifies to this 
fundamental uneasiness. France’s more overt ambitions to play an active struc-
turing role in the security industry through co- ownership and nurturing of 
national champions is in line with French conceptions of an active role for the 
state in economic governance.
Conclusion: value added and the challenges of combining 
case study techniques
The combination of covariational, process- tracing and congruence- analysis tech-
niques yielded more, i.e. broader, deeper, more differentiated and com-
plementary, insights that I could not have gained from just a covariational or 
process- tracing analysis. Embracing the plurality of existing case study tech-
niques and combining their strengths promises to enhance the range, richness 
and reliability of causal inferences that can be drawn from (comparative) case 
studies of non- state actors in international security.
 But, of course, such a combination also poses challenges. It requires quite a 
bit of work to collect, evaluate and interpret many different kinds of empirical 
data and points of observation. More fundamentally, combining these techniques 
should not imply that differences in their logics are ignored (Blatter and Blume 
2008; Collier et al. 2010; Mahoney 2010, 2012). Covariational analysis is essen-
tially wedded to a quantitative understanding of drawing causal inferences from 
the covariation of independent and dependent variables (i.e. a very limited range 
of dataset observations) over as many points of observation (cases) as possible, 
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while ideally keeping all other factors constant. By contrast, the logics of 
congruence- analysis and causal- process tracing require deep involvement with 
and detailed knowledge of a much broader set of causal- process observations 
(beyond the independent and dependent variables) for a limited number of well- 
selected cases (e.g. ‘hard cases’ for confirming a theory and ‘easy cases’ for 
refuting a theory when the goal of research is a theory test). Here, causal 
leverage does not come from increasing the number of cases but from taking a 
very close look at the (very) few chosen cases. These different logics imply dif-
ferent data needs and divergent understandings of the role of operationalization 
and interpretation for making causal inferences. Whereas covariational analysis 
typically checks the values for a priori operationalized variables (i.e. their indic-
ators) at several points of observation, congruence analysis and causal process- 
tracing involve (explicit) causal interpretation; that is, reflection on what a 
certain causal- process observation means for the explanatory power of particular 
theories.
 These different logics could be taken into account during the distinct meth-
odological steps of the described research project on states’ use of PMSCs 
(which relied first on covariational analysis, then on process- tracing and ulti-
mately on congruence analysis). But for the sake of coherence of the overall 
study and to arrive at common, additive inferences (such as the above synthetic 
explanatory argument) through different methodological strategies and via 
heterogeneous empirical data, it was necessary at times to make tough choices, 
privileging one kind of evidence over another (e.g. evidence from the historical 
narratives over cross- country covariation) and compromises that led to the 
application of less than ‘pure’ and ‘ideal’ (covariational, congruence- analysis 
and process- tracing) case study logics. This is also evident in the number and 
selection of cases and in the number of causal- process observations that could be 
covered.
 Such compromises might be a cause for concern for the purist methodologist 
wedded to a certain understanding of how to carry out (comparative) case 
studies. But, from the perspective of problem- oriented research interested in a 
comprehensive understanding of a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, a 
combination of various approaches, not only on the theoretical level but also on 
the methodological level, appears to be a fruitful strategy for studying non- state 
actors in international security.
Notes
1 Even if monocausal theories might ultimately be considered lacking when the analyt-
ical objective is to comprehensively grasp complex, multifaceted phenomena such as 
security privatization, a very reasonable way to achieve a systematic theoretical synthe-
sis still departs from the deductive reconstruction of distinct, internally consistent 
models and their application to empirical cases (see Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 50).
2 Although this conceptual distinction between domestic/security and international/
defence- related contracting (with my research focusing on the latter) is more blurry in 
the empirical world of security privatization, it was important to keep this distinction in 
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mind when comparing data from different sources and countries that might vary in 
their understanding of what qualified as security privatization (including or excluding 
domestic privatization of police functions in Western OECD states).
3 Moreover, QCA is good for studying multicausal relationships but is less well suited to 
researching dynamic causality, which turned out to be quite important in my study.
4 For a proposal and a detailed elaboration of process- tracing as a rigorous scientific 
method for uncovering necessary causal connections, see Bennett and Checkel (2015); 
for a distinction of different kinds of process tracing tests for causal inference, such as 
straw- in-the- wind, hoop and smoking- gun tests, see Collier (2011).
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9 Qualitative comparative analysis 
and the study of non- state actors
Patrick A. Mello
Introduction
Suppose you wanted to find out under what conditions non- state actors (NSAs) 
rebel against state authorities or to investigate what factors lead governments to 
contract private military and security companies (PMSCs). For these and similar 
research aims there will rarely be a single cause to account for the outcome. 
Instead, you might discover that multiple factors bring about the phenomenon of 
interest and that these interact in specific ways. Qualitative Comparative Ana-
lysis (QCA) is ideally suited to analyse these kinds of causal relations, especially 
if the aim is to conduct a comparative study of at least a medium number of 
cases. Two particular strengths of QCA are its ability to account for equifinality 
and conjunctural causation. The first concept relates to the potential presence of 
alternate pathways towards an outcome, and the second concerns the idea that 
configurations of conditions can be jointly necessary and/or sufficient for an 
outcome. Fuzzy sets complement QCA as a methodological tool for translating 
categorical concepts into measurable conditions, drawing on the notion that 
cases can hold degrees of membership in a given set.
 QCA was introduced and further developed by the sociologist Charles Ragin 
(1987, 2000, 2008). Recent textbooks indicate that QCA has gained recognition 
among social scientists as a methodological approach that offers specific benefits 
for comparative studies (Blatter and Haverland 2012; Gerring 2012; Rohlfing 
2012; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). From its inception, QCA was aimed at 
the ‘middle ground’ between quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Ragin 
2000: 22). In contrast to regression- based statistical approaches, QCA is based 
on set theory; as such, it investigates the specific conditions under which an 
outcome occurs rather than estimating the ‘average effects of independent vari-
ables’ (Mahoney 2010: 132). Hence, causal relations are expressed in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions – a ‘substantively important’ view of causa-
tion that has recently gained increased attention in the social sciences (Collier et 
al. 2010: 147).
 Most of the existing QCA applications in international security, and in Inter-
national Relations (IR) more generally, compare countries or national govern-
ments as their cases or units of observation. Hence, QCA has at times been 
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equated with an approach that is exclusively macro- comparative. Contrary to 
this view, however, there are no inherent methodological reasons why QCA 
cannot be applied to the study of NSAs. Equifinality and conjunctural causation 
are just as relevant when it comes to researching NSAs in international security. 
For example, many of the explanations for the outbreak or termination of civil 
war or states’ use of PMSCs combine several conditions and specify alternative 
pathways to the same outcome. Moreover, as a rigorous comparative method, 
QCA offers advantages over some alternative approaches.
 Yet, as outlined by Andreas Kruck and Andrea Schneiker in the introduction 
to this volume (see Chapter 1), there are challenges when it comes to research on 
NSAs in international security, specifically when the aim is to conduct a com-
parative study. Without doubt, the greatest of these is the problem of finding 
reliable and comparable data on NSAs. This problem also exists in other sub-
stantive fields, but the security realm is notorious for having inaccessible and 
unreliable data, which is why many studies in this area have focused on a single 
case or a small number of cases, based on in- depth qualitative information. 
However, an advantage of QCA is that researchers can draw equally on qual-
itative and quantitative sources of data, depending on their specific research aim 
and the kind of information required to operationalize their theoretical frame-
work. Whereas statistical approaches require standardized data, QCA allows for 
more flexibility on the part of the researcher in terms of using unstandardized 
sources of information or case- specific indicators. This can be achieved through 
the calibration of crisp and fuzzy sets, a process that forms the backbone of any 
set- theoretic analysis. Thus, although QCA has been rarely used to study NSAs 
in the field of international security, it holds considerable potential as a way to 
enrich the portfolio of methods currently employed in this research area.
 The aim of this chapter is twofold. The first part introduces the methodo-
logical approach of QCA, including its core principles, specific terminology and 
analytical procedures. While this methodological discussion may appear rather 
dense to readers unfamiliar with this approach, the second part of the chapter is 
intended to illuminate the research process of a study that used QCA, showing 
step- by-step how some of the somewhat abstract ‘nuts and bolts’ translate into 
an empirical study. This second part draws on my own work on democratic 
participation in armed conflict (Mello 2012, 2014). The demonstration of QCA 
in use should provide helpful guidance for conducting medium- N research on 
NSAs. The final section briefly covers some of the advantages and challenges of 
applying this analytical method.
Principles and terminology of QCA
Crisp and fuzzy sets
Although there are several variants of QCA, the most popular ones are crisp- set 
QCA and, increasingly so, fuzzy- set QCA (fsQCA). Crisp sets take on binary 
values, whereas fuzzy sets can take on any value between 0 and 1. Which of 
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these should be applied will depend on the research aim of a given project, but in 
many cases there will be advantages to using fuzzy sets. Fuzzy- set theory was 
developed by Lotfi Zadeh (1965) as an extension of traditional set theory. Based 
on the notion that cases can hold degrees of membership in a given set, fuzzy 
sets enable the researcher to translate categorical concepts into measurable con-
ditions. Thus, fsQCA allows for qualitative differentiation: on the basis of sub-
stantive and theoretical knowledge, the researcher establishes ‘qualitative 
anchors’ to determine whether a case is ‘fully in’ a given set (fuzzy score 1), 
whether it is ‘neither in nor out’ (fuzzy score 0.5) and at what point a case is 
‘fully out’ of a set (fuzzy score 0). This set- theoretic conception and calibration 
procedure challenges an assumption often made in statistical research; that is, 
where all variation is held to be equally meaningful (Ragin 2000: 163).
 Three different procedures are possible for the calibration of fuzzy sets. In 
the straightforward approach, fuzzy scores are assigned to cases on the basis of 
substantive and theoretical knowledge. Using this approach, a researcher would 
first conceptualize different degrees of membership in a given set and then quali-
tatively assess the fuzzy score of each case. Other coding procedures are the 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ methods of calibration (Ragin 2008: 85–105), which 
become relevant only when quantitative data are used. For example, a study 
interested in the severity of non- state armed conflicts could draw on various 
forms of qualitative information (interviews, reports, secondary sources, etc.) or 
could use an existing data set, such as the information provided by the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which could prove particularly beneficial when 
the aim is to conduct a larger comparative study.
 Both direct and indirect methods use statistical estimation techniques to trans-
form interval- scale variables into fuzzy- set scores. The direct method of calibra-
tion applies a logistic function to transform raw data into fuzzy- set values based 
on three qualitative breakpoints specified by the researcher (Ragin 2008: 89–94). 
As the name implies, the indirect method of calibration includes an additional 
step that necessitates a preliminary qualitative grouping of cases according to 
their degree of membership. In turn, a fractional logit model is used to estimate 
fuzzy- set values based on the raw data and the initial qualitative coding of cases 
(Ragin 2008: 94–97). It is apparent from these procedures that, despite their dis-
similarities, all calibration procedures require careful conceptualization of qual-
itative anchors. Hence, even for ‘semi- automated calibration techniques’, 
substantive knowledge is a prerequisite for the coding of fuzzy sets (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012: 41).1
Boolean algebra
QCA is grounded in Boolean algebra, originated by George Boole, a nineteenth- 
century British mathematician and logician who developed an algebra for vari-
ables that have only two possible values: true (present) or false (absent). By 
convention, QCA solution terms are expressed in Boolean notation, which com-
prises several basic operators. Explanatory and outcome conditions are stated in 
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capital letters, whereas a tilde [~] refers to a logical NOT, as in the negation or 
absence of a condition. Multiplication [*] refers to a logical AND, or the combi-
nation of conditions, whereas addition [+] indicates a logical OR, as in altern-
ative pathways. Finally, arrows express the relationship between one or several 
explanatory conditions and the outcome. Accordingly, a rightwards arrow [→] 
refers to a sufficient condition, whereas a leftwards arrow [←] indicates a neces-
sary condition.
 For example, the civil war literature considers economic motives [E] and 
injustice [I] to be drivers of rebellion. However, to be sufficient for the outbreak 
of civil war [W], these factors must combine with a potential rebel group’s 
opportunity to form an armed movement, which depends on the presence of fin-
ancial resources [R] and popular support [S]. In Boolean notation, these altern-
ative pathways would be expressed as: (E*R*S) + (I*R*S) → W. This indicates 
that the conjunctions ERS and IRS are both sufficient for the outbreak of 
civil war.
 Set- theoretic methods are governed by three simple mathematical principles 
that can be applied equally to crisp sets and fuzzy sets.
 First, the negation of set values is calculated by subtracting the membership 
value of a case in a given set from 1. If case A holds a fuzzy membership value 
of 0.3 in set Y, then its value for ~Y is 0.7.
 Second, the combination of conditions, a logical AND, refers to the minimum 
membership values in the respective conditions. For instance, assuming we 
wanted to calculate the membership of case A in the combination of the fuzzy 
sets B and C. If A’s membership in B were 1.0 (fully in the set) but its set mem-
bership in C were 0.2 (mostly outside the set), then membership in the combina-
tion of these conditions B*C would be the lower of the two values (0.2). This 
set- theoretic principle contrasts with quantitative approaches that would calcu-
late the average value between the two conditions. However, with regard to their 
membership in a given combination, no difference exists between cases with 
membership scores outside only one or both sets of the respective combination.
 Finally, the third principle is the logical OR, which reflects the presence of 
alternative conditions and thus refers to the maximum of the respective member-
ship values. For example, this could be the case when two conditions, A and B, 
individually lead towards an outcome. Hence, a case’s fuzzy- set membership in 
the term (A+B), as in ‘A OR B’, refers to the case’s highest membership score 
across the two conditions.
Complex causation
As a set- theoretic method, QCA interprets relationships between social phe-
nomena in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This perspective on 
causal relations entails three methodological assumptions: equifinality, conjunc-
tural causation and causal asymmetry. Together, these constitute ‘complex cau-
sation’, a specific asset of QCA (Ragin 2008: 78; Schneider and Wagemann 
2012). In a nutshell, QCA allows for the possibility that different pathways 
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towards the same outcome exist (equifinality); that two or more conditions can 
jointly cause an outcome to occur (conjunctural causation); and that an identi-
fied relationship between a condition and the outcome does not mean that the 
inverse relationship must also be true (causal asymmetry).
 In social science research, however, it is apparent that conditions are seldom 
individually necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome. By contrast, ‘INUS’ and 
‘SUIN’ causes are found frequently, although causal explanations are not often 
framed in these terms. INUS denotes ‘an insufficient but necessary part of a con-
dition, which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result’ (Mackie 1965: 
245, emphases in the original). SUIN refers to ‘a sufficient but unnecessary part 
of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome’ (Mahoney et al. 
2009, emphases in the original). It follows from the definition of INUS causes 
that these are present whenever equifinality and conjunctural causation combine, 
meaning that at least two pathways towards an outcome exist and that at least 
one of them comprises more than a single condition. In turn, SUIN causes can be 
understood as equivalent indicators that constitute a necessary condition, where 
each individual element is unnecessary but sufficient for the condition. Table 9.1 
shows the relationship in formal notation. The conditions A and B are INUS 
causes for the outcome Y1; the conditions F and G are sufficient conditions for 
D, which is a necessary condition for the outcome Y2.
 The third methodological assumption, causal asymmetry, implies that the 
solution for the non- outcome cannot with certainty be derived from the solution 
for the outcome. Therefore, it is considered ‘good practice’ to conduct separate 
analyses for the outcome and its negation (Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 
408–409). This procedure can also serve to validate a theoretical claim – if a 
specific conjunction leads consistently towards the outcome but also leads 
towards the non- outcome, doubts arise about its explanatory strength. Moreover, 
a meaningful analysis of the non- outcome requires the inclusion of negative 
cases, which can strengthen confidence in the QCA results for both analyses 
(Mello 2013: 13–14).
Measures of consistency and coverage
Fuzzy- set analysis introduces the measures of consistency and coverage to assess 
whether a single condition or a conjunction of several conditions is necessary 
and/or sufficient for an outcome.2 Whereas consistency reflects the fit of the 
Table 9.1 INUS and SUIN causes
A and B as INUS causes F and G as SUIN causes
AB + C → Y1 D ← Y2
F + G → D
Source: own table.
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empirical evidence with an assumed set- theoretic relationship, coverage indi-
cates the relevancy of a condition in empirical terms. For the analysis of suffi-
ciency, set- theoretic consistency indicates the extent to which instances of a 
combination of conditions are a subset of instances of the outcome. Formally 
speaking, if all values for Y are equal to or less than their corresponding values 
for X, then Y is a subset of X and thus X is a necessary condition for the 
outcome. In turn, if all values for X are equal to or less than their corresponding 
values for Y, then X resembles a subset of Y and is thus a sufficient condition for 
that outcome.
 The calculation of set- theoretic coverage is inversely related to the consist-
ency measure. This implies that the coverage of a sufficient combination of con-
ditions indicates the size of the empirical overlap, or the proportion of instances 
of the outcome that are explained by the given combination. Although conjunc-
tions with several conditions are likely to show higher consistency scores, their 
empirical relevance will tend to decrease, because there will be fewer empirical 
cases that fit the described causal path. In turn, for a necessary condition, the 
coverage value reflects the fit between instances of that condition and the 
outcome. Even though a condition could be a perfectly consistent superset and 
thus a necessary condition in formal terms, it may be irrelevant in theoretical 
terms if the condition is present across cases that show the outcome and among 
cases that do not show the outcome.
Truth table analysis
How do these concepts and principles translate into the analysis? The core of the 
QCA procedure contains two steps. First, a truth table is constructed that con-
tains rows for each logical combination of conditions and indicates which cases 
belong to a configuration and how these relate to the outcome. Hence, the fuzzy- 
set truth table represents a multidimensional vector space with 2k corners, where 
k relates to the number of conditions and each corner of the resulting property 
space signifies a distinct combination of conditions, represented by a separate 
row in the truth table. For example, if four conditions are part of the analysis, the 
truth table comprises 24, or 16, rows. Based on their fuzzy- set membership 
scores for each condition in a respective combination, cases can be assigned to 
distinct corners of the property space (Ragin 2008: 124–135). The consistency 
column of the truth table indicates the extent to which the fuzzy- set values of all 
cases in a given row or conjunction are sufficient for the outcome. Based on the 
consistency scores, the researcher determines a cut- off point to indicate which 
rows will be included for the remainder of the truth table procedure (Ragin 
2008: 135).
 The second step involves the logical minimization of the truth table, which is 
required to identify sufficient conditions. Here, Boolean algebra is applied to 
minimize the truth table and identify combinations of conditions that are suffi-
cient for the outcome (Ragin 1987: 937). In QCA, this is done by means of the 
Quine–McCluskey algorithm, also known as the truth table algorithm. It requires 
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the researcher to set a consistency threshold that determines which truth table 
rows will be included in the ensuing minimization procedure. By convention, 
this threshold should be set to a consistency of at least 0.75.
 To illustrate the construction of truth tables with a simple crisp- set example, 
let us assume we have three conditions that are expected to cause an outcome, 
either in combination with other conditions or individually. Table 9.2 shows all 
logical combinations of conditions X, Y and Z and their empirical relation to the 
outcome O based on 15 cases across the eight possible configurations. The right- 
hand column shows us how many empirical cases fall into each configuration of 
conditions (i.e. truth table rows). It is apparent from the table that only the first 
two rows will lead towards the outcome. In Boolean algebra, this is expressed as 
(X*Y*Z) + (X*Y* ~ Z) → O. Based on logical minimization, this complex 
expression can be further reduced to (X*Y) → O, because the condition Z is 
irrelevant for the outcome, since O occurs in Z’s presence (see row 1) and its 
absence (see row 2), whereas X and Y are necessary elements of a conjunction 
that is sufficient for O. This simple example serves to illustrate the basic prin-
ciple of comparison that is embedded in QCA. When fuzzy sets are used and 
further conditions are added, the analysis becomes increasingly complex, justi-
fying a systematic treatment that can be conducted with the appropriate software, 
as will be discussed below.
Limited diversity
During the truth table analysis, most applications of QCA will encounter the 
phenomenon of limited diversity, which refers to the discrepancy between logi-
cally possible combinations of conditions (conjunctions) and the actual empirical 
cases in a given study. This problem increases as more conditions are included. 
For example, imagine a study that seeks to explain the contracting of PMSCs in 
12 conflicts on the basis of five explanatory conditions. As discussed in the 
previous section, this would imply that there are 25, or 32, distinct combinations 
Table 9.2 Example of a truth table
Conditions Outcome Cases
X Y Z O N
1 1 1 1 3
1 1 0 1 2
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 2
0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 3
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 2
Source: own table.
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of conditions. Hence, because of the number of cases (conflicts) included, this 
design would yield at least 20 ‘logical remainders’ in the truth table rows not 
filled with empirical information; that is, if one assumes that each case shows a 
distinct combination of conditions (which would be a rather bold assumption). 
Although the phenomenon of limited diversity is ubiquitous in social research, 
QCA allows for analytical strategies that deal with logical remainders.3 It is 
therefore important for researchers to be aware of these strategies to avoid 
drawing unwarranted conclusions during analysis.
The QCA research process: an illustration
The remainder of this chapter will illustrate a QCA research process by drawing 
on my study of democratic involvement in the Iraq War (Mello 2014: Chapter 
7). The study sought to explain the military participation (and non- participation) 
of 30 democracies in the ad hoc coalition that was established for the Iraq War 
in 2003. Rather than seeking a monocausal explanation for the observed phe-
nomenon, my approach was directed towards theoretical integration, drawing on 
liberal, institutionalist, constructivist and neorealist explanations. The decision 
in favour of eclecticism was partly a response to prevalent accounts of the Iraq 
War, in which various factors were being highlighted as ‘causes’ but a more 
comprehensive explanation of military involvement was not given. Moreover, it 
was apparent that interaction between certain conditions had been overlooked, 
something that QCA promised to capture quite well. There are good reasons to 
assume that many research projects on NSAs in international security will face 
similar challenges and pursue comparable aims. Thus, the following reflections 
on the application of QCA to the study of democratic war should encourage, and 
is apt to guide, QCA- based research on NSAs.
Conceptualizing the outcome
For any causal research design, the first step is to specify the outcome (or 
dependent variable): what is to be explained? In my case, it soon became apparent 
that the measurement of ‘military participation’ in the Iraq War was more difficult 
than I had imagined when I started the project. First, there were qualitative differ-
ences in the types of military contributions. Several countries sent military engi-
neers, others deployed ground transportation units, and some dispatched military 
police to Iraq. Should all these contributions be considered ‘war involvement’? 
Moreover, there were immense quantitative differences in the number of troops 
made available. For example, Estonia deployed an infantry platoon of 55 soldiers, 
whereas the United Kingdom sent nearly 50,000 troops to Iraq. How does one take 
this variation into account? Crucially, there was the dimension of time. The United 
States, the United Kingdom, Poland and Australia were the only countries involved 
in the immediate invasion in March 2003, but many other countries contributed 
during the following weeks and months. But where does one draw the line to dis-
tinguish military participation from other forms of involvement?
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 Rather than using binary coding to distinguish participation and non- 
participation, I decided to construct a fuzzy set, designated ‘military participa-
tion’ (MP), that allowed me to take into account the qualitative and quantitative 
differences in military contributions from the various countries. But I still needed 
a distinguishing criterion to decide whether a case was rather ‘inside’ (values 
larger than 0.5) or rather ‘outside’ (values lower than 0.5) the fuzzy set ‘MP’. I 
based this on whether or not a country’s deployment included ground troops 
with combat tasks – a criterion that goes to the heart of the debate about the use 
of military force by democracies. The number of troops and the timing of the 
deployments then allowed me to make further distinctions. The resulting fuzzy 
set MP ranged from countries such as Finland, which did not contribute (fuzzy 
score 0), to Belgium, which granted overflight rights (fuzzy score 0.1), to the 
Czech Republic, which had contributed a military field hospital (fuzzy score 
0.4), to the United States, which contributed the most (fuzzy score 1.0). Table 
9.3 shows the information that went into the coding of some of the selected 
countries (abbreviated for presentational purposes).
Selecting explanatory conditions
The selection of explanatory conditions is central to any study that uses QCA. 
From a theoretical point of view, the inclusion of a large number of conditions 
can often be desirable; however, adding further conditions will in all likelihood 
increase the problem of limited diversity, because the number of possible combi-
nations of conditions will rise exponentially with each additional condition, 
resulting in fewer or no empirical cases for each row in the truth table.
 In my study, like many researchers, I also faced the challenge of selecting from 
a potentially boundless number of factors offered by the various IR theories. I 
approached this problem by subsuming prevalent factors in the literature on demo-
cratic war under three broad approaches: institutional constraints, political prefer-
ences and external constraints and inducements (Mello 2014: Chapter 2). I then 
settled for a theoretical framework that included five explanatory conditions: (1) 
parliamentary veto rights, (2) constitutional restrictions, (3) executive partisanship, 
(4) public support and (5) military power. In line with previous work on demo-
cratic peace, which formed the backdrop to my research project, these conditions 
emphasized domestic factors but also included a neorealist condition based on the 
distribution of material capabilities among the included countries.
 Of my six conditions (five explanatory conditions and the outcome), three 
were calibrated based on qualitative information by developing a coding scheme 
and assigning values to each case (based on country- specific research, govern-
ment documents, secondary sources, news agencies, etc.). The other three con-
ditions were coded using the ‘direct method of calibration’, which transforms 
raw data into calibrated fuzzy sets (on this procedure, see Ragin 2008: 85–105). 
For these conditions, I drew on quantitative data from the Comparative Mani-
festo Project (CMP) (Budge et al. 2001), various public opinion polls and 
military expenditure statistics.
Table 9.3 The fuzzy set ‘military participation’ in the Iraq War (outcome)
Country MP Phase Type Deployment Contribution Troops
United States 1.0 Invasion Combat 03–2003 Army, naval, air force units 150,816
Spain 0.9 Post-invasion Combat 04–2003 Marine infantry, support units 1300
Italy 0.8 Post-invasion Combat 07–2003 Mechanized infantry, helicopters 2400
Czech Republic 0.4 Post-invasion Non-combat 05–2003 Military field hospital, military police 110
Norway 0.3 Post-invasion Non-combat 07–2003 Mine clearance 150
New Zealand 0.2 Reconstruction Non-combat 09–2003 Engineers, reconstruction 61
Belgium 0.1 – Logistical – Overflight rights –
Finland 0.0 – – – None –
Source: own table, based on Mello (2014: 159–163).
Note
MP is the fuzzy set military participation. Table shows only selected cases for presentational purposes, for a full documentation see Mello (2014: 159–163).
Qualitative comparative analysis  133
 Table 9.4 lists the conditions of my study and shows the resulting values for 
five out of 30 countries. The upper three rows show fuzzy sets based on qual-
itative information. The lower six rows show fuzzy sets that were based on 
quantitative and raw data; for these data I used the direct method of calibration, 
after having first defined three qualitative breakpoints for each set. For the left–
right (L–R) partisanship CMP data, I used breakpoints of −50 (fully out), 0 
(cross- over) and 50 (fully in). Although the CMP data can take on values 
between −100 (all leftist statements in the party manifesto) and 100 (all rightist 
statements), empirical cases rarely come close to the theoretical end points of 
this continuum. Hence, I decided that values of 50 and −50 would be sufficient 
for deciding what was ‘fully in’ or ‘fully out’ of the respective sets. As a result 
of these coding decisions, Latvia was rather outside the set ‘right executive’ 
(0.38), whereas Italy received a value of 0.96 and could thus be considered 
almost ‘fully in’ the set of right executives.
Formulating hypotheses
QCA can be used in different ways, but most studies employ this method to test 
established or refined hypotheses or theories.4 However, because QCA investi-
gates the specific conditions under which an outcome occurs rather than the 
average effect of a set of independent variables, hypotheses need to be framed in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This can pose a problem when the 
Table 9.4 Fuzzy-set calibration





0.00 0.80 0.20 0.90 0.90
Parliamentary veto 
rights
1.00 0.60 0.60 1.00 0.00
Constitutional 
restrictions
1.00 0.20 1.00 0.20 0.00
Quantitative 
fuzzy sets
Public support 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.04
Right executive 0.51 0.96 0.66 0.38 0.66
Military power 0.15 0.63 0.87 0.13 0.25
Raw data Public support (%) 8.00 18.00 20.00 7.00 12.00
Executive L-R (CMP 
data)
0.80 53.83 11.12 –7.92 11.42
Military expenditure 
(bn US$)
1.80 25.60 39.50 0.15 8.70
Source: own table, based on Mello (2014, Chapter 7).
Note
Table shows only selected cases for presentational purposes, for a full documentation see Mello 
(2014: Chapter 7).
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research goal is to test established probabilistic hypotheses. Although a large 
body of work in the social sciences rests on a (sometimes implicit) understand-
ing of necessary and sufficient causation (Goertz 2003b), many hypotheses in 
the literature continue to be framed in probabilistic language, requiring prior 
‘translation’ on the part of the researcher who seeks to employ such hypotheses 
in an fsQCA procedure (Goertz 2003a).
 In my study, I formulated two hypotheses for each condition, many of which 
were conceived as INUS causes (see above). Put in simple terms, this meant that 
the given condition was expected to cause the outcome when combined with 
other conditions. For others, the expectations derived from the literature were 
more concrete, so I expected a specific conjunction to be a sufficient condition 
for the outcome. Here are three examples (Mello 2014: 34):
• ‘Parliamentary veto rights combined with public opposition are a sufficient 
condition for military non- participation.’
• ‘Constitutional restrictions are a sufficient condition for military non- 
participation.’
• ‘Right partisanship is an INUS condition for military participation.’
Analysis of necessary conditions
The stages just described are still part of the research design; the QCA data ana-
lysis proper involves a sequence of steps, all of which can be carried out with the 
use of appropriate software. Until recently, the most widely used program for 
this purpose was fsQCA 2.5, which can perform the essential tasks but is limited 
in terms of reliability, advanced functions and user- friendliness. Among existing 
alternatives, the most promising is the QCA package for R (Thiem and Duşa, 
2013), currently in version 1.1–49.5 In addition, a graphic user interface for R 
(QCAGUI) is under development and will greatly enhance the accessibility of R, 
especially for users who are not familiar with that environment.
 The QCA procedure should always begin with a test for necessary conditions. 
In set- theoretic terms, a necessary condition is given when instances of the 
outcome are a subset of instances of a condition. As a rule of thumb, the consist-
ency threshold for potential necessary conditions should be set to 0.90 (Schnei-
der and Wagemann 2012: 143). To test for necessary conditions, I applied the 
formulas for consistency and coverage on each individual condition and its nega-
tion for the outcome and the non- outcome (using fsQCA for this purpose). This 
procedure revealed that the absence of constitutional restrictions (~C) was a 
necessary condition for military participation, at 0.94 consistency and 0.64 
coverage. This finding supported my expectation that military participation 
required a lack of constitutional restrictions and, conversely, implied that con-
stitutional restrictions amounted to a structural veto against military participa-
tion. The calculations further showed that the absence of public support was 
necessary for both outcomes, at 0.99 consistency for military non- participation 
and 0.97 consistency for military participation. Yet, given the near unanimous 
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public opposition to the Iraq War across the observed democracies, this finding 
was far from surprising. As the respective coverage scores of 0.50 and 0.55 indi-
cated, the inferential value of this necessary condition was rather limited.
Truth table analysis
During the next step, I constructed a truth table for the outcome ‘military parti-
cipation’ (Table 9.5). Because the model included five conditions, the resulting 
truth table comprised 25 (M, V, C, S, E), or 32, rows. However, because of limited 
diversity, only 12 of these rows contain empirical cases, whereas the others are 
logical remainders. These represent combinations of conditions that can be 
included in an intermediate solution produced by the software, if one can formu-
late plausible assumptions about their potential outcome even when these are not 
empirically observed. Table 9.5 shows the resulting truth table for military parti-
cipation in the Iraq War.
 Each country’s membership in the respective conjunction of conditions is given 
in parentheses. Italy, for instance, holds a membership of 0.60 in the conjunction 
given in the first row, which comprises the presence of military power, parlia-
mentary veto rights and a right executive, combined with the absence of constitu-
tional restrictions and public support. The consistency column indicates the extent 
to which the fuzzy- set values of all cases in a conjunction are sufficient for the 
outcome; that is, military participation. Based on the consistency scores, a cut- off 
point is determined for separating combinations that pass fuzzy- set sufficiency 
from those that do not. In my study, I elected a consistency threshold of 0.84. This 
meant that all configurations below Row 5 were excluded from the following min-
imization procedure performed by the software. I decided to exclude Row 6 
because it would have lowered overall consistency but added only a single case 
(Norway) that held a low membership in the respective configuration (0.55). 
Hence, there was little inferential leverage to be gained by including this case.
 The truth table is central to any QCA analysis. Even without the minimization 
procedure, the truth table provides comprehensive information concerning the 
structure of the data. As such, Table 9.5 tells us which conjunctions are filled by 
which empirical cases and the extent of their fuzzy- set membership. Given our 
theoretical expectations, we can also examine specific combinations and see 
whether or not these lead consistently towards the outcome.
Boolean minimization and solution terms
Based on the truth table algorithm and the consistency cut- off value specified by 
the researcher, the software can be used to derive three solution terms – complex, 
parsimonious and intermediate – that differ in the treatment of logical remainders. 
The complex solution provides a conservative estimate, because it does not make 
any assumptions beyond the empirical cases. As the name implies, this approach 
also tends to produce the lengthiest solution terms. In contrast, the  parsimonious 
solution includes logical remainders but does not assess their plausibility. Although 













1 1 0 0 1 1 0.94 1 ITA (0.60)
1 0 0 0 1 1 0.93 2 USA (0.77), GBR (0.65)
0 0 0 0 1 1 0.87 5 AUS (0.76), ESP (0.66), 
NLD (0.60), PRT (0.60), 
POL (0.52)
0 1 0 0 1 1 0.84 4 DNK (0.84), SVK (0.60), 
SVN (0.58), EST (0.55)
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.84 6 LTU (0.73), BGR (0.72), 
ROU (0.72), HUN (0.69), 
CZE (0.64), LVA (0.62)
0 0 1 0 0 0 0.83 1 NOR (0.55)
1 0 0 0 0 0 0.77 1 FRA (0.68)
1 1 1 0 1 0 0.65 1 JPN (0.60)
0 1 1 0 1 0 0.58 1 FIN (0.60), AUT (0.51)
1 1 1 0 0 0 0.58 1 DEU (0.73)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.54 4 NZL (0.80), GRC (0.78), 
CAN (0.76), BEL (0.71)
0 1 1 0 0 0 0.45 2 SWE (0.82), IRL (0.75)
Source: own table, based on Mello (2014: 172).
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this leads to solution terms that are easier to interpret, the parsimonious solution 
should always be treated with care and contrasted with other solutions, because it 
could comprise implausible assumptions. Finally, the intermediate solution allows 
the researcher to designate how logical remainders are to be treated based on 
explicit expectations about the causal relationship; hence, it is positioned between 
the complex and the parsimonious solutions.
 Table 9.6 shows the analytical results for war involvement in Iraq. The top rows 
display the previously identified necessary conditions. As expected from the ana-
lysis of necessity, all paths towards military participation contained the absence of 
constitutional restrictions (~C). The complex solution further entailed public 
opposition (~S), which is also implicated in the other solution terms but is not part 
of the minimized formulas. Measures of consistency and raw coverage are given for 
each solution term, whereas solution paths further specify raw coverage and unique 
coverage. The latter indicates ‘how much’ is explained exclusively by a respective 
path, whereas raw coverage also includes empirical overlap. For example, the parsi-
monious solution term includes two paths and has an overall consistency of 0.77 
and coverage of 0.85; however, we can see that Path 1 has a consistency of 0.82 and 
a unique coverage of 0.28 (indicating how many cases this path can account for).
 The solution terms show that two consistent pathways towards military participa-
tion exist. The first entails a right executive (E) and the absence of constitutional 
restrictions (~C), as indicated in Path 3. The second comprises the absence of 
Table 9.6 Solution terms for ‘military participation’ in the Iraq War





~C ←MP 0.94 0.64 –
~S 0.97 0.50 –
Parsimonious solution  
  term
0.77 0.85 –
Path 1 ~C*E + 0.82 0.69 0.28
Path 2 V* ~ C →MP 0.75 0.57 0.17
Intermediate solution  
  term
0.79 0.85 –
Path 3 ~C*E + 0.82 0.69 0.31
Path 4 ~M*V ~ C →MP 0.77 0.54 0.17
Complex solution term 0.80 0.84 –
Path 5 ~C* ~ S*E + 0.84 0.68 0.30
Path 6 ~M*V ~ C* ~ S →MP 0.78 0.54 0.17
Source: own table, based on Mello (2014: 173)
Note
[M] Military Power, [V] Parliamentary Veto, [C] Constitutional Restrictions, [S] Public Support, [E] 
Right Executive, [MP] Military Participation, [~] absence of a condition, [*] logical ‘and’, [+] logical 
‘or’, [←] necessity, [→] sufficiency.
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military power (~M) and constitutional restrictions (~C) with parliamentary veto 
rights (V), as shown in Path 4. This finding lent some support to the partisan argu-
ment and the expectation that small powers without constitutional restrictions had 
had incentives to become involved militarily in the Iraq War.
Visualization of results
To assess the validity of the analytical results and to relate them to individual 
cases, graphic means of representation can be helpful. For this purpose, I con-
structed an x–y plot that displayed each country’s membership in the complex 
solution term in relation to its membership in the outcome. The plot showed that 
the complex solution was (almost) sufficient for military participation because a 
large majority of countries were placed above the main diagonal, which reflects 
the subset relationship. As defined above, a sufficient condition X is given when-
ever X resembles a subset of Y, meaning that all values for X are equal to or less 
than the values for Y. Hence, cases on or above the diagonal fulfil the subset cri-
terion for a sufficient condition.
 Figure 9.1 shows four groups of cases. Countries in the lower- left corner hold 
low membership values in outcome and solution and can thus be considered 
































































Figure 9.1 Military participation and solution term.
Source: own figure, based on Mello 2014: 174.
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largely irrelevant for the analysis. In contrast, 12 out of 30 democracies hold 
membership in the solution term (Zones 1 to 3), eight of which can be con-
sidered typical cases (Zone 1). In turn, Zone 3 holds three deviant cases, as in 
countries with membership in the solution that do not show the expected 
outcome. In other words, based on their characteristics, one would have expected 
Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia to contribute to the Iraq War beyond their actual 
involvement. Finally, Zone 4 includes countries that show the outcome but do 
not hold membership in the solution. This indicates that alternative explanations 
may better account for the pattern observed in these particular cases.
 Depending on the specific aim of a research project, the next step could be the 
selection of cases for an in- depth study by means of process- tracing (see Chapter 
8 by Andreas Kruck). Here, the x–y plot can be useful in identifying appropriate 
cases for further study (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013). For example, in Figure 
9.1, we could select a case either from Zone 3 to explain why the country did not 
participate as expected or from Zone 6 to discuss alternative explanations for the 
observed participation that were not covered by our theoretical framework.
Interpretation of results
QCA solution terms tend to be complex and difficult to interpret. Hence, it is 
important to formulate specific theoretical expectations before the analysis and 
relate these to the results provided by the software. Rather than focusing solely 
on the analysis of the outcome, it is further recommended to also examine the 
non- outcome. That being said, for reasons of space I will solely highlight some 
selected findings for the analysis of the outcome of military participation (for 
details, see Mello 2014: 176–181).
 First, the absence of constitutional restrictions was found to be a necessary 
condition for military participation and was also part of all sufficient conjunctions. 
This finding contradicted the argument presented in some previous studies that 
constitutional settings would not constrain decision- making regarding the use of 
force. Second, the analysis shed light on the relationship between partisanship and 
war involvement. As expected, left or right partisanship were individually neither 
necessary nor sufficient. Instead, it was confirmed that these constitute INUS 
conditions. A rightist government combined with the absence of constitutional 
restrictions was sufficient for involvement in the Iraq War. Countries with a high 
level of membership in this path included, among others, Australia, Spain and the 
United States. Finally, the ‘parliamentary peace’ hypothesis could not be 
confirmed. Earlier studies suggested that parliamentary veto rights should serve as 
an effective constraint against war involvement (Dieterich et al. 2015), especially 
when combined with widespread public opposition to the use of force (V* ~ S). 
Although this pattern was found empirically, it crossed with constitutional 
restrictions and was thus overdetermined with regard to explaining military non- 
participation. Moreover, countries such as Italy, Denmark, Bulgaria, and several 
others also held membership in (V* ~ S), but for them the expected mechanism 
failed to prevent military involvement.
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Conclusion: strengths and limitations of QCA
QCA has gained recognition as a research approach that offers distinct advant-
ages for comparative studies. Although many existing QCA applications take a 
macro- comparative perspective, there is nothing inherent in the set- theoretic 
approach that would prevent it from being used for the study of NSAs in the 
field of international security. Hence, this chapter should also be understood as a 
plea for the (wider) application of QCA in this specific area of research. To this 
effect, it has provided an outline of the core principles and terminology of QCA 
and complemented this methodological introduction with a step- by-step illustra-
tion of an empirical study.
 As discussed in the theoretical section and shown in the empirical part of this 
chapter, QCA allows the researcher to take into account causal complexity – 
most importantly, the fact that different pathways can lead towards the same 
outcome and that a combination of conditions can be jointly necessary and/or 
sufficient for an outcome. Moreover, QCA offers a systematic and rigorous com-
parative approach. Yet it gives researchers flexibility, because crisp and fuzzy 
sets can be calibrated on the basis of qualitative and quantitative sources of data, 
depending on the particular research aim and the type of information required to 
operationalize one’s theoretical framework.
 Despite these strengths, it should be noted that QCA also has several limita-
tions.6 First, a researcher interested in using QCA would need to ‘buy into’ the 
set- theoretic logic, because it is the central methodological assumption of the 
approach. Certainly, it would make no sense to test probabilistic hypotheses 
within a set- theoretic framework. Likewise, if the language of necessary and suf-
ficient causation does not fit with the research aim of a given study, then QCA 
should simply not be used. Second, the truth table analysis itself is a static 
approach. Hence, it is difficult to incorporate assumptions about sequence and 
timing in a QCA framework because the analysis treats all conditions the same 
way. There are variants of QCA that try to circumvent this limitation and include 
‘time’ as a factor; but as of now, these still come with substantial drawbacks (see 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 263–274). Finally, in order for QCA to ‘get off 
the ground’ and work properly, a certain number of cases are required, because 
it gets increasingly difficult to conduct the truth table analysis if there are not 
enough observations. Although some studies have involved as few as nine cases, 
this numerical restriction might be the biggest obstacle to using QCA for some 
research projects on NSAs. Nonetheless, when the requirements of a set- 
theoretic approach are met, the application of QCA can certainly be a rewarding 
strategy for research projects on NSAs in international security.
Notes
1 For a demonstration of the effects of different calibration techniques and their applica-
tion in QCA, see Ragin (2008: 85–105) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 32–41).
2 The mathematical formulas behind these measures are introduced and discussed in 
Ragin (2006).
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3 For an elaborate discussion of these strategies, see Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 
Chapter 6).
4 On various ways to use QCA, see Berg- Schlosser et al. (2009: 15–16).
5 For a comparison of the various software packages, see Schneider and Wagemann 
(2012: 283).
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the strengths and limitations of QCA, see the sym-
posia published in the APSA Newsletter Qualitative Methods, 2004 (2)2, in Studies in 
Comparative International Development, Spring 2005 (40)1, Political Research Quar-
terly 2013 (66)1 and Sociological Methodology 2014 (44)1. A detailed reply to some 
of the critiques can be found in Meur et al. (2009).
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10 Geospatial analyses of non- state 
actors in violent conflicts
Alexander De Juan
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the use of quantitative geospatial analysis for investigat-
ing non- state actors (NSA) in violent conflicts. How can information on the geo-
graphical associations between socio- economic factors and violence be used to 
answer questions related to the motives, opportunities and strategies of militias 
and rebel groups? Drawing on my own research concerning communal violence 
in the Darfur region of Sudan, I illustrate how this specific methodological 
approach can be translated into a concrete research design, and how problems 
that arise during the research process can be dealt with. In particular, I will focus 
on conceptual issues related to the generation of plausible spatial hypotheses, the 
selection of units of analysis, the operationalization of core variables and the 
interpretation of results.
 When anti- state opposition escalated in Darfur in 2003, the government 
enlisted the help of militias. These mostly Arab proxy armies sided with the gov-
ernment against mainly non- Arab groups (Salmon 2007). Media and policy- 
related accounts of the conflict have argued that climate change and resource 
scarcity were essential in motivating militia attacks and the ensuing inter- ethnic 
violence. I have analysed whether longer- term changes in the subnational distri-
bution of water and vegetation resources really correlated with the spatial distri-
bution of militia violence in the early phase of the Sudanese civil war. 
Investigating highly disaggregated geographical patterns of violence and decadal 
environmental change in an information- scarce region such as Darfur requires a 
specific research approach. The core empirical analysis of the study consisted of 
a geospatial quantitative analysis based on remote sensing information about 
attacks on villages from 2003 to 2005 and on changes in vegetation in the 20 
years prior to the beginning of the civil war. By complementing these data with 
additional socio- economic information, such as the spatial distribution of the 
population and access to infrastructure, I was able to construct a data set of arti-
ficial grid cells covering all populated areas of northern and southern Darfur. 
More specifically, using the open- source Geographic Information System (GIS) 
software Quantum GIS (QGIS), I projected a grid net over the region of interest 
and used individual grid net cells as units of analysis, measuring all variables of 
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interest per individual cell. Statistical analyses using Stata 12 have yielded 
robust correlations between the probability and intensity of violence and long- 
term changes in natural resource availability (see De Juan 2015).
 In the following sections, I describe the core methodological and conceptual 
decisions that led me to this specific research design. First, I outline some major 
arguments in favour of subnational geospatial analyses. I then address individual 
elements of the research process. Throughout the subsections, I present more 
general considerations, as well as practical descriptions of how I approached the 
respective issues in my own research. The final section summarizes key meth-
odological issues and recommendations.
Subnational geospatial analyses of NSA
In peace and conflict studies, countries constitute the prime units of analysis. 
Indeed, various factors relevant to understanding the motives, strategies and activ-
ities of rebel groups are best analysed at the country level, either because these 
factors do not display substantial within- country variations (e.g. regime type) or, 
as one might argue, because aggregate country- level features are more important 
than variations on more disaggregated levels (e.g. ethnic or religious demography). 
However, many other aspects of NSA may actually be better analysed with altern-
ative units of observation. A micro- level turn has reoriented research on political 
violence from structural factors at the country level to disaggregated analyses of 
dynamics and actors at a subnational level (Kalyvas 2006).
 As part of this more general trend, quantitative geospatial analyses have been 
gaining in importance (e.g. Buhaug and Gates 2002; Kalyvas 2008; Raleigh et 
al. 2010a, 2010b). These studies use quantitative techniques to investigate corre-
lations between outcomes and explanatory factors of interest across geograph-
ically disaggregated units of analysis, such as regions, districts or artificial grid 
cells. As such, they use information on the ‘Where’ to answer questions related 
to the ‘Why’ of armed conflicts: Why do rebel groups emerge? Why do people 
support violent action? Why do rebel groups act in a specific way? Thus, geo-
graphical variations are not the actual research interest, but are rather an instru-
ment for inference. For instance, based on the fact that violence is geographically 
concentrated in a particularly poor region of a country, we might infer that eco-
nomic deprivation plays a key role in motivating rebellion against the respective 
state. Two key advantages of this methodological approach stand out: it avoids 
the ecological inference fallacy, and it considers the spatial characteristics and 
determinants of NSA activities.
 The ecological inference fallacy can occur when aggregated data are used to 
draw conclusions about individual characteristics or relationships (Robinson 
1950; King 1997). Most NSA are not active across entire state territories; their 
presence and activity are geographically limited to specific substate regions. The 
same holds true for factors that are said to influence rebel group emergence and 
activity, such as ethnic identity, terrain or economic well- being. For example, a 
comparatively high national gross domestic product (GDP) may indicate a high 
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degree of welfare at the national level. However, national- level numbers may 
obscure the strong concentration of economic power in specific regions, which 
in turn may exacerbate regional, ethnic or religious cleavages and increase rather 
than reduce rebel groups’ potential for mobilization. Without analysing whether 
subnational patterns of violence match the subnational patterns of the explan-
atory variables, it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions concerning the actual 
effects of the factors under investigation (see for example Raleigh et al. 2010b; 
Raleigh 2011).
 Subnational geospatial analyses allow not only new ways of analysing con-
ventional questions related to rebel groups and other NSA but also the analysis 
of new questions. Spatial disaggregation permits the consideration of character-
istics of NSA that are very difficult or impossible to investigate on the national 
level. For example, studies may analyse the spatial diffusion of NSA activities, 
specific features of rebel governance or how the same NSA behave differently 
across different subnational regions. The subnational approach also allows the 
consideration of specific explanatory variables that are inherently geographical, 
including economic and political disparities across regions (Fjelde and Østby 
2012), peripheral locations (see for example Rustad et al. 2011) and the accessi-
bility of regions (Raleigh and Hegre 2009). This diversification of explanatory 
and outcome variables may help us understand rebel groups and other NSA more 
comprehensively and to scrutinize aspects that have previously been under- 
investigated.
Designing geospatial analyses
Geospatial studies not only have specific potentials but also face specific meth-
odological challenges. A number of studies have dealt in detail with more tech-
nical issues related to the statistical analysis of spatial data (see for example 
Gleditsch and Weidmann 2012; Raleigh et al. 2010b; Stephenne et al. 2009).1 
The following subsections focus on conceptual specificities of geospatial ana-
lysis, the kinds of problems they may create and how they may be dealt with. 
This section is organized according to essential elements of the research process 
in which these challenges may occur: (1) the definition of the theoretical argu-
ment; (2) the selection of the unit of analysis; (3/4) the conceptualization and 
measurement of the outcome and explanatory variables; and (5) the meaningful 
interpretation of quantitative results.
Suggesting plausible hypotheses
In geospatial analysis, defining a plausible causal hypothesis is more challenging 
than it may seem at first glance. Geospatial analyses differ from country- level 
studies in at least one essential respect: whereas the presence of rebel groups is 
presumably associated with structures, actors and processes observable within 
the same country, this is not necessarily the case at the subnational level 
(Kalyvas 2008). People do not necessarily fight in the subnational region where 
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their grievances or personal political or economic aspirations have impelled 
them to take up arms. Thus, in contrast to the country- level approach, geospatial 
analysis does not allow us to establish a direct link between the location of NSA 
activity and the motives of the NSA. The following blunt example may illustrate 
this argument.
 Subnational analyses may reveal that rebel groups are particularly active near 
military bases or government facilities. The explanation is straightforward: chal-
lengers of state authority act strategically and target the resources of their 
enemies. Thus, the location of NSA activity informs us about the strategic aims 
of the rebels but not – or not necessarily – about their actual motives. Similarly, 
in many cases, NSA activities within a subnational region may be a consequence 
of diffusion from neighbouring regions rather than being associated with specific 
characteristics of the region itself (Schutte and Weidmann 2011). Rebellions 
erupt in one region and may in time engulf other parts of a country. If we 
observe violent events within a given subnational unit of analysis, we therefore 
cannot know for sure whether violence has been caused by factors found in that 
unit, whether violence has been caused in other areas but has been ‘pulled’ to 
that unit as a result of specific characteristics of that unit (e.g. features of terrain) 
or whether violence has been ‘pushed’ to that unit from surrounding areas (e.g. 
as a consequence of a military retreat).
 It is for this reason that one must carefully translate basic assumptions about the 
NSA under investigation into concrete hypotheses based on observable spatial 
associations. Specifically, one needs to develop explicit auxiliary theories that link 
the location of explanatory factors to the location of observable NSA activities. In 
the case of my study of Darfur, careful reflection about the causal steps that linked 
environmental change to NSA activity led to seemingly counter- intuitive hypo-
theses. Although one might at first assume that violent conflict would grow more 
intense where natural resources were becoming scarcer, a closer look at the context 
made another hypothesis more plausible. Previous arguments had highlighted 
environmentally induced migration to relatively resource- rich areas as an essential 
mechanism that links political violence to the more long- standing processes of 
environmental change (Reuveny 2007). Such change was uneven in Darfur: in the 
northern and eastern parts of the region, natural resources became depleted, 
whereas in the south and west, resources became more available. These protracted 
processes eventually resulted in migration to the more affluent south and west. 
This led me to the hypothesis that violent acts against civilians would become 
more likely and more intense in those areas where the influx of migrants would 
increase competition for resources among identity groups that lacked common tra-
ditions and institutions of peaceful conflict resolution.
 I then developed an explicit auxiliary hypothesis that translated my general 
(aggregated) hypothesis – increasing resource scarcity and competition motiv-
ated inter- ethnic militia attacks – into a concrete spatial argument: resource scar-
city in resource- poor areas led to high levels of in- migration and resource 
competition in relatively resource- rich areas and increased the risk and intensity 
of militia attacks in these regions.
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Selecting the ‘right’ geographical unit of analysis
At what geographical scale do I expect these hypothesized causal associations to 
materialize? Switching from the country- level to the subnational level of ana-
lysis opened up choices as to what geographical unit of analysis should be 
selected to investigate a specific research question: should the explanatory and 
outcome variables be measured at the level of villages, districts or provinces, or 
should one create a small or large artificial grid net that covers the geographical 
area under investigation and then measure the variables per grid cell? For 
example, if I wanted to investigate political violence in Pakistan, I could use one 
of the following four units of observation (see Figure 10.1): larger or smaller 
administrative units (e.g. districts or subdistricts) or two different- sized grid cells 
(e.g. individual square units of, say, 100 km × 100 km or 50 km × 50 km, which 
together make up grid nets).
 Although these options increase the freedom of the researcher, they present 
the challenge of having to make and justify an actual decision. Here the issue is 
what units of analysis are appropriate for a specific research project (Buhaug and 
Rød 2006; Rød and Buhaug 2007; De Luca et al. 2012). In political geography, 
the widely debated modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) refers to potential 
variation of results across different units of analysis (Openshaw 1996; 
O’Loughlin 2007; Lee et al. 2008). The MAUP basically consists of two dif-
ferent aspects. One of these aspects, zoning, concerns the question of how geo-
graphical boundaries of units of observation should be defined. In most cases, 
researchers do not know what determined the shapes of provinces or districts, 
such as geographical characteristics or social criteria (e.g. ethnic or religious 
factors). Thus, it is not clear what these boundaries really signify and how they 
relate to the social phenomena under investigation (Openshaw 1996). The other 
aspect of the MAUP is scaling, which concerns questions such as: in geograph-
ical terms, how small or large should the units of observation be; should specific 
phenomena be analysed at the village level or at the district level; and what is 
the optimal resolution of the grid cells to be used?
 Conceptual challenges may arise when one is selecting the unit of observa-
tion. For example, with respect to the relational variables often used in analyses 




From left to right: Districts, subdistricts, 100 km × 100 km grid cells and 50 km × 50 km grid cells.
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of political violence, such as vertical or horizontal inequality and ethnic and reli-
gious polarization or fractionalization, one could argue that at the national level 
people will tend to compare their own situation with that of fellow citizens of 
their country. However, this argument cannot easily be made at the subnational 
level. Does inequality matter across or within districts, and across or within vil-
lages? How should grid cells be positioned and sized in order to capture relevant 
demographic (religious or ethnic) constellations?
 There is no such thing as an optimal size and shape of units of analysis in 
investigations of specific NSA features and activities. Smaller units increase the 
chance of maximizing the homogeneity within and the variations across the units 
of observation (Oberwittler and Wikström 2009). Also, if one assumes that peo-
ple’s perceptions and actions are shaped by their immediate local environment 
rather than by wider administrative units or grid cells (Lee et al. 2008), smaller 
units might be more suitable. Some theoretical arguments to be found in studies 
of peace and conflict, however, emphasize the role of factors at the level of 
larger units of analysis. For example, if one assumes that the ethnic composition 
of decentralized regional governments plays a role in political violence, it would 
not be reasonable to investigate this argument using more disaggregated units of 
analysis, such as districts or villages. Moreover, it may make sense to use larger 
units of observation as a way to account for low- level geographical gaps between 
the location of the cause and the location of the observable effect (Raleigh and 
Kniveton 2012). For instance, if we expect greater violence near military bases 
because rebels strategically target critical infrastructures, we may expect violent 
events to be concentrated near these bases but not necessarily at their exact geo-
graphical location.
 Similarly, certain arguments favour the use of grid cells rather than the use of 
administrative units, or vice versa. For example, grid cells may be more favour-
able because, unlike administrative units such as districts, they are not intention-
ally shaped based on economic, political or social criteria unknown to the 
researcher (O’Loughlin 2007). Moreover, grid nets can more easily be generated 
in different sizes and locations. From a practical perspective, grid cells may be 
easier to handle in cross- country and panel analyses, because administrative 
areas often vary greatly in size across countries, and their boundaries are often 
subject to amendments. On the other hand, administrative units may be more 
suitable when reliable socio- economic data are obtained at the administrative 
level (e.g. from household surveys) rather than at less aggregated levels (e.g. per 
household or per individual), which would be required for aggregation into arti-
ficially created grid cells.
 Decisions concerning units of analysis should be made on a case- by-case 
basis in line with the specific research questions and factors under investigation 
(Openshaw 1996; Lee et al. 2008). These decisions must be explicit and must be 
validated by conceptual arguments in favour of their selection. If the units of 
observation are selected purely on the basis of data availability, researchers 
should explain why this specific unit of analysis is suitable for the respective 
analyses and how zoning or scaling effects may affect the results. Whenever 
Geospatial analyses  149
possible, robustness checks using a variety of different units of analysis should 
be conducted to show that the results are not driven by a more or less arbitrary 
decision to use a specific unit of analysis.
 In my study of Darfur, I relied on artificial grid cells as the units of observa-
tion. Administrative units were just not a practicable choice, because the prin-
cipal administrative units – states and counties – are fairly large in Darfur, so 
that a lot of geographical variation of interest would have been concealed by 
aggregation into these units. Moreover, they promised few advantages in terms 
of data availability, because administrative data for Sudan are scarce. I therefore 
relied on a grid net that I modelled according to previous extensive environ-
mental and livelihoods vulnerability mapping (ELVM) that was undertaken in 
Darfur by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the ProAct 
Network (2010). Modelling the units of analysis according to an existing study 
had certain disadvantages: it limited the possibility of performing robustness 
checks with alternative grid specifications, most notably in terms of size and 
location, and I had to focus on the specific study areas of the assessment, which 
excluded western Darfur.
 The essential advantage of this approach was that it allowed me to use the 
data provided by the study on the respective grid cell level. In a context of scarce 
socio- economic data, this advantage overruled other considerations and led to 
my decision to use a total of 1087 grid cells, 16 km × 16 km each, across northern 
and southern Darfur as my primary units of analysis. To control for the MAUP, I 
also created a second data set on the village level that was used for additional 
robustness checks. Instead of aggregating data per 16 km × 16 km grid cell, I 
measured them in circular village buffers with a radius of either 2 km or 5 km. 
Statistical analyses with these alternative units of analysis confirmed my initial 
findings and made me confident that they were not driven by the selection of my 
primary unit of analysis.
Measuring the outcome variables
The next step in the research process consisted of measuring the main variables 
of interest. For my study of Darfur, I needed geolocated information on militia 
activities – but where could such data be obtained?
 Most subnational analyses of various facets of violence rely on newspaper- 
based event data sets such as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 
(ACLED) or the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset 
(UCDP GED) (see Raleigh et al. 2010a; Sundberg and Melander 2013). These 
data sets, which rely on international press coverage to identify violent events 
that are in turn attributed to geographical locations described in the respective 
articles, have provided extremely valuable avenues for research on geographical 
patterns of violence. Their specific strength is that they provide temporally and 
geographically disaggregated data that have been collated based on the sources 
and coding rules used by a number of countries, thus allowing analyses of viol-
ence on the subnational level across several countries.
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 One weakness of these data sets, however, is that the geographical informa-
tion is not always precise or complete, and because they depend on inter-
national press coverage, violence in remote and rural areas is probably 
under- reported. As has been emphasized elsewhere, these data sets also do not 
always correctly attribute the place names cited in press reports to specific 
locations (Eck 2012). These issues raise problems for analyses on geograph-
ically highly disaggregated levels, as in the case of geospatial analyses of 
single countries or regions. These data-collection challenges are likely to be 
more pronounced in regions where violence is rampant in inaccessible places 
and place names are poorly documented.
 In many countries, more specific data sets that rely on national newspaper 
sources are available. In Nigeria, for example, a data set of violent events was 
compiled by the non- profit organization Nigeria Watch, which screened 15 local 
newspapers and human rights reports from 2006 to 2012 to extract information 
on 9255 violent events. The BFRS Political Violence in Pakistan Dataset (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2013) contains incident- level data on political violence that 
took place in Pakistan between 1988 and 2011, with a total of 17,679 events and 
rich information concerning the state and non- state actors involved. The Sistem 
Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan Indonesia (SNPKI) is a government- and 
World Bank- funded violent event database that covers several of Indonesia’s 
provinces; begun in 1998, this project provides a monthly updated list of violent 
events, which now exceeds 119,107 incidents.
 More recently, a number of crowdsourcing platforms that monitor violent 
events have been established. Such initiatives can provide abundant information 
even where international and national press coverage is minimal (see for 
example De Juan and Bank 2015). Individuals use online resources to file reports 
that either describe specific locations or position them on digital maps. Finding 
such country- specific data sets is often difficult and requires rigorous research 
concerning the countries of interest. Because most of these data sets are less 
prone to suffering from the problems associated with the cross- country data sets 
noted above, this additional investment will often pay off by providing greater 
data reliability. This is not to say that country- specific data sets are free from 
biases. Crowdsourcing data in Syria, for example, will likely be biased towards 
the opposition. Regions that are aligned with the ruling regime may tend to 
under- report violence, whereas rebel strongholds will most likely over- report 
numbers of fatalities. In addition, certain types of incidents may not be accu-
rately reflected in the data; for example, particularly intense fighting may be 
under- reported if fewer civilian observers are able to file reports on such 
incidents.
 In any case, it is essential to make an informed choice about what data should 
be used while acknowledging data set- specific drawbacks and challenges. As for 
my study on Darfur, I doubted the reliability of ACLED and GED data, because 
these data sets were probably beset by such challenges in the sparsely populated 
Darfur region, which had little international press presence and coverage. Con-
sequently, I tried to find alternative country- specific data. In order to document 
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violence in Darfur, the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) at the US State 
Department created a database of information about villages that were damaged 
(evidence of partial destruction) or destroyed (evidence of complete destruction) 
between 2003 and 2010, as well as about those confirmed to be neither damaged 
nor destroyed during this period. Derived from satellite images that revealed 
changes in village structures over time, the data set contains information on 9183 
villages across Darfur.
 Once a data set has been selected, the next step involves operationalizing the 
outcome variable according to the main theoretical arguments. Event data may 
be used to measure various facets of rebel group violence; that is, its onset, inci-
dence or intensity. Although the determinants of all three of these elements may 
overlap, they are not necessarily the same (Montalvo and Reynal- Querol 2007). 
The factors that motivate people to take up arms or that influence their ability to 
stage a rebellion may differ from the factors that influence the intensity of fight-
ing. A large number of events in a specific area may be traced back to a spiral of 
attacks and reprisals within a given territory (Raleigh 2012), or it may be influ-
enced by a military scorched- earth strategy aimed at weakening the adversary. In 
neither case are the factors that increase the intensity of the conflict within a spe-
cific area necessarily related to the causes of the conflict. The same argument 
can be made the other way around: a high degree of poverty in a subnational 
region may be associated with a greater risk or incidence of conflict within that 
region (Buhaug et al. 2011); however, why high levels of poverty should actu-
ally increase the intensity of fighting within a region is not theoretically obvious, 
because having compelling reasons to fight does not necessarily lead to more 
zealous, aggressive fighting (see for example Costalli and Moro 2011).
 My principal theoretical argument concerning the role of environmental 
change in non- state violence in Darfur explicitly applied to the occurrence and 
intensity of militia violence; that is, inter- ethnic competition in resource- rich 
areas increased the likelihood of attacks on villages. Resource wealth also 
creates incentives for high- intensity violence aimed at displacing competing 
ethnic groups. Consequently, I decided to consider both variables in the main 
models of my analysis. The first was a dichotomous ‘occurrence variable’, which 
was assigned a value of 1 for each grid cell that contained at least one village 
found to be damaged or destroyed during the period under investigation, and a 
value of 0 if no villages in the grid cell were damaged or destroyed. The second 
was an ‘intensity variable’, which measured the actual counts of villages 
damaged and/or destroyed per grid cell. The results were comparable for both 
specifications, indicating that environmental factors played an important role in 
the occurrence and intensity of militia violence.
Measuring the explanatory variables
Regardless of the level of analysis and the specific methodological approach, it 
is often difficult to identify indicators of the explanatory variables of interest that 
are both valid and reliable. Most classical theoretical arguments concerning the 
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causes of political violence focus on individual needs, strategies and actions; for 
example, the role of deprivation in generating frustrations that may motivate 
individuals to take up arms (Gurr 1970). Thus, all causal theories about conflict 
onset, intensity or duration entail explicit or implicit assumptions regarding the 
effects of the respective explanatory factors on individual- level perceptions, 
decisions and actions. The use of aggregated indicators (e.g. country- level or 
district- level indicators) to explain political violence requires auxiliary assump-
tions that link the indicator to local, micro- level dynamics; however, such 
assumptions introduce additional uncertainties into empirical analyses. We might 
assume, for example, that a state’s security budget reflects its actual coercive 
capacity on the ground, or that decentralization laws mirror individuals’ actual 
access to decentralized decision- making.
 A major challenge confronting every quantitative study is the need to trans-
late associated abstract concepts and variables into quantifiable and measurable 
indicators suitable for more aggregated statistical analysis (Kalyvas 2003, 2008). 
Lack of data can make persuasive operationalization in subnational analyses 
even more difficult, especially in conflict- ridden countries such as Sudan. 
Whereas information about the national- level GDP may be available, informa-
tion about income levels at the subnational level is often unattainable. The same 
holds true for data about ethnic identities or various development indicators. 
Paucity of data increases the need to rely on proxy indicators that may or may 
not appropriately reflect the concepts at hand. Thus, geospatial analyses have, 
for example, attempted to capture state capacity using such indicators as distance 
from the capital, type of terrain (e.g. mountainous) and density of road networks 
(Cederman et al. 2009; Buhaug 2010).
 Another problem is that individual indicators may in principle be used as 
proxies for various variables and concepts, thus making the interpretation of 
empirical results somewhat discretionary and ambiguous. For example, if we 
consider road networks, in addition to reflecting state capacity (Cederman et al. 
2009), they might be used to indicate overall levels of development (Buhaug and 
Rød 2006), or they might be seen as strategic targets of rebel groups (Raleigh 
and Hegre 2009) or as potentially enhancing rebels’ logistical capacities (Zhukov 
2012). What conclusions can be drawn if dense road networks are found to be 
negatively or positively associated with political violence?
 Challenges of measurement related to a lack of available data are not easily 
resolved. One way of dealing with such challenges is to focus on countries with 
a relative abundance of relevant data, although this strategy is not very satisfy-
ing. It excludes from the analyses many countries in which violent NSA play a 
particularly pronounced role, most notably fragile states with high levels of viol-
ence and low statistical capacity and/or a high level of political interference with 
the generation of statistical data. Thus, a better strategy for dealing with a lack of 
reliable data consists of more rigorously searching for less obvious data sources. 
Various data sets contain geographically disaggregated information, such as the 
US Agency for International Development’s Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS) and EdData (Education Data); the World Health Organization’s World 
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Health Survey (WHS); and the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement 
Study (LSMS). In many cases, such data feature information (on identities and 
attitudes, as well as on the social and economic conditions of households and 
individuals) that is relevant to the analysis of NSA.
 Remote sensing data can provide relevant geographical information on a 
highly disaggregated level. Satellite images can be used to measure terrain fea-
tures such as elevation (freely available from the Shuttle Radar Topography 
Mission (SRTM) and other sources). Images of Earth at night can be used as 
proxies for a region’s access to electricity (De Juan and Bank 2015) or for more 
general economic development (Min 2009). Such data are available from the 
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Operational Linescan System (DMSP-
 OLS) provided by the US National Centers for Environmental Information 
(NCEI). Finally, data on precipitation and on soil properties can provide 
information about access to renewable natural resources or the agricultural 
potential of a given territory (see for example the data sets provided by the 
GeoNetwork of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)). 
A particular advantage of these data is that the probability of any intentional 
manipulation is very low. Many authoritarian regimes have been particularly 
reluctant to provide meaningful socio- economic information; however, remote 
sensing information is not within reach of these states.
 As regards the more general challenges of measurement and operationaliza-
tion beyond the problems related to the lack of available data, subnational 
research designs may actually offer certain advantages when compared with 
cross- country analyses. Geographical disaggregation permits the researcher to 
use indicators that are closer to the local and individual levels. For instance, sub-
national analyses have relied on information concerning households’ durable 
assets per administrative unit as an indicator of subnational poverty and rates of 
economic inequality (e.g. Hegre et al. 2009; Østby et al. 2011; Fjelde and Østby 
2012). Such operationalization can more appropriately capture concepts and 
hypotheses related to the role of poverty and deprivation in political violence 
than can nationally aggregated measures such as GDP levels. One possible 
strategy for dealing with the remaining uncertainties involves availing oneself of 
a specific opportunity that single- country subnational analysis provides; that is, 
identifying and using context- specific indicators rather than drawing on more 
generic catch- all proxies. Case- specific qualitative methods can be used to scru-
tinize the validity of quantitative indicators and to permit informed judgements 
as to whether these indicators persuasively reflect the underlying theoretical con-
cepts in the specific case under investigation.
 In the case of my study of Darfur, I used information from remote- sensing 
sources concerning environmental conditions to measure the primary explan-
atory variables. The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) is gener-
ated from satellite imagery. Data stem from the Global Inventory Modeling and 
Mapping Studies’ (GIMMS) 15-day Advanced Very High Resolution Radiome-
ter (AVHRR) and are provided by the Global Land Cover Facility at the Univer-
sity of Maryland (see Tucker et al. 2004). The NDVI exploits the fact that 
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healthy vegetation strongly reflects the near- infrared part of the electromagnetic 
spectrum and absorbs wavelengths of visible red light. As vegetation cover 
changes, so do these reflectance properties. Thus, satellite imagery can be used 
to estimate the relative density and health of vegetation, as well as changes over 
time. Higher NDVI values indicate greater vegetation density and health. I 
aggregated NDVI data by grid cell to generate variables for environmental 
change prior to the beginning of the War in Sudan in 2003. Previous in- depth 
studies on Darfur revealed that vegetation in the region I studied is largely deter-
mined by the three- month rainy season (from July to September). Rainfall during 
these three months is around 90 per cent of the total annual rainfall. I therefore 
focused my measurement on this specific period, using the average NDVI values 
for these three months. Using QGIS, I calculated per grid cell the mean NDVI 
value of all pixels included in the respective cell. In addition, I relied on the 
aforementioned ELVM study for most of the control variables considered in the 
main models. This approach allowed me to make use of comparatively reliable 
data on a geographically highly disaggregated level.
Interpreting the results
Even with convincing hypotheses, a careful selection of units of analysis and 
reliable data sources, statistical correlations may still be misleading. In the case 
of my own study, I was able to document a robust correlation between long- term 
environmental change and the occurrence and intensity of violence in line with 
my theoretical expectations. But how could I be sure that these findings would 
actually reflect my specific arguments concerning the link between migration 
from areas in which the availability of natural resources was decreasing to areas 
in which it was increasing and the ensuing ethnic conflict in these regions? This 
challenge is not unique to geospatial subnational analysis – that is, it is a chal-
lenge that confronts every purely observational study – but it is of particular 
concern for this specific methodological approach: the need for auxiliary 
assumptions to connect causes of rebel activity to the location of the observable 
violent events introduces additional uncertainty and makes causal claims even 
more challenging.
 A number of technical approaches can be used to further scrutinize statistical 
correlations. In the absence of a robust experimental design, however, such 
strategies cannot be employed to reliably dispel any remaining doubts about the 
actual mechanisms at play. Consequently, it may be more promising to make 
use of a multi- method design. Such an approach would allow subnational 
geospatial analyses to contribute their specific added value while their potential 
weaknesses would be offset by qualitative analyses on the local level. Tech-
niques such as process tracing (see Chapter 8 by Andreas Kruck) can provide 
important additional layers of evidence in favour of or against the causal hypo-
theses investigated in statistical analyses (Raleigh et al. 2010b). Such a multi- 
method design could be set up as an actual nested analysis in which the 
subnational  statistical analysis of administrative units or grid cells is combined 
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with an  in- depth investigation of one or more of the units contained in the larger 
sample (see Lieberman 2005).
 In the case of Darfur, I decided to scrutinize the suggested auxiliary hypo-
theses linking environmental change to militia attacks on villages by making use 
of a large body of qualitative and descriptive quantitative data obtained from 
previous ethnographic studies and historical archives (original maps of ethnic 
settlement patterns provided by the British colonial government), as well as the 
remote- sensing systems mentioned above, to connect individual elements of the 
suggested causal chain. Most notably, I showed that (1) environmental change 
has been highly uneven in Darfur; (2) various ethnic groups have been affected 
by environmental change to varying degrees; (3) decreasing resource availability 
led to migration of affected groups into more affluent regions; (4) these move-
ments increased inter- ethnic tensions in areas of high in- migration; and that (5) 
these tensions motivated militia formation and attacks. Obviously, these step- 
wise qualitative accounts do not permit strong causal claims, but they do lend 
support to the argument that these processes link environmental change to 
observable patterns of militia violence.
Conclusion
Geospatial analyses on the subnational level can shed new light on hypotheses 
that have been tested in country- level analyses and can make it possible to con-
sider aspects of NSA that have thus far been widely neglected. This approach is 
best suited to addressing research questions that focus on variables with a high 
degree of within- country variation and with a strong spatial component. 
However, when it comes to identifying plausible spatial hypotheses, this specific 
methodological approach also presents its own specific challenges, the most 
notable of which are the selection of appropriate units of analysis, operationali-
zation and measurement, and the interpretation of statistical correlations.
 To mitigate these challenges and to optimize the specific benefits to be gained 
through geospatial analysis, the following recommendations should be kept in 
mind. First, when conducting analyses, researchers should generally think twice 
before transferring theoretical arguments and empirical findings from the cross- 
country level to the geospatial level, and vice versa. It may be more promising to 
use geospatial analysis for particular research questions that are geared more 
specifically to the actual geographical characteristics of NSA features and activ-
ities and to develop specific spatial hypotheses. Second, researchers should 
evaluate the plausibility of implicit or explicit assumptions that relate observable 
violence in one subnational region to specific features of that region. The under-
lying assumptions should be made explicit and justified theoretically and/or 
empirically. Third, units of analysis should ideally be selected on explicit con-
ceptual and theoretical grounds. Purely data- driven selections of units of analysis 
should be made explicit. To demonstrate that empirical results are not driven by 
the researcher’s choice of the unit of analysis, additional robustness checks 
should be conducted using alternative (in terms of size and location) units of 
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analysis. Fourth, to reduce uncertainty resulting from potentially ambiguous 
indicators, researchers should invest time in identifying context- specific data 
sources rather than relying on conventional, readily available indicators of 
dubious validity. Finally, researchers should consider the potential of nested ana-
lyses that combine quantitative and qualitative analyses as a way to ensure that 
quantitative findings in subnational geospatial analysis are interpreted in a 
meaningful way.
Note
1 The following textbooks provide more general technical introductions to the use of 
geographical information systems and statistical analyses of spatial data: Isaaks and 
Srivastava (1989); Cressie (1993); Bossler et al. (2002); Heywood et al. (2011).
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11 Discussion chapter




The purpose of this contribution is to assess how several of the methodological 
approaches to investigating the role of non- state actors in international security, 
introduced and applied in this volume, contribute to the possibility of stating 
plausible causal claims. To that effect (no pun intended) this chapter dissects 
three contributions that specifically address the issue of causal claims: com-
parative case study methodology (Chapter 8 by Andreas Kruck on the privatiza-
tion of security); qualitative case analysis (Chapter 9 by Patrick Mello on armed 
conflict); and geospatial analysis (Chapter 10 by Alexander De Juan on the 
emergence of violent conflict). I will organize my own claims around several 
questions to be put to each individual chapter: how to select a suitable method 
for answering a particular research question? How to select cases that fit research 
design and method(s)? What type of knowledge is served, or hindered, by our 
choice of method(s)? What can be said to have been explained? I will discuss the 
three chapters in this part of the volume while keeping these questions in mind. 
As will be shown, there is not always the perfect solution: researchers often have 
to make decisions that involve trade- offs.
 One preliminary observation is in order, however: by assessing whether and 
how specific methodologies allow for causal claims it is presupposed that, at least 
in principle, causality exists, and that, to different degrees and possibly only indi-
rectly, evidence exists that allows us to agree on the plausibility of causality to 
have occurred (see Guzzini 2016). Within this spectrum many different positions 
are still tenable and indeed the International Relations (IR) discipline boasts hugely 
diverse notions of causality. On the one hand, we find those who, sometimes expli-
citly modelling themselves after the natural sciences, seek for universal laws of 
international politics – Waltz’s claims about balancing in anarchical systems come 
closest to that notion (Waltz 1979). On the other hand, we find those who reject 
the possibility of universal laws, but still agree that even unique historical develop-
ments can be unpacked as a sequence of events representing a causal chain in 
which one phenomenon at t1 helped bring about another at t2.
 Social Constructivists often find themselves at odds with either position: 
because universal laws presuppose similar, if not identical, actors and contexts 
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to be present in the international realm, constructivists argue that actors, their 
properties, and the contexts in which they find themselves change over time 
because their social existence (constitution) is subject to social construction. 
Although this leaves little room for universal laws, for some constructivists this 
does not render impossible the notion of causality as long as the scholar strives 
for causal claims about time- and space- bound, comparable phenomena. Hence 
their emphasis on the importance of so- called scope conditions (e.g. Checkel 
2001).
 Still, a constructivist would argue, another issue has to be tackled before 
one can engage in such ‘small t theorizing’: the issue of mutual constitution. 
Because, in social constructivism, meaning emerges out of interaction between 
two or more actors, such meaning is mutually constituted in a process in which 
it is difficult to assume a clear linear process of x leading to y. Rather, for a 
constructivist, y affects x while, at the same moment, x affects y. This hugely 
complicates the issue of causal claims, because dissecting the mutual constitu-
tive effect still requires the adoption, if only for pragmatic reasons, of some 
kind of time sequence. Hence, the position of some constructivists that con-
structivist research requires engaging in so- called bracketing. Bracketing 
involves the temporary assumption that one side of the mutual interaction can 
be considered to be constant in order to describe the other side. In this sense, 
constructivists borrow from an experimental research design (Price and Reus- 
Smit 1998; for a different perspective see Fierke 2005: 9–16; Klotz and Lynch 
2007: 14–15).
 Critical theorists would not necessarily discard the possibility of causal 
claims. They would point to two major issues: first, because to them empirical 
phenomena are by definition context bound (in time and place) they would hes-
itate talking in terms of universal laws and strive for limited causal claims for a 
circumscribed class of phenomena. Second, they would emphasize that the indi-
vidual researcher herself is part of the social phenomenon she is studying. They 
thus add a new dimension to causality: everything the researcher does or does 
not do may have a causal effect on the phenomenon to be studied. This is dia-
metrically opposed to those scholars in our field (such as, for example, neo- 
realists) who would argue that the investigator is looking in on international 
reality from the outside and that her presence does not affect the subject under 
study. A critical theorist would therefore require the scholar to be aware of her 
position and impact on the matter under investigation.
 With these caveats in mind, I will look upon the three chapters on causal 
claims. My own position is that causality implies a time sequence (even if in the 
form of constructivist ‘bracketing’) and that because of this we are implicitly or 
explicitly thinking in terms of an independent variable preceding a dependent 
variable. In addition, I start from the notion that establishing a causal claim not 
only requires an observation of a sequence of events, but above all an explan-
atory mechanism accounting for why the sequence has occurred. Such explan-
atory mechanisms can only be found in theories, also if we are investigating 
phenomena that only occur in a specific context of time and space.
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How to select a suitable method for answering a particular 
research question?
One often hears the suggestion that one’s research question determines one’s 
research method. Yet, that claim is still no shortcut to a pragmatic decision on 
method. First of all, we need to distinguish between research design and methods 
in the more narrow sense. Second, we need to distinguish methods to collect data 
from methods to analyse data. One’s research design is related to one’s concep-
tual model which in turn reflects the research question as well the essential ele-
ments of the theory one considers plausible for tackling the research question. 
Theory could be conceived in a narrow sense (assumptions leading to the deduc-
tion of testable hypotheses) or in a wider sense (a set of related concepts that 
delineate the empirical phenomena we wish to study), but it always implies some 
kind of reduction of complexity as well as applying an interpretive filter that 
allows us to make sense of the world. E.g., realists do this when they present 
world politics as an anarchic system of states (despite the presence of other 
actors and forms of governance) on the grounds that only states have the capa-
city to organize in such a way that they can survive in such a surrounding.
 Andreas Kruck’s research (see Chapter 8) seeks to explain the variation in 
degree and nature of privatization of security in four different countries. Andreas 
Kruck opts for a comparative case study of France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Now the research question itself does not pre-
clude other methods: it allows for a large- n study of privatization. His opera-
tional definition of privatization would certainly facilitate that. Yet, Andreas 
Kruck seeks to accomplish more than correlation between variables: he wants to 
see whether the causal mechanisms underlying such a correlation can be 
unveiled. In order to trace causality, one could, instead, consider opting for a 
large- n study supplemented with one or more case studies, a strategy sometimes 
preferred if a large n is available (Landman 2005). Andreas Kruck, however, 
opted for four case studies in order to establish both the ‘comprehensive expla-
nation’ and the causal claims. He might have done so for pragmatic reasons 
because large- scale standardized data for numerous countries that would be 
necessary for a large- n study (supplemented by case studies) were not available 
as ready- made data sets and might be hard to gather by the individual researcher. 
He calls this ‘zooming in’ and ‘linking up’. This is a plausible strategy for situ-
ations in which a large n is absent and a comparative case study seems war-
ranted. At any rate, the broader lesson is that the number of (potentially) 
available n is an important determinant for the choice of an adequate method. 
The number of available cases may in turn depend on a whole range of factors 
including the real world frequency of a phenomenon, availability of (reliable) 
data and the researcher’s time and resources for gathering new data. So research-
ers might want to ask themselves: would my research question allow for large n 
analyses, or does it suggest a comparative case study? Which additional con-
siderations regarding data collection and data analysis would this demand from 
my research?
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 Patrick Mello (see Chapter 9) is looking for an explanation of the choices 
by 30 democracies of whether or not to participate in the 2003 Iraq War. 
Patrick Mello suggests Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an appro-
priate method to tackle this specific question. Although his research involves 
few – if any – non- state actors, his empirics indicate that QCA can be a viable 
avenue for specific forms of research into non- state actors. QCA is a method 
of analysis that enables us to establish whether individual variables or specific 
combinations of variables constitute necessary or sufficient conditions for a 
specific outcome to occur by formally attaching weights to qualitative vari-
ables and counting the actual occurrence of all possible logical combinations 
of independent variables. Now QCA offers particular advantages to com-
parative case studies: when n is too small to engage in probability tests, yet the 
number of cases is substantive, QCA offers a method to make a statement 
about causal links between independent and dependent variables (or conditions 
and outcomes, as researchers using QCA prefer to call them) – importantly, it 
is a method that facilitates replication. The additional advantage is that QCA 
allows for making plausible statements about there being various causal path-
ways to the same outcome (equifinality). Furthermore, QCA permits identify-
ing clear outlier cases, which could then be investigated in depth through 
single case studies. Hence, it might be useful for a lot of studies of non- state 
actors in international security, if researchers asked themselves: does my 
research allow for the possibility of different causal pathways leading to the 
observable outcome? Would in my research design QCA be useful to depict 
various such pathways?
 Alexander De Juan (see Chapter 10) seeks to investigate the relationship 
between reduced availability of natural resources and the advent and intensity 
of violent conflict. His analysis involves data pertaining to the situation in the 
Sudanese region of Darfur. Interestingly, Alexander De Juan’s research ques-
tion springs from an empirical observation that geographical patterns of violent 
conflict do not coincide with geographical patterns of deteriorating supply of 
vital natural resources. This contradicts the common- sense idea that people 
would be prepared to use violence over extreme lack of access to (dwindling) 
resources. The observation induces him to formulate a theory that basically 
states that dwindling resources force people to migrate to areas of plenty and 
that this migration causes tension between old and new users of these 
resources. This observation allows for a conceptual model accounting for these 
two movements (first, migration patterns; second, use of violence) and for 
readily testable hypotheses, which could be approached both with qualitative 
and with quantitative methods. Alexander De Juan’s approach thus highlights 
the importance of formulating testable hypotheses. This points to another set 
of questions relevant for causal research: does my research design allow me to 
formulate straightforward expectations? Which type of methods would allow 
me to put these to the test?
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Data collection and units of analysis
In terms of data collection, it requires a decision on the unit of analysis: the case 
to be selected is supposedly part of a class of phenomena about which one’s 
theory is expected to provide a meaningful interpretation. For Andreas Kruck 
(see Chapter 8) this seems to be all ‘Western “strong” and democratic’ countries 
that have to some extent privatized security. From that group he selects four. 
Although quite a considerable number for a comparative case study, one could 
debate whether more may have been better. However, researchers often have to 
limit their analysis for pragmatic reasons (how much time do I have for my 
research? What data are available?). Andreas Kruck offers three explanatory the-
ories (functional, political and ideational). In particular, from the perspective of 
‘covariation analysis’ – one of the three case study techniques Andreas Kruck 
discusses – one might argue that establishing a hint of causation would require 
holding constant two of three ‘theories’ each time one ‘theory’ is ‘put to the 
test’. Four case studies would thus not yet yield sufficient insight into the rel-
ative strength of the three theoretical approaches. The four case studies do 
however yield a sizeable number of empirical observations (beyond IVs and 
DV) which – through ‘congruence analysis’, the second case study technique he 
mentions – can be compared with the predictions of the three theories. More-
over, Andreas Kruck’s case selection would allow for tracing the causal mech-
anism within each approach, but then one case per approach would suffice. The 
question then is which case comes closest to representing each theoretical 
approach: the expectations formulated by Andreas Kruck make France the best 
candidate for the political approach (weakest parliament); the UK for the idea-
tional approach (as the most neoliberal system) and possibly the USA for the 
functional angle (being the system most geared toward cost saving). Indeed, one 
would thus engage, as did Andreas Kruck, with structured- focused comparison 
as a research method (George 1979a): ‘focused’ implies a plausible link with the 
theory that informs the research (here: functional, political and ideational 
accounts of privatization). ‘Structured’ implies that the selected cases still have 
to be argued in terms of comparability: certainly, in Andreas Kruck’s chapter, 
France, the UK and USA have, or seek, a leading role in world politics and thus 
would have a comparable ‘interest’ in an effective security apparatus. This 
would be less plausible for Germany. Ultimately, however, achieving both goals 
of comprehensive explanation and zooming in may profit from additional cases. 
This specific study thus raises general questions for all kinds of causal research 
projects: is it clear from my research design how many different theoretical 
claims are under investigation? Is it clear at what level of analysis my theories 
seek to account for phenomena? How large is the universe of cases related to 
these theories? When juxtaposing various theories, how to ensure that my 
selected cases are, on the one hand, comparable, yet differing in terms of the 
independent variables my theories identify?
 Alexander De Juan (Chapter 10) would like to be able to make claims about 
all non- state actors engaged in violent conflicts. His theory is about situations in 
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which natural resources are dwindling. Of course, what constitutes salient 
resources differs across countries and even within countries and what counts as a 
salient resource may partly be the product of social construction. Nevertheless, 
Alexander De Juan seeks to engage with the literature that focuses on natural 
resources in a traditional sense (related to land, water and air) often in the 
context of climate change (Buhaug et al. 2010). Importantly, Alexander De Juan 
persuasively argues that resource deterioration, migration and conflict often 
occur at the subnational level. He rightfully pleas for the collection and analysis 
of data at the subnational, i.e. regional, level. He proposes the use of geospatial 
analysis as a method to collect and interpret such regional data, in his case from 
Darfur in Sudan. This disaggregation is certainly welcome, but if one assumes 
that actors or structures at the national level affect the situation and choices at 
the regional level, this should be included in the conceptual model and one 
should seek to hold constant the impact of the national level. Alexander De Juan 
elaborately discusses the pros and cons of different approaches to measure phe-
nomena at the regional level and persuasively argues to use specifically sized 
grids as the optimal unit of observation (rather than administrative units, etc.). 
Rather than opting for single size grids, he proposes two different- sized circles 
around villages. Generally, choosing the ‘right’ level of analysis is a crucial but 
often tricky task, not only but especially for researchers of non- state actors in 
international security who have to ask themselves: to what extent does my 
research design give a lead to the level of analysis at which my theory offers an 
explanation? What does this imply for the actual unit of observation I select in 
my empirical research? In selecting cases can I control for the impact of vari-
ables at different levels of analysis?
 Patrick Mello’s (Chapter 9) research question makes the state the unit of ana-
lysis. Different theories point to variables at different levels (e.g. realism to 
military power; liberalism to parliamentary veto power). The advantage of QCA 
is that combinations of variables at different levels can point to causal pathways, 
thus allowing for the identification of the complementarity of theories (which 
may not be the same as the desired integration of theories). Yet the specific 
research question comes at a price: Patrick Mello’s research question lumps 
together the decision to participate in the 2003 intervention in Iraq and the deci-
sion to contribute (militarily) to the post- war reconstruction. This obscures the 
position of countries such as Italy and the Netherlands, which opted for political 
support for the war and, later, for military support for reconstructing Iraq. In this 
case this would affect the so- called truth table (Table 9.5) and the conclusions 
regarding necessary and sufficient conditions. It does not jeopardize the valuable 
contribution of QCA per se, but it once more underlines the vital interest of 
linking precise research questions to theory before the use of specific methods 
can be assessed. Researchers should therefore always ask themselves: is my 
research question sufficiently specific about the phenomenon to be accounted 
for? Do my theories speak to precisely this phenomenon?
 The objective of assessing the causal mechanism implies a data analysis 
method that would allow one to do just that. Andreas Kruck has chosen process 
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tracing to accomplish that aim (see George 1979b; Checkel 2008). His strategy 
of assessing whether covariation over time or across countries takes place allows 
him to draw plausible conclusions regarding causal links. Andreas Kruck com-
plies with the prescription that process tracing requires us to pose the same ques-
tions to comparable cases and to standardize the data collection of all cases. In 
doing so, he avoids the problems of thick description, which may give valuable 
qualified and more complex information, but which entails the risk of losing 
sight of arguing that causal patterns can or cannot be observed.
 The unravelling of causal mechanisms is, however, a challenging endeavour 
for researchers. The conceptual model that was chosen by Alexander De Juan, 
for example, cannot yet fully account for the causal chain: we know from the 
mobilization literature that the step from frustration to aggression requires the 
incorporation of processes of organization and mobilization (see Tilly 1978); we 
need to establish whether migrants moved because of the threat rather than for 
other reasons; we need to know whether variation in conflict in migration areas 
can be linked to differences in organization and mobilization. Still, in principle, 
such issues could be measured by taking the geospatial angle, provided data at 
the grid level are available.
 The broader lesson from these examples is that (the growing number of ) 
researchers who are interested in thoroughly studying causal mechanisms will 
have to address a number of crucial questions: does my research design specify 
the causal mechanism(s) that may underlie the theoretical approaches to answer-
ing my research question? Does my chosen method of analysing data, and the 
data itself, allow me to draw conclusions about the presence of the identified 
causal mechanisms? Are my selected cases sufficiently comparable that infer-
ences about causal mechanism can be made?
 In Patrick Mello’s QCA approach, causality is effectively defined as identi-
fying necessary and sufficient conditions. This renders important insights into 
his scientific problem: he identifies two pathways to participation in the 2003 
Iraq War: the presence of a right- wing executive combined with absence of 
constitutional restrictions, and the absence of military strength combined with 
the absence of constitutional restrictions combined with the presence of parlia-
mentary veto rights. Despite these results it remains unclear how these path-
ways represent the causal mechanisms belonging to the four theoretical 
approaches Mello sets out to test and, at some point, integrate: institutional-
ism, realism, liberalism and constructivism. Undoubtedly, this is addressed in 
the research from which he draws (Mello 2014), but the exact link with theory 
could have been developed more. Such a shortcoming is a frequent lacuna; 
maybe because linking empirics to theory is a very demanding task. If this link 
is underdeveloped, however, it may render it difficult to fully assess the 
explanatory power of the theories used (or of alternative ones). In the present 
QCA- chapter this makes it more difficult to assess under what circumstances 
QCA needs to be supplemented with process tracing in order to detect the 
causal mechanisms that can be traced back to theory (see George and Bennett 
2005: 163). Again, this underlines the usefulness of a research design that 
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specifies the causal mechanism(s) that may underlie the theoretical approaches 
to answering one’s research question.
What kind of knowledge is generated?
Andreas Kruck has succeeded in plausibly arguing that causal patterns have been 
observed – the goals of zooming in. Yet, it in order to meet the wider objective 
of a comprehensive explanation it might be useful to specify more precisely the 
wider class of phenomena and to place the theories that guide the case selection 
in the context of larger debates in International Relations about what behaviour 
to expect from states towards privatization of security, e.g. whether sovereign 
states can be expected to privatize security in the first place. It is interesting that 
new puzzles and blind spots are identified but it remains unclear whether they 
speak to the original research question. However, as said before, researchers 
often have to limit their analysis due to practical reasons, which can lead to 
trade- offs. From Alexander De Juan’s analysis we learn that geospatial analysis 
helps us falsify the direct link between resources depletion and violent conflict 
and establishes the plausibility of an indirect link via migration behaviour to 
resource- plenty areas. Geospatial analysis enables us to expand the conceptual 
model (to account for causal mechanisms) to the extent that data at the grid level 
are available. Generalization of knowledge would nevertheless require control-
ling for influences at the national (and possibly transnational) level.
 Patrick Mello’s research underlines the possibility of making causal claims 
even when the number of cases is too low for quantitative analysis. Because 
QCA forces the researcher to be extremely explicit about operational definitions 
and the attaching of weights to variables it facilitates generalization. Although 
he does not discuss whether his empirical case (states’ decisions regarding the 
2003 Iraq War) is representative for all armed conflict, it is safe to say that the 
two causal pathways are plausibly valid for democracies’ decisions to go to war 
in the post- Cold War era. The additional advantage of QCA in identifying outlier 
cases will help us to conduct supplementary in- depth case studies that trace the 
conditions that trigger deviant choices. These reflections on the three specific 
studies invite a final set of questions that will be relevant for many, if not all 
research projects seeking to make causal claims: is it clear in my research which 
class of phenomena I seek to theorize? Is it clear whether I consider them time- 
and space- bound and how that may limit the size of the phenomenon I seek to 
account for? Is it clear how this relates to the larger debates in IR theory?
Conclusion
First and foremost, the choice of method(s) follows one’s conceptual model, 
which itself is based upon a theory- driven research question. In that sense, each 
method applied in this section of the volume may be a wise strategy depending 
on the problem at hand. The chapters in this volume make clear, however, that 
research question and conceptual model merit further explicit deliberation and 
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justification. This is necessary to be able to determine the nature of the know-
ledge generated (e.g. in terms of generalizability) and to assess whether the 
chosen methods of data collection and data analysis actually make forms of 
causal claims possible. Although all three methods (Structured Focused Com-
parison; Geospatial Analysis; QCA) seriously offer a tool to make plausible 
claims about causality, the chapters show that the former two, but possibly also 
the latter, may need additional tools (such as process tracing) to reveal under-
lying causal mechanisms. In order to be able to do so, we need to be more 
explicit about the causal mechanism that our theories suggest. All in all then, 
although we may have come closer to making inferences about causality, we 
may still be in Plato’s cave observing shadows.
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12 An ethnographic approach to 
non- state security




Participant observation has largely defined how anthropologists do research 
(Agar 1996; DeWalt and DeWalt 2002). In this chapter, I will discuss how I used 
this method – participant observation – in my research on analysing the daily 
practices of private security companies and private security officers and their 
interactions with other security actors throughout the past eight years. Although 
I mention several disadvantages and obstacles, my main aim is to highlight the 
numerous advantages of participant observation and the incredibly rich and in- 
depth empirical data it can yield.
 Many anthropologists have used participant observation to analyse the social 
world of non- state security actors across the globe, such as gangs (Rodgers 2006; 
Jensen 2008) and vigilante organizations (Goldstein 2012; Pratten and Sen 2007; 
Buur 2006). Yet ethnographic accounts of commercial private security com-
panies – that are primarily based on participant observation – are scarce 
(Diphoorn 2016; Konopinski 2014; Rigakos 2002). In fact, when I tell people 
that I study private security, many question how this is related to anthropology. 
It seems that the growing and expanding private security industry has failed to 
catch the attention of anthropologists and has primarily been contained within 
the fields of criminology and political science.
 As noted by Daniel Goldstein (2010: 487), ‘anthropology has not developed a 
critical comparative ethnography of security and its contemporary problematics’. 
Furthermore, there is a reigning assumption that participant observation among 
private security companies inherently places researchers in a range of ethical, emo-
tional, and moral conundrums. Although I do not refute this claim, I also argue 
that participant observation has numerous benefits, such as gaining access into the 
daily practices of private security officers, uncovering a bottom- up perspective to 
security, and understanding how private security officers actually experience their 
line of work. In fact, I argue that when applied effectively, participant observation 
provides insights that other methods cannot, such as discovering both what people 
say and what they do, and the potential differences between the two.
 In this chapter, I will discuss both the advantages and disadvantages of using 
participant observation when studying private security companies and I will 
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draw from my own field experiences from two different projects on private 
security companies that took me to South Africa, Kenya, Jamaica and Israel. In 
the next section, I will briefly outline the two research projects. In the third and 
largest section, I will examine participant observation as a method and analyse 
the seven main elements that define it: participation, open interviews, observa-
tion, field notes, longitudinal research, establishing rapport, and reflexivity. In 
this discussion, I will present some of the benefits and obstacles I faced and how 
I dealt with these issues. In the fourth section, I bring these seven elements 
together and emphasize that participant observation provides insight into what 
people say and do. This chapter ends with some concluding remarks on the use 
of participant observation when studying non- state security actors.
Research projects and objectives
This chapter is based on experiences from two different research projects. The 
first is my PhD research about the armed response sector in Durban, South 
Africa. The armed response sector is a specific type of private security that com-
prises armed security officers who patrol communities in vehicles and react and/
or respond to triggers such as alarms and panic buttons that are installed on 
clients’ premises. Durban was selected as the research site, because it is a large 
urban centre, experiences high rates of violent crime, has great demographic 
diversity, and is less- researched than other South African cities, such as Cape 
Town and Johannesburg (Diphoorn 2016).
 I commenced the research with a rather broad research objective, namely to 
uncover the daily policing practices of armed response officers and their niche 
within the larger security spectrum. Employing a pluralized perspective on polic-
ing, I was not only interested in finding out who the men are that perform this 
work and how the companies operate, but also how they interact with other 
actors, such as clients and police officers. My research approach was thus rather 
exploratory: it was clear what I was looking at, but it was not clear what I was 
going to find. This research goal virtually necessitated participant observation as 
a central research method, as other research methods would not allow me to 
achieve this objective. My ethnographic approach contrasted with most studies 
of private security officers, which derive from the field of criminology and 
employ a quantitative approach to present the ‘typical security officer’ in a par-
ticular space and time (Manzo 2004; Wakefield 2003).
 Between 2007 and 2010, I spent a total of 20 months in Durban, spread across 
three periods: October to December 2007, June 2008 to May 2009, and April 
2010 to September 2010. Although I frequented several companies and inter-
viewed the owners of more than 20, I focused on four companies for in- depth 
analysis. These firms were selected to reflect the diversity of the industry. The 
first is an internationally owned company that operates globally. The second is a 
Durban- based company that operates solely in the Durban Metropolitan Area 
(DMA). The third and fourth are community- based companies: one operates in 
an affluent, predominantly white area while the other operates in a former Indian 
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township on the outskirts of the city. Although I used several qualitative 
methods, the bulk of the data collected for this project derives from participant 
observation. In addition, I also conducted structured interviews, group interviews 
with other types of security officers, recorded the life histories of several indi-
viduals, and conducted some degree of secondary data analysis, such as 
employee contracts and minutes of meetings. The other methods were used as a 
means of triangulation and to support participant observation. For example, 
when I attended operational meetings organized by the state police, I used the 
minutes written by someone else and compared them with my own observations.
 After my PhD research in South Africa, I started my post- doctoral research 
within a larger comparative project entitled ‘public- private security assemblages’, 
which focuses on the interactions between different security providers and how 
these impact citizenship in five different cities: Nairobi (Kenya), Recife (Brazil), 
Jerusalem (Israel–Palestine), Kingston (Jamaica), and Miami (USA).1 In addition to 
four PhD researchers, another post- doctoral researcher, and the principal investiga-
tor, my role was to conduct a comparative analysis of the composition, regulation 
and operation of these security assemblages in Nairobi (Kenya), Jerusalem (Israel–
Palestine), and Kingston (Jamaica). In contrast to my PhD research, participant 
observation was not my main research method, and I predominantly used inter-
views, life histories, and secondary data analysis. The main reason for this concerns 
the research question, which comprises three parts. The first two parts, namely the 
‘composition’ and ‘regulation’ of the security assemblages, do not inherently 
require participant observation, but can be gathered through interviews and data 
analysis. It is only the third component of the research question, namely the opera-
tion of the security assemblage, that requires participant observation. Thus, while in 
South Africa, participant observation was the key method that was supplemented 
by others, in this project, it was the other way around: participant observation com-
plemented the other methods. The centrality of participant observation thus differed 
in each project, further highlighting the versatility of this method.
Participant observation
Although many anthropologists have carried out forms of participant observa-
tion before him, Bronislaw Malinowski is regarded as the founder of this 
method, as he was the first to explicitly outline it as a technique during his field-
work on the Trobriand Islands in the 1920s. Bronislaw Malinowski’s emphasis 
on everyday interactions and observations and the systematic noting down of 
this is what differentiated his approach from others (DeWalt and DeWalt 
2002: 3).
 I employ Kathleen DeWalt and Billie DeWalt’s (2002: 1) conceptualization 
of participant observation, defined as 
a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, 
interactions, and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning 
the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture. 
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‘Explicit’ refers to things that people can articulate themselves, such as how they 
feel and think about something, and ‘tacit’ refers to things that we are not 
directly aware of, but that steer how we act. The most commonly used examples 
to explain the latter are the appropriate amount of space between people when 
standing in a queue or how a wink is interpreted. These are interpretations that 
we do not think about, but are elements that we simply know and enact.
 Participant observation is essentially an oxymoron, as participating and 
observing are opposing activities. Observation is to detach oneself from the 
research setting and look at what is happening. Participation, on the other hand, 
entails the opposite, as one is supposed to immerse oneself in a situation. Build-
ing on Spradley’s (1980) typology of participation, Kathleen DeWalt and Billie 
DeWalt (2002: 19–22) discuss a continuum, including nonparticipation, passive 
participation, moderate participation, active participation, and complete parti-
cipation. In my research, nonparticipation did not exist – I was always there, and 
thus, always participating. Furthermore, full participation, complete immersion, 
or ‘going native’ was also not the case, as I always remained an outsider. For 
example, when accompanying armed response officers on their shifts, I particip-
ated in most of their activities, but not all of them, such as driving the company 
vehicles and arresting suspects. I therefore did things differently than my 
research participants and was not fully immersed.
 Elsewhere (Diphoorn 2013), I discuss three different modes of participation, 
namely active participation, reluctant participation and passive participation, 
during my research in South Africa. The first mode is active participation, and I 
discuss how I experienced giving mouth- to-mouth resuscitation to the family 
member of an informant. It is an incident where I actively and willingly stepped 
into my research setting by moving beyond the position of the researcher and 
concordant to my research population. The second is reluctant participation, a 
mode I often encountered during violent incidents, in which I participated rather 
unwillingly, less actively, and differently than my informants. The third is 
passive participation, where I deliberately tried to inhabit the role of observer.2 
These three modes of participation do not refer to different roles or personal 
identifiers, but they examine the actions I undertook in the field during particular 
(violent) encounters. It is not a fixed classification, but functions more as a heur-
istic device to analyse our position, as participants, in relation to other research 
participants.
 There is much debate about what exactly participant observation is, particu-
larly with regards to anthropology as a discipline. Participant observation is 
often regarded as the means in which anthropologists distinguish themselves 
from other social sciences. Yet numerous scholars, such as Tim Ingold (2008) 
and Martin Forsey (2010), highlight that participant observation should not be 
equated with ethnographic fieldwork: it is a method that largely defines ethno-
graphic fieldwork, but it is one method among many, and almost all anthropolo-
gists combine this method with others. Furthermore, the method is increasingly 
being used in other disciplines, such as criminology and sociology. In policing 
studies, for example, participant observation is increasingly encouraged and 
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common (Marks 2004; Punch 1986). In fact, some evocative ethnographies on 
private security, such as George Rigakos’s (2002) excellent account of the Cana-
dian security company Intelligarde, are not conducted by anthropologists, and 
other scholars studying private military companies are also increasingly using 
participant observation (Chisholm 2014; Higate 2011). Participant observation is 
thus not confined to anthropology and can also be used in other disciplines, such 
as political science.
 In the following sections, I will outline how I define participant observation 
as a larger tool- kit that primarily consists of the following seven elements: (1) 
actively participating in daily activities and ‘hanging out’, (2) using and 
regarding everyday conversations as a form of interviewing, (3) continuously 
observing one’s surrounding, (4) systematically recording the observations 
made, (5) living in a particular area for a substantial amount of time, (6) estab-
lishing rapport, and (7) being reflexive. In the following subsections, I will 
discuss each element and how I implemented this in my fieldwork.
Participation
The first element concerns participating and ‘hanging out’. This entails attending 
as many activities as possible. In the past, anthropologists often studied entire 
‘cultures’ by conducting research on particular tribes and groups of people. 
Well- known accounts are Bronislaw Malinowski’s’ work on the Trobriand 
Islands (1922) and Edward Evans- Pritchard’s (1940) account of the Nuer in 
South Sudan. In these accounts, participant observation entailed participating 
in all of the events of the people one studied. These studies often occurred in 
defined geographical areas, where ‘the field’ involved literally stepping outside 
one’s doorstep. This is increasingly not the case, as my research portrays. Parti-
cipant observation is more often used to analyse particular aspects of social life, 
such as security. Furthermore, there is a much more expansive understanding of 
what ‘the field’ is (Gupta and Ferguson 1997), where forms of multi- sited ethno-
graphy (Marcus 1995), nonlocal ethnography (Feldman 2011), and anthropology 
at home (Jackson 1987) are increasingly common.
 In my research, participation entailed taking part in security- related events, 
specifically those associated with the armed response sector. This primarily 
meant accompanying armed response officers during their 12-hour shifts. In 
total, I spent approximately 750 hours with armed response officers in their vehi-
cles – this amount only includes the actual time spent on their shifts. When I 
went out on duty with the armed response officers, I wore a bulletproof vest on 
which I attached my university business card to clearly show that I was a 
researcher and not an employee of the company. In addition to the 750 hours 
spent on the road, I regularly hung out at the company offices. This involved 
finding a seat in the office, looking at what happened around me, and striking up 
conversations with people walking by. This was slightly awkward at first, but 
eventually my presence became normal. I also participated in the control room, 
the technical hub of a company, accompanied technicians and sales reps on their 
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rounds, completed several private security training courses (including a firearm 
training course), worked as a car guard for a few days, attended various work- 
related settings, such as disciplinary hearings and job interviews, tagged along 
with private investigators and bodyguards, spent approximately 100 hours with 
citizens on their patrols, accompanied the state police on their shifts for approxi-
mately 80 hours, did a polygraph test, and much more. All of these participatory 
efforts allowed me to gain a richer understanding of private security and crime 
in South Africa.
 Yet participation in a research that involves the use of violence can also place 
the researcher in dangerous and ethically charged situations and I experienced 
numerous violent encounters during my fieldwork in South Africa. The trouble-
some nature of researching violence is not under- analysed in anthropological, 
criminological and sociological fields (Ghassem- Fachandi 2009; Lee 1995, Lee- 
Treweek and Linkogle 2000; Punch 1986; Robben and Nordstrom 1995; 
Rodgers 2006; Sluka 1990; Scheper- Hughes and Bourgois 2004). Researching 
violence is emotional – for both the informants and the researcher – and it carries 
additional responsibilities and dilemmas that outweigh those associated with tra-
ditional ethnography (Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Ghassem- Fachandi 2009). 
Existing ethnographies on violence clearly portray the emotional turmoil inher-
ent in such research, and my own work follows suit (Diphoorn 2013, 2016). 
Feelings of estrangement, frustration, guilt and disgust and the recurrence of 
nightmares and insomnia were all part of the research experience. I often experi-
enced this as an impediment to the research process and I felt an incessant need 
to neutralize or subdue certain emotions. One of the means with which I dealt 
with this process was to repeatedly reflect on my emotions and outline them in 
my field notes. This not only had a therapeutic effect, but it also allowed me to 
analyse how my emotions affected my research and changed over time. Another 
way of coping with these emotions is to maintain frequent contact with col-
leagues about fieldwork experiences as a means of having an ‘outsider per-
spective’. Additionally, it is important that supervisors visit their researchers in 
the field to observe and discuss the emotional process of conducting such 
research.
 Besides emotional distress, research on violence inherently posits a researcher 
into degrees of judgementalism (Liebling and Stanko 2001; Rodgers 2006). In 
my view, the use of violence was very often morally wrong, a stance that is palp-
able in my field notes. Although my primary aim was to understand it, my moral 
standpoints continuously pierced this process. At the start of my fieldwork, I did 
not disclose my judgemental opinions about the behaviour of my informants, 
particularly when they were physically violent. Rather, I focused on asking them 
about their behaviour in an attempt to understand it; why they acted in such a 
fashion, what they believed it accomplished, and what they were feeling at the 
time. Nevertheless, by merely posing these questions and showing the need for 
clarification, my judgement and dissimilar understandings of morality surfaced. 
Therefore, when researching violence and security, we need to be aware of the 
risk we place ourselves in and the ethical and moral predicaments we may face. 
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When applicable, it is important that ethic committees approve of the research 
topic and proposed methodology. This is particularly important for students 
engaging on such endeavours. It is crucial that supervisors outline the necessary 
precautions, compel students to think about the potential risks they are taking, 
and how they will deal with certain issues, such as anonymizing the identities of 
their informants.
Open interviews
The second element that defines participant observation is open interviews. These 
are interviews that are more like conversations and are not based on a topic list, 
but are largely guided by the interviewee and take place while participating and 
observing. For example, when accompanying armed response officers on their 
shifts in South Africa, we would have endless conversations about their occupa-
tion, but also about their personal lives, and other random things, such as music 
and sports. Similar to Michael Agar (1996), I regard these as a key part of parti-
cipant observation and they generated the majority of my data, particularly 
regarding personal issues, such as their relationships with their wives and the dif-
ficulties they experienced in ‘bringing the work home’. Such conversations also 
include ‘small talk’, an essential part of fieldwork and a useful technique when 
speaking about sensitive issues (Driessen and Jansen 2013). Active listening is 
also a key component. In fact, Martin Forsey (2010) argues that ethnographic 
fieldwork is much more about ‘participant listening’ than participant observation. 
According to him ‘a significant enough portion of ethnographic writing is based 
more upon what was heard in the field than what is seen there’ (Forsey 2010: 563).
Observation
The third important element is to observe one’s surroundings. This includes 
looking at people, such as their bodily behaviour, the physical surroundings, 
such as the use of space, and the interactions between people. My approach has 
always been to write down as much as I can remember and incorporate as many 
details as possible, even if such aspects may seem irrelevant at the time. This is 
especially pertinent at the start of fieldwork, when it is not clear which details 
are important. For example, many of my more structured interviews took place 
in boring office buildings. This may seem like an irrelevant surrounding to 
describe in comparison to people’s homes. Yet even with such places, I describe 
how I get to that office, what the person is wearing, whether there are particular 
objects in that office that catch my attention, such as diplomas on the wall or 
family pictures, etc. Although much of this information may eventually turn out 
to be unimportant, it can also turn out to be insightful. For example, in Nairobi I 
interviewed a member of a community policing initiative in his office. While 
waiting in another room, I saw numerous medals and awards on a shelf that con-
tained his ascribed nickname within that policing initiative.3 By seeing this and 
noting it down, it made parts of the interview that followed much clearer.
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 Another technique I habitually use is what Kathleen DeWalt and Billie 
DeWalt (2002: 69–72) call ‘mapping the scene’, i.e. drawing out the surround-
ings of events that I attended. Many anthropologists ‘map’ the neighbourhood 
and area that they research, yet since my research was not focused on a particular 
neighbourhood, I primarily used this technique when attending certain events. 
For example, in Durban and Nairobi, I attended operational meetings between 
police officers and company owners and I always drew out the situation: the size 
of the room, the table, where everyone was seated, and so forth. Additionally, I 
would count things, such as the number of police officers versus private security 
officers, use arrows and colours to note particular interactions between people, 
and use other measures in order to draw out the different dynamics. These 
details, particularly when done repeatedly and over time, have provided insight 
into the dynamics between state police officers and company owners.
Field notes
This technique is also related to the fourth key element of participant observation, 
namely the recording of field notes. As highlighted by Kathleen DeWalt and Billie 
DeWalt (2002: 142): ‘observations are not data unless they are recorded in some 
fashion for further analysis’. We need to remember that participant observation is 
a method: as humans, we participate in a range of interactions every day, yet it 
only becomes a method when we systematically note down this information and 
analyse it for scientific purposes. As mentioned, I contend that field notes should 
be as detailed as possible, despite how long this may take. Field notes often start 
from small jotted down notes that consist of keywords. For example, I always 
carry a notebook with me in which I jot down keywords related to events, such as 
arrest, themes in conversations, such as violence, and my own emotions, such as 
irritation. At times, particularly in Durban, I used a recording device to record par-
ticular conversations and I always informed my informants when I used it. As it 
was practically impossible to record all 12 hours of each shift, I recorded conver-
sations that I deemed to be important at the time. After the end of the day, or the 
following day, I wrote up field notes that I branded mosaics of data, which 
included jotted- down keywords, fragments of transcribed interviews, and detailed 
field notes written afterwards.
 Unlike Susan Murray (2003), I do not distinguish between personal, observa-
tional or methodological notes, since I believe that such a categorization dis-
regards the interconnectedness between emotions, method and knowledge. 
Rather, personal accounts and methodological issues are woven throughout the 
notes as a key ingredient of the empirical data, resulting in ‘messy texts’ (Denzin 
1997) that voice various facets of the research process. In the coding of my 
notes, I only distinguish personal accounts when they are overtly explicit and at 
the forefront – otherwise, they blend in throughout the notes as an interwoven 
ingredient of the empirical data.
 My means of writing notes is a very time consuming process and requires a 
lot of patience and perseverance. However, it pays off: when I read some of my 
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notes, I am able to mentally re- immerse myself back into that particular situ-
ation. Furthermore, writing up field notes is more than just recording data; it is 
the first step in data analysis. In my field notes, I often pose questions and try to 
identify patterns and connections between particular issues. In contrast to other 
disciplines and methods, data analysis is an ongoing process and does not only 
occur ‘after’ the data have been collected. In addition to my notes, I also main-
tain a detailed log of events, contact details and interview lists as a systematic 
way of organizing my data. This entire process greatly assists me when I analyse 
my data, as I have already started to use codes in these lists.
 Another prominent technique that I employ throughout the research process is 
the frequent rereading of my field notes, both in and out of the field. This ini-
tially served as a means of recalling the research data, yet it has also allowed me 
to trace developments in my relationships with my informants and my analytical 
insights. Furthermore, as discussed by Kathleen DeWalt and Billie DeWalt 
(2002), the re- reading of notes is also a means in which researchers come up 
with new research questions. Unlike other methods, participant observation often 
demands adapting the research questions due to the nature of the collected data: 
our empirical data often steers us in a certain direction.
Longitudinal research
The fifth core element of participant observation concerns time: it is a method 
that needs to be carried out over a long period of time and requires a substantial 
amount of ‘being there’ (Becker 1970, in DeWalt and DeWalt 2002: 13). Previ-
ously, this entailed living in a field site (very often a village or neighbourhood) 
for a full annual cycle, in order to be able to document all of the events, changes 
and seasons of a year (Geertz 1988). For my PhD research, I spent 20 months in 
the field spread out across three years, of which one period was a bit longer than 
a year, and this is considered rather normal for many anthropologists.
 Yet claims are increasingly made that long fieldwork periods are no longer 
necessary or possible. For example, due to personal circumstances, such as the 
difficulties of leaving one’s family behind for longer periods of time, many 
anthropologists cannot stay in the field for months at end. Similarly, many 
research projects cover a period of three years, making it difficult to conduct a 
year of fieldwork. Therefore, in the comparative research project on security 
assemblages, I did not have the time to spend a year in each country, and my 12 
months of fieldwork had to be spread across three field sites. This is also a reason 
why participant observation was not my main method in this project, and this is 
increasingly common in anthropology.
 Yet at the same time, shorter periods of fieldwork are also criticised. John Van 
Maanen (2011), for example, discusses the emergence of ‘Blitzkrieg fieldwork’, 
and states that ‘formal interviews, sample surveys, focus groups, brief periods of 
observation … replace lengthy in situ immersion’ (Van Maanen 2011: 164). Such 
studies are critiqued for not acquiring that ‘insider’ perspective. The main reason 
behind this critique, and thus the perceived need for longer fieldwork periods, is 
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that more time means more immersion: research participants get more used to your 
presence and become more willing to discuss particular issues. Second, it takes 
time to acquire local knowledge, particularly the ‘tacit’ elements that often require 
a command of the local language, for example. The ability to speak the local lan-
guage and/or dialect is identified by Kathleen DeWalt and Billie DeWalt (2002: 4) 
as a key element to participant observation. I concur, as not speaking Hebrew 
made it practically impossible to conduct participant observation in Israel. Whereas 
I accompanied security officers and attended training sessions in South Africa and 
Kenya, I was not able to do the same in Israel, and due to the nature and time 
frame of the project, learning Hebrew was not a possibility. This did not mean I 
could not conduct fieldwork, but that the opportunities for conducting participant 
observation were very limited.
Rapport
The issue of time is related to the sixth key element, namely establishing 
‘rapport’, which is both a goal and a tool (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002: 40). 
Rapport is difficult to define, but it generally refers to a particular type of rela-
tionship between the researcher and the researched, whereby they share a 
common goal and feel comfortable with each other to communicate, so that the 
researcher can collect data from the researched. Trust is probably the most 
fundamental basis for rapport and establishing this takes time.
 In my research, I have gained access to the companies by approaching the 
owners and/or managers and requesting permission to study their activities. 
Although my request to accompany security officers in their vehicles has some-
times been denied, primarily for (gendered) safety reasons, most owners have 
provided full consent for participation. Access is crucial to conducting such 
research and it is therefore extremely important that this is (partially) granted 
before one does the fieldwork. Yet rapport and building trust was primarily an 
issue with the armed response officers, as it took time for them to really open up 
to me. As has been the case for other researchers working on policing (Horn 
1997; Marks 2004), many armed response officers suspected that I was a spy for 
company management, the police, or other companies, and that my intention was 
to ‘watch them’ and report back to a higher authority. Fortunately, this suspicion 
dwindled over time, and eventually the armed response officers came to trust me 
in both occupational and personal matters. In Kenya, where I had less time to 
conduct fieldwork, I attempted to gain credibility by providing copies of my PhD 
dissertation to interviewees. I hoped that, by showing I had researched the topic 
before, they would be more willing to discuss particular issues with me.
 With some informants, rapport is established after a particular event or moment, 
regarded as a ‘break- through’, while with others it may be subtler and may develop 
slowly over time. With some informants, rapport entails a very friendly relation-
ship, with whom I interact similarly to as I do with other friends outside the field. 
With other informants, rapport does not resemble a friendship, but is more profes-
sional and based on the research topic. For example, I regularly had lunch and 
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breakfast appointments with one company owner in Durban. Although we sporadi-
cally mentioned personal matters, such as family life, we primarily talked about 
the topic of my research (i.e. private security). It was not necessarily a very 
friendly and personal relationship, but it was one that was based on trust and 
comfort. Furthermore, I also established rapport with informants that I disliked, an 
issue that is not often discussed. Even though I disliked some of them, there was a 
certain amount of understanding between us and I was still able to collect fascinat-
ing data from them.
 Spending long periods of time with people allows you to gain access to their 
perceptions and feelings. With armed response officers in Durban, I was able to 
collect data about their personal perspectives and experiences of doing security 
work. For example, discussing traumatic experiences is not common among 
armed reaction officers. When I enquired about particular traumatic episodes, 
common responses included: ‘I can handle it’, ‘It’s part of the job’ and ‘I’ve 
toughened up’. As time passed, however, several armed reaction officers opened 
up to me about their difficulties in dealing with the stress of the job. Through 
establishing rapport, I was able to know more about their personal lives, and 
many shared stories about the difficulties of ‘turning off ’ after a day’s work, not 
being able to communicate with their families, engaging in various forms of 
domestic violence, and having extramarital affairs to escape their ‘failures at 
home’. Therefore, through developing rapport, researchers can incorporate the 
individual and personal experiences, which is a dimension that is often over-
looked in policing studies. I argue that the emotions evoked while performing 
particular policing practices shape the nature of those practices and therefore the 
ontological nature of the individual performer. This reaffirms the need for ethno-
graphic fieldwork that allows us to analyse emotions, perceptions, and multiple 
forms of meaning- making among our research participants.
Reflexivity
The seventh key element that is crucial to participant observation is reflexivity. 
The main critique addressed towards participant observation is that the research-
er’s engagement in the field eliminates objectivity. The idea is that the involve-
ment of the researcher results in a ‘clouded judgement’, as the mere presence of 
the researcher alters the situation that the researcher is analysing. I concur that 
we as researchers influence our research setting. For example, elsewhere I 
discuss how I, as a woman, influenced the performance of masculine behaviour 
by armed response officers (Diphoorn 2013). Yet I am also convinced that my 
presence was not decisive, as many armed response officers exhibited this type 
of behaviour both before and after my fieldwork. Furthermore, I am certain that 
this does not prevent us from making a scientific analysis.
 Yet in order to do this, researchers must engage in a process of reflexivity. 
Primarily due to the ‘crisis of representation’ and influence of feminist theory, 
the importance of reflexivity is currently undisputed. It is regarded as an 
‘unavoidable pre- condition’ (Madden 2010: 23) to any ethnographic fieldwork 
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in order to ‘achieve a methodological rigour’ (Nilan 2002: 369). Yet although 
what is meant by reflexivity remains to be debated, there is a general consensus 
that ethnographers must understand their own position and role in the social 
world that they are studying and recognize that they, as persons with their own 
personality traits, backgrounds, and world perceptions, play a decisive part in 
shaping the entire research process (Coffey 1999; Denzin 1997; Madden 2010). 
I regard reflexivity as the ‘reciprocal interplay of one’s relationship with oneself 
and with others’ (Jackson 2010: 36). Furthermore, elsewhere I discuss the 
importance of reflecting on how our emotions influence how we participate in 
the field, i.e. ‘the emotionality of participation’ (Diphoorn 2013). Yet this does 
not mean that we should all engage in ‘narrative ethnographies’ (Tedlock 1991) 
and produce ‘confessional tales’ (Van Maanen 2011) where researchers solely 
focus on themselves.
What people say and do
These seven elements constitute participant observation as a method and I want 
to highlight that participant observation is therefore more like a box of tools that 
conjunctively form a single method. It is therefore about the combination of the 
seven different elements. For example, participating in events without making 
field notes or observing a meeting without being reflexive is not participant 
observation.
 Although there are numerous advantages, the main benefit of participant 
observation is that we not only analyse what people say, but we focus on what 
people do. The reality is that people often provide socially accepted answers 
during surveys and interviews. One of the best examples from my research in 
South Africa to exemplify this regards the use of violence. When I first started 
my fieldwork in Durban in 2007, I asked people during interviews about the use 
of violence, and specifically, whether armed response officers ever became 
involved in violent incidents. Almost everyone stated that violence was seldom 
used, that armed response officers were rarely instigators or victims of violent 
incidents, and they generally all frowned upon the use of coercion. I therefore 
initially assumed that violence would not be a central theme in my research. 
However, after a few months of fieldwork in 2008, it slowly became clear that 
violence is a large part of their everyday policing practices. Although violent 
encounters do not occur on a daily basis, they are certainly not rare, and as I 
argue elsewhere, violence is a central component of the occupational culture of 
armed response (Diphoorn 2016). When I then discussed this with the same 
interviewees who had previously disregarded the centrality of violence, they pro-
ceeded to discuss at length about the problems associated with violence, recol-
lected all sorts of stories where violence was used, and in some cases, even 
showed off their use of violence.4
 A second example emerged during my fieldwork in Kenya where I focused 
on a formalized partnership between the Diplomatic Police Unit (DPU), a par-
ticular unit of the Kenyan Police, and several private security companies operating 
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in that area. This policing partnership comprises two main elements: joint- patrols 
whereby police officers patrol with the private security companies in their vehi-
cles and the sharing of crime intelligence during monthly meetings. When I 
interviewed individuals involved in this partnership, they all stressed the formal-
ized and organized nature of this partnership and described a structured system 
between the companies regarding the joint- patrols, with company A conducting 
patrols on Monday night, company B on Tuesdays, and so forth. However, when 
I eventually went on some of these joint- patrols, it became evident that much of 
this structure was non- existent. In fact, I realized that some companies were not 
conducting patrols at all, that some companies patrol on different nights and thus 
not on the same day every week, and that most of this was ad hoc and informal. 
Therefore, what was presented as a very formalized and structured policing part-
nership was in fact not the case. It was through participant observation that I dis-
covered this discrepancy.
 These differences are not simply glitches or disparities. Rather, I argue that 
they are fundamental insights into how non- state security operates. Knowing 
whether armed response officers engage in acts of violence and how they feel 
about it is crucial to understanding how security is related to crime, violence and 
fear. Knowing whether police officers and security officers patrol weekly within 
a structured system or on a very ad hoc basis, is important to know when analys-
ing how state and non- state security actors interact with each other to shape the 
pluralised security landscape. It is therefore not simply about catching people in 
a lie, but it is about uncovering data that has theoretical implications. Through 
participant observation, I was able to discover particular practices and processes 
that determined my conceptual contribution to the scholarly work on private 
security. For example, my research in South Africa allowed me to develop the 
concept of ‘twilight policing’ (Diphoorn 2016), which refers to disciplinary, 
punitive and exclusionary practices that are performed in a twilight zone between 
state and non- state and are marked by uncertainty. Although I also used other 
methods, it was participant observation that generated the bulk of my empirical 
data and played the most fundamental role in my conceptual development. Fur-
thermore, although my empirical data are based on South Africa and generaliza-
tion is not my main aim, I argue that ‘twilight policing’ is a conceptual 
framework that can be applied to understand policing outside the South African 
context.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter, my main aim was to discuss the method of participant observa-
tion and how I used it in my research on private security officers and companies. 
In my discussion of what the key elements of participant observation are, I 
showed that participant observation is a very useful method to understand the 
daily practices and experiences of non- state security. Furthermore, participant 
observation concerns a combination of various methods that are interconnected, 
serves specific types of research questions and objectives, and demands a degree 
184  T. Diphoorn
of craftsmanship. Yet, like other methods, participant observation involves par-
ticular logistical and practical issues. For example, taking extensive field notes, 
learning the local language and spending long periods of time in a foreign place 
are physically demanding and time consuming activities. Furthermore, accom-
panying private security officers can place the researcher in dangerous situations, 
which inherently leads to a range of ethical and moral predicaments.
 However, despite these disadvantages, I argue that participant observation 
provides tremendous insight into how non- state actors operate and is a very 
rewarding method. By spending long periods of time in a particular place, par-
ticipating in a range of activities, observing what people do and the surround-
ings, continuously engaging in conversations and small talk, writing systematic 
field notes and being reflexive, we can access data about how people think and 
feel about security. Furthermore, as highlighted in the previous section, we are 
able to analyse not only what people say, but also what people do, and the poten-
tial incongruities between the two. Participant observation therefore provides 
data that other methods cannot, and when trained in how to use it and in combi-
nation with other methods, it acts as a truly significant method in researching 
non- state security providers.
Notes
1 For more information on this project, see www.security- assemblages.com.
2 Other scholars have made similar categorizations, such as Murray (2003), who differ-
entiates between different roles in the field, and Hage (2010), who discusses the analyt-
ical, emotional, and political modes of participation.
3 This interview was conducted together with Francesco Colona, the PhD researcher of 
the comparative research project, who focuses on private security assemblages in 
Nairobi, Kenya.
4 This is also an example of how empirical data forces an alteration of the initial research 
question.
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The increase of experimental work in high profile journals as well as the launch 
of the new Journal of Experimental Political Science suggests a general trend of 
using experimental methods in political science, and of late, experimental 
methods in conflict/post- conflict countries.1 The initial turn to experimental 
methods in political science began in the 1960s and 1970s when political scien-
tists started to use behavioural theories to explain phenomena. In the 1980s, 
political scientists developed a social cognition framework for assessing political 
behaviour – political psychology – which also increased the use of experimental 
methods in the field. Around the same time, rational choice theory gained 
momentum and researchers turned to lab experiments to assess whether indi-
viduals behave in the rational ways theorized by game theoretic models (Druck-
man et al. 2006). The method grew in popularity, especially in the subfield of 
comparative politics (including American politics).
 Much of the recent experimental work in political science has focused on 
assessing the impact of development programmes. The randomized controlled 
trials (RCT) – where the individuals being studied are randomly allocated one or 
more different treatments under the study – is considered the gold standard for 
programme evaluation in the medical field and in development economics, and 
is perhaps the most popular way to assess the effectiveness or the impact of par-
ticular policies, programmes and services. RCTs have also been used increas-
ingly in post- conflict countries to assess peace building efforts and other 
programmes associated with security and development.
 This chapter introduces the reader to a series of experimental work conducted 
with the Liberian National Police. My research has focused on two main ques-
tions. (1) How do civilian perceptions of and support for the government change 
when they are exposed to gender reforms in policing institutions in post- conflict 
countries? (2) How do group dynamics within the police institutions of post- 
conflict countries change due to gender reforms? The broader aim of the project 
was to understand how security sector reforms, starting with gender reforms in 
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the security sector, affect post- conflict countries. The literature on security sector 
reform in post- conflict countries is minimal; it is mostly relegated to Monica 
Toft (2010), which finds that the implementation of security sector reform leads 
to longer- term peace duration. While this book demonstrates the importance of 
security sector reform, it does not disaggregate reforms, and it does not provide 
a theoretical framework for evaluating reforms. Although my broader project 
assesses security sector reforms generally, experimental methods were also used 
to evaluate gender reforms in the security sector. The research mentioned in this 
chapter demonstrates why it was appropriate to use experimental methods, spe-
cifically RCTs, lab- in-the- field experiments and surveys to answer the questions 
and to begin to fill some of the gaps in the security sector reform literature. The 
studies discussed in the chapter were carried out between 2012 and 2015 in col-
laboration with the Liberian National Police.
 The broader aim of this chapter is to describe when using experimental 
methods may be appropriate in studying non- state actors in post- conflict coun-
tries. Specifically, when are experimental methods appropriate instruments to 
use in conflict/post- conflict countries? Using experimental methods is not 
without challenges, such as ensuring compliance, safety, minimal spillover, feas-
ibility and the need for vast resources. Yet, when such methods are used, they 
are often thought to be some of the most rigorous methods available to research-
ers. Thus, it is important to develop a set of criteria for when relying on experi-
mental methods is appropriate. Referring to my experimental work with the 
Liberian National Police, the chapter provides theoretical and practical con-
siderations for using experimental methods to research populations in conflict/
post- conflict countries. It begins by introducing causal inference and providing 
an explanation of the use of various tools that employ causal inference. It then 
moves to explaining the advantages and drawbacks of using such tools. The 




The use of experimental methods in political science comes from concerns about 
quantitative, observational studies’ inability to address sources of bias. In 
general, there are three sources of bias from which quantitative observational 
studies – and to some extent survey work – may suffer: endogeneity, selection 
bias, and omitted variable bias.2
 There are at least two potential non- experimental methods that researchers 
can use to answer the question: how do civilian perceptions of, and support for, 
the government change when they are exposed to gender reforms in policing 
institutions? In the first, using a quantitative observational method, the researcher 
collects data (ideally) from every post- conflict country about gender reforms in 
the security sector. For example, one may look at whether the post- conflict state 
instituted a quota for female officers or not.3 The researcher then uses statistical 
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analyses to assess whether post- conflict states that adopted a quota have higher 
rates of sexual violence in the country.4 The intuition is that with more women in 
the police force, individuals are more likely to report rape and domestic violence 
cases, and this is an indicator that there is increased levels of trust in the state 
because individuals are reporting cases to the state. In the second method, the 
researcher conducts a survey and asks whether or not individuals had contact 
with female police officers and then later on in the survey whether or not they 
trust the police force. Unfortunately, however, the three sources of bias affect 
both types of research designs.
 First, endogeneity refers to the difficulty in assessing the causal direction of 
relationships. Statistical models are not able to account for loops in causality 
between independent variables (or the explanatory variables) and the dependent 
variable (the outcome of interest). In the observational, quantitative research 
design mentioned above, it is quite possible that states that experience high 
levels of sexual violence are more likely to adopt quotas for women in the police 
force. In the survey design, it is possible that those that trust female police offic-
ers seek out contacting female police officers. In both cases, it is not possible to 
tell which causal direction is at work.
 Second, in technical terms, omitted variable bias refers to variables that are 
correlated with both the dependent and independent variables but that are absent 
from the analysis. Factors that may influence the relationships are not accounted 
for. For the quantitative, observational study, while it is possible to take into 
account observable factors such as the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
country, regime type and other observable country- level variables, it is not pos-
sible to account for unobservable factors that might influence both whether states 
adopt female quotas and whether or not there are higher rates of sexual violence 
– i.e. the level of gender equality in the country. For the survey research design, 
it is possible to take into account observable variables such as sex, age, house-
hold income, etc., but unobservable variables, such as latent trust in the govern-
ment, may still be missing from the analysis. Because researchers are unable to 
take into account every possible confounding factor, another method is required 
to get at cause and effect relationships.
 Finally, selection bias/effect refers to the selection of individuals, groups, or 
data for analysis in such a way that proper randomization is not achieved. As a 
result, the sample obtained is not representative of the population intended to be 
analysed. In the quantitative, observational study, only post- conflict countries 
were selected. Post- conflict countries are not a random sample of countries in 
the world. This limits the ability to generalize whether or not quotas for women 
affect reporting rates of sexual violence globally. For the survey research design, 
it is possible that the researcher asked survey questions to only individuals that 
were at home – mostly females. The survey results may indicate that when the 
respondents, mostly female, had contact with female officers, they were more 
likely to report sexual violence. However, this conclusion is not valid, because 
men who should have had an equal chance of being selected were not included 
in the sample. It is possible that men may not have the same response as women 
190  S. Karim
due to negative gender stereotypes about women or other patriarchal beliefs, but 
these potential results are not included in the findings.
 The examples demonstrate the perils of using quantitative, observational 
studies and sometimes even survey designs to assess the effects of gender 
reforms in the security sector on citizens’ perceptions and behaviour. The differ-
ence between observational studies (and surveys), which are common in the field 
of conflict studies, and experimental methods is the ability to randomize the 
causal factor or what may be called the treatment. The treatment is randomly 
assigned to a particular population defined by the researchers. Everyone in that 
particular population must have an equal chance of being selected to receive the 
treatment. Note that experimental studies focus on the random assignment of 
treatment to the subject – not to be confused with a random sample. For the 
former, each stage of the process in the research design ensures that all subjects 
have equal probability of receiving the treatment. A random procedure, whether 
a coin flip, a dice roll or a random number generator, determines whether the 
subject receives the treatment or not. Those that do not receive the treatment are 
considered a part of the control group. For the latter, subjects are chosen from a 
larger population randomly, whereby each subject is equally likely to be chosen. 
The process ensures that the observed and unobserved factors that influence out-
comes are equally likely to be present in both the treatment and control groups. 
In other words, the groups are ‘balanced’.
 Random assignment is necessary for the proper assessment of causal relation-
ships. However, to ensure that the results are generalizable to the broader popu-
lation, a random sample from which to randomly assign treatment is also 
necessary. In other words, to ensure that the experiment has external validity, or 
that the findings can be applied broadly, random sampling is necessary to avoid 
problems of selection bias.
 If we return to the original question about whether or not gender reforms 
increase reporting of sexual violence, then using experimental methods might 
ensure that the sources of bias mentioned above are avoided. I randomized police 
patrols by sex and then evaluated whether or not reporting of sexual violence 
increased (in addition to whether other outcome variables such as enhanced per-
ceptions of the state/police forces or support for the government increased) in 
those areas that were patrolled by women compared with the areas that were 
patrolled by men, and compared with areas that were not patrolled at all (Karim 
2016). Using this example, random assignment of treatment refers to the random 
selection of households to be visited by female police officers. Random selection 
refers to the random selection of villages selected for the entire study – these 
include the control villages where there will be no visits by policewomen and 
treatment villages. This approach ensures the preferred causal direction, ensures 
balance between the treated and untreated groups on unobservable characteris-
tics, and ensures a random sample of the population of interest.
 While it may seem as if experimental methods are quantitatively based, 
employing experimental methods may help bridge methodological divides 
between those who prefer case study and those who prefer large- N data analysis. 
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Due to the nature of field experiments, they can usually only be conducted in 
particular locations (one country, one region of a country, etc.). This means that 
researchers that use them must be intentional and employ rigorous methods for 
case design and case selection (Gerring 2008). Additionally, qualitative methods 
such as interviews (see Chapter 5 by Anja Mihr) and focus groups provide very 
helpful knowledge that lead to better designed experiments. They may provide 
important supplemental material that greatly contextualizes experimental results, 
particularly the mechanisms and processes through which treatments may have 
an effect (Paluck 2010).
Comparison­of­experimental­methods
Field experiments
A field experiment refers to studies conducted in natural settings in which sub-
jects are allocated randomly to treatment and control groups. Field experiments 
in post- conflict settings usually involve testing the impact of policies, in par-
ticular development programmes. They are also helpful in assessing the mecha-
nisms through which certain outcomes occur. In the case of my research, for 
example, it was useful to test whether it was the sex of the officer or any visits, 
regardless of sex, by police officers that increased support for the state. I did this 
by sending male officers to randomly selected households and females to ran-
domly selected households and no officers to another set of randomly selected 
households.
 Other researchers have used field experiments to assess the impact of 
community- driven development programmes (Beath et al. 2012, 2013; Fearon et 
al. 2009, 2015) and land programmes (Blattman, Hartman, and Blair 2014). 
Moreover, field experiments in conflict and post- conflict countries served to test 
the impact of psycho- social programmes on ex- combatants (Blattman and Annan 
2016) and of police patrols on trust in the government (Karim 2016; Blair, 
Karim, and Morse 2016).
 There are several criteria that determine whether a researcher conducts a 
‘true’ field experiment. According to Alan Gerber and Donald Green (2012: 
10–11), these are whether the treatment used in the study resembles the interven-
tion of interest in the ‘real’ world (authenticity), whether the participants 
resemble the actors who ordinarily encounter interventions (participants), 
whether the context within which subjects receive the treatment resembles the 
context of interest (context), and whether the outcome measures resemble the 
actual outcome of theoretical and practical interest (outcomes). When research-
ers implement field experiments, they should try to meet these criteria.
Authenticity
For authenticity, the intervention or the treatment should closely resemble what 
happens in the real world. For example, if the goal is to measure how police 
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patrols by women influence trust in the state, then the treatment should mimic 
how police patrols would normally be carried out by the state. Deviations from 
this approach may include having enumerators5 visit households and provide 
information about gender balancing reforms in the police. More generally 
speaking, ‘information treatments’ or surveys in which enumerators provide 
information about a particular policy and then assess whether that information 
changes peoples’ minds or behaviour about something, move the study away 
from being authentic. If experiments are not authentic, it may be hard to extrapo-
late what the findings of the experiment mean. In the latter scenario, it would be 
unclear if the actual reform or information about the reforms drive perceptional 
and behavioural changes.
Participants
In field experiments, it is important to get as close to the true population of 
interest as possible. Sometimes this may be difficult to achieve, especially if the 
research question is related to studying political elites such as high- level polit-
ical figures or members of the security forces (Loewen et al. 2010). When 
research with the participants of true interest is not possible, then researchers 
have used a ‘convenience sample’ usually involving undergraduate participants 
or online systems such as Mechanical Turk (Berinsky et al. 2012). The downside 
to this is that it can be difficult to determine whether or not college students act 
similarly to the population of interest such as elites, police officers, or civilians 
in post- conflict settings.
Context
Another important consideration for field experiments is the environment in 
which the treatment is implemented. This includes whether the implementation 
of the treatment occurs in the location of interest. This may be difficult because 
it is often laborious to travel to post- conflict settings. Nevertheless, doing field 
work in the ‘real setting’ is important because it ensures that factors related to a 
different setting (such as a lab setting) do not influence civilians’ answers on 
surveys and behavioural outcomes. For example, if the study is on gender 
reforms in policing and the interactions with female police officers occur in a lab 
versus in the community, individuals may say they trust the female police offic-
ers when they actually do not.
Outcomes
The outcome measures should resemble the outcomes of interest in the real 
world. Researchers often use surveys to measure change in response to an inter-
vention, but these only gauge changes in perceptions and not actual behaviour. 
While changes in perceptions are important to measure, the goal is (mostly) to 
understand whether the treatment induces some change in behaviour or a tangible 
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outcome of interest that improves the quality of life of the individuals. For that 
reason, looking at outcomes such as changes in reporting levels, income, com-
munity leadership positions, voting and other variables that actually capture 
changes in the behaviour or people’s status better meets the criterion of 
outcome. Another concern is that sometimes researchers are interested in 
assessing concepts that are difficult to measure, such as ‘legitimacy’ and ‘trust’. 
However, while surveys are often utilized to get at difficult concepts, research-
ers can sometimes employ creative methods to measure concepts such as legiti-
macy and trust.6
Potential disadvantages and trade- offs of field experiments
Although field experiments or randomized controlled trials may be useful for 
evaluating programmes, there are several downsides of using them. Field experi-
ments require parsimonious theories (Gerber and Green 2012) because they 
usually allow researchers to test only a limited number of treatments or causal 
factors. The unit of analysis may be confined to the individual or at most to vil-
lages or certain organizations. Field experiments are not practical for theories of 
institutional change, explaining historical processes, and they are not practical 
for units of analysis that involve states, international systems, or fuzzy concepts 
such as power. Thus, the increased use of such methods could narrow the theor-
etical innovations in the field.
 Additionally, outcome measures may be detectable in the short- term, but still 
not last in the long term. That is, the effects from programmes usually only last 
for a short period after the intervention and decay rapidly; this underlines the 
limited utility of field experiments for testing theories of (longer- term) institu-
tional change on highly aggregated levels.
 There are also concerns about external validity. Because experimental methods 
are resource- intensive and thus can only be implemented in limited settings (one 
country, one region of a country, etc.), the theory or casual mechanism(s) being 
tested may only be context specific. As a result, experimental methods may be 
helpful if researchers are assessing a novel causal claim to see if there is any merit 
to it. If there is support for the causal claim, then the onus of demonstrating the 
scope conditions for generalization is on the researcher. He or she should suggest 
other countries/areas where the theory may generate support and why it would or 
would not.
 With limited resources to implement field experiments, researchers are forced 
to make difficult decisions that constrain the ability to include multiple para-
meters in the research design. In designing a field experiment, researchers must 
ensure that there are enough participants in the control groups and in all the dif-
ferent treatment groups. This is usually done by calculating the statistical power 
or the likelihood that a study will detect some effect when there is an effect to be 
detected. Highly powered studies ensure that the probability of concluding that 
there is no effect when, in fact, there is an effect (Type II error) decreases. 
Higher power is associated with a higher number of participants in the control 
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group and each treatment group or arm. Thus, the more treatment arms (i.e. 
causal factors) the study includes, the higher number of participants must be 
included in each group. Doing so raises costs, time and other resources.
 Field experiments are expensive, time- consuming and high stakes. They often 
require that researchers receive large amounts of funding through grants. This 
limits the number of researchers that can engage in such efforts as there is a 
finite amount of available funding. It also means that field experiments are held 
hostage to budget cuts, funding cycles and grant guidelines. Field experiments 
usually take a long time to conduct, so they are not efficient for scholars who are 
pressed to publish frequently. They are also high stakes in that they are 
dependent on many outside factors that are beyond the control of the researcher. 
Often, researchers cannot closely monitor the implementation of the treatment 
and data collection process at all times because projects conducted in the field 
take a long time and researchers must rely on the assistance of locals or partner 
agencies to implement them. As a result, this sometimes leads to mistakes that 
jeopardize the integrity of the entire experiment, such as if proper randomization 
is not conducted. Field experiments are also susceptible to major shocks, which 
makes them high risk and costly if something goes wrong. As an illustration, 
researchers who were conducting field experiments in Sierra Leone or Liberia 
when Ebola broke out had to suspend their projects, which in some cases meant 
the project ended without being complete and funding was lost.
Lab- in-the- field experiments
Another type of field experiments are lab- in-the- field experiments. Lab experi-
ments are often used by applied game theorists to test whether individuals 
behave rationally when making decisions and bargains. These games are often 
stylized portrayals of the real world, as participants are often ordinary people 
such as university students, and not legislators or diplomats or other populations 
of interest. A lab experiment becomes ‘in the field’ when it is conducted outside 
of a lab and in the actual location of interest. Lab- in-the- field experiments are 
carried out with actual representatives of the entity being studied. This is the 
method that I used to answer the second research question: how do group 
dynamics within the police institution change due to gender reforms?7 We (see 
Karim et al. 2016) selected over 600 Liberian National Police officers from the 
different police units and departments to participate. We then randomized the 
group composition by sex (no women, two women, four women, and six women) 
– the treatment was the number of women in each group and the control group 
constituted groups with no women. We then assessed the individuals’ and teams’ 
ability to do police work, as well as tested some standard behavioural games. 
Two typical games were used to assess whether the level of altruism or 
cooperation increases or decreases based on group composition.
• Public Goods Game:8 In the public goods game each player is allocated an 
endowment (i.e. generally corresponding to a consistent proportion of a 
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daily wage), and must decide how much of this endowment to personally 
retain and how much to put in a group pot. The total amount donated to the 
group pot is then doubled and redistributed evenly among all the players. 
According to game theoretic models that suggest that individuals are 
rational, for the individual, the optimal strategy is to give nothing and ‘free- 
ride’ on other players’ contributions to the collective fund, while the most 
profitable outcome for the group is that all players contribute everything. 
Variants of this game include telling people different scenarios for what will 
happen to the money or who will get the money.
• The Ultimatum Game:9 In the ultimatum game, the first player receives an 
endowment (i.e. generally corresponding to a consistent proportion of a 
daily wage) and proposes how to divide the sum between himself/herself 
and another player. The second player chooses to either accept or reject this 
proposal. If the second player accepts, the money is split according to the 
proposal. If the second player rejects, neither player receives any money. 
According to game theoretic models, the first player would give the lowest 
possible amount to the second person. Variants of this game involve saying 
who the second person is (someone in the same room or someone in dif-
ferent rooms).
The results of our study found that group composition does not affect groups’ 
level of cooperation or altruism, which runs contrary to some of the literature in 
social psychology that suggests that women are more cooperative and altruistic 
than men.
Survey experiments
Survey experiments include some sort of treatment that is written into the 
survey. Survey questions then evaluate how that particular treatment affected 
perceptions based on survey questions that come later (after the treatment). 
There are at least three types of survey experiments: ‘information’, ‘endorse-
ment’ and ‘list’. The latter two are particularly helpful in post- conflict settings, 
where researchers may be interested in asking sensitive questions.
 The use of informational triggers may influence how people make decisions. 
The treatment group receives some sort of information and the control group does 
not. Alternatively, the treatment group receives some variant of information while 
the control group receives some baseline information. The information may be 
provided in the survey (they read something or are told the information) or they 
may view a video that provides information. In my own research to assess 
whether actual visits by women or information about gender reforms are more 
important for enhanced perceptions and changes in behaviour, I conducted an 
informational survey experiment. The treatment included having the enumerator 
read information about gender reforms that have occurred in Liberia. Individuals 
in the control group did not get this information. The survey then assessed out-
comes based on information or no information about gender reforms.
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 A second treatment may be to endorse a particular project or item on a survey 
and see if this leads to changed perceptions. Members of the treatment group are 
told that a particular policy is endorsed by a candidate or a group, while the 
control group is not told that the policy is endorsed by a particular candidate or 
group (Lyall et al. 2013). This allows the researcher to comparatively assess the 
level of individuals’ support for non- state insurgent groups (such as insurgent 
groups), the state, or international actors.
 In an example of an endorsement experiment, respondents were asked:10 
‘[THE LIBERIAN GOVERNMENT/THE TRADITIONAL LEADERS/SOME 
PEOPLE] say it is a crime to make children do work they are not able to do. 
How much do you personally agree?’
 In this example, the researchers would assess the percentage of people based 
on whether they were randomly assigned the endorsement from the Liberian 
Government, traditional leaders or ‘some people’ (which is the control group). 
We thus learn how much individuals support traditional leaders over the state.
 Finally, a list experiment includes statements about which participants may agree 
or disagree. The treatment group receives four statements while the control group 
receives three statements. The statements that the control group receives are usually 
statements that respondents are likely to all either agree or disagree on, whereas the 
one with four statements in the treatment group asks a question that is sensitive. 
The participants are not asked whether they agree or disagree with the statements, 
but rather just the number of statements they agree or disagree with. This allows the 
researcher to assess whether more people on average agree or disagree with the 
statement in question. Here is an example of such a list experiment:11
I am going to present to you a list of four things [three, for the control 
group] that some people support and others do not. Please listen to these 
things and tell me HOW MANY you support. Do not tell me WHICH of 
these things you support, only how many of them you support.
The South American nations creating a central bank.
The assessment of a special tax to finance the expansion of the parks and 
green spaces in your neighbourhood.
The conservative ideology gaining more influence in the Colombian society.
The military forces having more freedom to defend the nation in the way 
they see fit [excluded for the control group].
There are many problems with implementing surveys as some questions of 
interest are sensitive; people are reluctant to answer questions that trigger diffi-
cult memories; that may cause trauma or that are embarrassing. Additionally, 
some groups of people may have some sort of bias in recalling events from the 
past. Such problems may lead to social desirability bias or non- random refusal. 
Social desirability bias is the tendency of survey respondents to answer ques-
tions in a manner that will be viewed favourably by others, particularly the enu-
merator or the group the enumerator represents. Non- random refusal is the 
tendency of survey respondents to choose to ‘refuse to answer’ in a systematic 
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way. Both are problematic because the researcher is not getting accurate 
responses for  questions. These problems are exacerbated in conflict and post- 
conflict countries. Some questions on support for various insurgent groups or for 
the government may be sensitive and even dangerous to answer because insur-
gent groups are competing for support and if they hear that some individuals 
support one group versus another, it could jeopardize the responding individuals’ 
lives. Nevertheless, both the endorsement and list experiments have been used in 
conflict and post- conflict countries to avoid these types of problems. (Bullock et 
al. 2011). There is evidence that both techniques produce substantively similar 
empirical findings even in places such as Afghanistan (Blair et al. 2014).
Ethical considerations in doing experimental research
This section considers the ethical implications of using the experimental methods 
mentioned above and suggests several considerations for researchers when using 
experimental methods.
 At least in the US, all field experiments are subject to Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) authorization.12 Because field experiments use human subjects, 
most researchers must gain approval from their home institution in the form of 
an IRB. But even if this is not mandatory, researchers should – as is the purpose 
of the IRB – ensure that all human subject research be conducted in accordance 
with federal, institutional and ethical guidelines. Each institution has a process 
for receiving IRB applications. Without IRB approval, researchers are often 
unable to get grant funding and are unable to publish their work. A key goal of 
IRBs is to protect human subjects from physical or psychological harm. 
Researchers are required to put together a research protocol that addresses the 
risks and benefits to subjects, the potential harm that can be done to subjects, the 
protection of subjects’ identity, and demonstrate that participation is voluntary.
 While the IRB is an important threshold for human subject safety, it is prim-
arily designed to protect human subjects who participate in some form of 
medical study. In the social sciences, there are additional ethical considerations 
that researchers should consider before implementing experimental research 
designs. For example, the IRB does not consider the safety of enumerators nor 
of the researcher. Thus, especially when it comes to conducting field experi-
ments, there are a number of other ethical guidelines to ensure that the research-
ers, enumerators and human subjects are unharmed from the experiment. Thus, 
the IRB is merely the minimal protection a researcher should take to ensure the 
work he or she does is ethical.
 In addition to creating a protocol for the IRB, those involved in using experi-
mental methods usually register their research design and create something 
called a pre- analysis plan. The pre- analysis plan usually includes the research 
design of the project, as well as the hypotheses that will be tested, and the empir-
ical models that will be used to test the data. However, additional information 
could be included in the pre- analysis plan that includes decisions about 
enumerators, the researchers’ control over the design and implementation of the 
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treatment, challenges and dangers associated with implementing the project, and 
provisions for information dissemination. These are all issues that relate to the 
ethics of implementing field experiments, but that are not addressed by the IRB.
 When conducting field experiments, there may be a fine line with regards to 
how much control researchers have in manipulations that affect real people’s 
lives. In a sense, researchers sometimes play the ‘hand of God’, choosing which 
people receive a treatment and which people do not and choosing what form the 
treatment will take. For example, in 2014, political scientists were reprimanded 
in Montana when they sent official- looking flyers to 100,000 Montana voters 
just weeks before Election Day. The manipulation could have swayed the elec-
tion, and there was an official inquiry into the ethics of conducting such an 
experiment. While the ‘do no harm’ principle applies here, the question is more 
about whether researchers should be able to sway elections. How much involve-
ment is too much involvement? Unfortunately, there are no generally applicable 
guidelines for such questions. Researchers must assess all potential outcomes – 
positive and negative – about their manipulation and then make an individual 
judgement call about whether it is worth conducting.
 In my own research, I had to decide whether it was ethical for individuals 
who may have been traumatized by the war to receive visits by police officers 
who may have been perceived as threatening. The visits were justified because 
the government already had plans to do community policing in the rural counties 
of Liberia. My project enabled them to expedite this process. Thus, in this case, 
my project was actually able to help with state capacity building because it 
involved police officers becoming trained in community policing and it has 
potentially helped increase trust in the state.
 One way to mitigate ethical problems is to conduct field experiments in part-
nership with local organizations. This means that the researcher is not the main 
decision maker when it comes to implementation of the treatment, but rather 
local organizations in consultation with the researcher make decisions about 
implementation and the local organization implements the treatment, not the 
researcher. This ensures that local context and local knowledge about the poten-
tial negative and positive impacts are taken into consideration. It also better 
guarantees that the goal of authenticity and context are achieved. Working with 
local partners helps to ensure that a treatment is something that the group or the 
government would actually do. Even though the researchers have less control 
over the implementation, it is important to implement something that would have 
been implemented by a campaign, by the government, or NGO even without the 
involvement of the researcher. The researcher ‘only’ ensures that the process of 
receiving the treatment is random.
 Still, one criticism of researchers’ control over randomization has been that 
the process by which individuals receive treatments is not organic. Rather, 
researchers choose who gets the treatment and who does not. This means that if 
there is an advantage to the treatment (i.e. it increases household income), then 
only select members of the population will get the benefit. However, researchers 
have argued that the process for selection is often more fair than the ones that 
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exist or that occur organically. Because the process is random, everyone has an 
equal chance of receiving the treatment, which may not be the case otherwise.
 There are also potential challenges and dangers of doing fieldwork for the 
researcher. Conducting field experiments in conflict and post- conflict settings 
makes researchers susceptible to particular dangers such as diseases, breakdowns in 
law and order, crime, road accidents, and even sexual harassment. In my case, I had 
to delay my project for one year due to the Ebola epidemic in 2014, but the delay 
strengthened my project and I developed a much more rigorous memorandum of 
understanding with the research team, which included what to do if there was 
another outbreak. Researchers may do well to think about the potential dangers and 
challenges and ensure that they have the resources, insurance and contingency plans 
for conducting field work in such environments. One recommendation is to do an 
initial visit to the location before actually conducting the experiment in order to 
understand the challenges associated with working in the country. This also ensures 
that the researcher has a greater understanding of the context of the setting for the 
field experiment, which may better inform how the experiment will be carried out. 
It also contributes to (re-)considering the feasibility of the research design.
 Conducting field experiments requires the use of local enumeration teams. 
This means that, in addition to considerations about the researcher’s safety, the 
researcher must think about the safety of the enumeration team as well. Regard-
less of how the data collection team is organized, the researcher and the enumer-
ation team should create a memorandum of understanding about the conditions 
under which the project will be implemented. The parameters for this should 
include what happens if researchers get sick on the job, what types of crisis may 
put an end to the project, which communities are safe and accessible enough for 
project implementation, what happens if, upon entering a particular area, it is 
actually unsafe and enumerators are unable to go there, and how much commu-
nication the enumeration team will have with the researcher.
 For the data collection, while many countries have large survey firms that are 
often utilized to implement surveys and field experiments, there are several bene-
fits and challenges to using such firms versus creating and training a team. Large 
survey firms will have already done feasibility assessments and will be able to 
advise researchers about their limitations. They are also likely to have the person-
nel, equipment and infrastructure to carry out the project. Thus, for those that have 
minimal experience in a country, such firms may be the best option. However, they 
tend to be very expensive and the researcher may have very little control over the 
process. This could lead to poor quality of data collection, as it becomes difficult 
for the researcher to ensure that the proper protocol and procedure was utilized.
 Another option may be for the researcher to invest time and energy in creating 
his or her own enumeration team.13 This may be possible through using local 
college, Masters or PhD students. These students may be eager to learn about 
research methodology and, in employing them, the researcher may actually be con-
tributing to skills development in the country, which is particularly useful for indi-
viduals in post- conflict countries. The researcher could spend time conducting 
training and building a relationship with the enumerators. The enumerators may 
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then be able to provide valuable information about the conditions under which the 
project may be implemented and other information that goes into the memorandum 
of understanding. The drawback of this approach is that it is more time consuming. 
However, the benefit is that the researcher may have more control over the imple-
mentation of the process, which means there may be less ‘shirking’.
 A final, important ethical consideration is about how much the communities 
benefit from the research and how much they know about the research and the 
results. Perhaps one of the most important parts of conducting field experiments is 
conveying the information back to the communities in which the experiments 
occurred. This ensures that the research process is two sided and that both the 
researcher and the communities gain in knowledge (Kaplan 2015). Often times, 
researchers do not have enough resources allocated in their budgets to be able to 
give back in this way. Thus, it may be the duty of organizations that provide grants 
to incorporate a section in grant proposals requiring researchers to explain how 
they would disseminate their research to the participants and an appropriate budget 
for doing so. In addition to, or instead of, information dissemination, researchers 
may find other ways to give back to the community or their partners. For example, 
they may provide some sort of training for their enumerators, for their partner 
organization, or even in communities. Regardless, researchers that implement field 
experiments may do well to think more about the imprint they leave, and how the 
knowledge that they have may be made intelligible to the local population. For 
example, when I conducted a survey in 2012, I presented the results to the com-
munity during a community forum by having enumerators act out the results.
Conclusion
The chapter has provided an account of the growing use of experimental 
methods in conflict and post- conflict countries. The growing trend has necessi-
tated a set of criteria by which researchers can evaluate whether or not to use 
experimental methods in post- conflict countries. Based on the above discussion, 
the following is a summary of questions researchers should ask themselves 
before using such methods with non- state actors in post- conflict countries. If the 
answer is yes to the questions, then experimental methods may be appropriate.
1 Is my research subject to high levels of bias if conducted through analysing 
observational data/surveys (endogeneity, omitted variables and selection bias)?
2 Is my research question limited to a unit of analysis that is the individual or 
groups?
3 Is my research question limited to only one or a few mechanisms?
4 Is this a new theory or causal mechanism being tested?
5 Are my scope conditions well- defined for the theory/causal mechanism?
The closer the research design is to authenticity, ‘real’ participants, ‘real context’ 
and ‘real’ outcomes, the more closely it aligns with a ‘true’ field experiment. 
However, there may be certain instances where a lab- in-the- field experiment 
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may be more appropriate, such as if researchers are interested in testing whether 
individuals behave according to outcomes predicted from game theoretic models 
– do they behave rationally – given some sort of treatment (such as varying 
group composition by sex). In other cases, survey experiments may be more 
appropriate due to the danger of conducting actual field experiments in post- 
conflict countries, or because individuals may not answer some questions truth-
fully. Thus, if researchers are trying to elicit answers to questions that are 
particularly sensitive, survey experiments may be a useful method.
 Finally, other criteria relate to more practical and ethical aspects of using 
experimental methods. Practically, researchers need resources and time to use 
experimental methods. Additionally, there are certain ethical challenges that must 
be considered when using these methods. Researchers should work with partner 
organizations, choose enumeration teams with care, ensure that there is a memo-
randum of understanding with all participants in the study, and describe how 
researchers intend to convey information back to communities or think of other 
ways to give back to researched communities. Regardless of these suggestions, 
much more work should be devoted to setting guidelines for social scientists that 
wish to employ these methods and especially for those that wish to employ them 
in conflict and post- conflict environments, where the risks and stakes are higher.
 Despite the challenges, field experiments, lab- in-the- field experiments and 
survey experiments represent new tools in a big tool box of methods that 
researchers studying conflict and post- conflict countries can use, and the use of 
such methods has the potential to create new knowledge that will be valuable to 
the field.
Notes
 1 For a background of experimental work in International Relations, see Hyde (2010).
 2 For in- depth explanations of these biases, see King et al. (1994).
 3 In Liberia, the government, with help from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 
instituted a 15 per cent quota for women in the police force in 2005, a 20 per cent one 
in 2008, and a 30 per cent one in 2012.
 4 Other outcome variables may be measured, but here higher levels of sexual violence 
indicates higher reporting rates, which is an indicator of increased support for the 
state.
 5 Enumerators are research assistants who are from the country in which the experiment 
is occurring, and who help carry out the experiment or surveys.
 6 For example, see Blair (2015) and Karim (2016). In the latter study, to measure 
support for the government (such as inclination to start paying taxes), researchers may 
give individuals compensation for taking a survey and then asking them if they want 
to donate some proportion of what they received to the state to improve security 
services.
 7 See Karim et al. (2016), Blair, Karim, Gilligan, and Beardsley (2016). For applica-
tions in post- conflict countries related to peacekeeping and trust and legitimacy, see 
Blair (2015).
 8 You are with a group of people when a woman approaches with a proposition. She 
offers each person $5 in one- dollar bills and says that you can each keep some or give 
to the pot. She says if you give to the pot, that amount will be doubled and then split 
among everyone. What do you do?
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 9 You are standing on the sidewalk with a friend, minding your own business, when a 
man approaches with a proposition. He offers you $10 in one- dollar bills and says you 
can keep the money, under one condition: You have to share some of it with your 
friend. You can offer your friend as much or as little as you like, but if your friend 
rejects your offer, neither of you get to keep any of the money. What do you do?
10 Taken from Blair, Karim, and Morse (2016).
11 Taken from ‘Controlling Civilians? Examining Support for the Military in Colombia’ 
(Matanock and García-Sanchez 2015). The article compares using direct questions 
versus list questions to gauge truthful answers.
12 The IRB is a committee, usually housed within an academic institution, which has 
been formally designated to approve, monitor and review biomedical and behavioural 
research involving humans.
13 This is the approach that I took. I have worked with the same enumeration team for 
every project and have made it a point to do some kind of training (i.e. on randomiza-
tion, data analysis, grant writing, etc.) each time I go to Liberia.
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14 Empirical assessment of (policy) 
effectiveness
The role of business in zones of 
conflict
Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus Dieter Wolf
Introduction1
Transnational corporations operate in conflict zones around the world. Most 
prominent are cases where they have become entangled in conflict dynamics or 
have supported authoritarian regimes. Often cited examples have been com-
panies that buy ‘conflict diamonds’ from African countries or, more recently, 
that export ‘conflict minerals’ from the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). In contrast, corporate social responsibility (CSR), a concept that has 
received increased attention since the 1990s (Coni- Zimmer 2014), emphasizes 
that companies can and should go beyond simply doing business by engaging in 
CSR and governance.2 This discourse has spurred research on the potentially 
positive role of business and its contributions to governance in zones of conflict 
(Wenger and Möckli 2003; Haufler 2010; Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010b).
 This chapter addresses the challenges of conceptualizing and measuring the 
effectiveness of corporate engagement in zones of conflict. It mainly draws on 
the experience the authors gained during a collaborative research project on the 
role of business in zones of (violent) conflict conducted at the Peace Research 
Institute Frankfurt.3 The research question examined in this project was: under 
what conditions do corporations contribute to governance relevant to peace and 
security in zones of conflict (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010a)?4
 The project was developed in response to a biased state of the research that 
has emphasized the negative role of business; that is, how corporations con-
tribute to conflict rather than to peace and security. The increasingly important 
role of non- state actors has become a major issue in global governance research 
in the fields of political science and International Relations. In general, the call 
for an increased engagement of non- state actors rests on the assumption that they 
make governance more effective and legitimate (Reinicke and Deng 2000; Dany 
2013: 81). Although research has highlighted the positive role of civil society 
organizations and their contribution to governance, the role of business actors 
has been neglected for some time. In addition, the role of non- state actors has 
been broadly discussed in areas considered ‘low politics’, such as environmental 
politics and development, but it has hardly been considered in the field of 
security, which is often perceived as the prerogative of the state. As a result, our 
Assessment of (policy) effectiveness  205
knowledge about the role of business actors in the areas of peace and security is 
limited. But given the growing discourse about CSR, it was reasonable to assume 
that businesses also have the potential to contribute to governance in zones of 
conflict. Moreover, there was a gap in research with regard to explaining dif-
ferent forms and degrees of corporate engagement in conflict zones. Con-
sequently, our aim was twofold: to generate more systematic, descriptive 
evidence of corporate engagement in conflict zones, and to provide explanatory 
knowledge about the conditions under which corporations show varying degrees 
of engagement. If the engagement of business actors in conflict zones could 
indeed be shown to be effective, this would constitute an important argument for 
engaging this group of non- state actors in governance processes.
 The distinction of corporate governance contributions, that is, the dependent 
variable in the project, was based on the concept of effectiveness as developed in 
regime theory (see below). Governance contributions were conceptualized in terms 
of output and outcome effectiveness (see Wolf et al. 2007; Deitelhoff and Wolf 
2010a: 11). It was furthermore defined that these contributions had to be both 
intentional and voluntary – that is, they were not merely a by- product of business 
activities and they had to go beyond what companies were required to do by law.5 
A distinction was made between governance- related activities that directly address 
the level of violence in conflict zones (security governance) and contributions that 
indirectly address the underlying causes of violent conflict, such as human rights 
and corruption, the socio- economic dimension of conflict or socio- cultural prob-
lems (Feil et al. 2008: 6–7). Direct contributions to security governance might 
include corporate standards for dealing with public and private security forces or 
contributing to security sector reform. For example, oil companies such as Shell 
implement the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights that regulate 
their dealings with public and private security forces with the aim of preventing 
human rights violations and enhancing the human security of communities 
(Zimmer 2010: 65). Indirect contributions might include programmes to support 
civil society, the introduction of corporate human rights standards or the imple-
mentation of community development programmes. The latter nowadays consti-
tute a standard practice of all major extractive corporations with large operations 
on the ground (Jacobs 2015; Zimmer 2010: 69–71).
 The conceptualization of governance contributions based on the distinction 
between output and outcome effectiveness, as well as its pros and cons, will be 
discussed in the second section of this chapter. We argue that focusing on the 
two dimensions of output and outcome effectiveness is a sensible middle ground 
that seeks to reconcile two criteria: political relevance and the accessibility of 
data. In the third section, we will briefly describe the challenge of case selection 
and discuss the research methods used to collect the data. Method triangulation 
based on document analysis and interviews with companies and stakeholders 
(see also Chapter 6 by Joakim Berndtsson), as well as field research, allowed the 
researchers to gain valuable insights into the output and outcome dimensions of 
corporate governance contributions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
some of the broader implications of using this conception of effectiveness.
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The effectiveness of corporate engagement6
Effectiveness can be conceptualized in many different ways,7 and analysing 
effectiveness has been an important strand in research on regimes. Regimes are 
usually defined as sets of ‘principles, norms, rules and decision- making proce-
dures around which actors’ expectations converge’ (Krasner 1983: 2). Relevant 
research has focused primarily on intergovernmental regimes, such as the nuclear 
non- proliferation regime or various environmental regimes. When analysing the 
effectiveness of regimes, researchers have often distinguished among outputs, 
outcomes and impacts (see Easton 1965; Young 2004).8 ‘Outputs’ refer to pol-
icies, regulations and the development of instruments put in place as a response 
to a regime; ‘outcomes’ relate to measurable behavioural changes of regime 
members; and ‘impacts’ are ‘contributions regimes make to solving the prob-
lems that led to their creation in the first place’ (Young 2004: 12–13). It is fair to 
say that most research has focused on the output and outcome dimensions of 
effectiveness and not on the impacts and other broader consequences of regimes, 
owing mainly to difficulties in measurement and in attributing causality (Under-
dal 2004). More recently, the distinction among these three dimensions has also 
been used to analyse the effectiveness of public–private regimes (see Huckel et 
al. 2007; Flohr et al. 2010; Beisheim and Liese 2014). In our research project, 
this approach was adapted9 and used to analyse corporate engagement specifi-
cally in conflict zones (see Table 14.1).
Corporate output
Corporate output refers to the (self-)commitments of actors or, simply put, cor-
porate policies. Of the three dimensions of effectiveness, output is the most 
manageable in scholarly terms, but it is also the least interesting in practical 
terms. Business actors’ self- commitments are often suspected of being only 
window dressing, unrelated to their real intentions or behaviour, or of not con-
tributing to solving pressing societal problems (Vogel 2005).
 However, analysing the output dimension sheds light on whether corporations 
have clearly articulated policies towards security in a conflict zone and whether 
Table 14.1 Dimensions of effectiveness
Dimension of 
effectiveness
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they have goals when it comes to more structural causes of violence. Therefore, 
one can more explicitly investigate the intentionality of security- related corpo-
rate engagement and goals by examining output rather than the other dimen-
sions. The output dimension is also where the ‘design evaluation’ can take place 
(e.g. by addressing the question of how strong the monitoring mechanisms are). 
Here, one can study the overall scope of commitments (global, national or local), 
as well as different actor constellations (unilateral, multilateral corporate com-
mitment or multi- actor/sectoral commitment).
 Output is relatively easy to address in analytical terms. One might look at 
the statements made by individual companies or at collective business or 
multi- stakeholder commitments that can be found, for example, in codes of 
conduct or sustainability reports (see below). Empirical results for different 
outputs can be measured and evaluated along an axis that ranges from pro- 
active self- commitments to no self- commitments at all. To give an example, a 
company operating in conflict zones might have an individual statement refer-
ring to the use of and relationship with public and/or private security forces, 
or it might be part of a global standard initiative such as the Voluntary Prin-
ciples on Security and Human Rights (see Freeman and Hernández Uriz 2003). 
The company thereby acknowledges a certain responsibility for protecting and 
promoting human rights and commits itself to following certain principles and 
implementing certain measures to prevent human rights violations by security 
forces.10
Corporate outcomes
Focusing the evaluation of effects on analysing outcomes will provide a good 
balance between being interesting (i.e. politically relevant) and manageable (in 
analytical terms) at the same time. It goes beyond analysing formal commit-
ments in statements or codes of conduct (which are just ‘words’); instead, it 
addresses and evaluates companies’ behaviour and their compliance with their 
own commitments in zones of conflict: do corporate self- commitments indeed 
change corporate behaviour? Do companies actually comply with the (norm-
ative) standards to which they have committed themselves?
 Analysing the outcome dimension of corporate engagement is more ambitious 
than assessing output effectiveness; however, when compared with impact 
assessments (see below), it is often still more practicable. At any rate, it requires 
looking beyond corporate statements of policies. Collecting data for analysing 
corporate behaviour should not rely on corporate self- reporting but should 
include other sources, such as interviews, observation and/or reports from 
stakeholders.
 Different outcomes can be measured and evaluated along the axis from no cor-
porate activities related to peace and security (limited to just doing business) to pro- 
active activities that compensate for the failure of host states to provide security and 
related public goods. To give an example, from our research project, a company 
that has committed itself to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
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takes active steps to implement the standard by conducting risk assessments and 
offering human rights training for security personnel in conflict zones.
Impact
Impact (or problem- solving effectiveness) relates to the question of whether pol-
icies and activities that have been developed have contributed to mitigating or 
resolving real- world problems, such as the violent conflicts or human rights vio-
lations that led to their development in the first place. Of the three effectiveness 
dimensions, impact is clearly the most demanding in an analytical sense, but it is 
also the most interesting in terms of political relevance. Impact is ‘the ultimate 
concern of decision- makers and stakeholders’ (Underdal 2004: 34), and attribut-
able impact would doubtless offer the strongest argument for bringing the private 
sector into the realm of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
 However, manifold analytical problems arise when one attempts to apply the 
impact yardstick of success. They start with a simple question: impact on what? 
It would be most interesting to know whether positive corporate engagement had 
an effect on the level of physical violence. However, security- related impacts 
might also include conflict- specific ‘correlates of peace’, which may affect the 
level of physical violence indirectly, as in creating a more stable and better gov-
erned political environment (e.g. promoting the rule of law, ensuring human 
rights and reducing corruption) or a more sustainable social, economic and eco-
logical environment (Feil et al. 2008: 6–7). For example, implementing the Vol-
untary Principles on Security and Human Rights could be conceptualized as 
having an impact either on the human rights situation of the local population or 
on the level of violence.
 Even greater challenges to measuring the impact of corporate contributions 
result from the problems of multi- causality and counterfactuals (for an overview, 
see Underdal 2004; see also Section II in this volume). How can we control for 
other factors that might explain changes in the level of violence in conflict 
zones?11 What difference would the absence of a given private engagement 
make, and how can we discern it? Even if we observe that a corporation imple-
ments the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (and/or other 
measures) and that the level of violence has decreased in a given area, these two 
phenomena may not be causally linked; the reduction in the level of violence 
might be due to specific measures taken by state or other actors or to a general 
improvement in the relationship between the parties to the conflict. Moreover, in 
many conflict regions, there are usually simultaneous interventions by a variety 
of actors – state and non- state – making it difficult, if not impossible, to disen-
tangle the impact of a certain intervention.
 Given these analytical problems, and having to choose between identifying 
and assessing corporate engagement (output and outcome) or its impact, the 
former is clearly less difficult to translate into operational tools.
 Based on these considerations, we chose to focus our research on the output 
and outcome dimensions of corporate engagement. Caught in the dilemma 
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between political relevance and analytical accessibility, measuring outcome may 
be less relevant politically than the impact of corporate activities in the sense of 
its proximity to an ‘ultimate’ success. In favour of focusing on outcome, it can 
be argued that outcome is closer to impact than mere output is and may even be 
a precondition for impact. Outcome also is less difficult to observe and measure 
than is impact. Unlike impact, outcome offers a yardstick for measuring success 
that avoids the complex methodological problems of counterfactuals and multi- 
causality, which are inseparably linked to studying and evaluating impact. 
Admittedly, the framework suggested is a pragmatic one, in that it values analyt-
ical accessibility more than immediate political relevance. Its pragmatism may 
have the advantage of being equally appealing to both scholarly research and 
practical, policy- oriented analysis. The choice to focus on output and outcome 
has a number of implications for data generation that will be discussed in the 
next section.
Case selection and data: combining document analysis, 
interviews and field research
Before we address the process and challenges of generating data to measure cor-
porate output and outcome in more detail, we will first discuss case selection, 
because it poses specific problems when the focus is on business actors.
Case selection
There is a wealth of political science and International Relations literature on 
how to select cases (e.g. George and Bennett 2004; Gerring 2008). Generally 
speaking, in qualitative research, case selection is not random but is guided by 
the researchers’ theoretical interests (Gerring 2008: 645–646). In our project, 
however, it was complicated by the collaborative nature of the research project, 
in which the studies conducted by all the participating researchers were intended 
to contribute to the project’s overall aims; that is, describing and explaining cor-
porate engagement in conflict zones.12 This approach required a relatively high 
level of coordination in order to find a compromise between top- down considera-
tions (related to the overarching goals of the project) and bottom- up considera-
tions (related to the goals of the individual researchers).
 For the overall research project, company cases were chosen that reflected 
different company and production characteristics; different political, social and 
market environments; and different conflict characteristics. These sets of factors 
were all deemed to be potentially relevant in explaining corporate behaviour (see 
Wolf et al. 2007; Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010a: 19). Project members jointly 
developed a codebook that included guidance on how to analyse the dependent 
and potential explanatory variables, including working conjectures that were 
sometimes contradictory. Among other studies, the research project included a 
study on the oil industry in Nigeria (Zimmer 2010), one on the tourism industry 
in Israel and Palestine (Fischer 2011) and one on beverage companies in 
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Rwanda and the DRC (Feil 2012). Case selection involved industry sectors that 
were usually covered in the literature and for the most part were perceived as 
fuelling conflict (e.g. the oil industry), as well as others that had been hitherto 
neglected (e.g. beverage companies).
 The first criterion used in selecting cases was the existence (or only recent 
termination) of a violent conflict in a certain country or region.13 We then identi-
fied cases with a high likelihood that varying forms of corporate engagement 
could be observed. For example, in a study on the role of the oil industry, the 
first step was to identify countries where both violent conflicts and an operating 
oil industry were present. The second step was to compile lists of oil and gas 
companies operating in these countries. In this context, one particularity when 
doing research on non- state actors in conflict zones is the often potentially large 
number of cases. The information necessary to compile such lists was sometimes 
easily accessible via corporate websites, industry associations or NGO reports; 
but, more often, it was difficult to obtain, as when smaller or local companies 
rather than larger, transnational companies were investigated.
 The final selection of the country and company cases took into account data 
richness, the potential availability of companies with different characteristics and 
the accessibility of the conflict zone. For example, Nigeria was selected as a con-
flict zone for investigation, because many important oil companies are active 
there. Shell, Statoil and ExxonMobil were chosen as the company cases, because 
this selection of cases allowed us to analyse the influence on corporate engage-
ment of the different political and societal environments in the corporations’ 
home states (Zimmer 2010). At the same time, cases were selected in close 
coordination with other researchers involved in the project. Examining the influ-
ence of conflict characteristics on corporate engagement was possible only 
because the researchers chose cases in regions with different conflict types and 
conflict intensity. For example, the violent conflicts examined in Nigeria were 
closely related to its oil production and the presence of oil companies there, 
whereas the sources of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict were not related to the 
activities of the tourism industry. It was assumed that such differences would be 
relevant in explaining corporate engagement.
 Usually the process of case selection also includes pragmatic considerations. 
Advantages for a study include previous experience in certain countries or world 
regions and proficiency in the respective languages, which may heavily influence 
case selection. Access to the field is also a deciding factor. This issue presented 
itself in two variants in our research. First, access to the respective countries was 
required because field research was deemed necessary in analysing corporate 
engagement in conflict zones; however, in some cases the security situation or 
other travel restrictions presented difficulties (see Chapter 13 by Sabrina Karim). 
Second, access was needed to companies. Researchers contacted companies at 
an early stage with requests for further information and/or interviews (see 
below). The success of such requests greatly depended on who was approached 
at the company and on the previous experience that the person and the company 
in general had with participating in such research projects (see Chapter 5 by 
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Anja Mihr). Larger companies in particular might have in place general policies 
regarding how to deal with such requests. It is important to keep in mind that the 
first contact with responsible company staff might be more decisive than con-
tacting public officials because the information to be obtained might be more 
widely distributed and therefore more easily available in the latter case. If inter-
view requests were denied or ignored, a decision had to be made about whether 
a case study could be conducted without additional information from the 
company or whether another case study would be more suitable. This choice 
depended on the amount and quality of available academic literature,14 publicly 
available information, information available from corporate stakeholders and 
whether the case was central to the overall study. For example, analysing the 
role of the oil industry in Nigeria without covering the case of Shell would result 
in an incomplete picture, because the case is essential for understanding the 
broader picture (Zimmer 2010).
Methods ‘in use’
A combination of methods was used to obtain data on the output and outcome 
dimensions of corporate engagement in conflict zones. Based on the idea of tri-
angulation, researchers used content analysis of documents, interviews and field 
research in conflict zones to generate data.
 The term ‘triangulation’ refers to the ‘combination of two or more theories, 
data sources, methods, or investigators in the study of a single phenomenon’ 
(Kimchi et al. 1991: 384; see also Denzin 1970). Different types of triangulation 
are usually distinguished in the literature. Denzin (1970) distinguishes among 
four types: theory triangulation, investigator triangulation, data triangulation and 
methods triangulation. Theory triangulation involves the use of two or more 
(rival) theories to explain a given phenomenon, whereas investigator triangula-
tion means that two or more researchers analyse the phenomenon in question. In 
data triangulation, multiple data sources are used to validate results. Methods tri-
angulation can take two forms: within- method and between- method triangula-
tion. Within- method triangulation involves the use of two or more approaches to 
collecting data for measuring a phenomenon. But all these approaches belong to 
either the qualitative or the quantitative ‘camp’. Between- method triangulation 
uses both quantitative and qualitative data collection approaches in one study to 
examine a particular variable (Denzin 1970; Flick 2011).
 Our approach to studying the role of business in conflict zones can be related to 
the ideas of within- method and data triangulation as means of achieving more reli-
able results. Data collection approaches included document analysis, interviews 
and observations during field research in conflict zones (i.e. within- method trian-
gulation). Moreover, data were generated to examine the phenomenon of corporate 
governance contributions at different points in time, at different places and based 
on information from different individuals. In fact, one might call the type of trian-
gulation used in our research project as ‘soft triangulation’, because the intention 
was to complement and confirm our findings rather than to challenge them.15
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Content analysis of documents
Work on each company case study usually started with a review of the academic 
and the ‘grey’ literature, in addition to researching and analysing publicly avail-
able documents. The most important source proved to be documents published 
by the corporations themselves. In most cases, the documents that were available 
and easily accessible on corporations’ websites were codes of conduct and CSR 
or sustainability reports; otherwise, the availability of documents on corporate 
activities in conflict zones varied from case to case. Content analysis of these 
documents not only constituted the primary evidence for inferring corporate pol-
icies (self- commitments), it also provided preliminary insights into corporate 
activities (outcomes) related to self- commitments, because companies report on 
both their policies and the implementation of such policies, particularly their 
perceived achievements.
 Being widely accepted as a method for analysing governmental policies, ana-
lyses of corporate documents are often contested (for a discussion, see Kollman 
2008). Corporate documents are often regarded as pure public relations vehicles 
and ‘cheap talk’. Nevertheless, in order to deduce a corporation’s self- 
commitments, it is essential and perfectly appropriate to take official corporate 
statements seriously. Because corporate reports are usually available online for 
several years, this type of analysis also allowed us to trace changes in a corpora-
tion’s policies and activities over time. Other, supplementary sources of informa-
tion were considered to the extent possible, including reports published by 
(critical) civil society organizations.
 A content analysis16 (see also Chapter 6 by Joakim Berndtsson in Section I of 
this volume) was then conducted, during which the documents were screened for 
corporate policies and activities. In addition, the content analysis was used to 
infer explanations for corporate engagement. Using the project’s codebook as a 
point of departure, we found that some explanations for corporate engagement 
were easily identifiable in corporate documents, such as references to the import-
ance of a company’s reputation, changing societal expectations or membership 
in business initiatives.
 Short profiles of the corporations, including basic information on the 
company, as well as on its outputs and outcomes, were developed as a result of 
the document analysis. Although in many cases creating these corporate profiles 
had already begun during the case selection process, they were developed further 
in an iterative process. For example, during the field research, the corporations 
and other stakeholders often provided additional documents.
Expert interviews
Expert interviews were a major source of information. The interviewees were 
experts in the sense that they were part of the field of action that constituted the 
empirical case (Meuser and Nagel 2005: 73). These experts were expected to 
have insider knowledge about corporate engagement that could not be tapped by 
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relying only on an analysis of the public corporate documents. The interviews 
were developed as semi- structured interviews (see Chapter 5 by Anja Mihr) with 
the aim of gaining further insights into corporate outputs and outcomes, as well 
as into the different factors explaining a company’s engagement. The interviews 
were semi- structured (Gläser and Laudel 2004: 39), meaning that the researchers 
were not bound by the order of the questions or their exact wording. The ques-
tionnaires were adapted to the specific situation and interviewee.
 Based on the idea of data triangulation, interviews were conducted with rep-
resentatives of corporations and a variety of stakeholders, such as civil society 
organizations (NGOs), collective business and CSR initiatives, as well as repre-
sentatives of governments, development agencies and international organiza-
tions. The selection of interviewees was case- specific and was often developed 
only as part of the field research in the conflict zones (see below). Interviewees 
were usually asked to recommend additional experts, who were then contacted 
to request interviews (snowball sampling).
 It is evident that access to and interviews with corporate representatives were 
of special importance for analysing the different dimensions of effectiveness of 
corporate engagement. The researchers chose various strategies. In some cases, 
interview requests were first submitted to corporate headquarters, which are 
often based in the United States or Europe.17 Whenever possible, interviews were 
carried out in person, with telephone or Skype as the second- best alternative. 
Certainly this endeavour is not only time- intensive but also requires appropriate 
funding. Interviewees were asked to provide the names of additional respond-
ents, especially corporate representatives in conflict zones and stakeholders who 
either cooperated with or challenged the corporation.
 Gaining access to corporations required a certain level of endurance on behalf 
of the researchers (see also Monahan and Fisher 2015). In addition to sending 
written requests, researchers participated in industry and CSR conferences to 
establish contact with corporate representatives. However, it needs to be kept in 
mind that responsible corporate staff are usually very busy, often receiving many 
interview requests, and they have different previous experiences with research-
ers. Moreover, the issue of operations in conflict zones is often considered a very 
sensitive one, where transparency on the part of corporations might result in only 
more criticism. In fact, interview requests were not always successful, a frustrat-
ing experience that required pragmatic responses: some case studies were 
developed based on publicly available documents and interviews with corporate 
stakeholders; in other cases, granting anonymity was required to get access to a 
corporation (see Feil 2012); and as a last resort, researchers revisited the original 
case selection.
Field research in conflict zones
Field research in conflict zones was conducted to obtain additional data that 
could then be used to analyse corporate engagement on the ground. The main 
aim was to gain insights into the outcome dimension of effectiveness and to find 
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explanations for corporate engagement. Field research was regarded as an essen-
tial element of the research project and was deemed particularly important for 
studies analysing local small and medium- sized companies (see Fischer 2011). 
Publicly available information on such local companies (from corporate web-
sites) is often not as rich as it is for transnational corporations. In addition, these 
local companies usually do not receive much attention from civil society and 
academic researchers, which is why in most cases information about these com-
panies is more limited than is information about large corporations. The informa-
tion obtained during field research was also important for studies focusing on 
transnational corporations to broaden and validate data gained through inter-
views at headquarters. This was achieved mainly through interviews with local 
company representatives and representatives of stakeholder groups. Other 
methods used during field research included observation during company visits 
and participation in academic and industry conferences.18 Even more important 
would be field research for gaining insights into the impact of corporate engage-
ment on the local level. For example, analysing the impact of extractive opera-
tions often involves visits, interviews and focus group discussions with the local 
population affected by corporate operations and other stakeholders, which can 
be done only through field research.
 Researchers usually arranged for one or two visits to ‘their’ respective con-
flict zones, with stays of three weeks to two months. The duration of a field 
stay depended on a variety of factors, such as the number of places the 
researcher wanted to visit and previous knowledge about the selected conflict 
zone, but also, to a degree, on personal preferences. Conducting field research 
involves specific practical, ethical and methodological challenges (see Chapter 
12 by Tessa Diphoorn and Chapter 13 by Sabrina Karim; Goodhand 2000; 
Wood 2006; Browne and Moffett 2014). In general, conducting some kind of 
field research has become en vogue, particularly among graduate students and 
junior researchers (Mitchell 2013; Browne and Moffett 2014). However, 
researchers must prepare carefully for such visits. Access to conflict zones is 
not always easy – due to visa restrictions or because of the local (security) 
situation. Field research often requires special permits or visas. It is equally 
important to be flexible and monitor the local (security) situation closely so 
plans can be adapted accordingly. In some cases, it might be advantageous to 
cooperate with local actors, such as civil society organizations, universities or 
development agencies, who can help in obtaining access or providing a 
workspace.
 In addition to the many practicalities to be considered, ethical issues are also 
important. One important standard is to apply the generally accepted principle of 
‘do no harm’, which means that researchers’ interventions must not cause any 
harm to participants in the research, such as interviewees (Goodhand 2000; 
Wood 2006). It is important to keep in mind that
[…] the ethical imperative of research (‘do no harm’) is intensified in con-
flict zones by political polarization, the presence of armed actors, the pre-
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carious security of most residents, the general unpredictability of events, 
and the traumatization through violence of combatants and civilians alike.
(Wood 2006: 373)
Ethical problems are most likely to occur when researchers get in touch with the 
population and other stakeholders who are affected by corporate operations in 
conflict zones. In the context of business in zones of conflict, almost all the 
researchers in our project perceived the field experience as emotionally stressful 
at some point because of their first- hand insights into the local populations’ 
living conditions, whether or not these conditions were related to corporate 
activities. Ethical considerations also played a role when critical civil society 
representatives were interviewed. Although an invaluable source of information, 
they might not dare to speak openly against corporate and/or state officials. In 
general, interviewees must understand the risks and benefits of their participation 
in a research project and must agree by giving informed consent (Wood 2006: 
379–380). Practical issues involved in the planning of interviews also had to be 
considered, such as finding a time and place that was perceived by both sides as 
being safe. Another sensitive issue was how to ensure security of the data and 
anonymity of the interviewees. For example, names of interviewees should be 
stored separately from interview records and transcripts.19
 Another aspect of field research is the possibility that interviewees might expect 
something in return for their participation, thus imposing (emotional) pressure on 
the researcher. Most often, the interviewees in our project simply expected their 
story to be told, but sometimes material or other benefits were expected. For 
example, this issue was broached during interviews with civil society representa-
tives in Nigeria, who expected that the researchers would have some useful con-
nections with development agencies or foundations in their home country that 
might provide funding for certain projects. Therefore, it is important for the 
researcher to clearly articulate the goal and status of the study and the researcher, 
for example by communicating that one is not affiliated with a certain corporation 
or development agency. At the same time, it is appropriate to reflect on what to 
give back to those who contributed to the research. The literature on field research 
mentions such options as disseminating publications (and translating them into 
local languages as necessary) or returning field notes and other materials to the 
individuals involved (see Chapter 12 by Tessa Diphoorn; see also Wood 2006).
 Finally, when working on and with corporations, it is important for the 
researcher to maintain a neutral stance. Access to corporations is needed to gain 
access to information and company sites and, in some instances, to travel safely 
to remote places. Corporations might offer guided visits to production sites and/
or communities. However, being accompanied by a corporate official or even 
using transportation provided by corporations might influence who is willing to 
talk and what answers the researcher might get. At that point, emphasizing that 
one is an independent researcher and does not work for the company might be of 
only limited value. If possible, an alternative may be to arrange visits with staff 
from local development agencies or civil society organizations.
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 In summary, it is absolutely necessary to reflect on the necessity of field 
research as well as on the methods and procedures to be used. Very practical 
advice in the context of preparing field research is to talk to experienced col-
leagues with in- depth knowledge about a certain country or region. They are 
usually willing to share their experiences and best practices.
Results
After we had applied the methods and the conceptualization of effectiveness 
described in this chapter, the project revealed a significant level of corporate 
governance engagement in conflict zones. However, ‘the most striking empirical 
finding [was] the virtual lack of any direct contributions to security by corpora-
tions in almost all case studies’ (Deitelhoff et al. 2010: 204). As was suggested 
by many corporate interviewees, this is mainly because security issues are often 
regarded as belonging to the core responsibility of the state. Engaging in security 
governance continues to be a taboo for companies. Corporate governance 
engagement (outputs and outcomes) that was identified was rather indirectly 
related to peace and security by focusing on issues such as development, com-
bating corruption, environmental protection or human rights protection. 
However, there were considerable differences among companies, industries and 
conflict zones.
 Another interesting finding was a general trend towards developing CSR and 
governance programmes over time, mainly since the 1990s. This could be 
explained by the significance of a particular background factor: almost all case 
studies identified the importance of a changing transnational normative environ-
ment that pushes corporations to make more governance contributions. In other 
words, these emerging expectations led companies to develop, revise and extend 
their CSR policies and related activities (Deitelhoff et al. 2010: 205–206). 
Therefore, although expectations regarding corporate engagement in conflict 
zones must not be too high, corporations are relevant players in conflict zones 
and should not be overlooked.
Conclusion
How effective is the engagement of corporations – and of non- state actors in 
general – in conflict zones? This is a pertinent research question for global 
governance and peace and conflict research, not least because evaluating such 
engagement will provide an important, though certainly not the only, argument 
for bringing non- state actors into governance arrangements. The lesson learnt 
from our research is that addressing this research question is feasible and 
important but requires careful methodological reflection and contextualization 
of the results. The conceptual and methodological toolbox developed in regime 
theory has been applied not only to interstate but also to public–private 
regimes, and it can also be adapted to analyse non- state actors’ interventions in 
conflict zones.
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 Focusing research on the output and outcome dimensions of effectiveness has 
advantages and disadvantages, as discussed in this chapter. One important con-
textualization of results is that researchers can usually examine only one or a few 
cases of corporate engagement in conflict zones owing to their limited capacities. 
Results cannot and should not be overstretched and usually do not refer to the 
business community as a whole to avoid the risk of holistic fallacy.
 It is equally important to keep in mind that, despite the challenges, analysing 
corporate impact is an important scholarly task. The outcome and impact of cor-
porations need to be kept as separate dimensions in scholarly and public debates. 
It is reasonable to assume that a gap exists not only between output and outcome 
– the argument being that corporate CSR is merely window dressing – but also 
between outcome and impact. This gap might be due to a variety of factors, 
including the fact that even well- intended corporate programmes may not have 
the desired impact and that a variety of factors influence the course of violent 
conflicts and lie beyond the corporate sphere of influence. To measure corporate 
impact one would require a different methodological toolbox. For example, 
intensive field research is usually needed for measuring corporate impact on 
communities. In such cases, researchers usually stay for extended periods of 
time in the communities where corporate activities are located in order to inter-
view members of the local communities and/or to organize focus group discus-
sions (see, for example, Jacobs 2015). Another important dimension of 
effectiveness is analysing unintended consequences, which may be positive or 
negative and occur on different levels. One important consequence of non- state 
actors’ engagement in conflict zones may be their interaction with the responsib-
ility of the state for providing basic public goods. Although non- state actors are 
usually brought in to compensate for some kind of state failure, their engage-
ment may, in the long run, further weaken the role of the state rather than 
strengthen it.
Notes
 1 The authors would like to thank the editors for their valuable comments on an earlier 
version of this chapter and Olga Perov for her research assistance.
 2 The term ‘governance’ has become prominent in the fields of Political Science and 
International Relations since the 1990s. Broadly defined, governance involves all 
forms of collective regulation, including private self- regulation, different forms of co- 
regulation and (inter-)governmental regulation. The use of the term thereby represents 
a departure from the analytical focus on governments as the sole providers of public 
goods to also encompass other international and non- state actors who exercise author-
ity (Rosenau 1995; Avant et al. 2010).
 3 The project was funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation and the Cluster of Excel-
lence ‘Formation of Normative Orders’. Its main results were published in Deitelhoff 
and Wolf (2010b), Fischer (2011), Haidvogl (2011) and Feil (2012).
 4 The research project focused on transnational and local companies that do business in 
zones of (violent) conflict. Actors who provide security as part of their core business, 
such as private military and security companies, were excluded from the analysis.
 5 For example, it is obvious that corporate investments and business activities are 
linked to economic growth – a relationship that could be interpreted as an important 
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corporate contribution to the peaceful development of a society; however, mere 
business activities do not fulfil the requirement of intentionally contributing to gov-
ernance. Moreover, following legal standards is compulsory for corporations. In 
some countries, for example, companies are required by law to pay certain social 
contributions to the state or communities; such legally mandated payments are 
therefore not voluntary governance contributions.
 6 The information in this section is based on Wolf (2010).
 7 See, for example, the contributions in Hegemann et al. (2013) and those related to 
regime theory: Young and Levy (1999) and Young (2004).
 8 The distinction is also widely used in evaluation research, such as in studies that 
evaluate development projects.
 9 One important difference is that research on regimes usually focuses on an existing 
international regime, the effects of which are to be evaluated (Underdal 1992). In con-
trast, when doing research on business in zones of conflict, the focus is on the inter-
ventions of a single actor.
10 In the context of the research project, this was coded as a pro- active commitment.
11 In intrastate conflicts, the level of violence depends heavily on the relationships 
among the different parties to the conflict (e.g. the state and some non- state armed 
group or groups). A corporation is not necessarily a party to the conflict, and its 
impact on the evolution of a conflict might well be limited. Corporate impacts might 
be easier to identify on the local level; for example, in conflicts involving large- scale 
extractive projects, corporations are often influential parties, because their policies 
and behaviour directly affect the level of violence.
12 Given the unsatisfactory state of the research, the approach chosen was rather an 
inductive one. Certain working conjectures about corporate engagement were being 
tested for their plausibility (see Eckstein 1975), but there was also scope to identify 
other important variables along the way.
13 We analysed data from different conflict databases, including the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (2015), the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (2015) and 
the Conflict Barometer 2015 of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict 
Research (HIIK 2015). Although the focus of the project was on intrastate conflicts, 
these conflicts – particularly those in sub- Saharan Africa – are embedded in com-
plexes of regional conflicts.
14 When one is conducting research on business, important sources of information are 
usually the academic CSR and business journals.
15 See Turner and Turner (2009) for the distinction between soft and hard triangulation.
16 The term ‘content analysis’ is used widely and includes quantitative and qualitative, 
as well as more inductive and deductive, forms (for an overview, see Mayring 2010; 
Krippendorff 2013).
17 Obviously, this strategy was possible only for research on transnational corporations, 
not for research on small and medium- sized corporations headquartered in conflict 
zones.
18 Note that our approach to field research differed from anthropological approaches, in 
which participant observation is a central component (see Chapter 12 by Tessa 
Diphoorn). A focus on participant observation would require much longer field trips 
and would be of particular use in answering research questions other than assessments 
of effectiveness.
19 Other ethical dilemmas may include how to present sensitive material in publications 
and how to thank those who supported and participated in the research (Wood 
2006: 382).
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15 Discussion chapter
Practising reflexivity in field research
Jacqui True
In this commentary, I reflect on three distinct approaches to field research for 
studying distinct actors in the arena of international security: a field experiment 
designed to test the impact of gender reforms within policing in a single site, post- 
conflict Liberia, a comparative case study analysis assessing the effectiveness of 
business actors’ corporate social responsibility initiatives to address community 
security in a range of sites, and an ethnographic study of private security officers in 
several conflict- affected cities. All approaches come with their strengths and their 
limitations, and these three studies bring fascinating insights into new and emerging 
actors in the security field. We may have the best ideas, research questions and 
hypotheses in the world but the rubber really meets the road when we consider how 
to study them empirically. We must be able to answer our questions through a 
method or process that maximizes the chances that our answers are meaningful and 
defensible, withstanding critical scrutiny and alternative findings and explanations. I 
would argue that being able to devise a methodological approach that includes a 
research question, research design as well as specific methods for collecting, analys-
ing and disseminating data and knowledge is not just a practical problem for the 
researcher; it is also a profoundly ethical and theoretical challenge.
 The authors of the chapters in this volume have been asked to consider the 
practical application of their respective methods, including – in this section – 
field research methods. They have been encouraged to consider which criteria 
are important in selecting a suitable method for a particular research question, 
how a method (or a combination of methods) can be translated into a research 
design, and how to resolve practical issues with the application of a method to a 
particular case. They have also been asked to reflect on the relative interpretive 
or explanatory power of a particular analytical method and the sort of knowledge 
that is gained and the insights that may be neglected when a certain method is 
used. These common questions about the implications of different methods allow 
us to compare various approaches in a common field. However, they don’t allow 
us to interrogate where a researcher’s questions come from in the first place, 
which likely influences the choice of methods, nor do they give us an account of 
the researcher’s ‘situatedness’ in the research field.
 As researchers, we are part of the social world and not separate from the field 
we study. Our choices of study and of methods are therefore inherently social 
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and normative; that is, they have an effect on the world. Social science informed 
by positivist epistemology rests on the stance of objectivity, which assumes that 
the researchers can remove the effects of their subjectivity in the research 
process by following a replicable method. In describing their field research 
methods, each of the three chapters in this section recounts the authors’ efforts to 
achieve ‘objectivity’. However, the quest for objectivity itself may end up 
masking important social and political dynamics, including the situatedness of 
the researcher in the research subject/object. Our study of a subject may produce 
changes in that subject in ways that we will either neglect and/or not be ade-
quately aware of unless we are reflexive. This notion of inter- subjectivity is 
recognized in the physical sciences as the ‘observer effect’, where the act of 
measuring certain systems is known to create change in the systems themselves.
 To address the intersubjective dimension of research, social science informed 
by post- positivist epistemologies seeks to give a full account of the research 
process as a social and ethical process (Jackson 2011). Critical feminist method-
ology, for instance, builds reflexivity into all stages of the research process as a 
core ethic that improves our research (Ackerly and True 2008, 2010). It aims to 
be reflexive about the windows and the blind spots opened up by all methodo-
logical choices from the choice of research question and design through to the 
specific methods and strategies used to collect and analyse data. Feminist meth-
odology seeks to achieve ‘strong objectivity’ precisely by socially situating that 
knowledge and being conscious of the effects of subjectivities – and not just in 
terms of their potential bias and limitations but rather, in terms of the power of 
certain ‘standpoints’ and situatedness of researchers to generate critical know-
ledge (Harding 1991). Critical knowledge is knowledge that is able to scrutinize 
the origins, sources and interests associated with dominant forms of knowledge 
to gain a better and more complete purchase on the social world, be it the world 
of non- state actors in international security or any other world.1
 Critical feminism involves commitments (1) to being attentive to the power 
of different epistemologies in the research process; (2) to boundaries that 
include/exclude and often marginalize; (3) to all relationships in the research 
process including that between the researcher and the researched; and (4) to situ-
ating oneself as a researcher in the field. When we critically reflect on these four 
dimensions, power is the researcher’s subject rather than the researcher being the 
agent of power (Ackerly and True 2008: 699).
 In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the opportunities and challenges of 
the research question and methodological approach in each of the three field 
research studies and how each practises reflexivity within and about its methods 
and methodology.
Field experiments for studying gender and security sector 
reform
Sabrina Karim’s study examines the effects of gender reform in the Liberian 
National Police – a post- conflict, if not a non- state, actor. She asks, how does the 
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expansion of these reforms affect civilian perceptions and support for govern-
ment? The two major reforms under study appear to be the integration of women 
into the police as well as training to ensure police report sexual and gender- based 
violence (SGBV) incidents within neighbourhoods. The prevalence of SGBV 
after official conflict has ended is a significant issue in many post- conflict con-
texts. Policymakers in the United Nations and other international organizations 
and donor states have advocated for increasing the number of women employed 
in the security sector as one way to improve the responsiveness of governments 
and security sector to this problem of violence. However, the solution – despite 
generating considerable political support and some financial commitments – is 
largely untested.
 In this study, Karim wanted to find out whether the gender of police officers 
makes a difference to the reporting of SGBV crimes. She and her colleagues 
designed a study as close as possible to the randomized control trials associ-
ated with medical trials – the high water mark for ‘science’. Her theoretical 
approach, which involves an isolated variable of interest – the gender of offic-
ers in patrols – and a seemingly parsimonious hypothesis, emanating from the 
UN, to test appears to match the design requirements for field experiments. In 
the Liberian police field experiment, Karim and her collaborators used experi-
mental conditions to control for the presence and absence of female sex/gender 
of the officer patrol, of police visits to neighbourhoods, and of prior informa-
tion shared by police in neighbourhoods. Experimental methods aim to miti-
gate bias or the effects of subjectivity such as endogeneity, omitted variable 
and selection bias often associated with observation methods, especially 
through statistical inference.
 However, these issues may also inhere, even in experimental methods or 
other methods explicitly designed to eliminate entirely the effects of subjectivity 
and the larger social world from the particular subject or unit of analysis under 
study. For example, the problem of endogeneity is possible. For instance, in the 
experiment conducted by Karim and her colleagues we cannot ignore the possib-
ility that the outcomes of women’s inclusion in the Liberian police force is 
related to the outcomes of SGBV reporting to the extent that both are likely 
causal effects of the broader situation of women’s empowerment in Liberia. 
Researchers also have to ask about the effects that the selection of a particular 
country or region might have on the outcomes of the research. In the current 
case, the selection of Liberia as the site for the field test may also import selec-
tion bias. Liberia is not an average post- conflict country when it comes to gender 
reform. Indeed, the female President made gender equality a key platform of her 
government and explicitly requested an all- female UN police support unit to 
protect her government (Pruitt 2016). Thus, the Liberian police force may not 
fulfil all the specifications of scope conditions to enable it to serve as a general-
izable case. The findings for Liberia may be derivative of other, prior over-
arching state- building reforms not tested for in the study on the effects of gender 
reforms. This potential raises the possibility of another form of bias associated 
with omitted or missing variables not controlled for in the research design. 
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Hence, researchers should always have in mind that they might not be able to 
control for or include all possible variables in their research design.
 No research design can ever approximate the complexity of the social world 
by operationalizing and randomizing all the factors affecting outcomes, such as 
change in reporting behaviour. Equally, no method in the social world can easily 
isolate the effects of one or two factors – the sex/gender of police officers and 
neighbourhood presence – over others, such as the other personal identity 
attributes of police, small group dynamics, prior education and so on. Nonethe-
less, a field experiment makes sense as a costly but feasible way to provide evid-
ence testing a limited but powerful, singular theory that women police officers or 
gender balance among police increase citizens’ – especially women citizens’ 
who are likely the majority of victims of SGBV – sense of trust and security in 
government. For more sophisticated research questions that seek to understand 
the reporting of SGBV crimes and all the factors affecting this reporting or lack 
of it, we would need a different method and likely one that involves qualitative 
research in particular contexts (Davies et al. 2016). One- off experiments, more-
over, can only assess short- term outcomes and may not be able to capture 
changes in reporting practices over a longer time period, which is typically 
needed to bring about, as well as ascertain, social and normative changes. Hence, 
while a particular (experimental or non- experimental) research design might 
provide useful insights on a particular issue, researchers always have to be aware 
of the limits of their research.
Reflexivity in field experiments
Sabrina Karim highlights how a reflexive approach to the field experiment 
method was crucial to its successful application. Such an approach goes beyond 
the requirements of institutional ‘human subject ethics approval’ processes 
within universities and other research organizations and the ‘do no harm’ prin-
ciple common in other research. She discusses the power of researchers to decide 
which site or community receives an intervention or treatment and which serves 
as the control group and the effects this power may have on people’s lives. 
Finding ways to mitigate this power and the unfairness of its impact are crucial 
considerations for researchers using the field experiment method. For instance, it 
may involve negotiating with authorities to enable the intervention/treatment to 
be rolled out to control groups at the end of the study. Karim also highlights the 
power relations between researchers and local enumerators who are often 
involved in recording results during the field experiment. As a way of mitigating 
a potentially extractive and exploitative relationship she suggests that research-
ers could contribute to skills development in the post- conflict country with train-
ing workshops and the like. Karim also encourages us to consider what 
knowledge our field research leaves behind and how we can give back to the 
communities engaged in our research as participation subjects. These are also 
key elements of a feminist research ethic that is reflexive about the effects of our 
research process as well as the impact of our research findings.
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Case study analysis and policy effectiveness
The design and selection of cases to assess the effectiveness of security initi-
atives by business organizations in conflict- affected states requires the same 
rigour and involves similar challenges to the design and selection of a security 
sector field experiment site. In their chapter, Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus 
Dieter Wolf present a qualitative case study approach to understanding the role 
of multinational business actors, their contributions to security initiatives and 
what effects they have. Given the powerful nature of the actors and the public 
scrutiny in the past over human rights abuses that have occurred during their 
business activities in high- risk settings, Coni- Zimmer and Wolf knew from the 
outset that gaining access to the subjects of this study was going to be difficult. 
(We gather also from Karim that it was time- consuming and difficult to nego-
tiate access to the Liberian police force in order to be able to conduct a field 
experiment.)
 Given the access issues but also the dangerous contexts and the language 
barriers in some of them, a perfect research design, including a range of busi-
nesses across regions and industries, was not practically feasible. The authors 
acknowledge that in the end the selection of business actors, although origin-
ally intended to address different regional conflict situations and types of busi-
nesses, was based on practicality: access, availability, data richness and 
language competency. This is so often the case – our methods must be fit for 
studying the so- called real world but they must be adapted for the real- world 
constraints on research. Moreover, because the study was dependent on access 
and information from the businesses themselves, the researchers found it chal-
lenging to maintain their impartiality. This is a common challenge for 
researchers when ‘studying- up’ among political and economic elites, as is 
often the focus of political science and International Relations studies not only 
in the realm of international security.
 A key conceptual issue for the researchers in this study was being able to 
define and distinguish the outputs from the outcomes and the impacts of corpo-
rate security initiatives in the community. This is a familiar issue in policy 
research. Coni- Zimmer and Wolf note that while it is relatively easy, it is less 
theoretically interesting to measure outputs, such as the existence of policies and 
programmes as reflected in statements, codes of conduct and triple bottom line 
reporting, compared with outcomes such as behavioural and organizational 
change. To study outcomes we must look beyond tangible and objective things 
that we can read and count, to engage in qualitative research on intangible atti-
tudes and practices. However, the challenge here, as with the field experiment, is 
to define outcomes in the most tangible way – such as a change in community 
leadership, in surveyed community opinions or in a reporting pattern of com-
plaints and abuses, for example. Impact can be even more difficult to ascertain 
because the time line may be longer and causal chain(s) more challenging to 
document, and it may be difficult to isolate the contributions of other inputs. 
Here, qualitative analysis is most needed to be able to document and trace the 
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causal processes through which business initiatives led to a change in outcomes, 
as well as to contextualize these processes. While social scientists often put great 
stock on statistical correlations that reveal the strength of a relationship between 
an initiative and an outcome, they do not actually show the mechanisms that 
connect cause and effect. That requires at least some attempt at case analysis and 
counter- factual argument – ideally, case analysis where factors that represent 
counter- arguments and explanations are also present.
 Comparative analysis of cases is also a good way to test the effects of 
certain factors that are present to different degrees in real world cases, e.g. the 
size and type of business actor, the level of investment in security program-
ming, the design of the policy/programme, the conflict context, and so on. To 
enable analysis of the findings across the cases, Coni- Zimmer and Wolf pro-
duced a detailed codebook that specified the security initiatives under study 
and their various attributes as well as a range of explanatory variables that 
could affect the security initiatives and situation in positive or negative ways. 
With that explicit guide, the researchers could be confident that even in a study 
of a relatively small number of business actors they would isolate the key 
factors contributing to the effectiveness of security governance initiatives. 
They could also be confident that all researchers in the team were working 
with similar concepts and the one design.
Reflexivity in case study field research
The authors draw on a range of social science techniques to increase the signifi-
cance of their findings for broader knowledge about business actors in security 
governance. They discuss how they ‘triangulated’ across multiple sources of 
data and methods for collecting the data in seeking to complement and confirm 
or falsify them. They mention the efforts made to ensure a diverse sample of 
corporations and, within each case study, a diverse sample of stakeholders 
through the snowball method. However, the anti- snowball method can also be 
useful in gaining a comprehensive sample. Including those who are least likely 
to be suggested by the corporations themselves is one way to triangulate the 
information of other stakeholders and to potentially falsify as well as confirm 
findings of effectiveness (Ackerly and True 2010). The authors do anticipate that 
there may be unintended consequences of business security initiatives and that 
they must be alert to looking for these and studying them. Reflexivity encour-
ages us to question our expected answers and to anticipate the unanticipated in 
the process as well as the findings of research. As Cynthia Enloe (2011) says in 
The Curious Feminist: ‘If nothing ever surprises you then there would not be 
anything more to learn.’
 With respect to reflexivity that addresses the impact of the researcher and the 
research process, Coni- Zimmer and Wolf are aware of the ethical issues and 
risks in working with local groups who may experience difficult living con-
ditions, in part as a result of corporate initiatives. They discuss the risks and 
benefits to participant subjects of giving informed consent, the fact that researchers 
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may be seen as affiliated with the business organization rather than independent 
scholars. They mention the importance of sharing their data and analysis with 
participants in the form of translated publications and even field notes, which 
may be more accessible than academic writing. All these practices are crucial 
ways to ensure that our research does not harm and that we improve the world, 
not only with the addition of our research findings but also through our research 
process. That process attends to the relationships of power that are part of 
research, and we take responsibility for rebalancing these relationships in 
some way.
Participant observation and private security
Tessa Diphoorn’s chapter describes her approach to participant observation as a 
method for studying private security officers in South Africa. Her purpose was 
to understand how these security officers practice security, and she developed a 
new concept – ‘twilight policing’ – that conceptualizes the nature of the relation-
ship between state and non- state providers of security as a result of her field 
research. Specifically, Diphoorn analysed the routines of the private security 
officers in order to gain deeper insight into the meaning of the work and its inter-
face with traditional public security organizations. Tacit routines are not readily 
viewable through one- off interviews, surveys or other data points. They are 
revealed only over time when, through critical engagement, the researcher is 
able to peel back the formal rules from the informal, non- verbalized but shared 
norms. Participant observation is somewhat of an oxymoron – if one is a parti-
cipant, one can hardly be an observer. Participant observation is also contra-
dictory in positing that the outsider provides critical knowledge; but being an 
outsider, by its nature, prevents full ‘participant’ immersion.
 The history of this method belies an attempt at objectivity – distancing the 
researcher and their subjectivity even while immersed in the social world of the 
study’s participants. Diphoorn describes seven aspects of the participant obser-
vation method, which she treats as a synonym for ethnography: participation, 
open interviews, observation, field notes, longitudinal research, rapport and 
reflexivity. While her chapter is the only one on field research methods in this 
volume to explicitly discuss reflexivity, it is not until quite late in the chapter, for 
instance, that we learn she is a female researcher observing and accompanying 
mostly male private security officers into situations that include incidence of 
violence. We do not learn anything about her race/ethnicity positioning in the 
South African context and how that affected her research interactions. She notes 
succinctly that being a woman ‘influenced the performance of masculine 
behaviour by armed response officers’. However, how and why that is the case is 
left unanalysed.
 This situatedness of the researcher, including the race and gender differences 
between the researcher and her participant subjects, is crying out for a reflexive 
analysis. Diphoorn does acknowledge the danger involved in her research and 
the ‘emotionality of participation’, but she hardly mentions the gender issues; 
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and yet because of the gendered nature of security work, employing largely male 
workforces, and the masculine qualities expected to be a feature of this work, the 
researcher’s gender would not have been ignored by the participants in her study 
(Kumra et al. 2014). In fact, one can imagine many of her findings based on 
social interactions would have been enabled and indeed filtered through gender 
and race relations. It is hard (albeit possible) given existing gender norms across 
cultures, to envision a male researcher sharing emotions with his male security 
officer subjects to the same extent or in the same way (Parashar 2011).
 In contrast to the other two chapters on field research methods, Diphoorn does 
not discuss precisely how she selected which private security officers to observe. 
Perhaps this is because the ethnographic method is considered valid in its own 
right and intended to generate particular meanings only obtainable through deep 
immersion rather than generalizable findings. In that sense, the method reflects a 
different epistemology compared with the field experiment and case study 
approaches. However, in a second study, Diphoorn studied public- private 
security assemblages in five different cities through the ethnographic method, 
although not involving full immersion, in order to produce broader comparative 
findings.
 In her application of the ethnographic method, Diphoorn describes listening 
as well as participating in everyday conversations as opposed to conducting 
formal or semi- structured interviews with particular questions to address. Listen-
ing is a key method for reflexive approaches to research – as we cannot literally 
‘see’ meaning but we may be able to hear it (Bickford 1996). She argues that 
small talk is especially relevant for discussing sensitive issues. It enables parti-
cipants to disclose information that they would be unlikely to share in a more 
formal setting, where the researcher is relatively unknown to the subject. 
Diphoorn notes the importance of observing the surroundings, the seating and 
use of space in which conversations take place as well as the body language and 
other non- verbal signs that may become observable only over time. These factors 
help to reveal how officers feel as well as what they say and do about carrying 
out ‘security’ work in frequently violent and dangerous situations.
 While the method of participant observation expands ‘the field’ of study both 
with respect to the time frame of observation and the depth of interactions, a key 
challenge is how to determine when you have observed enough. With the 
grounded theory approach, the researcher knows when to withdraw from the 
field because a saturation point has been reached with the data, which is the same 
with successive interviews, interactions, documents or other data collected 
(Charmaz 2006). Grounded theory therefore seems a crucial complementary 
approach for the ethnographic method – especially truncated versions of the 
method typically used outside of the anthropology discipline.
Conclusion
The three chapters on the distinct challenges and the opportunities inherent in 
field research each justify the validity of the knowledge produced through their 
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distinct field experiments, case studies and ethnographic methods. The authors 
respectively go beyond traditional ‘scientific’ approaches to methodological 
rigour by considering the ethical dimensions of field research. Moreover, they 
demonstrate reflexivity about the research process and how it may shape the 
research findings that result from their application of method. They understand 
that social science knowledge is not only knowledge for its own sake but that it 
may do harm and/or it may enable social and political change.
Note
1 Feminist standpoint theory argues, for instance, that marginalized groups are socially 
situated in ways that make it more possible for them to be aware of things and ask 
questions than it is for the non- marginalized groups; and, moreover, that research 
focused on power relations (read: politics) should begin with the lives of the 
marginalized.
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16 From cookbooks to encyclopaedias 
in the making
Methodological perspectives for 
research of non- state actors and 
processes
Anna Leander
The contributions to this volume helpfully highlight the methodological diver-
sity, and also some of the specific difficulties, involved in researching Non- State 
Actors and Processes in International Security (NAPIS1). In this concluding 
chapter, I wish to further underscore and contextualize what I read as the core 
insight emerging from the volume taken as a whole: that researching NAPIS 
demands an approach to method that is well informed, but also open, imagina-
tive and ready to make unconventional methodological moves and combinations, 
as is this volume itself. I will insist that, as the contributions show, there are 
deeply ingrained reasons why narrow and restrictive approaches to method will 
do more to hamper than help NAPIS researchers. Some of these reasons are 
general and pertain to all research activities. But many of them are specific to 
NAPIS research. They are related to the complex relation between the state- 
centrism of the categories through which knowledge (of researchers as well as of 
the researched) is structured, and to the possibility of acquiring knowledge that 
defies these categories. Indeed, failure to problematize these categories and to 
incorporate them as objects of analysis (as opposed to the point of departure for 
analysis) will do more to distort, obscure or even obliterate NAPIS than to 
further explanations or understandings of them.
 For this reason, it is of essence to abandon an approach that sees methods as 
recipes to be followed – a cookbook approach – and instead adopt an approach 
that is well informed, imaginative, open and evolving. I think of this latter 
approach as having much more in common with an online interactive encyclo-
paedia, such as Wikipedia, than with a cookbook. It has no fixed table of con-
tents or structure, as entries can be added. It is constantly evolving and built 
through researchers’ intuitions, experience, and entries. It is methods in the 
making, developed on the go, as it were.2 Indeed, I would contend that such an 
approach to methods is the only viable methodological perspective for NAPIS 
research, as well as something NAPIS research can contribute to methodological 
perspectives more broadly. Herein lies the significance of this volume. I develop 
the argument in two steps. First, I argue that an ‘encyclopaedias in the making’ 
approach to methods matters generally, but especially for NAPIS research. I then 
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proceed to develop the argument by looking more closely at its significance for 
answering, but also for asking, questions about NAPIS. In the concluding 
section, I return to the broader implications of this argument for the methodo-
logical perspectives of NAPIS research and beyond.
Mastering the making of method matters for NAPIS research
It’s not news that methods matter for research. Indeed, the publication of this 
volume confirms this truism. I nonetheless think it worthwhile to insist that the 
methods that matter are of the ‘encyclopaedias in the making’ kind, and that 
overall developments have made this kind of methods matter ever more for all 
research, and finally that it is particularly important for NAPIS research. Method, 
understood as the questions about how research is carried out and hence also 
how its findings are arrived at, stands at the heart of any research endeavour. 
Methods provide insight into the foundations of claims made in the research, the 
processes through which they were formulated and thus also their standing and 
relation to other kinds of claims. The how questions of methods provide essential 
information about the foundations of science. Not surprisingly, there is con-
sequently a long tradition of debating what kinds of method are most adequate 
for different kinds of questions, which is precisely what most books on methods 
are preoccupied with.
 More centrally for the argument in this conclusion, there is also a very long tra-
dition of cautioning against methodological closure, as well as against the illusion 
that strict application of some specific method could produce definitive and suffi-
cient knowledge. Sheldon Wolin, for example, defended the work of the ‘Theorist’ 
against the encroachment of the ‘Methodists’ who, according to him, restricted 
‘the ‘reach’ of theory by dwelling on facts that are selected by what are assumed to 
be the functional requisites of the existing paradigm’, hence making it impossible 
to see that ‘because facts are richer than theories, it is the task of the theoretical 
imagination to restate new possibilities’ (Wolin 1969: 1082). Similarly, Hans- 
Georg Gadamer concludes his magnum opus Truth and Method by recalling that 
‘our entire exploration has shown that the security offered by the use of scientific 
methods is insufficient to guarantee truth…. What the methodological tool cannot 
offer, must be achieved through a discipline of questioning and researching’ 
(Gadamer 1990 [1960]: 494 my translation). Hans- Georg Gadamer and Sheldon 
Wolin are resisting a narrow understanding of scientific methods that stifles 
research and knowledge generally, and in particular the knowledge they were 
interested in: political philosophy and hermeneutics respectively. This does not 
mean that they are opposed to discussions of how research is carried out. They 
both write extensively on the topic and have found it crucial. However, it does 
mean that they dissociate themselves from ‘method’ understood as a narrow, 
restrictive, and stifling imposition, and underscore the significance of a more open 
and imaginative approach to the how questions of research.
 The caution against method as closure has lost none of its centrality. 
However, methods are now so indisputably central that the option Sheldon 
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Wolin and Hans- Georg Gadamer prefer – which is to distance themselves from 
methods, because they are so often narrowly understood – has been all but elim-
inated. Instead, the caution has taken the form of redefinitions of ‘method’ 
designed to broaden method to encompass more open and evolving ways of 
dealing with the how question. These redefinitions have been influential for three 
reasons. First, as the authoritative status of science (in universal and imposing 
singular) has given place to an understanding of science as a contested and ulti-
mately profoundly uncertain activity, an open and broader approach to method 
has become more central. While method talk cannot solve the conundrums asso-
ciated with the need of relating to and comparing different contradictory and 
often incompatible alternatives, it is a way of clarifying what alternative was 
selected and how it was construed (Abbott 2004: especially Chapters 1 and 7; 
Nowtny 2016). It is a short cut of sorts, as Andreas Armborst (see Chapter 2, this 
volume) argues when discussing definitions of terrorism. Second, as uncertainty 
penetrates the research process itself, the capacity to show that one has an 
answer to how to accommodate uncertainty, and therefore discover something 
novel, moves to the centre. This further consolidates the centrality of methods 
for the confirmation of scientific authority and validity (Law 2004). Method has 
to be redefined so as to leave space for ‘luck’ (see Chapter 6). Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly, research is dependent to an ever- increasing extent on 
competitive funding. In the distribution of this funding, ‘methods’ is a standard 
requirement (Przeworski and Salomon 1995; Mirowski 2011). The consequence 
of these developments is that the methodological literacy required to formulate a 
‘methods section’ for a research project has become a fundamental requirement 
for any researcher and for the credibility of research. Arguably, methodological 
language has become a sine qua non for the bulk of contemporary research.
 Not surprisingly therefore, treatises promoting methodological vocabularies 
have been burgeoning. This is true in the hard sciences (e.g. Stengers 1995: 
102–113 et passim, or Feyerabend 2010), but it is perhaps most noticeable in 
research traditions that previously lacked such vocabularies, either because they 
dealt with the how of research in other terms, as did International Law or Critical 
International Relations (e.g. Salter and Mutlu 2012; Shapiro 2012; Aradau and 
Huysmans 2014) or because they are recently established and linked to technolo-
gical developments (see for example Ruppert et al. 2013; Flam and Kleres 2015 
and Chapter 10 by Alexander De Juan in this volume; Ulmer and Koro- 
Ljungberg 2015). NAPIS researchers are participating in this redefining effort, 
as the publication of this volume testifies. Overall, the consequence is that the 
narrow (cookbook) understanding of ‘methods’ is increasingly displaced by an 
open and malleable understanding of method and a growing readiness to make 
the evolving ‘social life of methods’ an object of study in its own right (Stein-
metz 2005; Savage 2013; Boltanski 2014).
 These general reasons for adopting an ‘encyclopaedias in the making’ 
approach to methods are compounded in the context of NAPIS studies, as the 
contributions in this volume show. Indeed, the specific difficulty involved in 
studying Non- State Actors and Processes in International Security, is that NAPIS 
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cross the  categorical boundaries that usually serve to organize knowledge. They 
span the inside/outside, the public/private, the civilian/military and the peace/
war divides that structure not only most theories, but also legal systems, policy-
making, the institutional set up of national and international politics, the organ-
izational structures of armed forces and companies and the practices not only of 
researchers but also of most actors.
 These categories are practical and performative (Bourdieu 2003; Leander 
2015–2016). Their significance, violence and performativity can hardly be over-
stated (Elshtain 1981; Walker 1988; Tronto 2013). In fact, because they are so 
powerful, these divides are not only constantly mobilized both by observers and 
observed, they more often than not make it all but impossible to see (or capture) 
the place of NAPIS. The NAPIS are seemingly obliterated by the divides. They 
are split up to neatly fit the categories and hence become elusive or disappear 
from view altogether. The analogy with the chimera is a useful one in this 
context (Graz 2008; Leander 2014; Hurt and Lipschutz 2016). This mythological 
fire- breathing monster with characteristics of the lion, snake and goat, gains its 
power from being an impossible creature that is therefore also elusive to the 
observer. If it is cut up and analysed as only goat or lion or snake, its signifi-
cance is lost. The same is true of NAPIS. If they are cut up to be studied through 
the divides that usually organize knowledge and the theories and methods asso-
ciated with them, their significance is lost.
 Yet this is exactly what often happens. While it has become commonplace to 
include reference to the elusive line separating NAPIS from their state counter-
parts (see also Chapter 1 by Andreas Kruck and Andrea Schneiker and Chapter 
14 by Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus Dieter Wolf ), analyses more often than 
not proceed as if this did not matter. The reason is straightforward. It is difficult 
to circumvent the great categorical divides and their related ‘methodological 
nationalism’ (Scholte 2005). The state has imposed its own view on the world. It 
is structuring vision and division and its categorizations have come to dominate. 
The state has a historically developed and deeply anchored monopoly on ‘sym-
bolic violence’ which fashions not only social practices, but also theory, method 
and our innermost feelings and thoughts as individuals. The state therefore poses 
‘an epistemological problem’ by structuring categories and thinking (Bourdieu 
1994: 98–102, 2012: et passim). This problem is particularly acute for the 
NAPIS that tend to disappear when these categories are left unproblematized and 
their performative effects left unnoticed.
 The making of open and imaginative methods therefore matters in general, 
but especially for NAPIS research, as this volume and all the contributions in it 
testify. I have just suggested that for NAPIS research, clarifying ‘the how’ (or 
the method) of research in a grounded and informed manner while keeping it 
open enough to actually make discoveries is not merely a matter of useful reflex-
ivity, scientific rigour or funding requirements. It is essential for making the 
object of research visible, for capturing it, for circumventing the risk of distort-
ing, obscuring and obliterating it altogether. The introduction uses the figure of a 
researcher whose methodological toolkit contains only a hammer, and who 
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therefore sees the world as full of nails, as an entry point for underlining the 
importance of the methodological imagination. The trouble for NAPIS research 
is that most methods are deeply fashioned by the great categorical divides that 
make the state an ‘epistemological problem’ and therefore tend to see nails of 
very many kinds but not of the NAPIS kind. When they are applied to hammer 
away, they hit at random and often damage the understanding of NAPIS.
Methods for answering and asking questions about NAPIS
The volume is organized around the assumption that the how of research is 
something that one begins to think about once one has indeed come to terms 
with what the question to be researched is, and that there should be consistency 
between what the question is and how it is investigated. This indeed is a sound, 
and conventional, approach to methods. However, as transpires from many of 
the contributions, the state as an ‘epistemological problem’ complicates the neat 
sequencing. The categorical divides fashion data collection, interpretation and 
the writing up so that these often have to be altered along the way in order to 
actually work. They also often impose changes on the question itself. There is a 
constant tweaking and transforming of the methods, but also a reformulation of 
the relationship between method and question where the openness of method 
becomes a way of re- formulating the research question. Researchers are, in other 
words, contributing to, transforming and construing not only the methods appro-
priate to studying NAPIS, but also the questions asked about them.
 Making methodological openness and imagination central is perhaps not 
something the contributors to this volume would necessarily opt for if they had a 
choice (I don’t know). The point is that because of the specific difficulties 
involved in studying NAPIS they have little choice. As the introduction points 
out, this is not necessarily because it involves secretive and secluded security 
matters. Of course it also does that. However, many NAPIS (including those 
hybrids that span the divides) have to advertise themselves. They put up web-
pages. They participate in trade fairs and professional associations. They publish 
professional magazines. NAPIS personalities have published memoirs. Rebel 
groups, NGOs specialized in security and/or commercial security companies are 
willing to talk to researchers, who sometimes are embedded in them. The 
material researchers obtain in this way is of course and obviously marked by 
efforts to convey and promote specific images of NAPIS (see Chapter 14 by 
Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus Dieter Wolf and Chapter 7 by Jutta Joachim). 
This said, it provides considerable insights into NAPIS that often appear easier 
to access than public security actors and processes (see Chapter 5 by Anja Mihr, 
Chapter 4 by Magnus Dau and Marlen Martin, and Chapter 6 by Joakim Bern-
dtsson) or for that matter other market actors (Czarniawska 2016).
 The difficulty particular to data collection about NAPIS is that the data more 
often than not is fashioned by the great divides and hence mostly inadequate for 
the purpose. As discussed by Alexander De Juan (Chapter 10), Sabrina Karim 
(Chapter 13) and Patrick Mello (Chapter 9), quantitative data is often inadequate 
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for serious NAPIS research because the kind of data needed spans the usual 
boundaries separating data categories (national/international, public/private, 
civilian/military) and must break with standard assumptions about the state. This 
cannot be simply remedied by collecting more data. Indeed, the very extensive 
data collection undertaken by 20 investigative journalists of the Washington Post 
over two years, and made publicly available, leaves us with an impression of 
partiality and imprecision mainly for this reason (Leander 2014). Instead, meth-
odological imagination and flexibility is needed to reflect on how more persua-
sive data could be collected.
 Analogously, also for qualitative data, the great divides run through the self- 
understandings, actions and stories of the researched and fashion the research 
process. The divides therefore take on a practical importance that often goes 
against the grain of the expectations of both researchers and the researched, who 
start out with specific assumptions about where the NAPIS belong in the divide. 
For example, Joakim Berndtsson (see Chapter 6) recounts how Swedishness 
imposed itself as a ‘subtheme’, quite contrary to his expectations. Elsewhere 
Joakim Berndtsson and Maria Stern (2011) discuss the many unexpected para-
doxes, contradictions and tensions generated by the categorical divides. Meth-
odological flexibility and openness are a precondition for allowing these kind of 
unexpected themes, which break the great dividing lines, to impose themselves, 
and indeed for contemplating how better to collect data of this kind; perhaps 
making unlikely methodological combinations is of essence. As Andreas Kruck 
(see Chapter 8) argues, although such flexibility and willingness to make unex-
pected combinations may ‘be a cause for concern for the purist methodologist … 
from the perspective of problem- oriented research … [it] appears to be a fruitful 
strategy.’
 Another reason the process of analysing and interpreting data pertaining to 
NAPIS is particularly challenging is the omnipresent and methodologically 
central challenge of handling the consequences of observing from a specific 
location: what you see, understand and say depends on where you stand. Indeed, 
observation necessarily and always takes place from a specific location and with 
the help of specific observational instruments and devices that will shape the 
vision of the observed. The object of observation is constructed by the observer 
(Bourdieu et al. 1991). The way this inevitable challenge is articulated and 
handled varies. In the hard sciences or in quantitative analysis, this makes it 
essential to be aware of the significance of the kind of observations involved in 
constructing ‘facts’ (Barad 2007; Latour 2010 among many). In fieldwork and 
interviews it becomes crucial to be aware of the ways in which the researchers 
and the researched interact. As Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus Dieter Wolf 
(see Chapter 14), Tessa Diphoorn (see Chapter 12) and Anja Mihr (see Chapter 
5) discuss in their contributions, this includes the place of the emotions of the 
researcher, but also reflections on how the presence of a researcher as an embod-
ied personality transforms the object of observation (also Bourdieu 1999: 
Chapter 6; Flam and Kleres 2015). Being an unnoticed ‘fly on the wall’ simply 
is not an option.
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 The fact is that this challenge of handling the point of observation is particu-
larly daunting for NAPIS research, for the simple reason that the great divides 
shape not only the observed but also the observer. They fashion the way 
researchers understand what they are observing. Concretely, whether observing 
quantitative data, reading texts, watching images or listening to statements, 
observers will hear, see, feel, understand and analyse in specific categories. The 
experience of going through recorded material to find that something very 
clearly said was overheard because it did not fit the categories of listening; being 
surprised at discovering an unfamiliar way of reading a text; suddenly finding 
that ways of doing things make sense; discovering a new way of seeing an 
image; or realizing that another way of organizing data, or indeed collecting it, 
helps show a link, all point to the importance of the unexpected. It is part of the 
excitement and reward involved in doing research. The specificity of NAPIS 
research is that, precisely because the state is an epistemological problem ‘that 
makes itself felt in innermost thoughts’ (Bourdieu 1994: 100), this kind of sur-
prise has to be consciously cultivated, otherwise NAPIS will be overlooked and 
ignored. As Anja Mihr (see Chapter 5) puts it, the main challenge is to ‘control 
subjectivity’ enough to closely observe and carefully listen, so as not to miss the 
NAPIS, or crucial aspects of these, even when they are strikingly visible or 
really loud (Johns 1994; 2013, introduction). To discover the marginalization of 
human rights violations in UK narratives about Libyan rebels requires conscious 
control, offsetting the dominance of a public narrative that focuses on their 
heroism (see Chapter 3 by Alexander Spencer).
 Furthermore, method also concerns writing: how does one communicate 
research to others so that they will understand what is being said and find the argu-
ments persuasive and justified? Again, general issues that weigh on all researchers 
are particularly acute for NAPIS research. All researchers face choices about how 
much space in their text to accord their objects of research and how much to cover 
them up and insert them into theoretical issues; how much and what kind of viol-
ence of writing to exert. At one end of the spectrum are those who argue that 
poetry, art, stories or music best convey an understanding of the observed; at the 
other, those who include the observed as tightly constructed variables in an equa-
tion. Most, including the contributors to this volume, fall somewhere in- between, 
combining different forms of writing. The choices are clearly ‘personal’, although 
in a manner that ties into disciplinary contexts, requirements for publication, and 
national/institutional structures and preferences.
 Communicating NAPIS research is complicated by at least two things that are 
specific to it. The first revolves around the ethics of research and writing about 
NAPIS. It is increasingly a requirement for all kinds of research that ethical 
guidelines and codes be followed. This is justifiable and often comforting for 
researchers heading out to do research (see Chapter 12 by Tessa Diphoorn and 
Chapter 13 by Sabrina Karim). However, if ethical guidelines and codes replace 
reflection on what ethical research indeed is, the good intentions can become 
problematic for all kinds of reasons (Schrag 2010). The lack of understanding 
and engagement with NAPIS makes this scenario discouragingly common in 
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research in the area. Requirements that might seem unproblematic in some con-
texts, and are standard for many journals and funding agencies, including, for 
example, informed consent forms, commitments to keep full records of inter-
views or to allow reviewing of quotes and material, can easily fetter research 
communication as they are de facto impossible to keep. Similarly, the sensitivity 
of (post-)conflict contexts places particular ethical strains on research work. 
These are ill captured by guidelines developed for other contexts and problems, 
such as those the US Institutional Review Board developed with medical 
research on human subjects in mind (see Chapter 13 by Sabrina Karim). A more 
reflected, open and imaginative approach to research ethics that can relate to the 
specific context, is therefore core to communication.
 In addition to this, research communication – and particularly the currently 
dominant journal article communication – requires speaking to existing writing 
and literatures. This makes good sense and is intended to avoid eternal reinven-
tions of the wheel. However, in view of the centrality of the great divides in the 
construction of knowledge, this entails a feat for NAPIS research. One way this 
is articulated is in the common concern of NAPIS researchers with bias, includ-
ing their own ‘judgementalism’ (see Chapter 12 by Tessa Diphoorn), but also 
that of the literature (see Chapter 14 by Melanie Coni- Zimmer and Klaus Dieter 
Wolf ). The requirement of speaking to the literature tends to impose and per-
petuate this sense of bias and the difficulty of surmounting it. Hence, although 
NAPIS have been amply studied, research communication often does more to 
reinforce than to resolve the difficulty of studying them (Leander 2011).
 This leads directly to the final point I wish to make, namely that the possibly 
most important reason for adopting a methodological perspective on NAPIS that 
works as an ‘encyclopaedia in the making’ rather than a cookbook, is to open a 
route to improve the questions asked about NAPIS. The logic of the requirement 
to speak to the literature is not only stultifying because it imposes unhelpful 
terms of communication. It is sometimes misinterpreted to imply that questions, 
mechanisms and processes that have not already been studied cannot be studied. 
Unless an academic authority has named them, they cannot possibly matter. This 
is particularly troublesome for NAPIS research. The implication is that even 
when the observed is granted the space to speak back to the researcher and to be 
actually heard, researchers will often end up ignoring what they hear and see 
because it does not fit the methodological strictures. And if they don’t do it 
themselves, reviewers and journal editors will usually push them in that direc-
tion. The frustration vented by researchers, both junior and senior, who find the 
most important and interesting aspect of their research ending up as a footnote, 
marginalized or even invisible, addresses the point.
 One way of dealing with this difficulty is to refuse communication on these 
terms. Susan Strange opposed what she termed the ‘Procrustean bed’ of theory, 
and introduced her PhD classes by explaining that the structure of research was 
to first say what other had said and then proceed (Chapter 2) to explain why they 
had it all wrong, and she devoted one of her last writings to the stifling effects of 
theory and method (Strange 1995, 1996, 1998 respectively). Fortunately, as this 
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volume testifies, there are alternatives to this decreasingly tenable refusal to 
engage with method. One is to find authorities who have somehow engaged with 
the issues, for example by shifting theoretical and disciplinary terrain. Since aca-
demic authorities have worked on most issues, this is indeed a very realistic pos-
sibility for circumventing the problem and being allowed to reformulate the 
problem, and no doubt a reason why NAPIS research tends to be inherently 
interdisciplinary (Abrahamsen and Leander 2016). Another alternative is to learn 
from the anthropologists and ethnologists, who have turned it into a virtue to 
give space to the observed, and even to reverse the perspective by relying on 
their categories to redefine the terms (Viveiros de Castro 1992; Strathern 1996; 
Riles 2002). Perhaps it is not surprising that, in this volume, the contributors 
who most explicitly reflect on how their engagement with their field work led 
them to redefine their research focus and research questions are those most 
clearly engaged in ethnographically inspired work (see Chapter 12 by Tessa 
Diphoorn and Chapter 6 by Joakim Berndtsson). Clearly, this willingness to 
allow the observed to redefine the questions could also be made far more general 
and applicable to other research traditions (Leander 2015). This would indeed be 
an important methodological perspective for research about NAPIS.
Conclusion
To sum up, this volume demonstrates why it is important for research focused on 
Non- State Actors and Processes in International Security to leave behind the 
cookbook methods, with recipes for secure knowledge production. As this con-
clusion has argued – and the contributions to this volume demonstrate – methods 
need to be adjusted to the issues studied and, if well used, they can play an 
important role in redefining these issue by directing attention to overlooked 
mechanisms, processes, issues actors, logics, rationalities, or technologies. This 
requires an approach that looks at methods as an ‘encyclopaedia in the making’, 
where researchers are not merely ‘applying methods’ but adjusting them and 
rewriting them as they go along; an approach that leaves space for combinations, 
imagination and improvisation but also for learning from the mistakes of others.
 Much of this concluding chapter has been devoted to highlighting the reasons 
why this approach is particularly important for NAPIS research, which is what 
this volume is devoted to. NAPIS research crosses what I have termed the great 
divides: inside/outside, public/private, civil/military, state/market, created by the 
historically complex and contextually varied emergence of modern social polit-
ical thought that has stabilized the state’s monopoly on symbolic violence to 
which these categorical divides are pivotal. NAPIS research is therefore particu-
larly subjected to the state as an epistemological problem. Researching NAPIS 
demands not only that we resist the way these divides hamper NAPIS research 
by shaping data collection, data interpretation, writing, and the kinds of ques-
tions that can be asked. It demands that we incorporate them into the studies so 
as to make their performative effects visible. Such incorporation involves recon-
quering ‘a right to look’ at and problematize the consequences of the dominant 
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point of view and the principles of vision and division in it (Mirzoeff 2011). One 
of the main promises of NAPIS research is that it is often – perhaps unwittingly 
and unwillingly – pushed to do this and to discuss how it was done. Herein lies, 
I think, the methodological perspective of NAPIS research, which is of relevance 
not only for the growing NAPIS research community but for scholarship, 
research and the critical political and social theory well beyond it.
Notes
1 I add processes since for many approaches (including practice, system, structuralist, or 
discourse analytical approaches) the processes are at least as important as the actors.
2 I prefer this reference to a Wikipedia- like encyclopaedia to existing alternatives, such 
as for example Latour’s (2005: 17) travel guide image, precisely because it emphasizes 
researchers’ involvement and the constant change.
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